J-S27022-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : ANGEL RIVERA : No. 218 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Order Entered December 10, 2021 In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0001363-2021
BEFORE: STABILE, J., NICHOLS, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 28, 2022
The Commonwealth appeals from the order granting Appellee Angel
Rivera’s motion to suppress statements Appellee made and evidence seized
following a traffic stop.1 The Commonwealth contends that the trial court
abused its discretion or committed an error of law in granting Appellee’s
suppression motion. After careful review, we reverse and remand for further
proceedings.
The record reflects that on September 12, 2020, at 1:41 p.m., Trooper
Henry Kim of the Pennsylvania State Police was on patrol on Interstate 95 in ____________________________________________
1 In its notice of appeal, the Commonwealth certified that the trial court’s suppression order would terminate or substantially handicap the prosecution of its case. See Pa.R.A.P. 311(d) (stating that “in a criminal case, under the circumstances provided by law, the Commonwealth may take an appeal as of right from an order that does not end the entire case where the Commonwealth certifies in the notice of appeal that the order will terminate or substantially handicap the prosecution”). Notice of Appeal, 1/6/22; see also Commonwealth’s Brief at 1. J-S27022-22
Delaware County. N.T., 10/22/21, at 11. Trooper Kim testified that he
observed a tan sedan travelling faster than surrounding vehicles and following
too closely behind the vehicle ahead of it. The trooper followed the tan vehicle
and witnessed it cross the center line of the highway. Trooper Kim activated
his emergency lights and sirens and directed the driver of the tan vehicle to
pull over. When the vehicle pulled to the side of the highway, Trooper Kim
noted that the two occupants of the car were acting suspiciously and moving
back and forth in their seats, and he saw the driver extended his arm toward
the passenger. Id. at 11-15. The trooper exited his patrol car and approached
the tan vehicle. Id. at 17-19. The trooper asked the driver for his license,
insurance, and registration. Id. at 50. The driver indicated that the vehicle
belonged to his wife. Id. at 23. When the trooper reached the vehicle he
testified that the driver’s eyes looked “pinpoint,” and his experience led him
to conclude that this was an indication of drug intoxication, possibly opioids.
Id. at 19-20. The trooper testified that at this point, the motor vehicle stop
shifted to a possible instance of driving under the influence. Id. at 20.
Trooper Kim stated that the driver’s behavior appeared nervous, shaky, and
erratic, and therefore, the trooper asked the driver to exit the vehicle. Id. at
21-22. The trooper informed the driver that for his safety he was going to
conduct a pat-down. Id. 28. The driver turned his pockets inside-out
revealing that he had nothing in his pockets, and Trooper Kim testified that
this alleviated his concern that the driver may have possessed a weapon or
hypodermic needle. Id. at 28-29. The trooper asked the driver where he was
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coming from, and the driver said that he had driven to Philadelphia to drop off
a job application, and he and the passenger, later identified as Appellee, were
returning to Delaware. Id. at 22. The trooper asked the driver how long he
had known Appellee, and the driver indicated that he had known Appellee for
approximately one year. Id. at 23. Trooper Kim asked the driver for consent
to search the vehicle, and the driver consented. Id. at 24. At this point, the
trooper asked Appellee questions similar to those he asked the driver. The
trooper asked where they were coming from, and how long Appellee had
known the driver. Like the driver, Appellee responded that they had driven to
Philadelphia to drop off a job application and were returning to Delaware. Id.
at 28-29. However, when asked how long he had known the driver, Appellee
told the trooper three to four years or several years, and this conflicted with
the driver’s answer of one year. Id. at 29.
The trooper testified that the driver and Appellee’s movements and
behavior, and their possible deceit, led him to become more suspicious that a
crime was occurring. The trooper informed Appellee that the driver had given
consent to search and told Appellee that he was not under arrest but asked
him to exit the car. Id. at 32. The trooper reiterated to Appellee that he was
not under arrest, but the trooper was going to conduct a pat down for the
trooper’s safety. Id. at 35. Appellee raised his hands and said that he did
not want a pat-down and reached toward his left pants pocket. Id. at 35-36.
