Com. v. Robinson, D.

Opinion

J-S36021-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : DARIEN CHARLES ROBINSON : : Appellant : No. 768 MDA 2024

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 5, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-41-CR-0000726-2023

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED: DECEMBER 19, 2024

Darien Charles Robinson appeals from the judgment of sentence entered

following his conviction for criminal trespass1 following a non-jury trial.

Robinson challenges the sufficiency and the weight of the evidence and the

discretionary aspects of his sentence. We affirm.

The Commonwealth charged Robinson with criminal trespass and

harassment following his entry into the home of Danielle Wertz (“Victim”).

Evidence of the following was presented at trial.

Victim testified that on May 26, 2023, she was at her home by herself

taking a shower when she heard the bathroom door and the shower curtain

open. N.T. Trial, 11/1/23, at 5-6. She then saw Robinson standing there

staring at her. Id. at 6. Robinson made a sexual comment to her, and she ____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(a)(1)(i). J-S36021-24

screamed for him to leave the house. Id. She stated that she had left her

front door unlocked since it was a nice day, and she frequently left her door

unlocked because she has “good neighbors.” Id. at 6, 18.

When Victim saw Robinson in her bathroom, she grabbed her phone off

the bathroom sink, wrapped herself in a towel, and followed Robinson down

the stairs while he exited her house. Id. at 6-7. Once outside while still in a

towel, Victim called her mother, who lived close by. Id. She then called 911

and took a photograph of Robinson’s vehicle from her front porch as he drove

away from her residence. Id. at 6-8. Victim’s mother arrived at her house

within two minutes. Id. at 9. The Commonwealth played Victim’s 911 call to

the court. Id. at 9-10.

Victim stated that she had previously been in an “on-and-off”

relationship with Robinson for five years, but she had stopped all contact with

him approximately seven to nine months prior to this incident. Id. at 11-12,

20. She stated that she had moved and changed her phone number because

she did not want Robinson to know where she was. Id. at 17. Victim testified

that she never gave Robinson her new address and neither she nor her fiancé

ever invited him over to their house. Id. at 11.

Victim’s mother testified that when she arrived at Victim’s house, Victim

was “hysterical.” Id. at 24. Victim’s mother also stated that Robinson showed

up at her house looking for Victim a few months prior to this incident and she

“suggested him to just leave [Victim] alone.” Id. at 23.

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Officer William Hagemeyer, Jr. was the responding police officer on the

scene and testified that when he arrived at Victim’s house, Victim was “very

hysterical, upset” and had been crying. Id. at 27. Victim told Officer

Hagemeyer what happened and showed him the photograph that she took of

Robinson’s vehicle. Id. He was able to zoom in on the photograph and read

the vehicle’s registration plate, which he traced back to Robinson. Id. at 28.

Officer Hagemeyer did not recall the exact details that Victim told him of her

past relationship with Robinson, but stated “she had said that she ended the

whatever relationship that they had had and she had been trying to avoid

contact with him for a period time, and he persisted and was reaching out to

family members and friends to try to find her.” Id. at 29.

Robinson testified that he went to Victim’s house on May 26, 2023, with

the intention of retrieving some of his belongings, including his PlayStation,

TVs, jewelry, clothes, and alligator. Id. at 36-37. He stated that he had lived

in Victim’s previous house with her and had left his belongings there when he

was picked up by the police on a felony warrant on unrelated charges. Id. at

35, 36. Robinson said that when he approached Victim’s house on May 26,

2023, he asked Victim about his belongings. Id. at 38. He testified that he did

not enter Victim’s house. Id. at 37-38. Robinson stated Victim became upset

and told him to leave. Id. at 38. He said that he left when Victim told him to

leave. Id.

At the conclusion of the trial, the Commonwealth withdrew the charge

of harassment, and the court found Robinson guilty on the criminal trespass

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charge. Id. at 43-44. The court sentenced Robinson to 16 months to six years’

incarceration, with credit for time served, and various conditions for parole.

