Com. v. Rodriguez-Ayala, K.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: May 20, 2025
• Docket: 2265 EDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S12005-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : KIARALI RODRIGUEZ-AYALA : : Appellant : No. 2265 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 29, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No: CP-51-CR-0005880-2023

BEFORE: STABILE, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED MAY 20, 2025

Appellant, Kiarali Rodriguez-Ayala, pleaded guilty in 2024 to third-

degree murder and endangering the welfare of a child (EWOC). The Court of

Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court) sentenced Appellant to a

prison term within the statutory guidelines range – 15 to 40 years as to the

murder count, with no further penalty as to the remaining count. 1 In this

appeal, Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion at

sentencing by failing to consider mitigating evidence and imposing an

unreasonable and excessive sentence. We affirm.

The undisputed facts of this tragic and gruesome case have been

summarized by the trial court as follows:

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1 In a related case involving a second victim, docketed at CP-51-CR-0005881-

2023, Appellant also pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated assault and one count of EWOC. No appeal was taken in that case. J-S12005-25

On the night of February 16, 2023, [Appellant] was supposed to be babysitting [the decedent] A.L., the three-year-old child of her friend, Miriam Melendez ("Melendez"), while she was looking after her two biological children, two-year-old K.G. and four-year-old E.G. Instead of caring for [A.L.], [Appellant] beat, burned, sexually assaulted, and, finally, killed her by smothering her.

An autopsy of [the decedent, A.L.] was performed, in which the Medical Examiner found multiple abrasions on the child's face consistent with fingernail marks, bruising of the inside of the lips consistent with a smothering incident, as well as multiple bruises on the skin and internal bruising to the scalp. A sexual assault examination revealed bruising and lacerations of the decedent's labia majora and minora and bruising of the inner thighs. The decedent suffered abrasions, contusions, and burns on the torso and extremities, as well as hemorrhaging on the right side of the abdomen and elbows. The cause of death was ruled a non- accidental trauma, including asphyxia, blunt trauma, and thermal injury, and the manner of death was ruled a homicide. [Appellant’s] son, four-year-old E.G., witnessed [Appellant] burning and hitting [A.L.], then putting her in the bathtub to "make the booboo better." N.T. 3/13/2024 at 17-18.

In a post-Miranda statement, [Appellant] confirmed to police that she had exclusive custody of [A.L.] when [she] was killed and admitted to burning her with a lighter.

Trial Court 1925(a) Opinion, 9/17/2024, at 2-3 (some internal citations

omitted).

Appellant pleaded guilty to third-degree murder and EWOC. She

expressed remorse for her actions and apologized to the decedent’s family.

See Sentencing Hearing, 7/10/2024, at 54-55. A pre-sentence investigation

report (PSI) and a mental health evaluation (MHE) were supplied to the trial

court on Appellant’s behalf. These reports detailed Appellant’s own extensive

history of being physically and sexually abused, her struggles with controlled

substance use, and her declining mental health at the time of the incident.

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When announcing the sentence, the trial court expressly referenced those

materials and voiced sympathy for Appellant’s past struggles. See N.T.

Sentencing Hearing, 7/29/2024, at 5-15. The trial court even stated that

Appellant would have received the maximum sentence possible (25 to 50

years) were it not for that mitigating evidence. See N.T. Sentencing Hearing,

7/10/2024, at 55.

Appellant timely appealed, and in her brief, she raises a single issue:

whether the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing her to a prison term

of 15 to 40 years

when substantial mitigating circumstances existed, including, Appellant’s age, acceptance of responsibility, her remorsefulness, horrific history of sexual trafficking, sexual abuse, sexual victimization, mental health history, drug and alcohol abuse history, absence of adult convictions, positive prison adjustment and good conduct, and the rehabilitative needs at the time of sentencing[.]

Appellant’s Brief, at 8.2

The issue raised here is one which implicates the discretionary aspects

of a sentence. An appellant “is not entitled to the review of challenges to the

discretionary aspects of a sentence as of right.” Commonwealth v. Samuel,

102 A.3d 1001, 1006 (Pa. Super. 2014). Rather, the party challenging a

discretionary aspect of a sentence must invoke this Court’s authority to review

the claim by satisfying a four-part test. See Commonwealth v. Moury, 992

A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010). It is necessary to (1) timely file a notice of

2 Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

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appeal, (2) preserve the issue at sentencing, (3) submit a brief that comports

with Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f), and (4) establish that there is a “substantial question

that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing

Code.” Id.

A substantial question is posed where a colorable argument has been

advanced that the “sentence imposed is either inconsistent with a specific

provision of the Sentencing Code or is contrary to the fundamental norms

which underlie the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. Mastromarino,

2 A.3d 581, 585-86 (Pa. Super. 2010). Such a determination "must be

evaluated on a case-by-case basis." Commonwealth v. Bynum-Hamilton,

135 A.3d 179, 184 (Pa. Super. 2016).

Appellant satisfied the above test by preserving her sentencing claim in

a timely post-sentence motion, and a timely notice of appeal. She also filed

a brief that comports with the requirements of the procedural rules, including

a section that provides a concise statement of the reasons why appellate

review of her claim is proper, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). See Appellant’s

Brief, at 13-17. Finally, Appellant established that she has raised a substantial

question as to the propriety of her sentence under the Sentencing Code. See

Commonwealth v. Dodge, 77 A.3d 1263, 1272-73 (Pa. Super. 2013)

(recognizing that a claim of an excessive sentence, coupled with a claim that

mitigating evidence was not adequately considered by the trial court, may

raise a substantial question for appellate review).