The trooper asked why Appellee was worried, and Appellee said that he was
going to a shooting range. Id. at 37. This led the trooper to conclude that
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Appellee had a firearm, and Appellee then told the trooper the gun was in
Appellee’s right pants cargo pocket. Id. at 38, 64. The trooper told Appellee
to stop reaching for the gun, and the trooper seized the firearm. Id. at 39.
Appellee had a magazine for the gun in his left pocket and volunteered that
he had a pack of cigarettes in his pocket that contained narcotics. Id. at 39,
64. When the trooper asked Appellee if he had a permit, Appellee responded
that he did not. Id. 38-39. Trooper Kim testified that his partner, Trooper
Solis, arrived to provide assistance. Id. at 40. Trooper Kim testified that the
first time that he had physical contact with Appellee was when the trooper
seized the firearm. Id. at 41.2 After securing the gun, the trooper searched
the vehicle and found what appeared to him to be an empty packet of heroin,
and he testified that he then administered field sobriety tests to the driver.3
Id. at 49. The trooper testified that despite the warning, he never patted
down either driver or Appellee. Id. at 47.4
____________________________________________
2 The Commonwealth played the video, which was recorded by the camera in the police vehicle. This video showed the trooper’s pursuit of the vehicle and interaction with Appellee. N.T., 10/22/21, at 41-42. The video was marked as Commonwealth Exhibit CS-1 and admitted into evidence without objection. Id. at 41, 45.
3 The driver, David Rodriguez-Ramos, was charged with driving under the influence of a controlled substance and was accepted into ARD at trial court docket CP-23-CR-1364-2021.
4 “So, ironically, I actually never ended up patting down anybody.” N.T., 10/22/21, at 47.
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The Commonwealth charged Appellee with possession of a controlled
substance (PWID), possession of drug paraphernalia, firearms not to be
carried without a license, and possession of a firearm by a prohibited person.5
Appellee filed a motion to suppress claiming that Appellee was subjected to a
rigorous pat down, numerous inquiries, and a prolonged search. Appellee
alleged that although he told the trooper he did not want a pat-down, the
trooper said it was for officer safety. Appellant averred the search went
beyond what was necessary for the traffic stop, the police lacked reasonable
suspicion to support the conclusion that Appellee was engaged in criminal
activity or that he or that he was armed and dangerous. Suppression Mot.,
7/6/21, at 1-2.
On October 26, 2021, the trial court granted Appellee’s motion to
suppress. The Commonwealth filed a motion for reconsideration, and the trial
court held a hearing on the Commonwealth’s motion.
The trial court concluded that the traffic stop was justified because the
vehicle was traveling at a speed in excess of the posted limit. Am. Trial Ct.
Op. 1/21/22, at 1. However, the court determined that the prolonged
detention that followed the traffic stop was not justified under the
circumstances because the trooper had uncovered all information necessary
to determine whether to issue a warning or a citation to the driver. Id. The
trial court found that the trooper had completed the necessary investigation ____________________________________________
5 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16) and (32), and 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6106(a)(2) and 6105(a)(1).
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prior to speaking to Appellee. Id. at 2-3. Therefore, the trial court reaffirmed
its prior order granting Appellee’s motion to suppress. Id. at 3-6.
The Commonwealth filed this timely appeal. Both the Commonwealth
and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
On appeal, the Commonwealth raises the follow issues:
1. Did the trial court err by suppressing the statement made by Appellee where Appellee was not in custody, but merely detained as a result of a vehicle stop?
2. Did the trial court err by suppressing evidence of a loaded gun, ammunition, illegal drugs and drug paraphernalia recovered by the police from Appellee’s person after the State Trooper made a lawful car stop in which Appellee was the passenger, and the trooper had reasonable suspicion to frisk [Appellee] as a result of Appellee’s statement regarding possessing an unlicensed gun in his pocket?
