Com. v. Rodriguez, M.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: May 5, 2026
• Docket: 706 MDA 2025
• Status: Unpublished
• Author: Bender

Opinion

J-S07037-26

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : MIGUEL ANGEL RODRIGUEZ : : Appellant : No. 650 MDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 14, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0004713-2022

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : MIGUEL A. RODRIGUEZ : : Appellant : No. 706 MDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 14, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0004712-2022

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED: MAY 5, 2026

Appellant, Miguel A. Rodriguez, appeals from the aggregate judgment

of sentence of life without the possibility of parole, followed by a consecutive

term of forty-one and one-half to eighty-five years of incarceration, following

his convictions for first-degree murder, assault on law enforcement officers,

aggravated assault, and multiple related offenses. Additionally, Appellant’s

counsel, MaryJean Glick, Esq., (“Appellate Counsel”), requests permission to J-S07037-26

withdraw from further representation pursuant to Anders v. California, 386

A.2d 738 (Pa. 1967) and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa.

2009). After review, we affirm the judgment of sentence and grant Appellate

Counsel’s petition to withdraw.

The record reflects that on September 11, 2022, Appellant was in the

apartment that he shared with Nemesis Florentino when Appellant shot Ms.

Florentino in the head resulting in her death. See N.T., Trial, 2/3/25, at 209-

212, 223-225, 231-234; N.T., Trial, 3/5/25, at 662-665. When Officer John

Mulligan, Officer Kyle Brown, and Lieutenant Christopher Chase arrived on the

scene, Appellant began shooting through the doors and windows of the

apartment at the officers, and the officers were prevented from entering the

apartment to investigate or render aid to Ms. Florentino. See N.T., Trial,

2/3/25, at 259, 263-65, 267-74, 278-79, 292. Police ultimately fired teargas

into the apartment leading to Appellant’s surrender. See N.T., Trial, 2/4/25,

at 371-372, 376, 405-06.

Appellant was arrested and charged at trial court docket 4712-2022 with

one count each of criminal homicide (18 Pa.C.S. § 2501(a)) and recklessly

endangering another person (“REAP”)(18 Pa.C.S. § 2705). At trial court

docket 4713-2022, Appellant was charged with three counts each of criminal

attempt to commit murder of a law enforcement officer (18 Pa.C.S. § 901),

assault of a law enforcement officer (18 Pa.C.S. § 2702.1(a)(1)), aggravated

assault graded as a felony of the first degree (18 Pa.C.S. §2702(a)(2)),

aggravated assault graded as a felony of the second degree (18 Pa.C.S.

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§ 2702(a)(6)), REAP (18 Pa.C.S. § 2705), and obstructing administration of

law or other governmental function (18 Pa.C.S. § 5101).

Following a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder

and REAP at docket 4712-2022. The trial court sentenced Appellant to a term

of life without the possibility of parole for the murder and a concurrent term

of two years’ probation for REAP. Sentencing Order (4712-2022), 4/14/25,

at 1; N.T., Sentencing, 4/14/25, at 22.

At docket 4713-2022, the jury found Appellant guilty of two counts of

assault on a law enforcement officer, two counts of aggravated assault graded

as a first-degree felony, three counts of aggravated assault graded as a

second-degree felony, three counts of REAP, and three counts of obstructing

law enforcement.1 Appellant was acquitted on the remaining counts. The trial

court imposed an aggregate sentence of forty-one and one-half to eighty-five

years of incarceration at docket 4713-2022. Sentencing Order (4713-2022),

4/14/25, at 1-4; N.T., Sentencing, 4/14/25, at 22-24. Appellant’s aggregate

sentence at both trial court dockets was life without the possibility of parole, ____________________________________________

1 Specifically, at docket 4713-2022, Appellant was found guilty at count four

(assault on a law enforcement officer - Officer John Mulligan), count five (assault on a law enforcement officer - Officer Kyle Brown), count seven (aggravated assault (F1) – Officer John Mulligan), count eight (aggravated assault (F1) – Officer Kyle Brown), count ten (aggravated assault (F2) - Officer John Mulligan), count eleven (aggravated assault (F2) – Officer Kyle Brown), count twelve (aggravated assault (F2) – Lieutenant Christopher Chase), count thirteen (REAP – Officer John Mulligan), count fourteen (REAP – Officer Kyle Brown), count fifteen (REAP - Lieutenant Christopher Chase), count sixteen (obstructing law enforcement – Officer John Mullihan), count seventeen (obstructing law enforcement – Officer Kyle Brown), and count eighteen (obstructing law enforcement – Lieutenant Christopher Chase).

