J-A30002-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : RYAN THOMAS REESE : : Appellant : No. 280 WDA 2017
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 25, 2017 In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-26-CR-0001118-2015
BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED MAY 23, 2018
Ryan Thomas Reese appeals from the judgment of sentence of nine to
twenty-four months incarceration imposed following his conviction for
corruption of minors, graded as a felony of the third degree. We affirm.
On October 3, 2013, S.L., then a fifteen-year-old girl, was in her
apartment along with her eighteen-year-old boyfriend Brandon White, and
one other individual. The apartment contained marijuana, drug
paraphernalia, and a gun. Connellsville Police Department officers arrived
and entered, eventually arresting White. Appellant, who was one of the
police officers, informed S.L. that she would be charged through juvenile
court for her possession of drug paraphernalia.
Shortly after that incident, Appellant, then thirty-five years old, spoke
to S.L. on the phone and invited her to the Connellsville Police gym. S.L. J-A30002-17
went, believing that the two would discuss the cases against her and White.1
Instead, Appellant engaged in casual conversation and showed her a weight
vest, which she tried on. S.L. stated that the vest was too heavy, and
Appellant slid his hand down her shirt and touched her nipple while helping
to remove the vest. S.L. assumed that the contact was accidental and
thought nothing further of it at the time.
In early November, Appellant appeared at S.L.’s apartment and told
her that White had to turn himself in on the charges from October 3.
Appellant indicated that S.L. might be able to help by becoming a
confidential informant (“CI”). Appellant turned sixteen years old shortly
thereafter, and received a Connellsville Police Department shirt from
Appellant as a gift, which he left on her porch.
In December, S.L. met Appellant in a parking lot. S.L. thought the two
would discuss the case against her and White. She entered his personal
vehicle and, after a short drive, Appellant parked and shut off the vehicle.
He asked her if she would like to have sex. S.L. said no. Appellant
responded by kissing her and putting his hands down her pants. Appellant
pulled his hand out, and asked S.L. to perform oral sex on him. She agreed,
thinking that “if I do this my charges will be gone, [White]’s charges will be
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1 S.L. could not remember if her boyfriend called Appellant, or if Appellant called S.L.’s boyfriend. All parties had provided their personal information to the officers at the crime scene.
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gone and everything will just disappear.” N.T. Trial, 11/7-9/16, at 42. After
Appellant ejaculated inside her mouth, she walked home.
Approximately one month later, White was released from jail.
Appellant thereafter enlisted S.L. to act as a CI for three drug buys, which
he indicated would result in all charges being dropped. She performed two
buys. On the way back from the second, Appellant told her there were other
ways to work off the charges and asked her to perform oral sex, which she
did.
The authorities learned of these events in February of 2014, when S.L.
and several others went to a Pennsylvania State Police barracks in
connection with an investigation into S.L.’s mother, who was suspected of
stealing jewelry. S.L.’s mother had previously spoken to the investigating
troopers, and had shared her knowledge about S.L.’s contact with Appellant.
As a result, a trooper asked S.L. about the allegations. S.L. told him what
had happened. The matter was then referred to Trooper James
Aughinbaugh for investigation.
Trooper Aughinbaugh interviewed S.L., who supplied details of the
sexual favors and undercover buys. He reviewed criminal dockets and
determined that her details were corroborated by criminal cases filed by
Appellant. He then arranged for S.L. to call Appellant in his presence. She
made approximately a dozen calls, but the conversations did not produce
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incriminating statements. In April, S.L. informed Trooper Aughinbaugh that
she no longer wished to cooperate and ceased contact.
On May 16, 2014, S.L.’s mother contacted Trooper Aughinbaugh and
related that she had overheard S.L. speaking to Appellant on the phone and
S.L. intended to meet him later that evening. Trooper Aughinbaugh and
several other troopers used multiple vehicles to surveil the Connellsville
Police Department’s building. They saw S.L. arrive and stand next to
Appellant’s personal vehicle. Shortly thereafter, Appellant exited the
building in street clothes and entered his vehicle. S.L. joined him, and the
two drove around for approximately twenty minutes. Appellant then pulled
into a gravel lot and parked his vehicle in a spot concealed from view. The
vehicle remained parked for twenty-one minutes. S.L. testified to this
meeting at trial, and said that she had sex with Appellant in the backseat of
the car.
