Com. v. RPS

737 A.2d 747
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedJuly 13, 1999
StatusPublished

This text of 737 A.2d 747 (Com. v. RPS) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Com. v. RPS, 737 A.2d 747 (Pa. Ct. App. 1999).

Opinion

737 A.2d 747 (1999)

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant,
v.
R.P.S., Appellee.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued March 18, 1999.
Filed July 13, 1999.
Reargument denied September 16, 1999.

*748 J. Karen Arnold, Asst. Dist. Atty., Bellefonte, for Com., appellant.

Anthony M. Mariani, Pittsburgh, for appellee.

Before CAVANAUGH, HUDOCK and HESTER, JJ.

HESTER, J.:

¶ 1 The Commonwealth appeals from the April 8, 1998 order wherein the trial court concluded that the minor victim in this case, L.T., was not competent to testify. We affirm.

¶ 2 The factual background of this case follows. Appellee is the stepfather of L.T. L.T. and his sister are the natural children of M.T. and D.T.S., Appellee's wife. At the time of the alleged criminal incident, M.T. and D.T.S. were involved in a bitter custody suit involving L.T. and his sister. In its brief, the Commonwealth indicates that M.T. is a police officer. Commonwealth's brief at 38.

¶ 3 On October 21, 1996, Appellee was charged with involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, endangering the welfare of a child, corruption of minors and indecent assault. He was accused of abusing the victim over a period of approximately two years. He also was accused of placing his penis in the victim's mouth on August 9, 1996, while they were in the shower together. In August 1996, L.T. was four and one-half years old.

¶ 4 In the same time frame as when these criminal proceedings were instituted, a report of suspected abuse for the August 1996 incident was made to Centre County Children and Youth Services ("CYS"). In fact, prior to August 1996, four complaints of suspected abuse had been made to CYS concerning L.T. and Appellee, and CYS had determined that all four were unfounded. With respect to this new, fifth complaint, dependency proceedings were instituted by CYS, and CYS engaged the services of Dr. Arnold Shienvold, a clinical psychologist and forensic examiner, so that he could independently evaluate the child. Dr. Shienvold never was hired by Appellee with regard to these criminal proceedings or the dependency proceedings. Dr. Shienvold issued a report on March 5, 1997. As a result, a hearing occurred, and the testimony of the doctor was heard. CYS then withdrew its petition for dependency.

¶ 5 Appellee then moved for a competency hearing regarding L.T. in these criminal proceedings, and the competency hearing was held on October 1, 1997. On April 8, 1998, the trial court entered an order declaring L.T. incompetent to testify.[1] The Commonwealth filed this appeal.

¶ 6 The issue before us is whether the trial court erred in determining that *749 L.T. was not competent to testify. We examine this question under the following standards. The competency of a witness is presumed, but where the witness is under fourteen years of age, the court must conduct a searching inquiry as to mental capacity. Commonwealth v. McMaster, 446 Pa.Super. 261, 666 A.2d 724 (1995). A child witness is competent to testify if the child possesses:

(1) such capacity to communicate, including as it does both an ability to understand questions and frame and express intelligent answers, (2) mental capacity to observe the occurrence itself and the capacity of remembering what it is that she is called to testify about, and (3) a consciousness of the duty to speak the truth.

Id. 666 A.2d at 727 (quoting Rosche v. McCoy, 397 Pa. 615, 620-21, 156 A.2d 307, 310 (1959)) (emphasis added).

¶ 7 A trial court deciding on the competency of a child witness is torn by conflicting policies. Id. On the one hand, justice must not be denied merely because a case rests on the testimony of a young child while on the other hand, children are susceptible to suggestions and fantasy. Id. In light of the problems faced by the trial court, our standard of review regarding rulings on the competency of witnesses is extremely limited. Id. "[T]he determination of competency is a matter for the sound discretion of the trial court, which will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of that discretion." Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Hart, 501 Pa. 174, 177, 460 A.2d 745, 747 (1983)). Indeed, competency rulings by the trial court will not "be reversed except for a `flagrant abuse of discretion.'" Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Mangello, 250 Pa.Super. 202, 378 A.2d 897, 898 (1977)).

¶ 8 At the beginning of the competency hearing, L.T. was interviewed in chambers. That interview unquestionably establishes that L.T. has the ability to understand questions and frame somewhat appropriate answers. The child also clearly understood the difference between the truth and a lie. However, he seemed unable to understand his duty to tell the truth, as the following exchanges with the trial court indicate:

Q. What would happen if you told a lie?
A. My nose would grow.
Q. Is that the only thing?
A. No.
Q. What else would happen?
A. I would get in trouble.
Q. What kind of trouble would you be in?
A. I don't know.
Q. Who told you you would be in trouble?
A. I don't know.
Q. But do you think you could be punished if you told a lie?
A. I don't know.
Q. Who would punish you, L.T., if you told a lie?
A. I don't know. I don't know who would.
Q. Has anybody ever told a lie to you, do you know?
A. No.
Q. Have you ever lied to anybody? Did you ever do that?
A. No.
Q. You have never told a lie?
A. No.
Q. Okay. But did you know Amber to ever tell a lie?
A. No.
Q. She's never told a lie. You think she's always told the truth?
A. Yeah.
Q. To you anyway. That's good. If I tell you right now that I'm a duck, would that be the truth or a lie?
A. A lie.
Q. That I'm a duck?
A. I wanted to knock it down.
*750 Q. All right. Well you be careful.
A. My feet, my socks are sticking to the carpet.
Q. L.T., if I told you that I was a duck, would that be a truth—
A. A lie.
Q. —or a lie?
A. A lie.
Q. A lie. Okay. Are some lies okay to tell and some lies not okay to tell?
A. I don't know.
Q. Okay. Do you think as a judge if somebody told a lie in the courtroom that I would do something to punish them?
A. I don't know. How come the flags around up—
Q. They are.
A. Don't—
Q.

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Related

Commonwealth v. Seese
517 A.2d 920 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1986)
Commonwealth v. Garcia
387 A.2d 46 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1978)
Commonwealth v. Dunkle
561 A.2d 5 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1989)
Commonwealth v. Hart
460 A.2d 745 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1983)
Commonwealth v. Mangello
378 A.2d 897 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1977)
Rosche v. McCoy
156 A.2d 307 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1959)
Commonwealth v. McMaster
666 A.2d 724 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1995)
Commonwealth v. R.P.S.
737 A.2d 747 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1999)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
737 A.2d 747, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/com-v-rps-pasuperct-1999.