Robinson filed a post-sentence motion. After hearing argument on the motion,

the court denied it. This appeal followed.

Robinson raises the following issues:

1. Whether the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence of all the elements of the charged offense, such that he could be proven guilty of [c]riminal [t]respass?

2. Whether [Robinson’s] conviction is against the weight of the evidence, such that he could not be proven guilty of [c]riminal [t]respass?

3. Whether the sentencing court abused its discretion by imposing a manifestly excessive sentence without sufficiently considering the fundamental norms underlying the sentencing process?

Robinson’s Br. at 8.

Robinson first argues the evidence was insufficient to establish criminal

trespass. Id. at 12. He argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove he

entered Victim’s house. Id. He points to his testimony that he did not enter

the home and was only there to retrieve his belongings. Id. Robinson

maintains that Victim “admitted to making false statements to police officers

and in her written report about her and [Robinson’s] relationship” and

“significantly downplayed her relationship with [him] to officers on the scene.”

Id. at 12-13. He concludes that Victim’s “testimony was insufficient to find

him guilty of criminal trespass.” Id. at 13.

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The sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law. Therefore, “[o]ur

standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary.”

Commonwealth v. Mikitiuk, 213 A.3d 290, 300 (Pa.Super. 2019). When

reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we “must determine

whether the evidence admitted at trial, and all reasonable inferences drawn

therefrom, when viewed in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth as

verdict winner, support the conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Commonwealth v. Feliciano, 67 A.3d 19, 23 (Pa.Super. 2013) (en banc)

(citation omitted). “Where there is sufficient evidence to enable the trier of

fact to find every element of the crime has been established beyond a

reasonable doubt, the sufficiency of the evidence claim must fail.” Id. (citation

omitted). This standard applies equally where the Commonwealth’s evidence

is circumstantial. Commonwealth v. Patterson, 180 A.3d 1217, 1229

(Pa.Super. 2018). The factfinder, “while passing on the credibility of the

witnesses and the weight of the evidence — is free to believe all, part, or none

of the evidence.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 172 A.3d 632, 640 (Pa.Super.

2017). This Court “may not substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder.”

Commonwealth v. Griffith, 305 A.3d 573, 576 (Pa.Super. 2023), appeal

denied, 319 A.3d 503 (Pa. 2024).

A person is guilty of criminal trespass where “knowing that he is not

licensed or privileged to do so, he . . . enters, gains entry by subterfuge or

surreptitiously remains in any building or occupied structure or separately

secured or occupied portion[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(a)(1)(i). An occupied

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structure is “[a]ny structure, vehicle or place adapted for overnight

accommodations of persons, or for carrying on business therein, whether or

not a person is actually present.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3501. Thus, the

Commonwealth must prove that the defendant (1) knew he was not licensed

or privileged to enter the premises and (2) entered the premises. See

Commonwealth v. Jackson, 10 A.3d 341, 346 (Pa.Super. 2010).

Here, the trial court found that the evidence was sufficient to support

Robinson’s conviction for criminal trespass. It found Victim’s testimony that

Robinson entered her residence to be credible over Robinson’s testimony that

he did not enter the house. See Trial Court Opinion, filed 1/11/24, at 5. At

the conclusion of the trial, the court explained its reasoning:

Mr. Robinson, I have to be honest with you. This--this isn’t even a close call. It’s not a question as to whether or not the Commonwealth has proven you guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the [c]ourt’s satisfied that they’ve proven you guilty beyond all doubt.

It is--it is clear that you and the victim had a long term on again/off again relationship. It’s also clear that she minimized the nature and extent of that relationship when she was talking to the police. But it’s also clear to the [c]ourt that that relationship had ended in 2022. That she told you the relationship was over. That her fianc[é] told you to leave her alone. That her mother told you to leave her alone. That she moved to an address that she did not give you so that you could not find her, and she changed her phone number so that you couldn’t communicate with her any longer.

