Com. v. Reese, D.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: August 27, 2025
• Docket: 1505 WDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-A17027-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : DONALD WILLIAM REESE : : Appellant : No. 1505 WDA 2024

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 8, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-10-CR-0000594-2023

BEFORE: McLAUGHLIN, J., LANE, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY LANE, J.: FILED: August 27, 2025

Donald William Reese (“Reese”) appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed following his guilty plea to statutory sexual assault1 and the trial

court’s determination that he is a sexually violent predator (“SVP”) under the

Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”).2 We affirm.

The Commonwealth alleged that when Reese was twenty-five years old,

he “engage[d] in sexual intercourse with [a fifteen] year old juvenile, [who

was] was not his spouse.” N.T., 11/29/23, at 3. On November 29, 2023,

Reese entered a negotiated guilty plea to statutory sexual assault, a Tier II

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1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3122.1(a)(2).

2 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10 to 9799.95. J-A17027-25

offense under SORNA, which triggered a twenty-five-year registration period.3

This conviction also required the trial court to order the Sexual Offender

Assessment Board (“SOAB”) to evaluate Johnson for classification as an SVP.4

On August 8, 2024, the trial court conducted a combined SVP and

sentencing hearing (“SVP hearing”). The court imposed the negotiated

sentence: imprisonment of twelve months less one day to twenty-four months

less two days; and a consecutive twelve months’ probation.5

The Commonwealth called Julia Lindemuth (“Lindemuth”), a member of

the SOAB who conducted an SVP assessment of Reese, as an expert in the

assessment and treatment of sexual abusers. Lindemuth testified that Reese

did not agree to an interview. Nevertheless, Lindemuth reviewed “a few

hundred pages of records in total” pertaining to Reese. N.T., 8/8/24, at 12.

Lindemuth further testified to all of the following. There are “two

pathways to lifetime reoffending:” sexual deviance; and chronic antisociality,

3 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.14(c)(1.1) (classifying statutory sexual assault as

a Tier II sexual offense), 9799.15(a)(2) (requiring an individual convicted of a Tier II sexual offense to register for twenty-five years). At the same proceeding, Reese also pleaded guilty, at two different trial dockets, to disorderly conduct and possession of drug paraphernalia.

4 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.12 (defining a “sexually violent offense” as, inter

alia, an offense designated as a Tier II sexual offense), 9799.24(a) (providing that “a court shall order an individual convicted of a sexually violent offense to be assessed by the” SOAB). An SVP designation carries lifetime registration. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.15(a)(6).

5 The trial court also advised Reese of his twenty-five year SORNA registration

for this conviction of a Tier II offense.

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or “a pervasive disregard for the rights of others beginning in early

adolescence.” Id. at 13, 15. There was insufficient evidence to find Reese

suffered from the former — sexual deviance. However, Lindemuth opined,

within a reasonable degree of professional certainty, that Reese had the latter,

chronic antisociality, as he met the diagnostic criteria for antisocial personality

disorder.6 See id. at 21. Lindemuth defined this disorder as having a

“pervasive pattern of disregard for, and the violation of, rights of others that

begin[s] in childhood or early adolescence and continue[s] into adulthood,”

which “persists despite interventions.”7 Id. at 15, 20-21.

6 Lindemuth testified that she was “not making a medical diagnosis, but [she]

follow[ed] the criteria in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual.” N.T., 8/8/24, at 25.

