J-A03011-26
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JAMAL RIDEOUT : : Appellant : No. 2281 EDA 2024
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 30, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0001047-2021
BEFORE: BOWES, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. *
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 24, 2026
Jamal Rideout appeals from the aggregate sentence of four to eight
years in prison following his convictions of persons not to possess a firearm,
in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1), and carrying a firearm without a
license, in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a)(1). We affirm.
On January 4, 2021, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania charged
Appellant with the above-identified crimes, among others, after he was
observed holding and then concealing a revolver in a parking lot outside of a
bar in Delaware County. Appellant was prohibited from carrying a firearm due
to a 2007 federal felony conviction of conspiracy to distribute cocaine.
Relevant here, Appellant filed a pre-trial motion to quash the firearm charges,
asserting that they were unconstitutional insofar as they violated his Second
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-A03011-26
Amendment rights. In so doing, Appellant primarily relied upon a decision of
the Supreme Court of the United States, New York State Rifle & Pistol
Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), which ruled unconstitutional
a New York law prohibiting persons from carrying handguns for self-defense
unless they showed a distinct need for self-protection apart from that of the
general community. Following briefing from the parties, the trial court denied
Appellant’s motion. The case proceeded to a stipulated bench trial, at the
conclusion of which the court found Appellant guilty of the §§ 6015(a)(1) and
6106(a)(1) offenses. The court sentenced him as indicated on the same day.
This timely appeal followed. The trial court ordered Appellant to submit
a concise statement of errors pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and Appellant
complied.1 He presents the following claims for review:
[I] Whether the trial court erred in denying [Appellant]’s as- applied constitutional challenge to 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1) and § 6106(a)(1), as [Appellant] is a nonviolent offender who falls within the protections of the Second Amendment.
[II] Whether the trial court erred in finding that the Commonwealth met its burden to demonstrate that permanently disarming [Appellant] for a non-violent conviction is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.
Appellant’s brief at 4 (citations altered).
Both of Appellant’s claims relate to the court’s decision to deny his
underlying motion to quash, which raised constitutional challenges to § 6105
1 We remind the court that all Rule 1925(b) orders must specify both where
the appellant may serve the statement in person and the address where it may be mailed. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(3)(iii).
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and § 6106. The constitutionality of a criminal statute “is a question of law
for which our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is
plenary.” Commonwealth v. Farmer, 329 A.3d 449, 451 (Pa.Super. 2024)
(citation omitted), appeal granted, 343 A.3d 180 (Pa. July 8, 2025). Further,
in his as-applied challenge, Appellant bears a heavy burden to demonstrate
that the law “clearly, palpably, and plainly violates the constitution.” Id. at
455 n.5 (citation omitted). The Supreme Court of the United States has
emphasized that “when legislation and the Constitution brush up against each
other, a court’s task is to seek harmony, not to manufacture conflict.” United
States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 701 (2024).
Our Crimes Code defines the offense of persons not to possess thusly:
(1) A person who has been convicted of an offense enumerated in subsection (b), within or without this Commonwealth, regardless of the length of sentence or whose conduct meets the criteria in subsection (c) shall not possess, use, control, sell, transfer or manufacture or obtain a license to possess, use, control, sell, transfer or manufacture a firearm in this Commonwealth.
18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1). Appellant’s prohibition arises from subsection (c),
which forbids firearm possession by “[a] person who has been convicted of an
offense under . . . The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act,
or any equivalent Federal statute or equivalent statute of any other state, that
may be punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding two years.” 18
Pa.C.S. § 6105(c)(2). Additionally, as it relates to Appellant’s second charge,
barring certain exceptions not applicable in this case, “any person who carries
a firearm concealed on or about his person, except in his place of abode or
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fixed place of business, without a valid and lawfully issued license under this
chapter commits a felony of the third degree.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a)(1).
The Bruen Court articulated the following test courts must apply in
weighing the constitutionality of statutes affecting the federal right to bear
arms:
When the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct. The government must then justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Only then may a court conclude that the individual’s conduct falls outside the Second Amendment’s “unqualified command.”
Bruen, 597 U.S. at 24 (citation omitted). Nonetheless, the High Court
clarified two years after Bruen that “[a]n individual found by a court to pose
a credible threat to the physical safety of another may be temporarily
disarmed consistent with the Second Amendment.” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 702.