The officers continued to observe the vehicle after it exited the lot, but
at some point the investigators suspected their cover had been blown based
on Appellant’s behavior. An officer consulted the Clean Network system,
which the police use to research registration information on vehicles. These
requests are logged. His investigation revealed that Appellant requested
information on a license plate that matched one of the vehicles used to tail
Appellant on May 16.
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At trial on these charges, Appellant testified and agreed that he used
S.L. as a CI. Additionally, he confirmed that he left her a birthday gift, and
agreed that he had consensual sex with S.L. in his vehicle. However, he
denied any other sexual encounters between the two, including the
allegations of oral sex.
The jury found Appellant guilty of corruption of minors, and not guilty
of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (“IDSI”). The trial court imposed
the aforementioned sentence and Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
Appellant complied with the order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement and
the trial court authored its opinion in response. The matter is ready for our
review of Appellant’s claims:
I. Whether the evidence was insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict for corruption of minors when the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant, by any course of conduct in violation of chapter 31 (of title 18) (relating to sexual offenses), corrupted or tended to corrupt the morals of any minor?'
II. Whether the lower court erred in its denial of the motion for recusal?
III. Whether the lower court erred in its denial of the motion for change of venue/venire?
Appellant’s brief at 6.
Appellant's first argument challenges the sufficiency of the evidence.
Our standard of review is well settled.
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there
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is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Fitzpatrick, 159 A.3d 562, 567 (Pa.Super. 2017)
(citation omitted).
Appellant was charged under the following subsection of the corruption
of minors statute:
Whoever, being of the age of 18 years and upwards, by any course of conduct in violation of Chapter 31 (relating to sexual offenses) corrupts or tends to corrupt the morals of any minor less than 18 years of age, or who aids, abets, entices or encourages any such minor in the commission of an offense under Chapter 31 commits a felony of the third degree.
18 Pa.C.S. § 6301(a)(1)(ii).
As we explained in Commonwealth v. Kelly, 102 A.3d 1025
(Pa.Super. 2014) (en banc):
Subsection (a)(1)(ii) identifies two distinct offenses. The part at issue addresses the application of the corruption of minors statute to sexual offenses committed by the adult defendant. The second part of subsection (a)(1)(ii) addresses the application of the corruption of minors statute where the
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defendant “aids, abets, entices or encourages” a minor to commit a sexual offense. 18 Pa.C.S. § 6301(a)(1)(ii). Considered together, these provisions evidence a clear intent to provide additional penalties when the act or acts that corrupt the morals of a minor are sexual offenses, irrespective of whether the sexual offense was committed by an adult defendant or a minor victim.
Id. at 1030.
Presently, we are dealing with the former crime, pertaining to sexual
offenses committed by the defendant. As indicated by the statutory text,
the Commonwealth was required to establish that the Appellant committed a
course of conduct in violation of Chapter 31 (relating to sexual offenses),
which corrupted or tended to corrupt the morals of S.L. The Commonwealth
submits that Appellant committed multiple violations of indecent assault.
(a) Offense defined.--A person is guilty of indecent assault if the person has indecent contact with the complainant, causes the complainant to have indecent contact with the person or intentionally causes the complainant to come into contact with seminal fluid, urine or feces for the purpose of arousing sexual desire in the person or the complainant and:
....
(2) the person does so by forcible compulsion; [or]
(3) the person does so by threat of forcible compulsion that would prevent resistance by a person of reasonable resolution[.]
18 Pa.C.S. § 3126. Furthermore, the definitions section defines the
pertinent terms as follows:
“Forcible compulsion.” Compulsion by use of physical, intellectual, moral, emotional or psychological force, either express or implied. The term includes, but is not limited to,
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compulsion resulting in another person's death, whether the death occurred before, during or after sexual intercourse.
“Indecent contact.” Any touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of the person for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire, in any person.
18 Pa.C.S. § 3101.
Appellant’s argument that the evidence was insufficient attaches great
significance to the fact that the jury acquitted him of IDSI.