Commonwealth’s Brief at 5 (formatting altered).6 Because the
Commonwealth’s issues are interrelated, we address them together.
The Commonwealth contends that Trooper Kim had probable cause to
stop the vehicle for violating the Motor Vehicle Code. Commonwealth’s Brief ____________________________________________
6 We note that Appellee asserts that the Commonwealth waived its issues on appeal for failing to present them in its Rule 1925(b) statement. Appellee’s Brief at 10. We note that the Rule requires that the statement must “concisely identify each error that the appellant intends to assert with sufficient detail to identify the issue to be raised for the judge.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii). We conclude that the Commonwealth’s Rule 1925(b) statement sufficiently identified errors concerning the validity of the traffic stop, the suppression of Appellees’ statements to police, and the legality of the subsequent search. Accordingly, we decline to find waiver. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. McKown, 79 A.3d 678, 685 n.5 (Pa. Super. 2013) (declining to find waiver where an issue on appeal is fairly included within an issue presented in the Rule 1925(b) statement).
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at 19. Further, during this traffic stop, Trooper Kim was permitted to direct
the occupants of the vehicle to exit the car. Id. at 20. Upon approaching the
vehicle, Trooper Kim noticed that driver was nervous and possibly intoxicated.
Id. at 20-21. The Commonwealth argues that the trial court failed to
recognize that Trooper Kim’s inquiries into the suspected Motor Vehicle Code
violations were not at an end after he spoke to the driver, because Trooper
Kim suspected the driver was driving while under the influence which required
additional investigation. Id. at 25. After the occupants were lawfully directed
to exit the car, the Commonwealth notes that Trooper Kim was permitted to
conduct a search of the occupants, even absent reasonable suspicion, for
officer safety. Id. at 20-21. When Trooper Kim informed Appellee that he
was going to search him for weapons for his own safety, Appellee volunteered
that he possessed a firearm, and no Miranda7 warnings were required
because Appellee was not subject to a custodial interrogation. Id. at 28. The
evidence seized following the search was incident to a lawful arrest. Id. at
29-30.
When reviewing a challenge to a suppression ruling, our standard of
review is
limited to determining whether the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Because the [defense] prevailed before the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the [defense] and so much of the evidence for the [Commonwealth] as remains uncontradicted ____________________________________________
7 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1966).
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when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record, the appellate court is bound by those findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are erroneous. Where the appeal of the determination of the suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the suppression court’s legal conclusions are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts below are subject to plenary review.
Commonwealth v. Smith, 164 A.3d 1255, 1257 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation
omitted and formatting altered).
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures. A search conducted without a warrant is deemed to be unreasonable and therefore constitutionally impermissible, unless an established exception applies.
Commonwealth v. Simonson, 148 A.3d 792, 797 (Pa. Super. 2016)
(citations omitted and formatting altered).
In Commonwealth v. Malloy, 257 A.3d 142 (Pa. Super. 2021), this
Court explained:
In light of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s interpretation of the current language of [75 Pa.C.S. §] 6308(b), we are compelled to conclude that the standards concerning the quantum of cause necessary for an officer to stop a vehicle in this Commonwealth are settled. Traffic stops based on a reasonable suspicion: either of criminal activity or a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code under the authority of Section 6308(b) must serve a stated investigatory purpose. See Commonwealth v. Chase, 960 A.2d 108, 116 (Pa. 2008). In effect, the language of Section 6308(b)—“to secure such other information as the officer may reasonably believe to be necessary to enforce the provisions of this title”—is conceptually equivalent with the underlying purpose of a stop conducted
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pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See Chase, 960 A.2d at 116 (quoting 75 Pa.C.S. § 6308(b)).
Mere reasonable suspicion will not justify a vehicle stop when the driver’s detention cannot serve an investigatory purpose relevant to the suspected violation. In such an instance, “it is incumbent upon the officer to articulate specific facts possessed by him, at the time of the questioned stop, which would provide probable cause to believe that the vehicle or the driver was in violation of some provision of the Motor Vehicle Code.” Commonwealth v. Gleason, 785 A.2d 983, 989 (Pa. 2001) (superseded by statute) (citation omitted); see also Chase, 960 A.2d at 116 (reaffirming Gleason’s probable cause standard for non-investigative detentions of suspected Vehicle Code violations.
