Com. v. Reed, J.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: May 11, 2026
• Docket: 1770 EDA 2025
• Status: Unpublished
• Author: McLaughlin

Opinion

J-S12004-26

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JAMES REED JR. : : Appellant : No. 1770 EDA 2025 :

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 12, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-15-CR-0002526-2023

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JAMES E. REED JR. : : Appellant : No. 1771 EDA 2025 :

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 12, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-15-CR-0000527-2024

BEFORE: McLAUGHLIN, J., SULLIVAN, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. *

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED MAY 11, 2026

James E. Reed, Jr., appeals from the judgment of sentence entered on

two separate dockets following his convictions for four counts of delivery of a

controlled substance, three counts of possession of a controlled substance

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-S12004-26

with intent to deliver (“PWID”), three counts of criminal use of a

communication facility, seven counts of possession of a controlled substance,

and one count of drug delivery resulting in death. 1 He challenges the

sufficiency and weight of the evidence and the discretionary aspects of his

sentence. We affirm.

On June 17, 2023, “[o]fficers from the Phoenixville Borough Police

Department responded to the residence of James Nelson [(‘decedent’)].” Trial

Ct. Order, filed June 11, 2025, at 1 n.1. They pronounced decedent dead at

the scene. The cause of death was an overdose of fentanyl,

methamphetamine, and xylazine. 2 See, e.g., N.T., Dec. 12, 2024, at 15, 17,

88.

The trial court conducted a jury trial.3 Detective Jason Komorwski

testified that he went to the scene on the morning of decedent’s death. N.T., ____________________________________________

1 35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(30), 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 7512(a), 35 P.S. § 780- 113(a)(16), and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2506(a), respectively.

2 Forensic toxicologist Ayaka Chan-Hosokawa testified that “Xylazine is a[n]

FDA approved veterinary analgesic or sedative that’s used in large animals. It is not approved for human use.” N.T., Dec. 12, 2024, at 16. She stated that “in the last few years, especially in the Philadelphia suburb area, we have seen . . . Xylazine mixed in elicit fentanyl.” Id.

3 The court consolidated two cases for trial. On docket number CR-2526-2023

(“docket 2526”), trial proceeded on three counts of delivery of a controlled substance (cocaine), one count of PWID (cocaine), two counts of criminal use of communication facility, and four counts of possession of a controlled substance (cocaine). On docket number CR-527-2024 (“docket 527”), trial proceeded on one count each of drug delivery resulting in death, delivery of a controlled substance (fentanyl), and criminal use of communication facility, (Footnote Continued Next Page)

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Dec. 10, 2024, at 144. During his investigation, he collected the decedent’s

cellular telephone. Id. at 146. Also, the decedent’s girlfriend, Adina Rowan,

contacted the police twice when she found clear bags with white powder

residue in decedent’s possessions. Id. at 116-18; 139; N.T, Dec. 11, 2024, at

92. The police collected the bags. Id.

Detective Thomas Hyland testified about the investigation into

decedent’s death. N.T., Dec. 11, 2024, at 6-7. He said that when the officers

at the scene read him the phone numbers that last had contact with the

decedent, he “immediately recognized the number . . . that was saved [in

decedent’s phone] as Lil U” as a number that Reed had been using. Id. at 7.

He explained that he had been investigating Reed and knew he frequently

changed phone numbers through an application that “has the ability to make

calls and texts from a different phone number.” Id. at 7-8. Through that

investigation, Detective Hyland knew that the number in the phone for “Lil U”

was “the newest number that [Reed] was using at that time[.]” Id. at 8.

He also testified that when he removed the outer case from decedent’s

phone, a bag that “was consistent with how heroin and fentanyl are packaged”

fell out. Id. at 10. He stated the bag was a white wax paper bag and had a

stamp on it that said, “mega millions.” Id. The parties stipulated that the

“white glassine bag stamped mega millions containing white powder . . . was

two counts of PWID (methamphetamine and cocaine), and three counts of possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine, cocaine, and fentanyl).

