NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA :
v. :
: :
RICARDO ROWLEY :
:
Appellant : No. 1127 MDA 2025
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 16, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-40-CR-0000499-2024
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., NICHOLS, J., and NEUMAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY NEUMAN, J.: FILED: SEPTEMBER 2, 2026
Appellant, Ricardo Rowley, appeals from the judgment of sentence of
nine months’ probation, with one month on house arrest, imposed after a jury
convicted him of disorderly conduct, 18 Pa.C.S. § 5503(a)(1), and the court
found him guilty of the summary offense of harassment, 18 Pa.C.S. §
2709(a)(1). After careful review, we affirm.
Appellant was charged with the above-stated offenses, as well as simple
assault, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2701(a)(1), after he had an altercation with a security
guard at a casino. Appellant proceeded to a jury trial in March of 2025, where
the following facts were established, as summarized by the trial court:
On November 22, 2022[,] at approximately 1:00 a.m., Eric Thiel, a Mohegan Sun Pocono Downs Casino security officer[] (Thiel), was called to the floor for a disruptive guest at the table games area. N.T. Jury Trial, 3/19/2025, at 22-24. When Thiel arrived on scene, he made contact with [Appellant,] who was reported for being very disruptive. Id. at 24. Thiel advised [Appellant] that he worked for the casino and explained he was there for a report
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of a disruptive guest. Id. at 25. Thiel advised [Appellant] that he needed to leave the premises for the evening due to [his] being disruptive. Id. at 24. [Appellant] became extremely combative with Thiel and refused to leave the premises. Id. [Appellant] told Thiel to “get the fuck out of [his] face” and pushed him. Id. at 25-26. Thiel then pushed [Appellant] back in order to create space between them. Id. at 26. [Appellant] then punched Thiel in the right side of his head. Id. Thiel and another security officer immediately subdued [Appellant] on the ground while trying to restrain him and advising him to relax until the police arrived. Id. During the attempt to restrain[ him], [Appellant] bit … Thiel on the inside of his left thumb. Id. at 27.
[Appellant] testified that he was placing bets at the blackjack table when another individual squeezed into his spot and a verbal altercation ensued between them. Id. at 65. [Appellant] testified that after that altercation already resolved itself, Thiel approached him and told him he needed to “get his ‘black ass’ out of [the casino]” so he pushed Thiel. Id. at 66. [Appellant] testified that Thiel then pushed him back and continued to come towards him. Id. at 67-68. [Appellant] testified that he punched Thiel at that point because he felt threatened and was in fear for his own safety due to [his] having metal rods in his back. Id. at 68-69.
Caroline Lawson (Lawson) testified during trial as a character witness for [Appellant]. Id. at 73-76. Lawson is [Appellant’s] cousin-in-law, has known him for over ten years, and was at the casino with him at the time of the incident. Id. at 73. Lawson testified that [Appellant] has a reputation in their community in New York, where he is from, for being non-violent. Id. at 73-74. She also testified on cross[-]examination that she would not want to see [Appellant] get in trouble for what happened at the casino. Id. at 76.
Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 12/31/25, at 2-3 (internal quotation marks
omitted; some brackets added by the trial court).
Pertinent to the issue raised by Appellant herein, the court also
explained that, at the close of the evidence, and
[a]t the request of defense counsel, the court gave [a] self- defense instruction to the jury relative to the count of simple assault. Id. at 104-[]08. However, when the court instructed the
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jury on the count of disorderly conduct[,] there was no self- defense instruction given. Id. at 108. At the conclusion of the jury charge, the court asked counsel if there was anything further from either party relative to the instructions given. Id. at 112. Defense counsel responded[,] “[N]o additions and no objections…[.]”[] Id. While deliberating, the jury asked if the self-defense instruction applie[d] to the count of disorderly conduct. Id. at 116-[]18. The court advised the jury that self- defense [did] not apply to disorderly conduct as charged. Id. at 117. For the first time, [Appellant] lodged an objection to the instruction[,] claiming that the self-defense instruction should be given relative to the charge of disorderly conduct. Id. at 117- []18.
Id. at 3.
The jury resumed deliberations and ultimately found Appellant not guilty
of simple assault and guilty of disorderly conduct. The trial court also
convicted him of harassment. On July 16, 2025, the court sentenced Appellant
to the term of probation set forth supra for his conviction of disorderly
conduct, as well as a fine of $200 for his harassment offense. Appellant filed
a timely notice of appeal on August 14, 2025, and he and the court complied
with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Herein, Appellant states one issue for our review:
[I.] Did the trial court abuse its discretion [or] commit an error of law when it instructed the jury, in response to a jury question during its deliberations, that the justification/self[-]defense instruction previously given to them for consideration at the request of the defense, did not apply to the charge of disorderly conduct, and was [Appellant] prejudiced by that refusal[?]