Id. at 148 (quoting Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285, 1290-91 (Pa.
Super. 2010) (en banc)) (formatting altered).
Out of concern for officer safety, Pennsylvania search and seizure jurisprudence also permits certain limited intrusions upon the liberty of passengers in lawfully detained vehicles. Hence, officers may order passengers to remain in a car for the duration of a lawful stop. Law enforcement officials may also inquire about the presence of weapons. Lastly, police officials may compel passengers to exit a lawfully stopped vehicle. The authority to carry out these actions do not, in and of themselves, expand the grounds for detaining or investigating passengers who are merely present in a lawfully stopped vehicle.
Id. at 150 (citations omitted and formatting altered).
The tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure’s mission—to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop, and attend to related safety concerns. Because addressing the infraction is the purpose of the stop, it may last no longer than is necessary to effectuate that purpose. Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been— completed.
A traffic stop can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete the mission of issuing a warning ticket. . . . An officer, in other words, may conduct certain
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unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop. But . . . he may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual.
Beyond determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, an officer’s mission includes ordinary inquiries incident to the traffic stop. Typically, such inquiries involve checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance. These checks serve the same objective as enforcement of the traffic code: ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly.
Id. at 149-50 (quoting Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354
(2015)) (citations omitted and some formatting altered). Accordingly, “within
the context of a lawful traffic stop, Rodriguez permits ‘mission related’
inquiries addressed to the traffic violations which originally prompted the
detention, as well as incidental inquiries aimed at ensuring the safe and
responsible operation of vehicles on the highway.” Id. at 150. Additionally,
we note that “furtive movements, when witnessed within the scope of a lawful
traffic stop, [may] provide . . . a reasonable basis for a protective frisk.”
Commonwealth v. Simmons, 17 A.3d 399, 403-04 (Pa. Super. 2011).
In its opinion, the trial court concluded that the traffic stop was justified
because the vehicle was traveling at a speed in excess of the posted limit.
Am. Trial Ct. Op. 1/21/22, at 1. However, the trial court concluded that
Trooper Kim initiated the traffic stop only because the vehicle was exceeding
the posted speed limit. Id. at 2. The court found that the prolonged detention
that followed the traffic stop was not justified under the circumstances
because the trooper had uncovered all information necessary to determine
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whether to issue a warning or a citation to the driver. Id. The trial court
concluded that Trooper Kim initiated a traffic stop and addressed the driver,
and “the driver, once addressed, provided the requisite information to the
police. This offered a reasonable opportunity for the police to issue a traffic
citation and allow the vehicle occupants to continue on their way.” Id. The
trial court found that the credible evidence including the police vehicle’s dash-
cam recording reflects that the troopers offered a pretext for an exploratory
search: “[T]he Trooper’s testimony concerning what occurred after the initial
purpose for the stop was accomplished seemed less certain and candid when
compared with his demeanor when testifying concerning his interaction with
the driver.” Id. at 3. The trial court concluded that “the insecurity” of the
trooper’s testimony combined with the lack of credible facts “suggest nothing
untoward to support the efforts of the police in continuing the investigation
after the original purpose of the traffic stop was completed.” Id. The trial
court acknowledged that although the police were permitted to ask the
occupants to exit the vehicle, the police did not offer credible evidence of an
independent cause to support the need for further investigation. Id.
Accordingly, the court found that the trooper had completed the necessary
investigation prior to initiating an interaction with Appellee. Id. at 2-3. The
trial court asserts that although the Trooper was permitted to legally ask the
occupants of the car to exit, the Trooper did not provide credible evidence of
an independent reason for further investigation “particularly related to the
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presence of [Appellant’s] legal (or even any) possession of a firearm.” Id. at
2-3. The trial court cites Malloy as support for its conclusion. Id. at 3.
