J-S43028-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : CURTIS WILFORD ROCHESTER : : Appellant : No. 1146 EDA 2025
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 27, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-15-CR-0002124-2023
BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED MARCH 2, 2026
Curtis Wilford Rochester appeals from the judgment of sentence entered
following his convictions for simple assault (mutual combat), recklessly
endangering another person (“REAP”), and harassment.1 He challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm.
The Commonwealth charged Rochester with the above-referenced
offenses for his assault of his then-girlfriend. He was also charged with
aggravated assault. Rochester proceeded with a jury trial. The trial court
summarized the factual history of this case as follows:
This is a case where [Rochester] and the victim were romantically involved and on April 21, 2023 an argument led to [Rochester] punching the victim’s face repeatedly with his fist causing extensive swelling and bruising. [Rochester] beat the much smaller victim knowing she had a heart condition and was taking blood thinners but ____________________________________________
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2701(a)(1), 2705, and 2709(a)(1), respectively. J-S43028-25
[Rochester] did not take the victim to get medical treatment, instead participating in attempts to conceal the victim’s injuries with makeup.
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, filed 8/5/25, at 1.
The jury returned guilty verdicts for simple assault and REAP but found
Rochester not guilty of aggravated assault. The court then found Rochester
guilty of the summary offense of harassment. The court sentenced Rochester
to nine to 23 months’ incarceration, followed by one year of reporting
probation. Rochester filed a motion for a new trial, which the trial court denied.
This timely appeal followed.
Rochester presents the following claim:
Did the lower court abuse its discretion when it denied [Rochester’s] Motion for Judgment of Acquittal/Motion- Challenge to the Sufficiency of the Evidence: to wit, was the evidence legally and factually sufficient to prove the crime of [REAP] when they found [Rochester] not guilty of Aggravated Assault but guilty of Simple Assault-mutual combat.
Rochester’s Br. at 8.2
Rochester claims that the Commonwealth presented insufficient
evidence to sustain his REAP conviction. He maintains that the acquittal for
aggravated assault shows that the jury “concluded that [Rochester] did not
attempt to cause serious bodily injury or caused such injury intentionally,
knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference
to the value of human life.” Id. at 16. He points out that, on the other hand,
____________________________________________
2 Rochester also raised a weight claim but states that he “withdraws this challenge.” Rochester’s Br. at 8.
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the jury convicted him of simple assault (mutual combat), which requires
proof that he attempted to cause or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly
caused bodily injury. He infers from these verdicts that the jury did not find
that he “recklessly caus[ed] injury under circumstances manifesting extreme
indifference to the value of human life,” which, in his view, is the mens rea for
REAP. Id. He thus maintains that the jury concluded that his actions did not
amount to the behavior required for REAP. See id. at 21.
He further argues that the evidence did not support a finding that his
conduct created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury. He points
out that “those who knew the victim and observed the victim did not feel it
necessary to summon medical assistance.” Id. at 20. He references the
testimony of some witnesses, including the victim herself, stating that they
had not requested medical assistance for the victim. See id. at 17-20. He
cites Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 747 A.2d 910 (Pa.Super. 2000), asserting
that in that case, this Court held that the Commonwealth must prove that the
defendant’s conduct created an actual risk rather than a hypothetical danger.
Id. at 14.
When performing sufficiency review, we determine “whether[,] viewing
all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict
winner, there [was] sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Enix,
192 A.3d 78, 81 (Pa.Super. 2018) (citation omitted). The Commonwealth may
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sustain its burden “by means of wholly circumstantial evidence.” Id. (citation
omitted).
Rochester arguably waived his arguments because the trial transcripts
are not in the certified record. See Pa.R.A.P. 1921, note (“An appellate court
may consider only the facts which have been duly certified in the record on
appeal”). However, Rochester has included a copy of them in the reproduced
record, and the Commonwealth does not dispute the accuracy of the copy in
the reproduced record. In such a case, we may consider the copy in the
reproduced record. Commonwealth v. Brown, 52 A.3d 1139, 1145 n.4 (Pa.
2012). We exercise our discretion to do so here and conduct review based on
the copy in the reproduced record.
Rochester’s arguments lack merit. A person is guilty of simple assault if
the person “attempts to cause or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes
bodily injury to another.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(1). Attempt requires the
Commonwealth to prove specific intent. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 901(a).
Aggravated assault occurs when a person “attempts to cause serious
bodily injury to another, or causes such injury intentionally, knowingly or
recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value
of human life.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1). Serious bodily injury is “[b]odily
injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious,
permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of
any bodily member or organ.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2301. The mens rea of
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aggravated assault is malice. Commonwealth v. Packer, 168 A.3d 161, 168
(Pa. 2017).