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analyzed and confirmed to contain fentanyl and Xylazine.” Id. at 17. They

further stipulated that “[t]he DNA swabs collected from the white glassine

bags stamped mega millions were submitted and analyzed and were

confirmed to contain one full single source male profile that matche[d] the

DNA profile of [the decedent] and [did] not match the DNA profile of James

Reed.” Id. at 18.

Detective Hyland testified that as part of a separate investigation, they

had started to look at Reed in early June 2023. Id. at 22. He said that as part

of that investigation they conducted a controlled buy on June 1, 2023 through

a confidential informant. Id. at 28. He testified that he was with the informant

when he or she communicated with Reed through text messages and a phone

call, and he provided the informant with cash. Id. at 29. He stated he dropped

off the confidential informant a couple of blocks from the meeting location and

did not see the hand-to-hand transaction, but another officer did. Id. at 30-

31. Detective Hyland testified that the confidential informant returned with a

controlled substance, which the parties stipulated was cocaine. Id. at 32, 35.

Detective Hyland testified that they conducted two more controlled

buys, both on June 20, 2023. Id. at 35-36. He stated that he did not observe

the transactions, but another detective did. Detective Hyland testified he

drove the confidential informant close to the meeting location, and the

confidential informant returned with controlled substances that the parties

stipulated were cocaine. Id. at 40-43, 44-48.

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Detective Michael Kinsman testified that for the controlled buy on June

1, 2023, he was in a vehicle about a block west of the target’s residence. Id.

at 132. He stated he observed the informant walk to a southeast corner and

Reed come out the front door of a home and walk directly to the informant.

Id. at 133-34. Detective Kinsman testified that Reed and the informant had a

brief conversation, and he observed Reed and the informant conduct a hand-

to-hand transaction. Id. at 134. On cross-examination, he acknowledged he

could not “immediately identify . . . the objects specifically or the exact

quantity.” Id. at 136-37. He stated he had binoculars. Id. at 137.

Detective Oscar Rosado testified regarding the two controlled buys on

June 20, 2023. Id. at 141. He stated he was in a vehicle with binoculars. Id.

He said that for the first controlled buy, he observed the informant walk to the

meet location and Reed exit the driveway of his residence and walk toward

the meet intersection. Id. at 142. He testified he drove to their location and

observed a hand-to-hand transaction, after which Reed returned to his street.

Id. He testified the second control buy was similar to the first, but he did not

need to relocate his vehicle to observe this transaction. Id. at 143. He said he

“saw a hand-to-hand, small talk, then [Reed] walked back to [his residence].”

Id. On cross-examination, he explained that he moved his vehicle during the

first controlled buy because he thought the meet location was at a different

corner, and when the informant arrived, he realized a building blocked his

view and moved his vehicle. Id. at 144. He testified he was able to see Reed

and the informant after he moved the vehicle, he was at a “stop sign and [he]

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looked to [his] right, [he] observed [Reed] and the informant, then [he]

started moving [because he] didn’t want to park there for too long, [he] saw

them moving south or towards their direction and that’s when [he] saw the

hand-to-hand.” Id. at 144-45. He testified he could not see what was in their

hands. Id. at 148.

Detective Hyland testified that when Reed was arrested he had on his

person a cross-body satchel and a cell phone. Id. at 49. The detective stated

that when he called the number used by the informant for the last two

controlled buys, the number of the phone the detective used appeared on

Reed’s phone screen. Id. at 49-50. The parties stipulated that the satchel

contained numerous bags of crack cocaine and marijuana. Id. at 50-51.