After review, we are constrained to disagree with the trial court’s
findings and conclusions as they are not supported by the record. See Smith,
164 A.3d at 1257. In Malloy, police initiated a traffic stop because the vehicle
in question did not have a license plate properly displayed, which constituted
a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code. Malloy, 257 A.3d at 145 (citing 75
Pa.C.S. § 1332 (display of registration plate)). However, when the officer
approached the driver, he saw “a license tag” in the rear windshield. The
officer also observed several occupants inside the car, including the appellant,
who was seated in the rear behind the driver. The officer told the driver that
that the car did not have a license plate on the back, and the driver informed
the officer that he had recently obtained the car and needed to get screws to
secure the license plate. The officer then continued his investigation and
asked the appellant to roll down his window. The officer asked the appellant
for identification, and the appellant removed a lanyard from inside his hooded
sweatshirt. The officer believed that some individuals who work as armed
security guards at local bars wear lanyards holding their identification, and the
officer asked if Appellant was carrying a firearm. The appellant responded
that he did have a firearm, and the officer asked where this firearm was
located. The appellant responded that the firearm was on his right hip. It
was at this point that the officer asked the appellant to exit the vehicle so that
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he could secure the firearm before continuing his investigation. See id. at
145.
Once outside the vehicle, the officer secured the firearm and asked the
appellant for his identification and documentation permitting him to possess
the firearm. See id. at 146. The appellant handed the officer this information,
and the officer observed that the appellant’s “Act 235” card, which authorized
the appellant to carry the firearm, had expired. The appellant told the officer
that he had another Act 235 card at home, and the officer proceeded to spend
the next fifteen to twenty minutes contacting local detectives and the
Pennsylvania State Police to determine whether the appellant was authorized
to carry the firearm. The officer learned that the appellant’s Act 235
certification had expired, and the officer arrested the appellant on charges
related to the unlawful possession of a firearm. However, because the driver
provided documentation supporting his statement that he had recently
purchased the car, the officer did not issue a citation to the driver. See id. at
146.
The appellant filed a motion to suppress, and the trial court held a
hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied the appellant’s
suppression motion, and the matter proceeded to a bench trial on stipulated
facts. The trial court found the appellant guilty of possessing a firearm without
a license and carrying a firearm in public in Philadelphia. See id. (citing 18
Pa.C.S. §§ 6106 and 6108).
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However, on appeal, this Court reversed holding that although the traffic
stop was justified due to the suspected violation of the Motor Vehicle Code
violation, the police officer was not permitted to initiate a separate
investigation into the appellant and whether he possessed documentation
permitting his to carry a firearm. The Malloy Court explained that once the
police stopped the vehicle due to the missing license plate, no further
investigation was required to support that finding. The officer’s additional
questions of the appellant, who was a backseat passenger were not “mission
related,” and because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to detain the
appellant and investigate his legal authority to carry a firearm, the appellant’s
detention violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Malloy, 257 A.3d at 156.
We conclude that Malloy is distinguishable. In the instant case, the
record reflects that Trooper Kim suspected not only a violation of the Motor
Vehicle Code for speeding, but when he spoke to the driver he also suspected
DUI. Unlike a missing license plate or exceeding the speed limit, suspicion of
DUI requires further investigation, and the traffic stop serves a further
investigatory purpose. See Commonwealth v. Walls, 206 A.3d 537, 541
(Pa. Super. 2019); see also Chase, 960 A.2d at 116. As noted, authority for
the seizure ends when the tasks tied to the traffic infraction are, or reasonably
should have been, completed. Malloy, 257 A.3d at 149. However, new
information obtained during the natural course of the stop may provide a
lawful basis upon which to extend the stop to investigate the new suspicions.
See Chase, 960 A.2d at 115, n.5. Here, that additional information was that
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the driver’s eyes were “pinpoint,” coupled with the fact that the vehicle was
weaving. See N.T., 10/22/21, at 13, 19.
