J-S28033-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : LOURDES M. RODRIGUEZ, : : Appellant : No. 1987 MDA 2017
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence November 13, 2017 in the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County, Criminal Division at No(s): CP-40-CR-0002315-2015
BEFORE: OLSON, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED JUNE 29, 2018
Lourdes M. Rodriguez (“Rodriguez”) appeals from the judgment of
sentence entered following her conviction of aggravated assault, simple
assault, endangering the welfare of children, and recklessly endangering
another person.1 We affirm.
On March 21, 2015, West Hazleton police officers were called to a home
located at 7 West Madison Avenue, West Hazelton Borough, Pennsylvania,
based upon a report that a one-year-old female was unresponsive and
bleeding from her mouth. The child was transported via helicopter to Lehigh
Valley Hospital, where she was found to have suffered fractures to her right
clavicle and right arm, lacerations to her liver and spleen, internal bleeding
and a possible contusion to her kidney, as well as facial, chest and abdominal
____________________________________________
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702, 2701, 4304, 2705. J-S28033-18
bruising. The treating physician indicated that the injuries were caused by
blunt force trauma. Rodriguez, the victim’s mother, offered differing stories
regarding the origin of the victim’s injuries. Ultimately, police arrested
Rodriguez and charged her with the above-described crimes.
A jury subsequently found Rodriguez guilty of the above-described
crimes. On November 13, 2017, the trial court sentenced Rodriguez to an
aggregate prison term of 10 to 20 years, followed by a five-year term of
probation. Thereafter, Rodriguez filed the instant timely appeal, followed by
a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement of matters complained
of on appeal.
Rodriguez presents the following claims for our review:
1. Did the trial court violate [] Rodriguez’[s] rights, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution[,] by conducting an in camera review of [Luzerne County] Children and Youth [Services’ (“CYS”)] records and denying the [d]efense the ability to review these documents?
2. In the event that this Court does not agree that the [d]efense had a right to review these records, then must this Court make an independent review of the trial court’s conclusion as to the value of said records in order to satisfy the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution?
Brief for Appellant at 3.
Rodriguez first argues that the trial court violated her Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process when it conducted an in camera review of
the CYS records, and denied her the ability to review the records. Id. at 7.
Rodriguez asserts that in camera review of the records by the trial court is
-2- J-S28033-18
“not an appropriate pretrial method of determining whether or not records
may be useful to a [d]efense.” Id. Rodriguez contends that the trial court’s
reliance on the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Pennsylvania v.
Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987), is misplaced. Brief for Appellant at 7. According
to Rodriguez, the holding in Ritchie is not inconsistent with the United States
Supreme Court’s holding in Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855 (1966),
wherein the Supreme Court held that only the defense is in the position to
make a determination as to what would be useful to the defense. Brief for
Appellant at 7.
In Ritchie, a defendant, who had been charged with sexual offenses
involving his minor daughter, subpoenaed the records of a child protective
services agency (“the agency”), which then refused to produce the records
based upon section 2215(a) (now section 6340(a)) of the Child Protective
Services Law (“CPSL”). See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6340(a). Former section 2215(a)
of the CPSL authorized the disclosure of child protective services records to
specified officials, agencies and individuals, including a “court of competent
jurisdiction,” but not to a subject of a child abuse report. See 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 6340(a). The trial court directed the agency to produce the CPS records for
an in camera review, and, following the completion of that review, concluded
that none of the CPS materials were discoverable by the defendant. See
Commonwealth v. Ritchie, 472 A.2d 220, 224-25 (Pa. Super. 1984).
-3- J-S28033-18
On appeal, the defendant in Ritchie argued that the trial court’s failure
to permit inspection of the CPS records by defense counsel violated the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania agreed, and held that the
defendant was entitled to access the agency’s entire file relating to his
daughter so that determinations regarding what information might be useful
to his defense could be made by his advocate, rather than the trial court.
Commonwealth v. Ritchie, 502 A.2d 148, 153-54 (Pa. 1985).
