Com. v. Richardson, J.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: October 18, 2024
• Docket: 403 MDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S33023-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JOHN JOSEPH RICHARDSON : : Appellant : No. 403 MDA 2024

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 18, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0002203-2014

BEFORE: OLSON, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED: OCTOBER 18, 2024

John Joseph Richardson appeals pro se from the order denying his most

recent petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 42

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. We affirm.

The pertinent facts and procedural history are as follows: On April 7,

2006, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Richardson pled guilty to one

count each of statutory sexual assault, unlawful contact with a minor, indecent

assault, and corruption of minors. On July 26, 2006, following a Megan’s Law

assessment where Richardson was determined to not be a sexually violent

predator, Richardson was sentenced to an aggregate 3½ to 8 years of

imprisonment, followed by a seven-year probationary term. J-S33023-24

On September 2, 2014, Richardson entered a guilty plea for failure to

register as a sex offender. Richardson was sentenced to 1 to 2 years of

imprisonment, followed by a two-year probationary term.

On November 15, 2017, Richardson filed a pro se PCRA petition, and the

PCRA court appointed counsel. On January 12, 2018, PCRA counsel filed an

amended PCRA petition, in which Richardson claimed that the registration

requirements for the Sex Offenders Registration and Notification Act

(“SORNA”), which was enacted after his 2006 conviction had been applied to

him retroactively in violation of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in

Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017). Under the provisions

of SORNA, Richard’s original ten-year registration requirement increased to

lifetime registration.

On May 2, 2018, the PCRA court held an evidentiary hearing. At the

hearing, the parties stipulated that Richardson should be a ten-year Megan’s

Law registrant rather than a lifetime registrant. The court therefore reimposed

the ten-year registration requirement but denied all other requests for post-

conviction relief. Richardson appealed. On February 26, 2019, this Court

affirmed the PCRA court’s order. Commonwealth v. Richardson, 209 A.3d

1094 (Pa. Super. 2019) (non-precedential decision). On November 13, 2019,

our Supreme Court denied Richardson’s petition for allowance of appeal.

Commonwealth v. Richardson, 219 A.2d 1105 (Pa. 2019).

The PCRA court summarized the subsequent procedural history as

follows:

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On September 15, 2023, [Richardson] filed a PCRA petition arguing the constitutionality of SORNA’s registration requirements and how they affected his right to reputation. [The PCRA court] treated [Richardson’s] petition as a Habeas petition rather than a PCRA petition. See Commonwealth v. Lacombe, 234 A.3d 602, 618 (Pa. 2020) (stating that the PCRA is not the exclusive way to challenge the constitutionality of sex offender registration requirements); Commonwealth v. Smith, 240 A.3d 654, 657- 658 (Pa. Super. 2020) (stating that SORNA requirements are collateral consequences of a sentence and therefore do not fall within the purview of the PCRA statute). On November 7, 2023, the Commonwealth provided a response to [Richardson’s] Habeas petition. On November 8, 2023, following a review of the Habeas petition and the Commonwealth’s response, [the PCRA court] dismissed [Richardson’s] Habeas petition. [Richardson did not file an appeal.]

On December 29, 2023, [Richardson] filed another PCRA petition with an identical argument to his September 15, 2023, PCRA/Habeas petition. On January 18, 2024, [the PCRA court] dismissed the petition as duplicative of [Richardson’s] September 15, 2023, petition that was denied on November 8, 2023.

PCRA Court Opinion, 4/18/24, at 1-2 (unnumbered). This appeal followed.

The PCRA court did not require Pa.R.A.P. 1925 compliance.

Richard’s hand-written brief on appeal consists of fourteen numbered

paragraphs in which he presents multiple challenges to the constitutionality of

SORNA’s registration requirements.

This Court’s standard of review for an order dismissing a PCRA petition

calls for us to “determine whether the ruling of the PCRA court is supported

by the evidence and free of legal error. The PCRA court’s factual findings will

not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the certified

record.” Commonwealth v. Webb, 236 A.3d 1170, 1176 (Pa. Super. 2020)

(citing Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 185, 191–92 (Pa. Super. 2013)).

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Here, the PCRA court dismissed Richardson’s December 2023 PCRA

petition because it raised the same claims he raised in the September 2023

petition, and Richardson did not appeal the PCRA court’s November 2023 order

denying that petition. Thus, the claims Richardson now raises on appeal have

been previously litigated under the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(a).

Moreover, even if not previously litigated, Richardson’s various

assertions regarding the punitive nature of SORNA and other constitutional

challenges recently have been rejected by our Supreme Court as to

Subchapter H of SORNA. See generally, Commonwealth v. Torsilieri, 316

A.3d 77 (Pa. 2024). Richardson committed his sex offenses in 2006; he is

therefore subject to the registration requirements under Subchapter I. In

Commonwealth v. Lacombe, 234 A.3d 602, 605 (Pa. 2020), our Supreme

Court concluded that Subchapter I of SORNA was not punitive.

In essence, in this appeal Richardson seeks to prevail on the same

arguments regarding Subchapter I that the high court rejected as to Chapter

H in Torsilieri. In the companion case to Lacombe, our Supreme Court

noted that that defendant made additional constitutional arguments that

would fail because they were predicated on a finding that Subchapter I was

punitive. See Lacombe, 234 A.2d at 608 n.5. Because our Supreme Court

in Lacombe concluded that Subchapter I is not punitive, Richardson’s

derivative constitutional claims fail. Thus, even if not previously litigated, we

would we affirm the order denying Richardson post-conviction relief on the

merits.

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Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 10/18/2024

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