Detective Hyland next testified about a search warrant executed at a

residence where Reed spent time. During the first search, the police did not

discover any evidence. Id. at 55. They obtained a second warrant for the

residence after they intercepted a phone call between Reed and a man named

Antonio Pittman that suggested that they had failed to discover a safe that

was in the house. Id. at 77.4 When they executed the second warrant, they

found a safe. Id. at 78. It contained, among other things, scales, items used ____________________________________________

4 During the call, Reed and Pittman discussed that some of the items in the

safe belonged to “Bev.” Exh. 25 at 2-3. Reed stated, “Yeah, that’s her lane yeah. Yup. And then I think it’s like ten jawns of tree or something like that, and then the rest of it empties [in] our lane.” Id. at 3. Detective Hyland testified that Bev “was known to be a methamphetamine dealer” so he “assumed” her “lane” was the methamphetamine and because he had arrested Pittman for cocaine distribution, he believed that was the other “lane.” N.T., Dec. 11, 2024, at 75-76.

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to prepare crack cocaine, knotted baggies, methamphetamine, and cocaine.

Id. at 85-87. Further, he testified there was no identifiable DNA on the

packaging located in the safe. Id. at 95.

Detective Hyland testified that they had learned from the decedent’s

girlfriend that the decedent hid his addiction and would delete items from his

phone. Id. at 19. He stated that they conducted a forensic download of the

phone, which could have potentially retrieved deleted messages or content,

and obtained the toll records for decedent’s phone provider. Id. at 19-21. He

testified that toll records “show all the transactions of calls and texts to and

from a particular number, as well as . . . cell site location and things of that

nature.” Id. at 156-57.

Detective Hyland testified they did not find any text messages on the

decedent’s phone that would indicate drug activity. Id. at 160. However, he

said they did retrieve from Reed’s phone text messages between Reed and

decedent. Id. at 161. He stated that on June 12, 2023, the decedent texted

Reed that he “need[ed] two,” which Detective Hyland opined meant that the

decedent needed two bags of something. Id. at 162-64. He said that in

subsequent text messages that day, Reed said he was in Pottstown and had

“one left though if you” want it and “[m]y other didn’t come today,” and the

decedent said he wanted it and would “hit [Reed] up” when he was done

cleaning. Id. at 165-66.

Detective Hyland testified that the following day, June 13, the decedent

texted Reed, “I know you don’t have any ice left. I’m trying to grab some D.”

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Id. at 168. Detective Hyland stated that ice is a slang word for

methamphetamine and D is an abbreviation for dope or slang for heroin

fentanyl. Id. The detective also said that in response to texts from decedent,

Reed stated, “I’m trying to get it homie”; the decedent responded, “Trying to

get what? The D or the ice?” Reed replied, “I’ll call you later.” After the

decedent sent numerous other texts, Reed responded, “I got cement, tree,

and D,” and the decedent said he wanted “to grab a couple D.” Id. at 168-71.

Detective Hyland said that cement meant hard crack cocaine, tree was

marijuana, and D was heroin fentanyl. Id. at 171.

Detective Hyland testified that on June 14 the decedent texted Reed

that he “want[ed] to grab a couple more of the D from [Reed],” Reed

responded that he was at Phoenixville Hospital, and the two talked by phone

twice. Id. at 172. The detective stated the decedent then texted Reed, “when

you come out walk straight and you will see me.” Reed texted, “I’m outside

bro WYA,” and the decedent responded, “if you came out the front door, you

just have to walk straight through and I’m right there, right next to the little

set of steps leading towards Nutt Road,” which is near Phoenixville Hospital.

Id. at 174. Detective Hyland further pointed out that there was another call

between the two. Id. at 175.

Detective Hyland testified that the next communication was on June 16,

from Reed to the decedent saying, “yo, bro, I got the ice back” and a second

saying, “yo bro.” Id. The detective stated that Reed also attempted to call the

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decedent and, on June 18, Reed texted the decedent, “yo, bro, what’s going

on? You good?” Id.

Detective Hyland also testified about a video shown to the jury that

showed Reed on June 14, 2023 standing outside the Phoenixville Hospital

entrance. In the video, after he received a text message, he proceeded to

walk to a white pick-up truck operated by the decedent. Id. at 177-78.

Detective Hyland stated Reed got in the vehicle, which pulled away and circled

the area. Id. at 178-88. Detective Hyland testified that it was typical during

street-level sales for a seller to get into a buyer’s vehicle, like they were

getting a ride, and then be dropped off at a separate location and walk back.