It is also clear that you continued to question and harass her friends and family trying to find out where she lived. That you showed up at her house uninvited. That you walked into that house uninvited. Into her home and into the bathroom where she was taking a shower, and candidly your

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claim that you simply came to the house and spoke to her on the front porch is really not believable.

The--the [c]ourt finds that the credible testimony of each of the Commonwealth’s witnesses has established your guilt beyond a reasonable doubt[.]

N.T. Trial at 44-45. In finding Victim to be credible, the court also considered

the testimony of other witnesses that “at the time of the incident[, Victim]

was hysterical and upset and shaking [which] all corroborates that it happened

exactly the way that [Victim] said it did[.]” Id. at 49.

The trial court’s findings are supported by the record, and we agree with

it that the evidence was sufficient. The trial court, as factfinder, was free to

“believe all, part, or none of the evidence,” and it was solely the court’s

purview to determine the credibility of witnesses. Miller, 172 A.3d at 640.

The court found Victim’s testimony credible that Robinson entered her home.

The evidence showed that Robinson knew that he was not licensed or

privileged to enter the home, as Victim had cut off contact with him months

prior to the incident, did not inform him of her new address, and conveyed

through family members that she did not want to see him. Viewed in the light

most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence was sufficient to support

the factfinder’s conclusion that Robinson was guilty of criminal trespass.

Robinson next argues that the verdict was against the weight of the

evidence. Robinson’s Br. at 13. He incorporates the same argument that he

set forth in his sufficiency of evidence challenge and requests that a new trial

be granted. Id.

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“We review a trial court’s order denying a weight challenge for an abuse

of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Fallon, 275 A.3d 1099, 1107 (Pa.Super.

2022). Because the trial court heard the testimony firsthand, we must “give

the gravest consideration to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial

judge when reviewing a trial court’s determination that the verdict is against

the weight of the evidence.” Id. (citation omitted). “To successfully challenge

the weight of the evidence, a defendant must prove the evidence is so

tenuous, vague and uncertain that the verdict shocks the conscience of the

court.” Commonwealth v. Windslowe, 158 A.3d 698, 712 (Pa.Super. 2017)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Further, “[t]he weight of the

evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact who is free to believe all, part, or

none of the evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses.”

Commonwealth v. Champney, 832 A.2d 403, 408 (Pa. 2003) (citation

omitted). “When the challenge to the weight of the evidence is predicated on

the credibility of trial testimony, our review of the trial court’s decision is

extremely limited.” Commonwealth v. Bowen, 55 A.3d 1254, 1262

(Pa.Super. 2012) (citation omitted).

Here, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in finding

the verdict did not shock the conscience. The court was free to believe all,

part, or none of the evidence presented in judging the credibility of the

witnesses and credited the Commonwealth’s witnesses. Champney, 832 A.2d

at 408. No relief is due.

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Robinson’s final argument is that his sentence was manifestly excessive. This

goes to the discretionary aspects of his sentence. “The right to appellate

review of the discretionary aspects of a sentence is not absolute, and [the

issue] must be considered a petition for permission to appeal.”

Commonwealth v. Conte, 198 A.3d 1169, 1173 (Pa.Super. 2018). Before

reviewing the merits of Robinson’s claim, we must determine whether:

(1) the appeal was timely; (2) the appellant has preserved his issue; (3) his brief includes a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of an appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of his sentence; and (4) the concise statement raises a substantial question whether the sentence is inappropriate under the Sentencing Code.

Commonwealth v. Green, 204 A.3d 469, 488 (Pa.Super. 2019); see also

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) (stating that an appellant who challenges the discretionary

aspects of a sentence “shall set forth in a separate section of the brief a

concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with

respect to the discretionary aspects of a sentence”).

Here, Robinson timely appealed and preserved his challenge in a post-

sentence motion. He has included a Rule 2119(f) statement in his brief and

raises a substantial question claiming that his sentence is excessive and

unreasonable, and the court overlooked mitigating factors. See Robinson’s Br.

at 11, 14-15; Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 770 (Pa.Super.