Appellant’s Brief at 3-4 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
Initially, we note:
When reviewing a challenge to part of a jury instruction, we must review the jury charge as a whole to determine if it is fair and complete. A trial court has wide discretion in phrasing its jury instructions, and can choose its own words as long as the law is
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clearly, adequately, and accurately presented to the jury for its consideration. The trial court commits an abuse of discretion only when there is an inaccurate statement of the law.
Additionally, … [this] Court has explained that:
In reviewing a challenge to the trial court’s refusal to give a specific jury instruction, it is the function of this [C]ourt to determine whether the record supports the trial court’s decision. In examining the propriety of the instructions a trial court presents to a jury, our scope of review is to determine whether the trial court committed a clear abuse of discretion or an error of law which controlled the outcome of the case. A jury charge will be deemed erroneous only if the charge as a whole is inadequate, not clear[,] or has a tendency to mislead or confuse, rather than clarify, a material issue. A charge is considered adequate unless the jury was palpably misled by what the trial judge said or there is an omission which is tantamount to fundamental error. Consequently, the trial court has wide discretion in fashioning jury instructions. The trial court is not required to give every charge that is requested by the parties and its refusal to give a requested charge does not require reversal unless the appellant was prejudiced by that refusal.
Commonwealth v. Baker, 963 A.2d 495, 507 (Pa. Super. 2008) (cleaned
up).
Here, Appellant argues the court erred by not telling the jury, in
response to its question, that the self-defense instruction applied to both the
simple assault and disorderly conduct charges. He maintains he presented
adequate evidence warranting a self-defense charge on both those counts.
Specifically, he claims both his simple assault and disorderly conduct charges
were premised on “the ‘fight’ between … [A]ppellant and the security guard[,]”
and he proffered evidence — namely, his own testimony — that he acted in
self-defense when engaging in that fight. Appellant’s Brief at 12. Accordingly,
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Appellant requested a self-defense jury instruction, which the court provided.
Id. at 15. Appellant insists the self-defense charge given by the court applied
to both the simple assault and disorderly conduct offenses. Id. Thus, he
concludes the court erred when it told the jury, in response to its question,
that self-defense did not apply to the disorderly conduct charge. Id.
After carefully reviewing the record, we conclude Appellant is not
entitled to relief. First, we disagree with Appellant that the jury instruction on
self-defense provided by the court applied to both his simple assault and
disorderly conduct offenses. Notably, the discussion between the parties and
the court before the jury charge indicates defense counsel only sought the
self-defense instruction regarding the simple assault offense. For instance,
the parties agreed the simple assault charge was premised on Appellant’s act
of punching Thiel (and possibly also his biting of Thiel’s thumb).1 It is notable,
then, that in requesting the self-defense instruction, defense counsel argued
such a charge was warranted because “[t]here clearly [was] evidence that
[Appellant] struck … the security guard immediately after he was …
forcefully pushed back up against the gaming table, and that he immediately
responded out of reaction and he punched the guard.” N.T. Jury Trial at
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1 See N.T. Trial at 82-83 (the parties and court discussing which act was the
basis for the assault charge, and the Commonwealth’s stating, “I think the two, both the punch and the bite, would be the attempt to cause or caus[ing] bodily injury[,]” to which defense counsel replied, “Right.”); see id. at 83 (defense counsel’s stating Appellant’s hitting Thiel is what was “alleged here to be the attempt or cause of bodily injury” underlying the simple assault charge).
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79 (emphasis added). At that point, there was no discussion of what conduct
formed the basis for Appellant’s disorderly conduct offense, or any indication
the self-defense instruction could pertain to that crime, as well.2 Thus,
defense counsel’s argument indicates he was seeking the self-defense
instruction regarding the simple assault charge. The Commonwealth also
seemingly interpreted counsel’s argument this way in objecting to the self-
defense instruction being given. See id. at 80 (the Commonwealth’s objecting
to the charge being given by contending Appellant was the initial aggressor
and comparing his case to a decision by this Court, where we “specifically
denied giving a self-defense instruction for simple assault where the
[d]efendant was the initial aggressor”) (emphasis added).3
Second, the record supports the trial court’s statement in its opinion,
set forth supra, that it instructed the jury on self-defense “relative to the count
of simple assault” and “no self-defense instruction was given” regarding the
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2 After the jury retired to deliberate and then asked whether self-defense applied to disorderly conduct, defense counsel averred “the predicate act” for Appellant’s disorderly conduct offense was “engaging in fighting.” N.T. Jury Trial at 116. In reply, the court stated, “Well, it’s broader than one punch[,]” to which defense counsel replied, “Yes.” Id. The court later reiterated the disorderly conduct crime was “broader than … the simple assault evidence,” and “encompasse[d] a greater sphere of conduct than the punch.” Id. at 118. These statements further support our determination, supra, that the simple assault crime was predicated on Appellant’s punching Thiel, and the court’s original instruction on self-defense pertained only to the simple assault crime.