Here, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion
to quash since both of his convictions infringe upon his Second Amendment
right to possess firearms. Specifically, he raises an as-applied challenge to
both §§ 6105 and 6106, asserting that, inter alia, the Commonwealth did not
prove that the United States has a “historical tradition of firearm regulation”
as to drug traffickers, as required by Bruen. See Appellant’s brief at 15-19.
Appellant avers that this is particularly so considering that his prior offense
was non-violent and involved no use of weapons. Id. at 15, 18.
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Critically, this Court recently rejected a virtually identical as-applied
challenge to § 6105 in Commonwealth v. Randolph, 343 A.3d 1248
(Pa.Super. 2025). Similar to Appellant, Randolph was convicted of persons
not to possess a firearm when his underlying prohibiting offense involved
possession of controlled substances with intent to deliver. In finding no merit
to Randolph’s claim, we determined that, in accordance with Rahimi, the
firearm prohibition was constitutional as applied to him because he was an
“individual found by a court to pose a credible threat to the physical safety of
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J-A03011-26
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JAMAL RIDEOUT : : Appellant : No. 2281 EDA 2024
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 30, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0001047-2021
BEFORE: BOWES, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. *
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 24, 2026
Jamal Rideout appeals from the aggregate sentence of four to eight
years in prison following his convictions of persons not to possess a firearm,
in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1), and carrying a firearm without a
license, in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a)(1). We affirm.
On January 4, 2021, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania charged
Appellant with the above-identified crimes, among others, after he was
observed holding and then concealing a revolver in a parking lot outside of a
bar in Delaware County. Appellant was prohibited from carrying a firearm due
to a 2007 federal felony conviction of conspiracy to distribute cocaine.
Relevant here, Appellant filed a pre-trial motion to quash the firearm charges,
asserting that they were unconstitutional insofar as they violated his Second
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-A03011-26
Amendment rights. In so doing, Appellant primarily relied upon a decision of
the Supreme Court of the United States, New York State Rifle & Pistol
Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), which ruled unconstitutional
a New York law prohibiting persons from carrying handguns for self-defense
unless they showed a distinct need for self-protection apart from that of the
general community. Following briefing from the parties, the trial court denied
Appellant’s motion. The case proceeded to a stipulated bench trial, at the
conclusion of which the court found Appellant guilty of the §§ 6015(a)(1) and
6106(a)(1) offenses. The court sentenced him as indicated on the same day.
This timely appeal followed. The trial court ordered Appellant to submit
a concise statement of errors pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and Appellant
complied.1 He presents the following claims for review:
[I] Whether the trial court erred in denying [Appellant]’s as- applied constitutional challenge to 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1) and § 6106(a)(1), as [Appellant] is a nonviolent offender who falls within the protections of the Second Amendment.
[II] Whether the trial court erred in finding that the Commonwealth met its burden to demonstrate that permanently disarming [Appellant] for a non-violent conviction is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.
Appellant’s brief at 4 (citations altered).
Both of Appellant’s claims relate to the court’s decision to deny his
underlying motion to quash, which raised constitutional challenges to § 6105
1 We remind the court that all Rule 1925(b) orders must specify both where
the appellant may serve the statement in person and the address where it may be mailed. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(3)(iii).
-2- J-A03011-26
and § 6106. The constitutionality of a criminal statute “is a question of law
for which our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is
plenary.” Commonwealth v. Farmer, 329 A.3d 449, 451 (Pa.Super. 2024)
(citation omitted), appeal granted, 343 A.3d 180 (Pa. July 8, 2025). Further,
in his as-applied challenge, Appellant bears a heavy burden to demonstrate
that the law “clearly, palpably, and plainly violates the constitution.” Id. at
455 n.5 (citation omitted). The Supreme Court of the United States has
emphasized that “when legislation and the Constitution brush up against each
other, a court’s task is to seek harmony, not to manufacture conflict.” United
States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 701 (2024).
Our Crimes Code defines the offense of persons not to possess thusly:
(1) A person who has been convicted of an offense enumerated in subsection (b), within or without this Commonwealth, regardless of the length of sentence or whose conduct meets the criteria in subsection (c) shall not possess, use, control, sell, transfer or manufacture or obtain a license to possess, use, control, sell, transfer or manufacture a firearm in this Commonwealth.