Id. at 188. The detective pointed out that when Reed walked back to the

hospital, he had the cross-body satchel found with him when they arrested

him. Id. at 189-90.

Detective Hyland stated they reviewed all other phone numbers in the

decedent’s phone, and all were “his regular contacts,” meaning co-workers,

family, and friends. Id. at 191. He also reviewed the toll records for the

decedent’s phone for June 14 to June 17, the day decedent died, and

concluded the decedent communicated with his “regular acquaintances; family

members, [his girlfriend], and co-workers.” Id. at 194.

Detective Hyland testified that in reviewing Reed’s phone, he found a

text message to “Frank from Douglassville” on June 5, 2023, which stated

“mega millions came back bro. He litty right now too bro ham.” Id. at 195-

96. He further testified that in a phone call between Reed and Beverly Barl,

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Reed said “I’m trying to figure out is [the decedent] really dead. Is - if he’s

really dead then I will be in some deep shit.” Exh. 44 at 1.

On cross-examination, Detective Hyland agreed that Reed and the

decedent “were in communication on pretty much a daily basis.” Id. at 202.

Detective Hyland agreed they were in communication on June 5, and Reed did

not tell the decedent through text message about mega millions, but noted

there was a phone call that day. Id. at 204-205.

A jury convicted Reed of the above-referenced offenses. The court

sentenced him to an aggregate sentence of 15 to 30 years’ incarceration on

docket 527 and an aggregate sentence of five to 10 years’ consecutive

incarceration on docket 2526. His total aggregate sentence was 20 to 40

years’ incarceration. Reed filed a post-sentence motion, which the court

denied. Reed appealed.

Reed raises the following issues:

I. Was sufficient evidence presented to support a conviction on Drug Delivery Resulting in Death, 18 Pa.C.S.A. §2506 (a), in docket CR-527-2024? Specifically, was there sufficient evidence presented to show [Reed] delivered the controlled substance that caused decedent’s death?

II. Was sufficient evidence presented to support a conviction on Delivering a Controlled Substance (fentanyl), 35 Pa.C.S.A. §780-1 13 (a)(30), in docket CR-527-2024? Specifically, was there sufficient evidence to show [Reed] delivered fentanyl to decedent on June 14, 2023?

III. Was sufficient evidence presented to support a conviction on Possession of a Controlled Substance (fentanyl), 35 Pa.C.S.A. §780-113 (a)(16), in docket CR- 527-2024? Specifically, was there sufficient evidence to show [Reed] possessed fentanyl on June 14, 2023?

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IV. Was sufficient evidence presented to support a conviction on Possession with Intent to Deliver Controlled Substance (methamphetamine), 35 Pa.C.S.A. §780-113 (a)(30) in docket CR-527-2024? Specifically, was there sufficient evidence to show [Reed] possessed methamphetamines?

V. Was sufficient evidence presented to support a conviction on Possession of a Controlled Substance (methamphetamine), 35 Pa.C.S.A. §780-113 (a)(16) in docket CR-527-2024? Specifically, was there sufficient evidence to show [Reed] possessed methamphetamines?

VI. Was the jury’s verdict against the weight of the evidence presented on Counts 1, 2, 3 (relating to Delivering a Controlled Substance, 35 Pa.C.S.A. §780-113 (a)(30)) and Counts 7, 8, and 9 (relating to Possession of a Controlled Substance, 35 Pa.C.S.A. §780-113 (a)(16)) in docket CR- 2526-2023?

VII. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in imposing an aggregate sentence of twenty (20) years to forty (40) years’ confinement, a sentence which is “unlikely to end during the defendant’s natural life span or [will] perpetually subject [the defendant] to the discretion of the Board of Probation and Parole” a concept disapproved of in Commonwealth v. Coulverson, 34 A.3d 135, 148 (Pa. Super. 2011)?

VIII. Did the trial court abuse its discretion imposing 20-40 years’ confinement considering the sentence fails to address [Reed’s] rehabilitative needs and fails to account for mitigating circumstances?