3 The Commonwealth relied on Commonwealth v. Bailey, 471 A.2d 551 (Pa.
Super. 1984), which we need not discuss in disposing of Appellant’s instant issue.
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count of disorderly conduct. TCO at 3. During the charge, the court first
provided an instruction on the elements of simple assault. N.T. Jury Trial at
104-05. The court then instructed the jury on self-defense, beginning the
instruction by stating: “Ladies and gentlemen, the defendant has raised the
issue of whether he acted in self-defense when he struck Mr. Thiel.” Id. at
105 (emphasis added). After providing the self-defense instruction, id. at
105-08, the court then instructed the jury on the elements of disorderly
conduct, id. at 108. The court did not mention self-defense after describing
the disorderly conduct offense.
In sum, this record demonstrates defense counsel only requested a self-
defense instruction pertaining to Appellant’s simple assault offense, and the
court ultimately provided a jury instruction on self-defense only regarding that
crime. Importantly, at the end of the jury instruction, the court asked the
parties if there was “[a]nything from counsel relative to the charge?[,]” to
which defense counsel replied, “No additions and no objections, Your Honor.”
Id. at 112. Then, after the jury retired to deliberate, it asked the following
questions: “May we please hear the Judge’s definition of disorderly conduct?
And if so, does self[-]defense apply to it?” Id. at 116. After a discussion with
the parties, the court determined it would “tell the jury that self-defense does
not apply to disorderly conduct as charged in this case, but will, obviously,
remind them that they must find each of the elements beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Id. at 117. Defense counsel objected to the court’s ruling. Id. at
117, 118.
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Considering this record, no relief is due to Appellant. Initially, Appellant
lodged no objection to the trial court’s instruction applying the self-defense
charge only to the simple assault offense.
Under Pa.R.A.P. 302(a), “Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). It is well settled that the failure to object to the jury charge before the jury retires for deliberation renders the issue waived for appellate review. See Commonwealth v. Schierscher, 668 A.2d 164 (Pa. Super. 1995); Commonwealth v. Byrd, 598 A.2d 1011 (Pa. Super. 1991). Rule 647 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure specifically addresses the failure of an appellant to object to the jury instructions. Under Pa.R.Crim.P. 647(C), “no portions of the charge nor omissions from the charge may be assigned as error, unless specific objections are made thereto before the jury retires to deliberate.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 647(C); see also Commonwealth v. Kampo, 391 A.2d 1005, 1008 (Pa. 1978) (holding that where [the] appellant did not object to omission in jury charge before deliberations, issue was not preserved for review); Commonwealth v. Martinez, 380 A.2d 747, 750 (Pa. 1977) (holding that where [the] judge asked if counsel had any exceptions or additions to jury charge and counsel replied that he had none, [the] appellant waived issue of alleged error in charge); Commonwealth v. Betz, 664 A.2d 600, 606 (Pa. Super. 1995) (holding that specific objection must be made before deliberations in order for challenge to jury charge to be preserved for appellate review).
Commonwealth v. Bushor, No. 960 MDA 2024, unpublished memorandum
at 5-6 (Pa. Super. filed Oct. 17, 2025) (emphasis added).4
Here, the court only instructed the jury regarding self-defense
pertaining to the simple-assault charge. Appellant did not object or ask for
additional instructions before the jury retired to deliberate. Therefore, he has
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4Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 126(b), non-precedential decisions of the Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for their persuasive value.
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waived any claim the court erred by not instructing the jury that self-defense
also applied to his disorderly conduct offense. Consequently, when the jury
asked whether self-defense applied to Appellant’s disorderly conduct crime,
the court did not err in telling them it did not. The court’s response was
consistent with the original instructions it had provided, to which Appellant did
not object. Additionally, in discussing how to respond to the jury’s question,
defense counsel never asked the court to provide additional or corrected
instructions. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 647(D) (“After the jury has retired to consider
its verdict, additional or correctional instructions may be given by the trial
judge in the presence of all parties….”). Instead, counsel simply argued the
court should tell the jury its original self-defense instruction applied to
disorderly conduct. See N.T. Jury Trial at 116-17. However, for the reasons
set forth supra, the record shows the original instruction did not apply self-
defense to the disorderly conduct offense, but only to Appellant’s simple
assault crime. Thus, the court did not err in its response to the jury.
Furthermore, to the extent Appellant suggests the court erred by not providing
a self-defense instruction regarding disorderly conduct in its initial jury charge,
he has waived that claim by not objecting before the jury retired to deliberate.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 09/02/2026