After granting certiorari, the United States Supreme Court concluded
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had erred in holding that defense
counsel must be allowed to examine the CPS files. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 59.
The Supreme Court reasoned that, “although the eye of an advocate may be
helpful to a defendant in ferreting out [exculpatory] information, … this
[C]ourt has never held—even in the absence of a statute restricting
disclosure—that a defendant alone may make the determination as to the
materiality of the information.” Id. (citation omitted).
To allow full disclosure to defense counsel in this type of case would sacrifice unnecessarily the Commonwealth’s compelling interest in protecting its child-abuse information. If the CYS records were made available to defendants, even through counsel, it could have a seriously adverse effect on Pennsylvania’s efforts to uncover and treat abuse. Child abuse is one of the most difficult crimes to detect and prosecute, in large part because there often are no witnesses except the victim. A child’s feelings of vulnerability and guilt and his or her unwillingness to come forward are particularly acute when the abuser is a parent. It therefore is essential that the child have a state-designated person to whom she may turn, and to do so with the assurance of
-4- J-S28033-18
confidentiality…. The Commonwealth’s purpose would be frustrated if this confidential material had to be disclosed upon demand to a defendant charged with criminal child abuse, simply because a trial court may not recognize exculpatory evidence. Neither precedent nor common sense requires such a result.
Id. at 60-61.
Based upon the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Ritchie, we
discern no due process violation here, where the trial court examined CYS’s
records and determined that they would provide no exculpation. See Trial
Court Opinion, 1/9/18, at 3.2 Accordingly, we cannot grant Rodriguez relief
on this claim.
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J-S28033-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : LOURDES M. RODRIGUEZ, : : Appellant : No. 1987 MDA 2017
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence November 13, 2017 in the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County, Criminal Division at No(s): CP-40-CR-0002315-2015
BEFORE: OLSON, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED JUNE 29, 2018
Lourdes M. Rodriguez (“Rodriguez”) appeals from the judgment of
sentence entered following her conviction of aggravated assault, simple
assault, endangering the welfare of children, and recklessly endangering
another person.1 We affirm.
On March 21, 2015, West Hazleton police officers were called to a home
located at 7 West Madison Avenue, West Hazelton Borough, Pennsylvania,
based upon a report that a one-year-old female was unresponsive and
bleeding from her mouth. The child was transported via helicopter to Lehigh
Valley Hospital, where she was found to have suffered fractures to her right
clavicle and right arm, lacerations to her liver and spleen, internal bleeding
and a possible contusion to her kidney, as well as facial, chest and abdominal
____________________________________________
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702, 2701, 4304, 2705. J-S28033-18
bruising. The treating physician indicated that the injuries were caused by
blunt force trauma. Rodriguez, the victim’s mother, offered differing stories
regarding the origin of the victim’s injuries. Ultimately, police arrested
Rodriguez and charged her with the above-described crimes.
A jury subsequently found Rodriguez guilty of the above-described
crimes. On November 13, 2017, the trial court sentenced Rodriguez to an
aggregate prison term of 10 to 20 years, followed by a five-year term of
probation. Thereafter, Rodriguez filed the instant timely appeal, followed by
a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement of matters complained
of on appeal.
Rodriguez presents the following claims for our review:
1. Did the trial court violate [] Rodriguez’[s] rights, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution[,] by conducting an in camera review of [Luzerne County] Children and Youth [Services’ (“CYS”)] records and denying the [d]efense the ability to review these documents?
2. In the event that this Court does not agree that the [d]efense had a right to review these records, then must this Court make an independent review of the trial court’s conclusion as to the value of said records in order to satisfy the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution?
Brief for Appellant at 3.
Rodriguez first argues that the trial court violated her Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process when it conducted an in camera review of
the CYS records, and denied her the ability to review the records. Id. at 7.
Rodriguez asserts that in camera review of the records by the trial court is
-2- J-S28033-18
“not an appropriate pretrial method of determining whether or not records
may be useful to a [d]efense.” Id. Rodriguez contends that the trial court’s
reliance on the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Pennsylvania v.
Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987), is misplaced. Brief for Appellant at 7. According
to Rodriguez, the holding in Ritchie is not inconsistent with the United States
Supreme Court’s holding in Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855 (1966),
wherein the Supreme Court held that only the defense is in the position to
make a determination as to what would be useful to the defense. Brief for
Appellant at 7.
In Ritchie, a defendant, who had been charged with sexual offenses
involving his minor daughter, subpoenaed the records of a child protective
services agency (“the agency”), which then refused to produce the records
based upon section 2215(a) (now section 6340(a)) of the Child Protective
Services Law (“CPSL”). See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6340(a). Former section 2215(a)
of the CPSL authorized the disclosure of child protective services records to
specified officials, agencies and individuals, including a “court of competent
jurisdiction,” but not to a subject of a child abuse report. See 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 6340(a). The trial court directed the agency to produce the CPS records for
an in camera review, and, following the completion of that review, concluded
that none of the CPS materials were discoverable by the defendant. See
Commonwealth v. Ritchie, 472 A.2d 220, 224-25 (Pa. Super. 1984).
-3- J-S28033-18
On appeal, the defendant in Ritchie argued that the trial court’s failure
to permit inspection of the CPS records by defense counsel violated the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania agreed, and held that the
defendant was entitled to access the agency’s entire file relating to his
daughter so that determinations regarding what information might be useful
to his defense could be made by his advocate, rather than the trial court.
Commonwealth v. Ritchie, 502 A.2d 148, 153-54 (Pa. 1985).
After granting certiorari, the United States Supreme Court concluded
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had erred in holding that defense
counsel must be allowed to examine the CPS files. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 59.
The Supreme Court reasoned that, “although the eye of an advocate may be
helpful to a defendant in ferreting out [exculpatory] information, … this
[C]ourt has never held—even in the absence of a statute restricting
disclosure—that a defendant alone may make the determination as to the
materiality of the information.” Id. (citation omitted).
To allow full disclosure to defense counsel in this type of case would sacrifice unnecessarily the Commonwealth’s compelling interest in protecting its child-abuse information. If the CYS records were made available to defendants, even through counsel, it could have a seriously adverse effect on Pennsylvania’s efforts to uncover and treat abuse. Child abuse is one of the most difficult crimes to detect and prosecute, in large part because there often are no witnesses except the victim. A child’s feelings of vulnerability and guilt and his or her unwillingness to come forward are particularly acute when the abuser is a parent. It therefore is essential that the child have a state-designated person to whom she may turn, and to do so with the assurance of
-4- J-S28033-18
confidentiality…. The Commonwealth’s purpose would be frustrated if this confidential material had to be disclosed upon demand to a defendant charged with criminal child abuse, simply because a trial court may not recognize exculpatory evidence. Neither precedent nor common sense requires such a result.
Id. at 60-61.
Based upon the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Ritchie, we
discern no due process violation here, where the trial court examined CYS’s
records and determined that they would provide no exculpation. See Trial
Court Opinion, 1/9/18, at 3.2 Accordingly, we cannot grant Rodriguez relief
on this claim.
In her next claim, Rodriguez argues that this Court must undertake “an
independent review of the trial court’s conclusions as to the value of [CYS’s]
records in order to satisfy the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment[.]”
Brief for Appellant at 9. However, Rodriguez did not present this claim in her
court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement of matters complained of
on appeal. Accordingly, it is waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (stating that a
claim cannot be raised for the first time on appeal); see also
Commonwealth v. Barnhart, 933 A.2d 1061, 1066 n.10 (Pa. Super. 2007)
2 Cf. Commonwealth v. Bergeri, 96 A.3d 1049, 1055 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citing, inter alia, Ritchie, and remanding for issuance of a rule to show cause why the agency should not produce the victim’s records for in camera inspection in order to determine if the materials were protected by privilege, or discoverable).
-5- J-S28033-18
(indicating that an appellant’s failure to include an issue in a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
concise statement results in the waiver of the issue).
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 6/29/2018
-6-