Reed’s Br. at 4-5 (footnote omitted).

Reed’s first five issues challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. The

sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law. Therefore, “[o]ur standard of

review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v.

Mikitiuk, 213 A.3d 290, 300 (Pa.Super. 2019). When reviewing a sufficiency

challenge, we “must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, and all

reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in a light most favorable

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to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, support the conviction beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Feliciano, 67 A.3d 19, 23 (Pa.Super.

2013) (en banc) (citation omitted). “Where there is sufficient evidence to

enable the trier of fact to find every element of the crime has been established

beyond a reasonable doubt, the sufficiency of the evidence claim must fail.”

Id. (citation omitted).

Reed argues the Commonwealth failed to prove he possessed and

delivered the mega millions bag or any xylazine and fentanyl to the victim

prior to his death. He argues the “only mention of ‘mega millions’ in [Reed’s]

phone was a single text from him to a person named Frank twelve days prior

to decedent passing,” where the text “merely acknowledges its presence on

the market and its potency.” Reed’s Br. at 30. He points out that the text

messages between him and decedent do not mention mega millions and the

bag stamped mega millions did not contain his DNA profile. Reed also claims

there was no heroin or fentanyl in his cross-body satchel or in the safe at the

house searched, there was no packaging in the safe consistent with Detective

Hyland’s description of heroin’s packaging, and the three controlled buys did

not involve heroin or fentanyl.

Reed emphasizes that Detective Hyland testified that the texts showed

that decedent had a routine of buying one or two bags a day from Reed, and

that Reed and decedent met on June 14, 2023, but there was no

communication between the two after that meeting. Reed notes that he texted

decedent twice on June 16, 2023, and called him that same day, but decedent

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did not respond. He argues that “[t]he fact that [Reed] and decedent routinely

texted each other throughout the day on a daily basis to set up daily purchases

and had not done so since June 14, 2023 is inconsistent with the conclusion

that [Reed] must have delivered the fentanyl that was the cause of death on

June 17, 2023.” Id. at 31. He notes that the decedent’s girlfriend testified and

informed the police that she believed decedent had been deleting text

messages and the police were not able to recover anything of evidentiary

value from decedent’s phone. He therefore argues the Commonwealth failed

to establish possession.

A person commits the crime of drug delivery resulting in death when (1)

the person “intentionally administers, dispenses, delivers, gives, prescribes,

sells or distributes any controlled substance or counterfeit controlled

substance”; (2) such act violates 35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(14) or (a)(30); and

(3) “another person dies as a result of using the substance.” See 18 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 2506(a); see also Commonwealth v. Peck, 242 A.3d 1274, 1281 (Pa.

2020). Section 780-113(a)(30), commonly known as PWID, prohibits a person

not registered under the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act

from engaging in “manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to

manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance.” 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).

The trial court concluded that the evidence supported the convictions.

It pointed to the sale of controlled substances from the hospital and noted

that Reed carried the same satchel during that encounter as contained the

controlled substances when he was arrested:

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[T]he final sale to [the decedent] that cost him his life occurred at Phoenixville Hospital. . . . Surveillance video showed [Reed] leaving through the hospital’s main entrance and getting into [the decedent’s] vehicle. [Reed] had a satchel-type bag with him. This was the same bag in which drugs were located at the time of his arrest. After the vehicle circled the building, defendant got out and went back into the hospital. Based on the record as outlined above, it is clear that the Commonwealth presented ample testimony and evidence from which the jury could find that every element of the crimes for which he was convicted were established beyond a reasonable doubt.

Trial Ct. Order at 1 n.1. We agree. The Commonwealth presented sufficient

evidence that Reed delivered the controlled substances that resulted in

decedent’s death. Reed and the decedent communicated regarding the

delivery of narcotics prior to his death, and video shows Reed and the

decedent meeting on June 14. Further, Reed communicated with another

person that “mega millions” was back.