A careful review of the facts as fully set forth by the appellant clearly indicate insufficiency as a matter of law. First, we can all agree that the acquittal on the IDSI charge removes that offense from consideration as part of "any course of conduct." Once that is removed from the equation, what can we find in the record that establishes a sexual offense? All that remains is the consensual sexual intercourse between Mr. Reese and [S.L.]. Said consensual intercourse cannot be considered as a "sexual offense" under Chapter 31 so as to be an act that would fall into a "course of conduct."
The "accidental touching" at the gym is not a sexual offense. Assuming arguendo that we would view it as a sexual offense it is one act: a single episode that does not constitute a "course of conduct." Additionally, it is impossible for any argument to prevail which posits that the oral sex as testified to by the alleged victim can serve as a sexual offense since Officer Reese was acquitted of the IDSI charge.
Appellant’s brief at 16-17 (emphasis added).
Next, Appellant cites Kelly, in which we held that the “course of
conduct” element of (a)(1)(ii) cannot be met by a single act.
Given the well-established meaning of the phrase, “course of conduct,” we ascertain no ambiguity in its use in subsection (a)(1)(ii) of the corruption of minors statute. Consequently, we hold that the use of the phrase “course of conduct” in the first
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provision of subsection (a)(1)(ii) imposes a requirement of multiple acts over time[.]
Kelly, supra at 1031.
Taken together, Appellant maintains that both oral sex incidents must
be removed from consideration, since the jury acquitted him of the facts
supporting the IDSI crime.2 Then, examining the remaining evidence, he
submits that the Commonwealth cannot meet its burden of proving a course
of conduct since all that remained was one act of consensual sexual
intercourse.
We begin with Appellant’s assertion that “acquittal on the IDSI charge
removes that offense from consideration[.]” Appellant’s brief at 16.
Appellant does not cite or discuss any case law in connection with that
argument. Preliminarily, we express our view that this argument is more
properly described as a challenge to the inconsistency of the jury’s verdict.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that a court's review of the evidentiary sufficiency of a particular conviction is separate from its review of inconsistent verdicts, as sufficiency review entails an assessment of whether the evidence was sufficient for the jury to convict a defendant of a particular offense and is “independent of the jury's determination that evidence on another count was insufficient.” United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 67, 105 S.Ct. 471, 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984). Thus, the Supreme Court has explicitly cautioned that sufficiency review “should not be confused with the problems caused by ____________________________________________
2 S.L. testified to performing oral sex twice. The Commonwealth’s information indicated that the crimes alleged occurred between November 1, 2013, and June 15, 2014.
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inconsistent verdicts.” Id. Accordingly, in line with the high Court, we emphasize that such challenges are more appropriately characterized as challenges to the inconsistency of the jury's verdict, rather than to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a particular conviction.
Commonwealth v. Moore, 103 A.3d 1240, 1242 n.3 (Pa. 2014).
In Moore, our Supreme Court addressed whether a conviction for
possession of an instrument of a crime (“PIC”) could be upheld “when a
defendant has been otherwise acquitted of related offenses involving the use
of that instrument of crime[.]” Id. at 1241. Although the instant crimes at
issue are different, we find that the analysis is analogous.
The defendant therein was charged with murder, attempted murder,
and possession of an instrument of a crime, all relating to a shooting. Moore
testified that he fired the gun in self-defense. The jury acquitted him of
murder and attempted murder, but convicted him of PIC. Relying on
Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 527 A.2d 106 (Pa. 1987), a panel of this
Court concluded that the jury’s acquittal of the charges involving use of the
firearm due to self-defense negated the criminality element of PIC. Moore
overruled Gonzalez, and reiterated that factual findings should not be
drawn from inconsistent verdicts:
Gonzalez is in substantial tension with the line of cases which overwhelmingly permit inconsistent verdicts in a variety of contexts, as we discuss below. As a result, we accept the Commonwealth's invitation to revisit the validity of that decision.
Federal and Pennsylvania courts alike have long recognized that jury acquittals may not be interpreted as specific factual findings with regard to the evidence, as an acquittal does
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not definitively establish that the jury was not convinced of a defendant's guilt. Rather, it has been the understanding of federal courts as well as the courts of this Commonwealth that an acquittal may merely show lenity on the jury's behalf, or that “the verdict may have been the result of compromise, or of a mistake on the part of the jury.” United States v. Dunn, 284 U.S. 390, 394, 52 S.Ct. 189, 76 L.Ed. 356 (1932); see also Carter, 282 A.2d at 376. Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court has instructed that courts may not make factual findings regarding jury acquittals and, thus, cannot “upset” verdicts by “speculation or inquiry into such matters.” Dunn, 284 U.S. at 394, 52 S.Ct. 189.
