Com. v. Rivera, II, J.

2025 Pa. Super. 255

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: November 13, 2025
• Docket: 1105 EDA 2025
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S31013-25

2025 PA Super 255

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JOSE M. RIVERA, II : : Appellant : No. 1105 EDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 10, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-15-SA-0000011-2025

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and NICHOLS, J.

OPINION BY PANELLA, P.J.E.: FILED NOVEMBER 13, 2025

Jose M. Rivera, II appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in the

Court of Common Pleas of Chester County after he was convicted of exceeding

the maximum posted speed limit.1 After careful review, we affirm.

On the morning of September 28, 2024, Pennsylvania State Police

Trooper Kyle Schuetrum was conducting radar speed enforcement of vehicles

traveling westbound on Route 202 in East Whiteland Township, Chester

County. See N.T. Trial, 4/9/25, at 10. At approximately 7:44 a.m., Trooper

Schuetrum clocked a vehicle, driven by Rivera, traveling 71 mph in a 55-mph

zone. See id. at 11. Trooper Schuetrum followed the vehicle and observed it

change lanes without activating its right-hand turn signal as it exited Route

202. See id. at 11-12. Trooper Schuetrum initiated a traffic stop and informed

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1 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3362(a)(3). J-S31013-25

Rivera that he had been conducting speed enforcement and clocked Rivera’s

vehicle traveling at 71 mph. See id. at 12-13. However, Trooper Schuetrum

issued Rivera a citation for the lesser, zero-points offense of changing lanes

without signaling.2

Rivera pleaded not guilty to the lane change offense. At the summary

hearing held before the magisterial district court on January 8, 2025, Trooper

Schuetrum amended the citation to charge Rivera with speeding, as he “felt

more comfortable testifying to the original reason for the stop, which was

speed enforcement.” See id. at 13. The magisterial district judge found Rivera

guilty of speeding, and Rivera appealed.

On April 9, 2025, the trial court held a de novo summary appeal hearing

at which Rivera argued that the Commonwealth was time-barred from

proceeding with its prosecution pursuant to the applicable statute of

limitations because Trooper Schuetrum amended the citation to include the

speeding charge more than thirty days after he issued the original citation.

See id. at 20. The trial court found Rivera guilty of speeding and imposed a

fine of $57 plus costs of prosecution as well as four points on Rivera’s license.

See Verdict on Summary Appeal, 4/10/25.

2 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3334(a).

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Rivera timely filed a notice of appeal and a concise statement of errors

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The trial court filed

its opinion, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), on May 15, 2025.

On appeal, Rivera presents the following questions for our review:

(1) Was it [] error to allow the Commonwealth to proceed with its prosecution based on a summary traffic citation that was amended by the Commonwealth more than thirty [] days after the date of the offense and which charged the defendant with an entirely different offense?

(2) Was it error to allow the Commonwealth to proceed on an amended citation that failed to include a summary of the facts alleged, in violation of Criminal Rule 403(a)(6)[?]

Appellant’s Brief, at 2 (formatting altered; lower court answers omitted).

Rivera challenges his summary conviction of speeding.

Our standard of review from an appeal of a summary conviction heard de novo by the trial court is limited to a determination of whether the trial court committed an error of law and whether competent evidence supports the findings of fact. The adjudication of the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion exists when the trial court has rendered a judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, has failed to apply the law, or was motivated by partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will.

Commonwealth v. Ishankulov, 275 A.3d 498, 502 (Pa. Super. 2022)

(citations and quotation marks omitted).

In each issue, Rivera contends that the trial court erred in permitting

the Commonwealth to proceed with its prosecution based on the amended

traffic citation.

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When a law enforcement officer initiates a summary case by issuing a

citation, the officer “contemporaneously shall give the defendant a paper copy

of the citation containing all the information required by Rule 403.”

Pa.R.Crim.P. 405. Rule 403 requires that every citation contain, inter alia, “a

citation of the specific section and subsection of the statute or ordinance

allegedly violated, together with a summary of the facts sufficient to advise

the defendant of the nature of the offense charged[.]” Pa.R.Crim.P. 403(A)(6).

Where a citation is amended to correct a defect in form, content, or procedure,

Rule 109 instructs us as follows:

A defendant shall not be discharged nor shall a case be dismissed because of a defect in the form or content of a complaint, citation, summons, or warrant, or a defect in the procedures of these rules, unless the defendant raises the defect before the conclusion of the trial in a summary case … and the defect is prejudicial to the rights of the defendant.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 109. Critically, courts “cannot find the necessary prejudice if the

content of the citation, taken as a whole, prevented surprise as to the nature

of the summary offenses on which a defendant was found guilty at trial.”