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followed by a consecutive term of forty-one and one-half to eighty-five years

of incarceration.

No post-sentence motions were filed, and Appellant filed timely appeals

at both dockets.2 In lieu of Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statements, Appellate Counsel

filed statements of intent to file an Anders brief pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.

1925(c)(4) at each docket.

In the Anders brief, Appellate Counsel identifies three issues which

might arguably support an appeal. Anders Brief at 18-29. The issues

challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, the legality of the sentences

imposed, and the discretionary aspects of the sentences imposed. See id.

Before we determine whether the issues Appellate Counsel identified are

frivolous, we must first address the petition to withdraw. When presented

with a petition to withdraw, this Court “must first determine whether appellate

counsel has satisfied all of the requirements that court-appointed counsel

must meet before leave to withdraw may be granted.” Commonwealth v.

Weitzel, 304 A.3d 1219, 1223 (Pa. Super. 2023). When seeking to withdraw

as counsel on a direct appeal under Anders,

counsel must (1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that he has made a conscientious examination of the record and has determined that the appeal would be frivolous; (2) file a sufficient Anders brief; and (3) provide a copy of the Anders brief to the defendant and advise the defendant of his right to retain new counsel or proceed pro se and to raise any additional points that he deems worthy of the court’s attention. ____________________________________________

2 On July 28, 2025, the appeals were consolidated sua sponte pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 513. See Order, 7/28/25.

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Id. Furthermore:

[A]n Anders brief must comply with all the following requirements:

[T]he Anders brief ... must (1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

Id. at 1223-24 (citing Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361). After determining that

counsel has satisfied the technical requirements of Anders and Santiago,

this Court will then “conduct its own review of the trial court’s proceedings

and render an independent judgment as to whether the appeal is wholly

frivolous.” Id. at 1224. However, as Appellant has filed a response to

Appellate Counsel’s Anders/Santiago brief, our independent review is

limited. Although we must first determine if Appellate Counsel has complied

with the Anders/Santiago requirements, because Appellant filed a pro se

response, our independent review does not extend to the entire record.

Commonwealth v. Bennett, 124 A.3d 327, 333 (Pa. Super. 2015). Rather,

we will review the only the issues raised in the Anders/Santiago brief and

those raised in Appellant’s pro se response. See id. (stating “when an

appellant, either acting pro se or through private counsel, files a response to

the Anders brief, our independent review is limited to those issues raised in

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the Anders brief. We then review the subsequent pro se or counseled filing

as we do any advocate’s brief”).

Here, Appellate Counsel indicates that she made a conscientious

examination of the record, and the Anders brief includes a summary of the

relevant history of the case, refers to the pertinent portions of the record in

her analysis of arguable appellate issues, and sets forth the conclusion that

Appellant’s appeal is frivolous. Anders Brief at 17-31. Appellate Counsel also

explains her reasoning in reaching that conclusion and supports her rationale

with citations to the record and pertinent legal authority. Id. at 18-30.

Further, the record includes Appellate Counsel’s petition to withdraw and a

copy of the letter she sent to Appellant in which Appellate Counsel informed

Appellant of his right to proceed pro se or retain private counsel. The letter

also informed Appellant that he had the right to raise any additional points to

this Court as he deemed necessary.3 We conclude that Appellate Counsel has

complied with the technical requirements for withdrawal.

I.

As stated above, Appellate Counsel identified three issues in the Anders

brief that might arguably support an appeal. We will address these claims in

the order presented.

____________________________________________

3 As noted, Appellant has filed a pro se response to counsel’s Anders brief.

See Pro Se Response to Anders Brief, 12/16/25.

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Sufficiency of Evidence

Our standard of review is well settled:

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the finder of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Robinson, 348 A.3d 291, 297 (Pa. Super. 2025)(citation

omitted and formatting altered).

At docket 4712-2022, Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder

and REAP.

An individual commits first-degree murder when he intentionally kills another human being; an intentional killing is defined as a “willful, deliberate and premeditated killing.” 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2501, 2502(a), (d). To sustain a conviction for first-degree murder, the Commonwealth must prove that: (1) a human being was unlawfully killed; (2) the accused was responsible for the killing; and (3) the accused acted with malice and a specific intent to kill. A jury may infer the intent to kill based on the accused’s use of a deadly weapon on a vital part of the victim’s body.

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Commonwealth v. Baker, 201 A.3d 791, 795–96 (Pa. Super. 2018)(some

citations and quotation marks omitted).