It is because of the inability to ascertain the rationale behind a jury's decision to acquit a defendant that the United States Supreme Court has proclaimed that “[c]onsistency in the verdict is not necessary,” expressly holding that a defendant may not challenge his conviction on one count when it is inconsistent with the jury's verdict of acquittal on another count. Id. at 393, 52 S.Ct. 189. This principle was first articulated by the United States Supreme Court in the 1930s in Dunn, and was later reaffirmed by the Court in Powell, wherein the Court—noting that “[t]he rule established in Dunn v. United States has stood without exception in this court for 53 years”—rejected an appellant's request to adopt an exception to Dunn in cases where a defendant is acquitted of a predicate offense, but convicted of the compound offense. Powell, 469 U.S. at 69, 105 S.Ct. 471.
Id. at 1246–47 (emphasis added).
Moore noted that, in some particular contexts, the fact of acquittal
remains relevant. However, in those cases it is because the acquittal is
relevant as a matter of law, not fact. See Commonwealth v. Magliocco,
883 A.2d 479 (Pa. 2004) (evidence insufficient to support ethnic
intimidation, which at that time required proof of a predicate offense, where
jury acquitted defendant of the charged predicate offense). Moore
emphasized that in Magliocco, “[i]t was the fact of the jury’s acquittal—not
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any factual inference drawn from the acquittal—and the statutory elements
that drove our discussion.” Moore, supra at 1248.
Appellant herein seeks to use the fact of acquittal as precluding a
finding that Appellant’s course of conduct “violat[ed] . . . Chapter 31[.]” 18
Pa.C.S. § 6101(a)(1)(i). However, that acquittal simply means, at most,
that we cannot determine that IDSI crimes constituted the course of conduct
for a violation of Chapter 31. It does not mean that we must further find
that the jury would have similarly deemed Appellant not guilty of any other
Chapter 31 offense. Therefore, contrary to Appellant’s assertion, the jury’s
acquittal does not render it “impossible for any argument to prevail which
posits that the oral sex as testified to by the alleged victim can serve as a
sexual offense since Officer Reese was acquitted of the IDSI charge.”
Appellant’s brief at 17. That argument seeks to attach factual significance to
the acquittal, a proposition that Moore rejects. Inconsistent verdicts are
permissible and we must recognize “its corollary that factual findings may
not be inferred from a jury’s acquittal.” Moore, supra at 1248. We
therefore must examine the sufficiency of the evidence with the notion that
the jury could have credited S.L.’s testimony that she performed oral sex
despite the acquittal on the IDSI charge. That mercy was theirs to give, and
we cannot assume the jury determined that oral sex did not occur.
Properly characterized as a challenge to inconsistency of verdicts, we
find no merit to the sufficiency challenge. The jury was entitled to find a
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course of conduct from the events testified to by S.L, which included:
Appellant placing his hands on her nipples, placing his hand on her vagina,
asking her to perform oral sex twice, and having sex in Appellant’s vehicle.
The two oral sex incidents alone clearly qualify as crimes under indecent
assault, as those acts constitute indecent contact as defined in the statute.
Furthermore, S.L. explained that Appellant asked her to perform oral sex in
connection with promises to manipulate the criminal justice system in her
favor. Therefore, the jury was entitled to find that Appellant used
psychological coercion, both express and implied. Hence, we agree with the
Commonwealth that the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable
to it as verdict winner, sufficed to establish a finding that S.L.’s participation
“was actually the product of coercion and manipulation resulting from
[Appellant]'s abuse of his position as a police officer. The obvious implication
in all of [Appellant]'s interactions with S.L. was that her favorable treatment
by the justice system was contingent on her willingness to submit to his
sexual advances.” Commonwealth’s brief at 9. We therefore reject
Appellant’s first claim.