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We now consider the substantive merits of Appellant’s sentencing claim.

At a sentencing hearing, the trial court "shall follow the general principle that

the sentence imposed should call for confinement that is consistent with the

protection of the public, the gravity of the offense . . . and the rehabilitative

needs of the defendant." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). Sentencing is a matter

vested in the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent

a manifest abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Akhmedov, 216 A.3d

307, 328 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citing Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 109 A.3d

711, 731 (Pa. Super. 2015)).

An abuse of discretion is not merely an error in judgment, rather a

defendant must establish that the sentencing court misapplied the law or

exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, or

arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision. Commonwealth v. Nevels,

203 A.3d 229, 247 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citing Commonwealth v. Cook, 941

A.2d 7, 11-12 (Pa. Super. 2007)).

In the present case, the trial court acted within its discretion, as

Appellant’s mitigating evidence was fully considered. The sentence imposed

was within the standard guidelines range, and it was not unreasonable or

excessive in light of the circumstances of Appellant’s offenses.

“[W]hen a court possesses a pre-sentence report, it is presumed the

court ‘was aware of and weighed all relevant information contained in the

report along with any mitigating sentencing factors.’” Commonwealth v.

Velez, 273 A.3d 6, 10 (Pa. Super. 2022) (quoting Commonwealth v. Marts,

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889 A.2d 608, 615 (Pa. Super. 2005)). The balancing of mitigating and

aggravating factors “is [within] the sole province of the sentencing court,”

Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 313 A.3d 265, 286 (Pa. Super. 2024), and

this Court “cannot reweigh sentencing factors and impose judgment in place

of the sentencing court where the lower court was fully aware of all mitigating

factors.” Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Kurtz, 294 A.3d 509, 536 (Pa. Super.

2023)).

In fashioning an individualized sentence, courts are directed to consider

“the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the

impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative

needs of the defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). Weighing these factors is

within the province of the sentencing court, and an appellate court cannot

substitute its own judgment in weighing those factors. See Commonwealth

v. Walls, 926 A.2d 957, 966 (Pa. 2007).

It is unnecessary for the trial court to “parrot the words of the

Sentencing Code” when balancing the factors of 42 Pa.C.S.A. 9721(b).

Commonwealth v. Coulverson, 34 A.3d 135, 145 (Pa. Super. 2011)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Feucht, 955 A.2d 377, 383 (Pa. Super. 2008)).

“[A]lthough a court is required to explain its reasons for imposing sentence,

it need not specifically cite or include the language of the sentencing code, it

must only demonstrate that the court had considered the factors specified in

the code.” Commonwealth v. Fish, 752 A.2d 921, 924 (Pa. Super. 2000)

(internal citations and quotations omitted).

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“The sentencing judge can satisfy the requirement that reasons for

imposing sentence be placed on the record by indicating that he or she has

been informed by the [PSI]; thus properly considering and weighing all

relevant factors.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 275 A.3d 530, 535 (Pa. Super.

2022) (quoting Commonwealth v. Ventura, 975 A.2d 1128, 1135 (Pa.

Super. 2009)).

The trial court in this case had the benefit of Appellant’s PSI and MHE.

See N.T. Sentencing Hearing, 7/10/2024, at 4. The trial court is therefore

presumed to have considered all relevant mitigation evidence. See

Commonwealth v. Pollard, 832 A.2d 517, 526 (Pa. Super. 2003). Appellant

has been unable to cite anything in the record which rebuts that presumption.

To the contrary, she only reiterates the content of her PSI and MHR that were

entered into evidence at sentencing. See Appellant’s Brief, at 13–14. In

substance, then, Appellant’s argument is not that the trial court failed to

consider her evidence of mitigating factors, “but rather that the court weighed

those factors in a manner inconsistent with [her] wishes.” Commonwealth

v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1255 (Pa. Super. 2014).

Further, the trial court explicitly stated that it had fully considered

Appellant’s evidence of mitigating factors, explaining that it had compelled the

trial court to impose a prison term below the maximum possible sentence.

See N.T. Sentencing Hearing, 7/10/2024, at 55–57. Indeed, the trial court

made it clear that “without mitigation . . . [the] sentence would have been 25

to 50 years,” as the maximum sentence “would have given” without

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“hesitancy.” N.T. Sentencing Hearing, 7/10/2024, at 55. In further

acknowledgment of Appellant’s background, the trial court recommended that

she receive mental health treatment while serving her sentence. See id., at

56.

Later, at the hearing on Appellant’s motion for reconsideration, the trial

court again elaborated on its consideration of her mitigation evidence. See

Sentencing Hearing, 7/29/2024, at 14-15. The trial court noted Appellant’s

“horrific background,” but weighed it against the torture and death of the child

victim. Id. On these facts, the record and applicable law do not support

Appellant’s contention that the trial court failed to take into account her

mitigating evidence, or that her sentence is manifestly excessive. Thus,

because the trial court did not abuse its discretion, Appellant’s claim has no

merit, and the order on review must be upheld.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 5/20/2025

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