2015) (en banc) (“an excessive sentence claim – in conjunction with an

assertion that the court failed to consider mitigating factors – raises a

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substantial question”) (citation omitted). Therefore, we will address

Robinson’s sentencing claim on the merits.

Robinson argues that the court failed to consider his hardships as a child

and the lapse in time between his current offense and most of his previous

criminal offenses. Robinson’s Br. at 15. He further argues that the court placed

too much weight on the nature of the crime and the parties’ prior relationship.

Id. He concludes that his sentence “at the top end of the standard range with

a [six]-year parole tail, more than [four] times his minimum[, was] manifestly

excessive.” Id.

“Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing

judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse

of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Edwards, 194 A.3d 625, 637 (Pa.Super.

2018) (citation omitted). An abuse of discretion occurs where “the sentencing

court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of

partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable

decision.” Id. (citation omitted). In imposing a sentence, the sentencing court

must consider “the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it

relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the

rehabilitative needs of the defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b).

Where the court has the benefit of a pre-sentence investigation (“PSI”)

report, we presume the court was aware of all appropriate sentencing factors

and considerations and consider the requirement that the court place its

reasoning on the record to be satisfied. Commonwealth v. Johnson-

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Daniels, 167 A.3d 17, 26 (Pa.Super. 2017). In conducting appellate review,

we may not reweigh the sentencing factors and impose our own judgment in

place of that of the trial court. See Commonwealth v. Macias, 968 A.2d

773, 778 (Pa.Super. 2009).

Here, the court reviewed the PSI report at the sentencing hearing, which

included information about Robinson’s criminal history, education,

employment history, upbringing with drug-addicted parents, and his own drug

use. N.T. Sentencing, 1/5/24, at 3-7. The court also reviewed Robinson’s prior

record score and offense gravity score. Id. at 7. It also heard defense

counsel’s argument regarding Robinson’s difficult childhood, in which he

highlighted how Robinson’s lack of parental care led him into crime. Id. at 8-

9. Robinson testified at the sentencing hearing that he wanted to “put [the

incident] behind” him and noted that his criminal record did not include violent

crime and that Victim was never in danger of him. Id. at 10.

Prior to imposing sentence, the court stated the following:

The [c]ourt wants to make clear that the sentence it intends to impose balances first the family and personal history that the [c]ourt is now aware of, including Mr. Robinson’s difficult childhood, but, ultimately, in imposing a sentence, the [c]ourt considers the following four factors:

First, [Robinson’s] failure to accept responsibility or demonstrate remorse in the face of clear evidence of his guilt. Secondly, that this trespass was outside the heartland of a typical trespass, in that [Robinson] entered an occupied residential structure and [Robinson’s] actions were a particularly egregious invasion of the victim’s privacy as he then confronted her while she was naked in the shower. It was clear at the time of trial that [Robinson’s] actions have caused particular upset and emotional distress to the victim

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[]. And, lastly, [Robinson] was on parole supervision for another felony at the time of this offense.

The [c]ourt finds that the totality of these factors would justify a sentence in the aggravated range. However, the [c]ourt declines to impose a sentence in the aggravated range but will impose a sentence at the top of the standard range. The [c]ourt finds that any lesser sentence would depreciate the seriousness of the offense.

Id. at 12-13.

The court did not abuse its discretion. The record belies Robinson’s

assertion that the court failed to adequately consider mitigating factors. The

court took into consideration the protection of the public, the gravity of the

offense, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant, as required under 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). Additionally, because the sentencing court considered

the PSI report, we presume the court was aware of all appropriate sentencing

factors. See Johnson- Daniels, 167 A.3d at 26. Because the court sentenced

Robinson within the standard range of the sentencing guidelines, albeit at the

high end of the range, we cannot conclude that the sentence is on its face

unduly excessive or unreasonable. See Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d

162, 171 (Pa.Super. 2010) (stating “where a sentence is within the standard

range of the guidelines, Pennsylvania law views the sentence as appropriate

under the Sentencing Code”).

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 12/19/2024

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