Here, the evidence revealed that Appellant shot Ms. Florentino in the

head twice, from close range, killing her. See N.T., Trial, 2/3/25, at 209-12,

223-25, 231-34; N.T., Trial, 3/5/25, at 662-65. Appellant’s use of a deadly

weapon on a vital part of Ms. Florentino’s body supports the finding of a

specific intent to kill. Baker, 201 A.3d at 795-96. For these reasons, we

conclude that the evidence was sufficient to prove first-degree murder at

docket 4712-2022, and we agree with Appellate Counsel’s assessment that

this issue is frivolous.

REAP is defined as follows: “A person commits a misdemeanor of the

second degree if he recklessly engages in conduct which places or may place

another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury.” 18 Pa.C.S. §

2705. Here, the record reflects that Appellant repeatedly discharged a firearm

within his apartment, firing into the walls, ceiling, windows, and doors in a

multi-unit residential building while an upstairs apartment was occupied,

endangering his neighbor. See N.T., 3/5/25, at 560-61, 584, 587, 595. Upon

review, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to prove REAP at docket

4712-2022, and we agree with Appellate Counsel’s conclusion that this issue

is frivolous.

At docket 4713-2022, Appellant was convicted of two counts of assault

of a law enforcement officer, two counts of aggravated assault (F1), three

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counts of aggravated assault (F2), three counts of REAP, and three counts of

obstructing administration of law or other governmental function.

Assault of a law enforcement officer is defined, in relevant part, as

follows: “A person commits a felony of the first degree who attempts to cause

or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to a law enforcement officer,

while in the performance of duty and with knowledge that the victim is a law

enforcement officer, by discharging a firearm.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702.1(a)(1).

Here, Officer Mulligan and Lieutenant Chase knocked on the door of the

apartment and announced their presence, and Appellant opened fire through

the apartment’s door and windows. N.T., 2/3/25, at 262-63, 265, 269-70,

271, 292; N.T., 3/5/25, at 550, 560-61. The evidence was sufficient for the

jury to conclude that Appellant knew that Officer Mulligan and Lieutenant

Chase were outside, and discharged his firearm toward Officer Mulligan and

Lieutenant Chase in an attempt to cause them bodily injury.

Aggravated assault (attempt to cause serious bodily injury graded as an

F1) is defined, in relevant part, as follows:

A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he … attempts to cause or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes serious bodily injury to [police officers] while in the performance of duty[.]

18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(2). Here, the record reflects that Appellant, with

knowledge that Officer Mulligan and Lieutenant Chase were at his door,

repeatedly discharged a firearm through the door and windows. N.T., 2/3/25,

at 262-63, 265, 269-70, 271, 292; N.T., 3/5/25, at 550, 560-61. The

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evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that Appellant attempted to

cause serious bodily injury to Officer Mulligan and Lieutenant Chase.

Aggravated assault (placing law enforcement officer in fear of imminent

serious bodily injury graded as an F2) is defined as: “[a] person is guilty of

aggravated assault if he … attempts by physical menace to put [a police

officer], while in the performance of duty, in fear of imminent serious bodily

injury;[.]” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(6). As noted earlier, the record reveals that

Appellant, with knowledge that Officer Mulligan and Lieutenant Chase were at

his door, repeatedly discharged a firearm through the door and windows.

N.T., 2/3/25, at 262-63, 265, 269-70, 271, 292; N.T., 3/5/25, at 550, 560-

61. Additionally, while Appellant was firing his weapon, Officer Brown was

outside and could hear the impact of Appellant’s bullets near him and in the

trees behind him. N.T., 2/3/25, at 335-36. The evidence was sufficient for

the jury to conclude that Appellant attempted to put Officer Mulligan, Officer

Brown, and Lieutenant Chase in fear of imminent serious bodily injury.

As stated above, REAP is defined as follows: “A person commits a

misdemeanor of the second degree if he recklessly engages in conduct which

places or may place another person in danger of death or serious bodily

injury.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705. Once more, we note that the record reflects that

Appellant was shooting through the door and windows of the apartment

toward Officer Mulligan, Officer Brown, and Lieutenant Chase. N.T., 2/3/25,

at 262-63, 265, 269-70, 271, 292, 335-36; N.T., 3/5/25, at 550, 560-61. The

evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that Appellant recklessly

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placed Officer Mulligan, Officer Brown, and Lieutenant Chase in danger of

death or serious bodily injury.