The crime of REAP occurs when a person “recklessly engages in conduct
which places or may place another person in danger of death or serious bodily
injury.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705. It “requires the creation of danger, so the
Commonwealth must prove the existence of an actual present ability to inflict
harm to another.” Commonwealth v. Shaw, 203 A.3d 281, 284 (Pa.Super.
2019). The mens rea for REAP is recklessness. Commonwealth v. Reynolds,
835 A.2d 720, 727 (Pa.Super. 2003).
REAP and aggravated assault require proof of different mental states.
REAP’s mens rea is recklessness, which entails a conscious disregard of a
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J-S43028-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : CURTIS WILFORD ROCHESTER : : Appellant : No. 1146 EDA 2025
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 27, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-15-CR-0002124-2023
BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED MARCH 2, 2026
Curtis Wilford Rochester appeals from the judgment of sentence entered
following his convictions for simple assault (mutual combat), recklessly
endangering another person (“REAP”), and harassment.1 He challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm.
The Commonwealth charged Rochester with the above-referenced
offenses for his assault of his then-girlfriend. He was also charged with
aggravated assault. Rochester proceeded with a jury trial. The trial court
summarized the factual history of this case as follows:
This is a case where [Rochester] and the victim were romantically involved and on April 21, 2023 an argument led to [Rochester] punching the victim’s face repeatedly with his fist causing extensive swelling and bruising. [Rochester] beat the much smaller victim knowing she had a heart condition and was taking blood thinners but ____________________________________________
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2701(a)(1), 2705, and 2709(a)(1), respectively. J-S43028-25
[Rochester] did not take the victim to get medical treatment, instead participating in attempts to conceal the victim’s injuries with makeup.
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, filed 8/5/25, at 1.
The jury returned guilty verdicts for simple assault and REAP but found
Rochester not guilty of aggravated assault. The court then found Rochester
guilty of the summary offense of harassment. The court sentenced Rochester
to nine to 23 months’ incarceration, followed by one year of reporting
probation. Rochester filed a motion for a new trial, which the trial court denied.
This timely appeal followed.
Rochester presents the following claim:
Did the lower court abuse its discretion when it denied [Rochester’s] Motion for Judgment of Acquittal/Motion- Challenge to the Sufficiency of the Evidence: to wit, was the evidence legally and factually sufficient to prove the crime of [REAP] when they found [Rochester] not guilty of Aggravated Assault but guilty of Simple Assault-mutual combat.
Rochester’s Br. at 8.2
Rochester claims that the Commonwealth presented insufficient
evidence to sustain his REAP conviction. He maintains that the acquittal for
aggravated assault shows that the jury “concluded that [Rochester] did not
attempt to cause serious bodily injury or caused such injury intentionally,
knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference
to the value of human life.” Id. at 16. He points out that, on the other hand,
____________________________________________
2 Rochester also raised a weight claim but states that he “withdraws this challenge.” Rochester’s Br. at 8.
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the jury convicted him of simple assault (mutual combat), which requires
proof that he attempted to cause or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly
caused bodily injury. He infers from these verdicts that the jury did not find
that he “recklessly caus[ed] injury under circumstances manifesting extreme
indifference to the value of human life,” which, in his view, is the mens rea for
REAP. Id. He thus maintains that the jury concluded that his actions did not
amount to the behavior required for REAP. See id. at 21.
He further argues that the evidence did not support a finding that his
conduct created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury. He points
out that “those who knew the victim and observed the victim did not feel it
necessary to summon medical assistance.” Id. at 20. He references the
testimony of some witnesses, including the victim herself, stating that they
had not requested medical assistance for the victim. See id. at 17-20. He
cites Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 747 A.2d 910 (Pa.Super. 2000), asserting
that in that case, this Court held that the Commonwealth must prove that the
defendant’s conduct created an actual risk rather than a hypothetical danger.
Id. at 14.
When performing sufficiency review, we determine “whether[,] viewing
all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict
winner, there [was] sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Enix,
192 A.3d 78, 81 (Pa.Super. 2018) (citation omitted). The Commonwealth may
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sustain its burden “by means of wholly circumstantial evidence.” Id. (citation
omitted).