7 Lindemuth further defined antisocial personality disorder as:

a pervasive pattern of disregard for, and the violation of, the rights of others occurring since the age of [fifteen], indicated by three or more of the following behaviors[:]

[f]ailure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behavior, as indicated by performing acts that are grounds for arrest; deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying, use of aliases, or conning others for . . . personal profit or pleasure; impulsivity or failure to plan ahead; irritability or aggressiveness, as indicated by repeated physical fights or assaults; reckless disregard for the safety of self or others; consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by repeated failure to sustain consistent work behavior or honor financial obligations; lack of remorse, as indicated by being indifferent to or rationalizing having hurt, mistreated, or stolen from another; they are least [eighteen] years of age; and there is evidence of a conduct disorder occurring before the age of [fifteen] [sic]. (Footnote Continued Next Page)

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In reaching this conclusion, Lindemuth reviewed the following mental

health history from Reese’s childhood and adolescence. First, when Reese

was around seven years old, “he was . . . evaluated due to behavioral and

emotional concerns.” N.T., 8/8/24, at 16. This “evaluation described him as

oppositional and noncompliant, [with] fighting and physical aggression.” Id.

at 16-17. Next, a 2008 report, made when Reese was ten years old,

noted that he was aggressive in his psychologists’ office, grabbing his mother’s neck, trying to punch[,] kick and bite her. He was restrained by the police and sent to the hospital. [Reese] was diagnosed with bipolar disorder, intermittent explosive disorder, attention deficit disorder, and conduct disorder.

Id. at 17.

At age twelve, Reese “was evaluated again . . . by another psychologist,”

who diagnosed him with “impulse control disorder, oppositional defiant

disorder, and ADHD.” Id. At age fourteen, a psychiatric evaluation produced

diagnoses of “ADHD, oppositional defiant disorder, and intermittent explosive

disorder.” Id. In 2015, when Reese was approximately seventeen years old,

he underwent another psychiatric evaluation, “where he was diagnosed with

ADHD, oppositional defiant disorder, and intermittent explosive disorder.” Id.

This evaluation also showed Reese “exhibited suicidal ideation, homicidal

ideation, depression, anxiety, aggression, and concentration problems.” Id.

at 17-18.

N.T., 8/8/24, at 19-20.

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Additionally, Lindemuth testified that she reviewed Reese’s juvenile

delinquency history. Lindemuth’s report, which the Commonwealth entered

into evidence, stated Reese had juvenile delinquencies of: disorderly conduct

at age ten; harassment at age thirteen, for threatening to shoot two “women

who worked for the Children’s Aid Society where he was involved in services;”

and conspiracy to commit theft by unlawful taking. Sexually Violent Predator

Assessment, 2/13/14, at 6. For the harassment charge, Reese “was placed

on [sixty] days house arrest and ordered to report to school as required,” but

he “violated the terms of his probation by failing to go to school as directed.”

Id. For the conspiracy charge, Reese “was sent to juvenile placement, where

he struggled to adjust and was sent to multiple secure placements. During

this time, his behaviors included physical and verbal aggression towards staff

and peers, and homicidal and suicidal ideations which resulted in psychiatric

hospitalizations.” Id.

Lindemuth further testified that records showed that “throughout

[Reese’s] time in the juvenile system,”

he was provided multiple forms of counseling interventions[, including] therapeutic support systems, mobile therapy, behavioral health services, behavioral specialist consulting services, wrap-around services, general counseling services, psychiatric services, and medication management.

****

. . . That’s a pretty exhaustive list of services. [T]hose are pretty common services available to individuals with problems . . . in their youth.

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N.T., 8/8/24, at 18.

Lindemuth also reviewed Reese’s adult criminal history, which began

around 2016 and “persist[ed]” through the present. Id. at 19. Her report

summarized his offenses, which included: simple assault and terroristic

threats, for punching the victim’s face with a knife in his hand; simple assault,

for punching his ex-girlfriend in the face; disorderly conduct against another

girlfriend; harassment; improper exhibition of a firearm or dangerous weapon;

and use of drug paraphernalia. Reese had several prior adult probation

violations and two pending probation violations, and he was the subject of two

prior protection from abuse orders.