Reed further argues the Commonwealth failed to establish that he

possessed methamphetamine. He argues it failed to establish he had

constructive possession of the drugs found in the safe. He notes that the

forensic testing of the bags recovered from the safe established that many

people handled the bags and that there was an incomplete source profile for

the bags that did not match Reed. He further notes he told Pittman that certain

things in the safe were in “Bev’s” lane and should be given to her. He

maintains that “[t]he convictions on possession of methamphetamine and

[PWID of] methamphetamine rest solely on [Reed’s] awareness of items

within the safe, but to establish possession the Commonwealth needed to

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show [Reed] had power and intent to control the methamphetamines.” Id. at

37. He maintains the evidence showed that Reed acknowledged the

methamphetamines belonged to Bev and should be returned to her.

To sustain a conviction for PWID, the Commonwealth must prove both

the possession of a controlled substance and the intent to deliver it.

Commonwealth v. Lee, 956 A.2d 1024, 1028 (Pa.Super. 2008) (citations

omitted). “In narcotics possession cases, the Commonwealth may meet its

burden by showing actual, constructive, or joint constructive possession of the

contraband.” Commonwealth v. Vargas, 108 A.3d 858, 868 (Pa.Super.

2014) (en banc) (citation omitted). “[C]onstructive possession is a legal fiction

used to prove [possession] although the individual was not in physical

possession of the prohibited item.” Commonwealth v. Peters, 218 A.3d

1206, 1209 (Pa. 2019). It exists where the defendant has “the power to

control the contraband and the intent to exercise that control.”

Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 67 A.3d 817, 820 (Pa.Super. 2013) (citation

omitted). The Commonwealth may prove constructive possession by the

totality of the circumstances. Hopkins, 67 A.3d at 820. “[K]nowledge of the

existence and location of the contraband is a necessary prerequisite to proving

the defendant’s intent to control, and, thus, his constructive possession.”

Commonwealth v. Parrish, 191 A.3d 31, 37 (Pa.Super. 2018). Further,

“[t]wo actors may have joint control and equal access and thus both may

constructively possess the contraband.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 874 A.2d

108, 121 (Pa.Super. 2005) (citation omitted).

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Here, the evidence supported a finding that Reed possessed the

methamphetamine. The methamphetamine was in a safe in a house that Reed

had been observed entering and exiting both before and after drug sales, and

during the phone call he admitted knowing the contents of the safe. Moreover,

he directed Pittman to relocate the substances, including the

methamphetamine. The fact that Reed told Pittman in a phone call that some

of the drugs in the safe were in Bev’s “lane,” that there was a mixture of DNA

on the safe, and that his DNA was not on the bags removed from the safe did

not prevent a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Reed constructively

possessed the controlled substance. The evidence was sufficient to prove that

Reed had the power and intent to exercise control over all substances in the

safe and that he therefore possessed them. See Commonwealth v.

McClennan, 178 A.3d 874,879-80 (Pa.Super. 2018).

Reed next argues that the verdicts related to his possession of the

cocaine he delivered to the confidential informant were against the weight of

the evidence. Reed points out that Detective Hyland did not see the hand-to-

hand exchanges and that Detective Kinsman testified he was about a block

away from where the transaction occurred and could not identify the objects

or quantity exchanged. He highlights Detective Rosado’s testimony that he

was using binoculars when observing the first June 20, 2023 transaction, his

view was blocked for about 30 seconds, he started moving because he did not

want to remain at a stop sign for too long, and saw the transaction as he

started moving south. Reed’s Br. at 41. Reed notes the Commonwealth did

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not introduce the communications setting up the purchases or recordings of

the transactions, did not conduct a DNA test on the drugs from the controlled

buys, and did not call the confidential informant to testify.

We review a trial court’s denial or grant of a weight claim for an abuse

of discretion. See Commonwealth v. Martin, 323 A.3d 807, 823 (Pa.Super.