Rochester arguably waived his arguments because the trial transcripts
are not in the certified record. See Pa.R.A.P. 1921, note (“An appellate court
may consider only the facts which have been duly certified in the record on
appeal”). However, Rochester has included a copy of them in the reproduced
record, and the Commonwealth does not dispute the accuracy of the copy in
the reproduced record. In such a case, we may consider the copy in the
reproduced record. Commonwealth v. Brown, 52 A.3d 1139, 1145 n.4 (Pa.
2012). We exercise our discretion to do so here and conduct review based on
the copy in the reproduced record.
Rochester’s arguments lack merit. A person is guilty of simple assault if
the person “attempts to cause or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes
bodily injury to another.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(1). Attempt requires the
Commonwealth to prove specific intent. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 901(a).
Aggravated assault occurs when a person “attempts to cause serious
bodily injury to another, or causes such injury intentionally, knowingly or
recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value
of human life.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1). Serious bodily injury is “[b]odily
injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious,
permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of
any bodily member or organ.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2301. The mens rea of
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aggravated assault is malice. Commonwealth v. Packer, 168 A.3d 161, 168
(Pa. 2017).
The crime of REAP occurs when a person “recklessly engages in conduct
which places or may place another person in danger of death or serious bodily
injury.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705. It “requires the creation of danger, so the
Commonwealth must prove the existence of an actual present ability to inflict
harm to another.” Commonwealth v. Shaw, 203 A.3d 281, 284 (Pa.Super.
2019). The mens rea for REAP is recklessness. Commonwealth v. Reynolds,
835 A.2d 720, 727 (Pa.Super. 2003).
REAP and aggravated assault require proof of different mental states.
REAP’s mens rea is recklessness, which entails a conscious disregard of a
substantial and unjustifiable risk:
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and intent of the actor’s conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the actor’s situation.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 302(b)(3).
Aggravated assault requires malice. Malice is “wickedness of disposition,
hardness of heart, cruelty, recklessness of consequences, and a mind
regardless of social, although a particular person may not be intended to be
injured.” Commonwealth v. Kling, 731 A.2d 145, 147-48 (Pa.Super. 1999)
(citation omitted). A showing of recklessness is not enough to prove malice:
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Where malice is based on a reckless disregard of consequences, it is not sufficient to show mere recklessness; rather, it must be shown the defendant consciously disregarded an unjustified and extremely high risk that his actions might cause death or serious bodily injury. A defendant must display a conscious disregard for almost certain death or injury such that it is tantamount to an actual desire to injure or kill; at the very least, the conduct must be such that one could reasonably anticipate death or serious bodily injury would likely and logically result.
Id. at 148 (citations omitted).
Rochester’s argument thus fails on its own terms. Whatever the jury
may have found regarding Rochester’s mental state when it acquitted him of
aggravated assault did not preclude it from convicting him of REAP.
Moreover, the acquittal for aggravated assault is not a basis on which
to invalidate the REAP conviction. Rochester essentially relies on the
inconsistency in the verdicts. However, “[a]n acquittal cannot be interpreted
as a specific finding in relation to some of the evidence.” Commonwealth v.
Moore, 103 A.3d 1240, 1250 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted, alteration in
original).
“Consistency in verdicts in criminal cases is not necessary.”
Commonwealth v. Miller, 657 A.2d 946, 948 (Pa.Super. 1995) (citation
omitted). This Court has stated that “[t]he rationale for allowing inconsistent
verdicts is that it is the jury’s sole prerogative to decide on which counts to
convict in order to provide a defendant with sufficient punishment.” Id.
(citation omitted). Therefore, where there is evidence to support the verdict,
we “will not disturb guilty verdicts on the basis of apparent inconsistencies[.]”
Id. (citation omitted). Here, the evidence supports the verdict.
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Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
the evidence sufficiently established that Rochester recklessly engaged in
conduct that placed the victim in danger of serious bodily injury. The victim
testified that Rochester punched her repeatedly in the face, with her head
hitting the hardwood floor repeatedly. See N.T., Trial, 11/7/24, at 43-47. The
beating resulted in the victim’s face being swollen and caused bruises to her
eyes, lip, and cheek. See N.T., Trial, 11/6/24, at 29; N.T., 11/7/24, at 64.
Rochester knew that the victim had had a heart transplant and was on blood
thinners, as he told the responding officer as much. N.T., 11/6/24, at 25-26.
The extent of her injuries also demonstrates that Rochester had the actual
present ability to inflict harm on the victim. Furthermore, Rochester’s
reference to Hopkins is misplaced. Rochester’s conduct created an actual risk
for the victim, not a hypothetical danger, especially considering her heart
condition. No relief is due.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Date: 3/2/2026
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