Commonwealth v. Neitzel, 678 A.2d 369, 375 (Pa. Super. 1996) (citation

omitted).

In his first issue, Rivera alleges the Commonwealth’s prosecution of the

speeding offense is barred because Trooper Schuetrum’s amendment to the

citation occurred after the applicable statute of limitations expired. See

Appellant’s Brief, at 5-6. Specifically, Rivera maintains “[i]t is contrary to the

applicable rules, statutes, and case law to allow the Commonwealth, on

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January 8, 2025, more than three months after the events in this case took

place, to either issue a new citation or amend the existing citation to add an

entirely new and different charge.” Id. at 6-7. We disagree.

Pursuant to our Judicial Code, proceedings for a summary offense

involving a vehicle “must be commenced within 30 days after the commission

of the alleged offense[.]” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5553(a). Generally, the prosecution

of a summary traffic offense commences when a citation is issued. See 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 5552(e). However, the thirty-day statute of limitations period for

commencing a prosecution is tolled when “a prosecution against the accused

for the same conduct is pending in this Commonwealth[.]” 42 Pa.C.S.A. §

5554(2).

Here, Rivera committed the alleged summary traffic offenses on

September 28, 2024, and Trooper Schuetrum issued the original citation that

same date, thereby commencing the prosecution for statute of limitations

purposes. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5552(e), 5553(a). The statute of limitations

was tolled when Trooper Schuetrum amended the citation to include the

speeding offense on January 8, 2025, because a prosecution was pending

against Rivera in the Commonwealth for the same conduct. See 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 5554(2). Accordingly, contrary to Rivera’s assertions, Trooper Schuetrum’s

amendment to the original traffic citation did not violate the applicable statute

of limitations. See Com., Dept. of Transp. v. Palmer, 482 A.2d 1318, 1321

(Pa. Super. 1984) (finding amendment of citation more than thirty days after

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issuance did not implicate the statute of limitations where amendment did not

commence a new proceeding and both original and amended citations referred

to the same conduct).

Moreover, even if amending the citation to include the speeding charge

constituted a procedural error, Rivera’s claim would nonetheless fail because

he has not demonstrated that he was actually prejudiced by the amendment.

See Pa.R.Crim.P. 109. To support his argument, Rivera cites Commonwealth

v. Tyler, 324 A.3d 1205, 2024 WL 3272796, at *3 (Pa. Super. filed July 2,

2024) (unpublished memorandum),3 in which a panel of this Court reiterated

the various factors to be considered when passing upon the propriety of an

amendment to a criminal information pursuant to Rule 564. See Appellant’s

Brief, at 9-10. However, Rivera’s reliance on Tyler is misplaced, where here,

the proceedings against Rivera were initiated by the issuance of a citation,

and citation amendments are governed by Rule 109, opposed to Rule 564 as

Rivera incorrectly asserts. See id. at 8-9.

Upon considering Trooper Schuetrum’s testimony regarding his initial

encounter with Rivera during the traffic stop and the “content of the citation,

taken as a whole,” we cannot conclude that the amendment prejudiced or

surprised Rivera “as to the nature of the summary offenses on which [he] was

3 Although unpublished decisions filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for their persuasive value, for the reasons explained above, we do not find Tyler to be persuasive.

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found guilty at trial.” Neitzel, 678 A.2d at 375. Trooper Schuetrum informed

Rivera that he had pulled him over for speeding but instead opted to cite him

for the observed turning violation. The amended charge was based on the

same encounter and evolved out of the same factual scenario, i.e., the stop

of Rivera’s vehicle initiated by Trooper Schuetrum after he observed two

moving violations. Although Trooper Schuetrum graciously did not charge

Rivera with speeding in the original citation, he nonetheless indicated in the

citation that Rivera was speeding at 71 mph. See Traffic Citation, 9/28/24.

Rivera has offered no explanation as to how he was actually prejudiced at his

trial de novo, which occurred three months after his summary hearing and

afforded him ample time and opportunity to develop and present a defense to

the amended charge. Rather, as the court emphasized in the following

exchange at his trial de novo, Rivera again failed to present a defense to the

speeding charge:

The Court: [A]ny defect… in notice that may have occurred below, I find has been cured as of today. In other words, you knew what the trooper and the Commonwealth were going to proceed on as of today. You had time to prepare a defense. I did not hear a defense to the substantive charge of speeding. I do find that the trooper timely wrote the citation in terms of the statute of limitations. He initiated his prosecution within 30 days, and, in fact, the same day, and that any notice issues that may have occurred below were cured.