2024). When a trial court reviews a challenge to the weight of the evidence,

it must determine whether “notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so

clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal weight with

all the facts is to deny justice.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Widmer,

744 A.2d 745, 752 (Pa. 2000)). “A new trial should not be granted because of

a mere conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same facts would

have arrived at a different conclusion.” Id. (quoting Widmer, 744 A.2d at

752). The trier of fact is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and

determine the credibility of witnesses. See Commonwealth v. James, 268

A.3d 461, 468 (Pa.Super. 2021).

Here, the trial court concluded the verdict was not against the weight of

the evidence:

In the instant case, the jury chose to find the Commonwealth’s witnesses credible and decided not to believe [Reed’s] version of events. Based on a review of the evidence, the jury’s finding does not “shock one’s sense of justice.” Again, even though [Reed] tried to claim that he was innocent of the crimes charged, the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that he did, in fact, commit the crimes for which he was found guilty. Based on the evidence introduced at trial, the court

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finds that [Reed’s] claim that the jury’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence is without merit.

Trial Ct. Order at 2 n.1. The court did not abuse its discretion. The

Commonwealth presented evidence that Reed sold cocaine. We cannot say

that the trial court committed an abuse of discretion in concluding that the

evidence Reed points to is not “clearly of greater weight that to ignore [it] or

to give [it] equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice.” See Martin, 323

A.3d at 823. This claim fails.

In the remaining issues, Reed challenges the discretionary aspects of

his sentence. He first argues that the court abused its discretion in imposing

a total aggregate sentence of 20 to 40 years’ incarceration. He cites an

academic article 5 that he states concluded that “for each year lived behind

bars, a person can expect to lose two years off of their life expectancy.” Reed’s

Br. at 43. He points out that he was 40 years old when the court imposed the

sentence and, if paroled at his minimum term, he would be 59 years old when

released. He alleges that the life expectancy for a non-incarcerated Hispanic

male in the United States is 75 years and if a non-Hispanic white male reaches

the age of 35, his life expectancy is 77. He argues, however, that the life

expectancies “do not take into account [the] study regarding the effect of

incarceration on life expectancy.” Id. at 44. He further notes that parole is not

guaranteed, so he could be incarcerated until he is almost 78 years old. He

maintains that the “sentence has subjected him to a term ‘unlikely to end ____________________________________________

5 Evelyn Patterson, The Dose-Response of Time-Served in Prison on Mortality:

New York State, 1989-2003, American Journal of Public Health (2013).

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during [his] natural life span or perpetually subject [him] to the discretion of

the Board of Probation and Parole,’ [which was] disapproved of in

Commonwealth v. Coulverson, 34 A.3d 135 (Pa.Super. 2011).” Id. He

concludes that, “[c]onsidering [his] age, the sentence realistically subjects

Appellant to Pennsylvania Parole Board supervision for the remainder of his

life which is clearly unreasonable and manifestly excessive.” Id. at 45.

Second, Reed maintains the court did not consider his rehabilitative

needs, even though Reed’s counsel mentioned Reed had a history of mental

health concerns and drug and alcohol abuse.

Before reviewing the merits of a challenge to the discretionary aspects

of sentence, this Court must first determine whether: “(1) the appeal is

timely; (2) the appellant has preserved his issue; (3) his brief includes a

concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of an appeal with

respect to the discretionary aspects of his sentence; and (4) the concise

statement raises a substantial question whether the sentence is inappropriate

under the Sentencing Code.” Commonwealth v. Green, 204 A.3d 469, 488

(Pa.Super. 2019).

Reed filed a timely appeal and included the issues in his post-sentence

motion.6 His concise statement of reasons for allowance of appeal does not

6 The Commonwealth maintains Reed failed to include his issue based on Coulverson in his post-sentence motion. However, we find he preserved this issue because in the motion he argued that the court failed to consider his age, and that “[i]n all likelihood, this could very easily be a life sentence for” Reed. Motion for Post-Sentence Relief, filed May 21, 2024, at ¶ 7.

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cite any law supporting his assertion that his first claim— that “the sentence

is unlikely to end during [his] natural life span”—on its own raises a substantial

question.