Lindemuth testified that Reese exhibited “many different types of

problematic criminal behaviors . . . occurring over time, [which did not] seem

to be impacted by consequence, whether it be therapeutic consequence or

legal consequence.” Id. at 15. Lindemuth reiterated that this persistent

conduct, “despite interventions,” was “a marker of the antisocial personality

disorder.” Id. Lindemuth thus opined Reese met the criteria for an SVP.

Reese did not testify or present any witnesses, but elicited Lindemuth’s

testimony that: (1) the facts of the underlying offense — “[t]hree instances of

sex [with a minor] over the course of three months [—] would not be enough

for [an SVP] determination for sexual deviance;” and (2) Lindemuth reviewed

only Reese’s juvenile mental health records, as she did not have any adult

evaluations. Id. at 24, 26. Nevertheless, when Reese asked Lindemuth

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whether she relied “solely” on his “juvenile information,” Lindemuth replied

she relied on both his mental health records and criminal history. Id. at 29.

In closing argument, Reese contended that Lindemuth’s reliance on his

juvenile mental health records was improper, because a juvenile cannot be

subject to an SVP assessment under SORNA. See id. at 32.

The trial court concluded Reese met the criteria for an SVP. Reese filed

a timely post-sentence motion, challenging the SVP determination, which the

court denied. Reese filed a timely notice of appeal and filed a court-ordered

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal.

Reese presents two issues for our review:

I. Whether the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to prove beyond clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court’s determination that [Reese] is [an SVP] under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.24, where it relied solely upon a juvenile mental health diagnosis as a ‘non-sexual’ pathway to such designation?

II. Whether the “[SVP]” designation as provided under [SORNA] is unconstitutional and violates [Reese’s] fundamental right to protect his reputation as secured by Pennsylvania Constitution Article I, Section 1, as applied to him, where his SVP designation is based exclusively upon juvenile mental health records and diagnosis to support such designation?

Reese’s Brief at 10.

In his first issue, Reese challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting his designation as an SVP, where the Commonwealth “relied solely”

on a mental health diagnosis he received as a child. Reese’s Brief at 15. We

consider the applicable standard of review:

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A challenge to a trial court’s SVP designation presents a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence for which our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support an SVP designation requires the reviewing court to accept the undiminished record of the case in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. . . . “We will reverse a trial court’s determination of SVP status only if the Commonwealth has not presented clear and convincing evidence that each element of the statute has been satisfied.”

Commonwealth v. Aumick, 297 A.3d 770, 776-77 (Pa. Super. 2023) (en

banc) (citations and footnote omitted).

SORNA defines an SVP as:

[a]n individual who committed a sexually violent offense . . . on or after December 20, 2012, who is determined to be a sexually violent predator under section 9799.24 (relating to assessments) due to a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the individual likely to engage in predatory sexually violent offenses.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.12. Section 9799.24(b), in turn, sets forth a non-

exhaustive list of fifteen factors an SOAB member shall consider in assessing

an individual:

(1) Facts of the current offense, including:

[List of seven factors]

(2) Prior offense history, including:

(i) The individual’s prior criminal record.

(ii) Whether the individual completed any prior sentences.

(iii) Whether the individual participated in available programs for sexual offenders.

(3) Characteristics of the individual, including:

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(i) Age.

(ii) Use of illegal drugs.

(iii) Any mental illness, mental disability or mental abnormality.

(iv) Behavioral characteristics that contribute to the individual’s conduct.

(4) Factors that are supported in a sexual offender assessment field as criteria reasonably related to the risk of reoffense.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.24(b)(1)-(4) (emphases added).

This Court has explained:

Whereas the SOAB member must consider the fifteen factors listed in section 9799.24(b), the trial court must determine whether the Commonwealth has proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is an individual who has “a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the individual likely to engage in predatory sexually violent offenses.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.12 (providing the definition of a “sexually violent predator”).

Aumick, 297 A.3d at 778-79 (some citations omitted).

Finally, we note that when interpreting a statute,

“our paramount objective [is] to give effect to the intent of our General Assembly in enacting the particular statute under review.” [See] 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(a)). “When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” 1 Pa.[C.S.]A. § 1921(b).”