Obstructing the administration of law or other governmental function is

defined as follows:

A person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if he intentionally obstructs, impairs or perverts the administration of law or other governmental function by force, violence, physical interference or obstacle, breach of official duty, or any other unlawful act, except that this section does not apply to flight by a person charged with crime, refusal to submit to arrest, failure to perform a legal duty other than an official duty, or any other means of avoiding compliance with law without affirmative interference with governmental functions.

18 Pa.C.S. § 5101. We reiterate that Appellant was shooting through the

ceiling, walls, door, and windows, and this continued gunfire prevented Officer

Mulligan, Lieutenant Chase, and Officer Brown from entering the apartment

to investigate the shooting and render aid to Ms. Florentino. N.T., 2/3/25, at

338. The evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that Appellant

obstructed the administration of law or other governmental function.

After review, we agree with Appellate Counsel’s assessment that

challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence are wholly frivolous. Appellant is

entitled to no relief.

Legality of Sentences Imposed

“Issues relating to the legality of a sentence are questions of law. Our

standard of review over such questions is de novo and the scope of review is

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plenary.” Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 181 A.3d 1165, 1166 (Pa. Super.

2018)(citation omitted).

A claim that implicates the fundamental legal authority of the court to impose a particular sentence constitutes a challenge to the legality of the sentence. If no statutory authorization exists for a particular sentence, that sentence is illegal and subject to correction. An illegal sentence must be vacated. Likewise, a sentence that exceeds the statutory maximum is illegal. If a court imposes a sentence outside of the legal parameters prescribed by the applicable statute, the sentence is illegal and should be remanded for correction.

Commonwealth v. Infante, 63 A.3d 358, 363 (Pa. Super. 2013)(internal

The available sentences for murder in the first degree are death or a

term of life in prison without the possibility of parole. 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102(a)(1);

61 Pa.C.S. § 6137(a)(1). As stated above, the trial court imposed a sentence

of life without the possibility of parole for the murder charge. Accordingly,

Appellant’s sentence was legal.

The maximum sentence available for each count of REAP at both 4712-

2022 and 4713-2022, graded as misdemeanors of the second degree, was

two years of incarceration. 18 Pa.C.S. § 1104(2). The trial court sentenced

Appellant to terms of two years of probation for each REAP conviction.

Therefore, Appellant’s sentences for REAP were legal.

The mandatory minimum sentence for assault of a law enforcement

officer was twenty years, and the statutory maximum sentence was forty

years of incarceration. 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702.1(b); 42 Pa.C.S. § 9719.1(a). The

trial court sentenced Appellant to terms of twenty to forty years at each count

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of assault of a law enforcement officer, and therefore, the sentences were

legal.

The maximum sentence for aggravated assault graded as a first-degree

felony was twenty years of incarceration. 18 Pa.C.S. § 1103(1). The trial

court sentenced Appellant to terms of four to eight years of incarceration at

each count. As such, the sentences were legal.

The maximum sentence for aggravated assault, graded as a second-

degree felony, was ten years. 18 Pa.C.S. § 1103(2). Here, the trial court

sentenced Appellant to terms of one and one-half to five years of incarceration

at each count, and therefore, we conclude that the sentences were legal.

Finally, the maximum sentence for obstructing administration of law, a

misdemeanor of the second degree, was two years of incarceration. 18

Pa.C.S. § 1104(2). The trial court sentenced Appellant to terms of two years

of probation on each count, and we conclude that the sentences were legal.

After review, we agree with Appellate Counsel’s conclusion that a

challenge to the legality of the sentences imposed is wholly frivolous.4

Accordingly, Appellant is due no relief.

Discretionary Aspects of the Sentences

Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not entitle an appellant to review as of right. Commonwealth v. Sierra, 752 A.2d 910, 912 (Pa. Super. 2000). An appellant

4 Although not specifically identified by Appellate Counsel, we discern no issues with respect to merger and the sentences imposed.

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challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:

We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether [the] appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether [the] appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.[ ] § 9781(b).

Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa. Super. 2006).... Objections to the discretionary aspects of a sentence are generally waived if they are not raised at the sentencing hearing or in a motion to modify the sentence imposed. Commonwealth v. Mann, 820 A.2d 788, 794 (Pa. Super. 2003)....

Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 935 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010)).

The record reflects that Appellant failed to challenge the discretionary

aspects of his sentence at the time of sentencing or in a timely filed post-

sentence motion. As such, this issue is waived pursuant to Griffin, and

therefore frivolous. See Commonwealth v. Cook, 175 A.3d 345, 350 (Pa.

