Com. v. Regan, J.
This text of Com. v. Regan, J. (Com. v. Regan, J.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
J-A22028-24
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JAMILA ADIZZA REGAN : : Appellant : No. 1112 WDA 2023
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 21, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0004225-2022
BEFORE: MURRAY, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J.
MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED: January 8, 2025
Jamila Adizza Regan appeals from the judgment of sentence entered
following her conviction for driving under the influence (“DUI”) of a controlled
substance, DUI of a combination of drugs-impaired ability, DUI of a
combination of alcohol and drugs, DUI-blood alcohol level of 0.10% to less
than 0.16%, DUI of alcohol-general impairment, and windshield obstructions
and wipers.1 She challenges the denial of her suppression motion. We affirm.
In April 2022, Regan was arrested following a traffic stop. She filed a
motion to suppress, arguing, in part, that the police officer did not have
probable cause to stop her vehicle based on the window tint.
At the suppression hearing, Officer Jacob Elk testified that he was a
police officer with the Mount Lebanon Police Department and had been ____________________________________________
1 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802(d)(1), 3802(d)(2), 3802(d)(3), 3802(b), 3802(a)(1),
and 4524(e)(1), respectively. J-A22028-24
working in that capacity for about five years. N.T., Apr. 13, 2023, at 4. He
testified that in April 2023, he “observed a black sedan with window tint not
allowing me to see inside the vehicle.” Id. at 5. He stated that after observed
the car he turned around, “got behind the vehicle,” and “conducted an
[National Crime Information Center (“NCIC”)] check of the vehicle[.]” Id. The
NCIC record showed that the registered owner had only a photo identification
card. Id. He then conducted a traffic stop. Id. He testified that a sedan should
not have window tint that lets in less than 70 percent of light, and that “sedans
should not have any dark window tint whatsoever.” Id. at 6. Officer Elk
testified that after he stopped the vehicle, he made contact with the driver,
Regan. Id. at 6-7.
On cross examination, Officer Elk testified that the stop was conducted
between 1:00 and 2:00 a.m., and the area was “darker than the business
district of Washington Road, however there’s street lights.” Id. at 8. He stated
he did not have technology to detect the level of tint on the windows and he
did not know the actual tint level. Id. at 8-9. He stated he “maybe” saw a
“silhouette from the rear, but . . . was not able to determine whether it was
male, female, anything like that.” Id. at 10-11. Officer Elk further testified
that he was not able to see in the vehicle when he passed it and went behind
it. Id. at 11.
The owner of the vehicle, Davon Burkes, testified that the person who
sold it to him told him that 72% of light was able to pass through the window
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tint. Id. at 15. He said that he can see inside the vehicle in darkly lit areas.
Id.
The court denied the suppression motion. N.T., Aug. 2, 2023, at 4. It
reasoned that “there was probable cause for the stop” due to the tinted
windows. Id. The court noted the argument that the officer allegedly could
see inside the vehicle, and pointed out that the officer “testified that he could
not see in the window.” Id.
After a bench trial, the court found Regan guilty of the above-referenced
counts and sentenced her to three to six days’ incarceration with permission
to participate in the DUI alternative to jail program, six months’ probation,
and fines. Regan filed a timely notice of appeal.
Regan raises the following issue:
Whether the Trial Court erred in denying Ms. Regan’s motion to suppress evidence where the police officer lacked a proper basis for conducting a traffic stop of her vehicle?
Regan’s Br. at 8.
Regan argues that the court erred in denying her motion to suppress
because there was no probable cause to stop the car for tinted windows. She
argues the stop occurred in the “middle of the night when it is naturally
difficult, if not impossible, to see the interior of any vehicle on the road,
particularly where, as here, the lighting was not ideal.” Id. at 13. Regan points
out that Officer Elk admitted he could see the driver’s silhouette when he
approached the vehicle on foot. Id. Regan argues Officer Elk did not have a
tint meter, made no effort to investigate the tint level, and never determined
-3- J-A22028-24
whether the tint level violated the law. She claims the trial court failed to
analyze Officer Elk’s allegedly contradictory statements. She asserts the
Commonwealth failed to establish probable cause to stop the vehicle based on
a suspected window tint violation.
When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we determine
“whether the factual findings are supported by the record and whether the
legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct.” Commonwealth v.
McMahon, 280 A.3d 1069, 1071 (Pa.Super. 2022) (citation omitted). Where
the Commonwealth prevailed on the motion, “we may consider only the
evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense
as remains uncontradicted.” Id. (citation omitted). “Our scope of review of
suppression rulings includes only the suppression hearing record and excludes
evidence elicited at trial.” Id. (citation omitted). Where the record supports
the suppression court’s factual findings, we will only reverse if there is an error
in the legal conclusions drawn from those facts. Id.
In Pennsylvania, a person cannot drive a vehicle that has any material
that does not permit a person to see inside the vehicle “through the
windshield, side wing, or side window”:
(1) No person shall drive any motor vehicle with any sun screening device or other material which does not permit a person to see or view the inside of the vehicle through the windshield, side wing or side window of the vehicle.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4524(e)(1).
-4- J-A22028-24
As the parties agree that an officer must have probable cause to initiate
a stop under this section, we will apply the probable cause standard.2
Commonwealth v. Prizzia, 260 A.3d 263, 268, 269 n.2 (Pa.Super. 2021)
(applying a probable cause standard to determine whether stop for window
tint violation was proper but stating the decision “should not be read as
precluding application of a reasonable suspicion standard to a stop for a
window-tint violation, if the specific facts of the case demonstrate that an
investigatory purpose was served by the stop”). Pennsylvania law makes clear
that a police officer has probable cause to stop a motor vehicle if the officer
observes a traffic code violation, even if it is a minor offense. Commonwealth
v. Chase, 960 A.2d 108, 113 (Pa. 2008).
Here, the trial court concluded probable cause supported the stop. It
concluded Officer Elk saw the vehicle with “dark, tinted windows,” which is a
violation of the Vehicle Code. Trial Court Opinion, filed Jan. 30, 2024, at 75
(unpaginated). The trial court pointed out that Officer Elk testified that he was
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