Commonwealth v. Brashear, 331 A.3d 669, 673-74 (Pa. Super. 2024)

(some citations omitted).

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On appeal, Reese challenges the sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s

evidence that he has a personality disorder that makes him likely to engage

in predatory sexually violent offenses. In support, Reese avers his “SVP

designation is [improperly] based exclusively [on] his childhood diagnosis,” as

SORNA “expressly” does not apply to children. Reese’s Brief at 17. Reese

cites Interest of J.B., 107 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2014), in which the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court distinguished “delinquent children [from] adult criminals” and

held that “SORNA violates juvenile offenders’ due process rights through the

use of [an] irrebuttable presumption.” Id. at 17-18. Additionally, Reese

contends that his juvenile mental health diagnosis “alone was insufficient

evidence to support his SVP designation,” where Lindemuth had testified the

facts of the instant case were insufficient to support an SVP determination.

Id. at 15, 19-20.

After review of the record in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth, we determine the evidence was sufficient to support the

finding that Reese met the criteria of an SVP. See Aumick, 297 A.3d at 776-

77. As noted above, he challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence that

he has a personality disorder that makes him likely to engage in predatory

sexually violent offenses. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.12.

First, we reject the factual premise in Reese’s argument — that

Lindemuth relied “solely” on his juvenile mental health records. Reese’s Brief

at 15. Lindemuth clearly testified that she also reviewed Reese’s juvenile

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delinquency history and adult criminal record, which spanned a few hundred

pages. See N.T., 8/8/24, at 12, 29.

Second, we reject Reese’s unsupported contention that SORNA does not

apply to children. Section 9799.13 provides that registration requirements

apply to “juvenile offender[s]” and “sexually violent delinquent child[ren].” 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.13(8)-(8.1), (9). Interest of J.B. did not hold otherwise.

Instead, that decision had a narrow ruling:

that SORNA’s registration requirements violate juvenile offenders’ due process rights by utilizing the irrebuttable presumption that all juvenile offenders “pose a high risk of committing additional sexual offenses,” 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9799.11(a)(4),[8] because that presumption is not universally true and a reasonable alternative means currently exists for determining which juvenile offenders are likely to reoffend.

Interest of J.B., 107 A.3d at 14 (emphasis added). The present case does

not implicate the concerns underlying Interest of J.B.; Reese was not a

juvenile when he committed the underlying offense and he did not suffer,

while a juvenile, the application of the irrebuttable presumption.

Instead, Reese attempts to extrapolate the Interest of J.B. holding to

mean that an SVP assessment cannot include a defendant’s juvenile mental

health records. We reject such an interpretation. Interest of J.B. made no

8 Section 9799.11 sets forth the Pennsylvania General Assembly’s legislative

findings, and states, in pertinent part: “Sexual offenders pose a high risk of committing additional sexual offenses, and protection of the public from this type of offender is a paramount governmental interest.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.11(a)(4).

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such pronouncement, nor did it involve any challenge to what materials an

SOAB member could review when conducting an SVP assessment.

Accordingly, we determine Interest of J.B. is not relevant to the issue

presented.

Third, we determine that the plain language of Subsection

9799.24(b)(3) does not support Reese’s argument. See Brashear, 331 A.3d

at 673-74. Subsection 9799.24(b)(3) provides that an SVP assessment “shall

include” examination of the defendant’s age, “any mental illness, mental

disability or mental abnormality,” and “[b]ehavioral characteristics that

contribute to the individual’s conduct.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.24(b)(3)(i), (iii)-

(iv) (emphasis added). The term “any” indicates there is no limitation on the

scope of a defendant’s mental health history that an SOAB member may

consider.

Similarly, we conclude that Subsection 9799.24(b)(4) permits an SVP

assessment to include review of a defendant’s juvenile mental health records.

