Com. v. Ruffin, C.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: May 8, 2024
• Docket: 3044 EDA 2022
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S36013-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : CLEO RUFFIN : : Appellant : No. 3044 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 19, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0002640-2021

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : CLEO RUFFIN JR. : : Appellant : No. 3045 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 19, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0000027-2022

BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED MAY 8, 2024

In this direct appeal by Cleo Ruffin, Jr. from his judgment of sentence,

we previously denied the motion to withdraw filed by his counsel, as our

independent review of the record pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S.

748 (1967), and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009),

identified an issue of arguable merit. Both parties filed substituted briefs and

the Commonwealth concedes that Appellant pled guilty to an inoperative J-S36013-23

criminal offense. We agree with the parties that the judgment of sentence for

violating 18 Pa.C.S. § 4915 must be vacated. Since this invalidates the

parties’ plea bargain, we vacate the judgment of sentence and the plea

agreement, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this

memorandum.

Our prior memorandum set forth the full factual and procedural

background underlying these appeals. See Commonwealth v. Ruffin, 309

A.3d 1086, 2023 WL 8277600, at *1 (Pa.Super. 2023) (non-precedential

decision). For present purposes, we need only observe that Appellant,

pursuant to a plea agreement, entered a guilty plea at docket 27-2022 to one

count of failing to comply with his sexual offender registration obligations in

violation of § 4915. As part of the bargain, the Commonwealth withdrew one

count of violating 18 Pa.C.S. § 4915.1(a)(1). Separately, Appellant entered

a guilty plea at docket 2640-2021 to one count of summary disorderly

conduct, with the Commonwealth withdrawing a charge of simple assault.1

Appellant filed a notice of appeal at each docket, and we sua sponte

consolidated the appeals. Appointed counsel concluded that the appeal was

frivolous, exclusively addressing in the Anders brief Appellant’s complaint

that plea counsel was ineffective. We agreed that those complaints could not

be raised in this direct appeal. However, we noted that § 4915(a)(1) was one

component of sweeping legislative enactments that our Supreme Court held ____________________________________________

1 The second case arose from different facts and was consolidated for purposes

of a global plea negotiation.

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to be unconstitutional pursuant to the “single subject” rule of the Pennsylvania

Constitution, and thus void ab initio. See Commonwealth v. McIntyre, 232

A.3d 609, 619 (Pa. 2020); Commonwealth v. Neiman, 84 A.3d 603, 605

(Pa. 2013). Therefore, we directed Appellant’s counsel to file a merits brief

addressing this issue of arguable merit.

Appellant’s substituted brief raises the following issue: “Whether the . . .

conviction . . . under 18 Pa.C.S. § 4915(a)(1), a statute declared

unconstitutional and void ab initio, should be vacated.” Appellant’s

substituted brief at 5. Appellant cites the foregoing law, asserting that the

§ 4915 offense cannot be enforced. We agree. Pursuant to McIntyre,

Appellant’s sentence is illegal and must be vacated. See McIntyre, 232 A.3d

at 619 (“[McIntyre]’s conviction and sentence cannot stand . . . because his

conviction was likewise based on [§] 4915, which . . . must be regarded as

void from the time of its enactment.”). This issue implicates the legality of

Appellant’s sentence and is not subject to issue preservation requirements.

Id. at 616.

Concluding that Appellant’s sentence for a violation of § 4915 is illegal

leads to the question of remedy. The parties presume that we should vacate

only the judgment of sentence as to that count and leave the remainder of

the plea bargain undisturbed. See Commonwealth’s substituted brief at 11

(contending that “[Appellant]’s conviction for failing to comply . . . should be

vacated,” but “his disorderly conduct conviction be affirmed”); Appellant’s

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brief at 10 (“Appellant asserts that his conviction for failing to comply with sex

offender registration . . . should be vacated.”).

However, we are not bound by the parties’ view of the proper disposition

of the appeal. See generally Commonwealth v. Brown, 196 A.3d 130,

146 (Pa. 2018) (explaining that the judicial branch is not required to adopt

the parties’ agreement on legal conclusions; “a district attorney’s concession

of error is not a substitute for independent judicial review”). Unpersuaded by

the parties’ advocacy, we conclude that the appropriate remedy is to vacate

the guilty plea and return the parties to the pre-plea negotiation stage.

It is well-settled “that a criminal defendant cannot agree to an illegal

sentence, so the fact that the illegality was a term of his plea bargain is of no

legal significance.” Commonwealth v. Gentry, 101 A.3d 813, 819

(Pa.Super. 2014). In Commonwealth v. Ford, 217 A.3d 824 (Pa. 2019),

our Supreme Court addressed a sentence entered following a guilty plea

encompassing three dockets, in which the court imposed fines and costs

without determining Ford’s ability to pay. During collateral proceedings, Ford

alleged that his sentence was illegal without said hearing. The Commonwealth

conceded that point but claimed that by accepting fines as part of a bargain

Ford implicitly agreed that he was able to pay. The Ford Court disagreed and

held that Ford’s sentence was illegal. As it pertains to this matter, the Superior

Court panel had vacated the non-mandatory fines and remanded for

resentencing. The Supreme Court determined that this remedy was

inadequate.

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As for the Superior Court’s chosen remedy, however, the panel should have vacated Ford’s entire judgment of sentence rather than simply vacating the illegal fines and remanding for resentencing. Indeed, the Commonwealth persuasively argues that it will be deprived of the benefit of its bargain if criminal defendants can, for instance, agree to pay a larger fine in exchange for a shorter term of incarceration, but then later attempt to eliminate or reduce the fine in a post-conviction proceeding. . . . Because selectively vacating specific conditions of a plea agreement threatens to upset the parties’ underlying bargain, the better remedy is to put both sides right back where they started, at which point they can begin plea negotiations anew or proceed to trial.

Id. at 831.

Similarly, we cannot simply vacate the judgment of sentence imposed

at the § 4915 count, as that “threatens to upset the parties’ underlying

bargain[.]” Id. Additionally, in the closely related context of ineffective

assistance of counsel claims premised on erroneous legal advice relative to a

negotiated guilty plea, the accepted remedy is to vacate the entire plea.

Commonwealth v. Melendez-Negron, 123 A.3d 1087, 1094 (Pa.Super.

2015) (vacating guilty plea and remanding for further proceedings; agreeing

with PCRA petitioner that a “shared misapprehension that the mandatory

minimum sentence . . . applied” tainted the parties’ negotiations);

Commonwealth v. DiMatteo, 177 A.3d 182, 196 (Pa. 2018) (explaining that

Melendez-Negron stands for “the proposition that both parties to a

negotiated guilty plea are entitled to the benefit of their bargains, but such

bargains may not be premised on some shared misapprehension that

wrongfully induces the plea”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

We therefore direct that the parties be returned to the pre-plea stage.

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Judgment of sentence vacated. Plea agreement vacated. Cases

remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Date: 5/08/2024

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