To the extent Reed’s Rule 2119(f) statement raises this claim, and

insofar as his statement of questions involved suggests Coulverson supports

a finding a substantial question here, we disagree. There, this Court found the

appellant raised substantial questions that the trial court failed to offer specific

reasons for the sentence that comported with Section 9721(b)’s

considerations and imposed an excessive sentence without considering his

rehabilitative needs, and the sentence was disproportionate to the

circumstances. Coulverson, 34 A.3d at 143 (stating “to the extent that

Coulverson’s claim impugns the trial court’s failure to offer specific reasons for

the sentence that comport with the considerations required in section 9721(b)

. . . we conclude that it raises a substantial question of the court’s justification

in extending Coulverson’s standard range sentences to the statutory

maximum”). We then concluded on the merits that the maximum sentence of

90 years was clearly unreasonable because the court considered only the

impact of the crime on the victim and “evinced no consideration whatsoever

of the dysfunction that marked Coulverson’s own life, his cooperation and

remorse, his attempts at reclaiming a productive role in society, or the

possibility that, with appropriate mental health treatment, he might succeed

at rehabilitation . . . .” Id. at 150.

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Here, in contrast, Reed makes no claim that the court failed to consider

factors or relied on only one factor when imposing the sentence. He merely

argues that the sentence—20 to 40 years’ incarceration—is excessive because

he may be imprisoned for the remainer of his natural life. Coulverson does

not support our review of such a question. Reed’s first sentencing claim does

not raise a substantial question.

In his concise statement for reasons relied on for appeal, Reed cites law

that his second claim—the court failed to consider his rehabilitative needs

when it imposed an excessive sentence—raises a substantial question. Reed’s

Br. at 24 (citing Sections 9781(c)(3) and 9721 and stating the court imposed

an excessive sentence and failed to consider his mental health and

rehabilitative needs). We agree and will review the claim’s merits. See

Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 770 (Pa.Super. 2015) (en banc)

(finding a substantial question was presented where appellant challenged “the

imposition of [a] consecutive sentence[] as unduly excessive, together with

[a] claim that the court failed to consider his rehabilitative needs . . . .”).

Sentencing is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be

disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Rominger, 199

A.3d 964, 970 (Pa.Super. 2018). “An abuse of discretion occurs where the

record discloses that the judgment exercised was manifestly unreasonable, or

the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will.” Id. (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted).

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When the court fashions its sentence, it must consider “the protection

of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life

of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the

defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). Additionally, where the court had the

benefit of a Pre-Sentence Investigation (“PSI”) report, as the trial court did

here, we may “assume the sentencing court was aware of the relevant

information regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those

considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.” Commonwealth v.

Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 937 (Pa.Super. 2013) (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted).

The trial court concluded:

ln the instant case, [Reed] was correctly sentenced in accordance with 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721 and existing case law. The court took into account all relevant factors, including all the information provided in the presentence report and considered the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense, and the rehabilitative needs of defendant. The court notes that [Reed] has an extensive criminal history dating back to 2000. His prior offenses consist of a juvenile adjudication for Accidents Involving Death or Personal Injury, a juvenile adjudication for Receiving Stolen Property, four (4) prior PWID convictions, one (1) Possession of Controlled Substance conviction, one (1) Flight to Avoid Apprehension conviction, and three (3) Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol or Controlled Substance convictions. Despite all of his previous convictions and all of the time he spent in jail, [Reed] continued to sell drugs. He, in essence, continuously played Russian roulette with his customers’ lives by selling them dangerous drugs, including crack cocaine, methamphetamine, and heroin/fentanyl. After considering [Reed’s] prior criminal record, the seriousness of the crimes for which he was convicted, and all other factors, the court determined that an aggregate sentence of

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20-40 years’ incarceration was warranted. Accordingly, [Reed’s] sentence is proper and should be upheld.

Trial Ct. Order at 5 n.1.

The court did not abuse its discretion. It reviewed all relevant factors,

including Reed’s rehabilitative needs, and did not impose an excessive

sentence. This claim fails.

Judgment affirmed.

Date: 5/11/2026

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