Mr. Rivera: You said [he] made a change the same day?

The Court: No. I said he initiated his prosecution under this set of facts and circumstances within 30 days, so he wrote the initial citation within 30 days. He charged you with a moving violation. He then changed that moving violation —

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Mr. Rivera: Months later.

The Court: I understand that. And the cure for that is to provide you notice and an opportunity to prepare your defense, which you had as of today. It doesn’t mean the ticket gets thrown out. That’s my ruling. It means that you get time to defend yourself against the new charge, the different charge that arises from the same set of facts and circumstances as the original charge. So that’s the purpose of getting this hearing here today, which you did, and I did not[] hear any defenses to the speeding[ charge].

N.T. Summary Appeal Hearing, 4/9/25, at 26-28 (unnecessary capitalization

omitted). Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court in

allowing the Commonwealth to proceed with its prosecution on the amended

citation.

In his second issue, Rivera alleges the trial court erred in permitting the

Commonwealth to proceed on a “facially defective” amended citation “which

fails to set forth a summary of the facts” in violation of Pa.R.Crim.P. 403(a)(6).

Appellant’s Brief, at 13, 6. We disagree.4

The factual summary set forth in a citation, as required by Rule

403(a)(6),

is meant to accurately describe the gravamen of the offense rather than lay out a blow-by-blow description of events. The summary must be sufficient to advise the defendant of the nature of the ____________________________________________

4 As a preliminary matter, we note that in its brief, the Commonwealth maintains Rivera waived this issue by raising it for the first time on appeal, in violation of Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). See Appellee’s Brief, at 10-11. However, we decline to find waiver, as Rivera presented this argument in a document that the court admitted into evidence at trial. See Exhibit D1, 4/9/25. However, for the reasons explained below, even if the issue were waived, it does not merit relief.

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offense charged, notifying him of the pending prosecution and affording him a chance to defend himself. The description of the offense is adequate as long as it advises the defendant of the nature of the charge and does not cause surprise which is prejudicial.

Commonwealth v. Lopata, 754 A.2d 685, 687 (Pa. Super. 2000) (quotation

marks and citations omitted).

Rivera maintains that the summary of facts set forth in the amended

traffic citation was “inadequate to support the amended charge of []

speeding.” Appellant’s Brief, at 14. Much of Rivera’s argument is centered on

his belief that the citation contains a “substantive defect,” which in his view,

permits discharge of a defendant pursuant to Rule 109, whereas an “informal

defect” does not warrant discharge. Id. However, the comments to Rule 109

expressly preclude an argument premised on any such distinction in the type

of defect a citation contains:

This rule clarifies when a defendant should be discharged or a case dismissed because of a defect; it eliminates disputes as to what is an informal defect or a substantive defect. As a condition of relief regardless of whether the defect is in form, content, or procedure, the court or issuing authority must determine that there is actual prejudice to the rights of the defendant.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 109, Comment.

Although Trooper Schuetrum described the nature of the offense as

“turned or changed lanes without safety and or without signaling” in the

amended citation, see Traffic Citation, 9/28/24 (unnecessary capitalization

omitted), Rivera has failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by any

inadequacy in the amended citation’s content. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 109. Rather,

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Rivera summarily assumes that he was prejudiced merely because Trooper

Schuetrum failed to amend the citation’s factual summary when he amended

the charge to speeding and ignores that the additional information contained

in the amended citation, taken as a whole, adequately informed him of the

nature of the summary offense with which he was charged. See Neitzel, 678

A.2d at 375. Specifically, the amended citation included a citation to the

specific section of the speeding statue Rivera was charged pursuant to and

indicated that Rivera’s actual speed of travel was 71 mph, while the maximum

allowed speed was 55 mph. See Traffic Citation, 9/28/24. Therefore, Rivera

is not entitled to dismissal of the speeding charge based on any defect in the

amended citation’s factual summary. Again, we discern no abuse of discretion

by the trial court in allowing the Commonwealth’s prosecution to proceed on

the amended citation.

For the foregoing reasons, Rivera is not entitled to relief, and we affirm

his judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 11/13/2025

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