Super. 2017) (finding that waived issues raised on appeal are frivolous); see

also Commonwealth v. Cox, 231 A.3d 1011, 1016 (Pa. Super. 2020)

(explaining that this Court is not permitted to “address issues that were not

properly preserved in the trial court[, and] the mere filing of an Anders brief

and petition to withdraw will not serve to resuscitate claims that were already

waived upon the filing of the notice of appeal”). No relief is due.

II.

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Appellant’s Response to Anders Brief

In his pro se response to Appellate Counsel’s petition to withdraw and

Anders brief, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict

him of REAP, assault of a law enforcement officer, aggravated assault graded

as a felony of the first degree, aggravated assault graded as a felony of the

second degree, and obstructing administration of law or other governmental

function. Appellant’s Response to Anders Brief at 2-3.

At the outset, we note that Appellant’s claims are wholly undeveloped.

As such, we conclude that these claims are waived. See Commonwealth v.

Bavusa, 832 A.2d 1042, 1052 (Pa. 2003) (reiterating that claims that are

undeveloped in briefs are waived); and Commonwealth v. Williams, 959

A.2d 1252, 1258 (Pa. Super. 2008) (stating that “waiver results if an appellant

fails to properly develop an issue or cite to legal authority to support his

contention in his appellate brief”). Moreover, even if Appellant had developed

his challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, we would conclude that no

relief is due. As stated above, we concluded that the evidence was sufficient

to support all of Appellant’s convictions, and that any challenge to the

sufficiency of the evidence would be frivolous. Accordingly, even if we had

not concluded that Appellant’s pro se challenges to the sufficiency of the

evidence were waived, we would conclude that he is not entitled to relief.

Next, Appellant asserts that the consecutive sentences for assault of a

law enforcement officer “were excessive and harsh.” Appellant’s Response to

Anders Brief at 3. This issue presents a challenge to the discretionary aspects

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of Appellant’s sentence. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Glawinski, 310 A.3d

321, 325 (Pa. Super. 2024). As discussed above, Appellant failed to preserve

any challenge to the discretionary aspects of his sentence. Accordingly, this

issue is waved. Griffin, 65 A.3d at 935.

Appellant proceeds to assert that voluntary intoxication should mitigate

his culpability, and that his degree of guilt should be third degree murder or

manslaughter. Appellant’s Response to Anders Brief at 4-5. Upon review,

we conclude that these claims are boilerplate and wholly undeveloped.

Therefore, we find these claims are waived. Bavusa, 832 A.2d at 1052;

Williams, 959 A.2d at 1258.

Finally, Appellant baldly, and without developing any argument, claims

that counsel was ineffective. Appellant’s Response to Anders Brief at 5.

Generally, “claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are to be deferred to

PCRA review; trial courts should not entertain claims of ineffectiveness upon

post-verdict motions; and such claims should not be reviewed upon direct

appeal.” Commonwealth v. Holmes, 79 A.3d 562, 576 (Pa. 2013).

However, there are limited exceptions where ineffectiveness claims can be

raised on direct appeal. The first exception applies to extraordinary

circumstances in which “the claim of ineffectiveness is apparent from the

record and meritorious to the extent that immediate consideration best serves

the interests of justice.” Commonwealth v. Delgros, 183 A.3d 352, 355

(Pa. 2018) (citing Holmes, 79 A.3d at 563–64). The second exception applies

“where there is good cause shown and the defendant knowingly and expressly

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waives his entitlement to seek subsequent PCRA review from his conviction

and sentence.” Id. (citing Holmes, 79 A.3d at 563–64). The third exception

allows “trial courts to address claims challenging trial counsel’s performance

where the defendant is statutorily precluded from obtaining subsequent PCRA

review.” Id. at 361.

As noted above, Appellant raises a boilerplate and undeveloped claim of

ineffectiveness, and he has failed to invoke any of the exceptions set forth in

Holmes and Delgros. Specifically, Appellant does not allege that counsel’s

ineffectiveness is apparent from the record, he has not expressly waived his

rights under the PCRA, and he is not statutorily barred from seeking PCRA

relief. For these reasons, Appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

cannot be considered on direct appeal and must be deferred to collateral

review. Holmes, 79 A.3d at 576.

III.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, we agree that an appeal on the issues

identified by Appellate Counsel would be wholly frivolous. Weitzel, 304 A.3d

at 1223; Santiago, 978 A.2d at 356. Additionally, we conclude that Appellant

is not entitled to relief on the claims presented in his pro se response to the

Anders brief. Accordingly, we affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence and

grant Appellate Counsel’s petition to withdraw.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. Petition to withdraw granted.

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Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 05/05/2026

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