18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1). Appellant’s prohibition arises from subsection (c),
which forbids firearm possession by “[a] person who has been convicted of an
offense under . . . The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act,
or any equivalent Federal statute or equivalent statute of any other state, that
may be punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding two years.” 18
Pa.C.S. § 6105(c)(2). Additionally, as it relates to Appellant’s second charge,
barring certain exceptions not applicable in this case, “any person who carries
a firearm concealed on or about his person, except in his place of abode or
-3- J-A03011-26
fixed place of business, without a valid and lawfully issued license under this
chapter commits a felony of the third degree.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a)(1).
The Bruen Court articulated the following test courts must apply in
weighing the constitutionality of statutes affecting the federal right to bear
arms:
When the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct. The government must then justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Only then may a court conclude that the individual’s conduct falls outside the Second Amendment’s “unqualified command.”
Bruen, 597 U.S. at 24 (citation omitted). Nonetheless, the High Court
clarified two years after Bruen that “[a]n individual found by a court to pose
a credible threat to the physical safety of another may be temporarily
disarmed consistent with the Second Amendment.” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 702.
Here, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion
to quash since both of his convictions infringe upon his Second Amendment
right to possess firearms. Specifically, he raises an as-applied challenge to
both §§ 6105 and 6106, asserting that, inter alia, the Commonwealth did not
prove that the United States has a “historical tradition of firearm regulation”
as to drug traffickers, as required by Bruen. See Appellant’s brief at 15-19.
Appellant avers that this is particularly so considering that his prior offense
was non-violent and involved no use of weapons. Id. at 15, 18.
-4- J-A03011-26
Critically, this Court recently rejected a virtually identical as-applied
challenge to § 6105 in Commonwealth v. Randolph, 343 A.3d 1248
(Pa.Super. 2025). Similar to Appellant, Randolph was convicted of persons
not to possess a firearm when his underlying prohibiting offense involved
possession of controlled substances with intent to deliver. In finding no merit
to Randolph’s claim, we determined that, in accordance with Rahimi, the
firearm prohibition was constitutional as applied to him because he was an
“individual found by a court to pose a credible threat to the physical safety of
another,” and thus could be temporarily disarmed without violating the Second
Amendment.2 Id. at 1258. We further noted that this holding was consistent
with a multitude of federal decisions that came to the same conclusion when
wrestling with this question post-Rahimi. Id. at 1259.
Since Appellant’s challenge to § 6105 is materially the same as that
raised by Randolph, and the prohibiting predicate offenses are of the same
nature, this case is squarely governed by Randolph. Indeed, Appellant did
not cite Randolph or attempt to distinguish that case, despite it being issued
before he filed his brief. As such, for the reasons discussed at greater length
in that opinion, Appellant’s attack on the constitutionality of § 6105 fails.
Turning to Appellant’s constitutional challenge to § 6106, carrying a
firearm without a license, we find that his claim is not sufficiently developed
on appeal. While Appellant explains in detail why he believes the ____________________________________________
2 Pennsylvania law provides procedures for restoration of firearms rights in certain circumstances. See, e.g., 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(d).
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Commonwealth has not demonstrated a historical tradition of depriving
convicted felons from possessing firearms, he does not discuss licensing
requirements at all or explain how Bruen and its progeny relate to firearm
licensing mandates. We will not undertake the task of developing Appellant’s
claim when he failed to do so. See Commonwealth v. Armolt, 294 A.3d
364, 377 (Pa. 2023) (“It is not the obligation of an appellate court to formulate
an appellant’s arguments for him.” (citation omitted)). Moreover, in Bruen,
which Appellant principally relies upon in this appeal, the Supreme Court of
the United States specifically stated that its decision did not bear on “shall-
issue” firearm licensing statutes, like Pennsylvania’s. See Bruen, 597 U.S.
at 38, n.9 (“To be clear, nothing in our analysis should be interpreted to
suggest the unconstitutionality of the [forty-three] States’ ‘shall-issue’
licensing regimes, under which ‘a general desire for self-defense is sufficient
to obtain a permit.’” (citation omitted)).
Based on the above, Appellant has not met his heavy burden of
demonstrating that either § 6105 or § 6106 “clearly, palpably, and plainly
violate. . . the constitution.” Farmer, 329 A.3d at 455 n.5. We therefore
affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Date: 2/24/2026
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