That subsection requires review of “[f]actors that are supported in a sexual

offender assessment field as criteria reasonably related to the risk of

reoffense.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.24(b)(4) (emphasis added). As discussed

above, Lindemuth testified there are “two pathways to lifetime reoffending,”

including chronic antisociality. N.T., 8/8/24, at 13 (emphasis added).

Lindemuth opined that Reese had such a condition — antisocial personality

disorder, defined as having a “pervasive pattern of disregard for, and the

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violation of, rights of others that begin[s] in childhood or early

adolescence and continue[s] into adulthood,” which “persists despite

interventions.” Id. at 15, 20-21 (emphases added). Accordingly, Reese’s

juvenile mental health history was relevant to Lindemuth’s determination of

whether his condition began in childhood or early adolescence, and whether it

persisted into adulthood.

Finally, we determine no relief is due on Reese’s reliance on Lindemuth’s

testimony, that the facts of the underlying case, alone, would not support an

SVP finding. As stated above, Lindemuth testified there are two pathways,

and while the facts of the instant case did not establish the former, sexual

deviancy, Reese met the latter — chronic antisociality. Indeed, in response

to Reese’s cross-examination, Lindemuth testified that his antisocial

personality disorder was distinct from sexual deviancy, as one could “have

antisocial personality disorder and not commit a sex crime.” N.T., 8/8/24, at

26. For the foregoing reasons, we determine no relief is due on Reese’s first

issue.

In his second issue, Reese avers SORNA’s SVP designation violates his

right to reputation, and is unconstitutional as applied to him because the

designation “is based exclusively [on] juvenile mental health records and

diagnos[e]s.” Reese’s Brief at 22. Reese acknowledges the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court has determined that SORNA’s SVP registration requirements

are not criminal punishment. However, Reese maintains that “the ‘non-sexual’

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pathway contained within the definition of [an SVP] criminalized his childhood

mental health diagnosis, [and then] was used as the sole support for” his SVP

designation. Id. In other words, Reese asserts, one’s “developing brain,

childhood immaturity, impulsivity, or mental health struggles [should not] be

used solely to support an SVP designation without any foundation in one’s

adulthood.” Id. at 24. Reese requests this Court to “clearly delineate an age

line to create the legal and constitutional floor for SORNA and SOAB . . .

evaluators so childhood mental health is protected and excluded from SVP

assessments.” Id.

We have rejected Reese’s claim that Lindemuth and the trial court relied

“solely” on his juvenile mental health diagnoses in concluding he was an SVP.

With respect to Reese’s constitutional challenges, we determine he has

waived them for failure to raise them before the trial court. See Pa.R.A.P.

302(a) (providing that “[i]ssues not raised in the trial court are waived and

cannot be raised for the first time on appeal”); see also Commonwealth v.

Jefferson, 256 A.3d 1242, 1261 (Pa. Super. 2021) (en banc) (stating “it has

long been true that failure to raise an issue in the trial court, even one of

constitutional dimension, results in waiver of the issue on appeal”).

At the SVP hearing and in his post-sentence motion, Reese argued only

that it was improper to consider his juvenile mental health records because

SORNA does not apply to juveniles. See N.T., 8/8/24, at 32; see also Post-

Sentence Motion for Sentence Modification, 8/15/24, at unnumbered 2. Reese

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raised his right to reputation and an “as-applied” constitutional challenge, for

the first time, in his Rule 1925(b) statement. See Commonwealth v. Jones,

271 A.3d 452, 457 (Pa. Super. 2021) (stating that “[r]aising an issue for the

first time in a Rule 1925(b) statement is insufficient to prevent waiver of an

issue that the appellant failed to raise while the case was pending in the trial

court”). As we find waiver, we conclude no relief is due on Reese’s second

In sum, we affirm the trial court’s finding that Reese is an SVP under

SORNA, and we affirm the judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

DATE: 08/27/2025

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