During this lawful stop, while Trooper Kim was investigating the driver
for possible DUI, the trooper was permitted to ask Appellee to exit the car and
inquire about weapons for officer safety. Malloy, 257 A.3d at 150. Moreover,
under the circumstances presented here, we do not conclude that Appellee
was yet under arrest or subject to the functional equivalent of an arrest, and
Trooper Kim was not required to provide Miranda warnings before asking
Appellee questions related to the trooper’s safety. See Berkemer v.
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40 (U.S. 1984) (explaining that “the usual traffic
stop is more analogous to a so-called ‘Terry stop’ . . . than to a formal arrest,”
and the questions posed are investigative rather than custodial, which does
not trigger Miranda protections); Malloy, 257 A.3d at 150; Chase, 960 A.2d
at 117. After being asked about weapons and informed that he would be
subject to a pat down for officer safety, Appellee told the trooper that he
possessed a firearm and did not have a permit to carry it.
As stated above, the record reveals that Trooper Kim pursued the
vehicle because he initially suspected the driver was violating the Motor
Vehicle Code by speeding and following another vehicle too closely. Once the
trooper began to follow the subject vehicle, he noticed it was weaving within
its lane of travel, and Trooper Kim testified that upon speaking to the driver,
he thought the driver may be under the influence. See N.T., 10/22/21, at 13,
19, 20. This permitted Trooper Kim to lawfully conduct a traffic stop and
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further investigate the driver for DUI. See Malloy, 257 A.3d at 148; see
also Chase, 960 A.2d at 115, n.5. The circumstances presented here are
distinct from the situation in Malloy where the officer was investigating the
display of a license plate and after speaking to the driver, no further “mission
related” questions were required and no further investigation warranted. See
Malloy, 257 A.3d at 150.
Additionally, in the instant case, because the trooper saw the occupants
moving about the vehicle, for safety purposes, the trooper was permitted to
have the occupants exit the car and ask about the possession of weapons.
See id. During a lawful traffic stop, where the officer observes the suspect
make furtive movements and reasonably concludes that the suspect may be
armed and dangerous, the officer may frisk the suspect for weapons. See
Simmons, 17 A.3d at 403-04. However, the record does not support the trial
court’s conclusion that there was a “Terry” frisk. Rather, Trooper Kim asked
Appellee to exit the car and informed him that he was going to pat him down.
Appellee said he did not want a pat down, and he told the trooper that he
possessed a firearm and did not have a permit.
It was at this point that Trooper Kim had probable cause to conclude
that Appellant, by possessing a concealed firearm without a permit, was
committing a crime. This probable cause led to the seizure of the gun and
Appellee’s lawful arrest, which in turn permitted a search incident to that
arrest. The search incident to the arrest led to the discovery of the loaded
ammunition magazine and cigarette pack containing narcotics, and the search
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of the vehicle revealed drug paraphernalia. The record supports the
conclusion that Trooper Kim’s questions were mission related. Moreover, the
record does not reveal a prolonged detention or coerciveness, and contrary to
the trial court’s conclusion, the record does not support the finding that pat
down or Terry frisk occurred.
After review, we are constrained to conclude that the trial court erred in
granting Appellee’s motion to suppress. Appellee was a passenger in a vehicle
that was lawfully stopped by Trooper Kim. During Trooper Kim’s investigation
of the driver for possible DUI, he asked the occupants to exit the vehicle. Prior
to any custodial detention, Appellee voluntarily informed the trooper that he
possessed a gun. After the lawful arrest resulting from Appellee’s illegal
possession of a firearm, the search incident to arrest by Trooper Kim
recovered the ammunition magazine, a controlled substance, and
paraphernalia. For these reasons, we reverse the trial court’s order granting
Appellee’s suppression motion, and we remand for further proceedings.
Order reversed. Case remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction
relinquished.
Judge Stabile joins the memorandum.
Judge Sullivan concurs in the result.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 11/28/2022
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