Appellant’s second issue concerns the trial court’s denial of his motion
to recuse. Our Supreme Court has set forth the relevant principles and
considerations as follows:
The standards for recusal are well established. It is the burden of the party requesting recusal to produce evidence establishing bias, prejudice or unfairness which raises a substantial doubt as to the jurist's ability to preside impartially. As a general rule,
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a motion for recusal is initially directed to and decided by the jurist whose impartiality is being challenged. In considering a recusal request, the jurist must first make a conscientious determination of his or her ability to assess the case in an impartial manner, free of personal bias or interest in the outcome. The jurist must then consider whether his or her continued involvement in the case creates an appearance of impropriety and/or would tend to undermine public confidence in the judiciary.
Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 720 A.2d 79, 89 (Pa. 1998) (citations
omitted).
The first portion, regarding the judge’s ability to assess the case in an
objective manner, is a subjective consideration on the part of the jurist that
is unreviewable. The latter portion, pertaining to whether the judge’s
involvement in the case creates an appearance of impropriety, is an
objective inquiry that we review for an abuse of discretion. See Goodheart
v. Casey, 565 A.2d 757, 764 (Pa. 1989) (the second consideration is
“whether [the judge]’s participation in the matter would give the appearance
of impropriety. To perform its high function in the best way, justice must
satisfy the appearance of justice.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted);
Lomas v. Kravitz, 130 A.3d 107, 136–37 (Pa.Super. 2015) (en banc)
(Stabile, J., concurring and dissenting) (tracing development of recusal
motions and appellate review thereof; “[W]hen confronted with a request for
judicial recusal, due process requires more than a jurist's examination of his
or her conscience for bias. Due process requires a more objective
standard.”).
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Initially, we note that the Commonwealth filed a motion seeking an
appointment of an out-of-county judge, due to the fact that Appellant
frequently appeared in Fayette County courtrooms in performing his job.
The Commonwealth stated that recusal “would eliminate the potential for
any real or apparent conflict of interest[.]” Motion, 9/9/15, ¶ 5. That
motion was denied shortly thereafter.
Appellant did not join this request. Instead, he filed his own motion
for recusal almost nine months later. The sole basis for that request was as
follows: “It has come to counsel’s attention that the Commonwealth plans to
call a witness who is a relative of President Judge Wagner during the
criminal proceeding. Counsel herein believes that this would create a
scenario where the Judge’s impartiality could be questioned by others.”
Motion for Recusal, 6/1/16, at 1.
On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by failing to
grant the recusal motion based on what the Commonwealth alleged
regarding the possible appearance of impropriety. However, Appellant did
not join the Commonwealth’s motion, and the sole basis for Appellant’s
independent motion was the possible conflict caused by a witness. Appellant
neither names that witness nor states that the witness actually testified.
Hence, we deem this claim waived.
Moreover, we would find no error in the denial. The trial court noted
that Appellant “has failed to establish any necessity for [recusal], and has
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not even attempted to demonstrate that there was any impropriety, or even
the appearance thereof . . . This Court had no doubts whatsoever about [its]
ability to preside fairly and [impartially].” Trial Court Opinion, 3/14/17, at 3.
Therefore, the trial court properly conducted the subjective inquiry regarding
the judge’s own ability to preside fairly, which is unreviewable. As to the
latter, objective inquiry, we agree that Appellant has failed to establish any
appearance of impropriety. There was no relationship between the judge
and Appellant other than the fact that their paths sometimes crossed when
performing their respective jobs. We would therefore find no abuse of
discretion in denying the recusal motion.
Finally, Appellant’s third issue alleges that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying his motion for a change of venue. The motion claimed
that this case received greater attention than normal in the media, thereby
prejudicing the ability to select an impartial jury. The trial court denied the
claim without prejudice to Appellant’s ability to raise the claim later should it
appear that selecting a jury proved difficult. Appellant did not renew the
motion.
As with the case with recusal, our system entrusts the trial court with
the initial decision on change of venue, recognizing that it “is in the best
position to assess the atmosphere of the community and to judge the
necessity of the requested change.” Commonwealth v. Karenbauer, 715
A.2d 1086, 1092 (Pa. 1998) (citation omitted). A defendant must show that
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“pre-trial publicity resulted in actual prejudice that prevented the impaneling
of an impartial jury.” Id. (citation omitted). Thus, the mere existence of
pre-trial publicity is not sufficient, and that is all that Appellant has
established. We find no abuse of discretion.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 5/23/2018
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