Com. v. Ray, T.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: October 7, 2025
• Docket: 1546 WDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S29028-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : THOMAS E. RAY : : Appellant : No. 1546 WDA 2024

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 5, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-26-CR-0001099-2024

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., SULLIVAN, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED: October 7, 2025

Thomas E. Ray (“Ray”) appeals from the judgment of sentence following

his conviction of criminal trespass as a felony of the third degree.1 Because

Ray’s claims of insufficient evidence to support his conviction and error in

denying a motion to strike a juror for cause are either waived or do not merit

relief, we affirm.

We take the underlying facts and procedural history in this matter from

the certified record. On September 23, 2023, T.J. (“the victim”) was asleep

in her home when she awoke at 3:00 a.m. to find Ray, her ex-partner,

standing over her. See N.T., 12/3/24, at 19-20. The victim had locked the

doors and windows before going to sleep and had not given Ray permission

to enter her home. See id. at 22. The victim was experiencing the effects of

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1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(a)(1)(i). J-S29028-25

insomnia medication and cold and flu medication and fell back asleep after

seeing Ray. See id. at 26-27. When she awoke later and found Ray still in

her home, she called the police. See id. at 23. Ray then fled. See id. At

the time of the incident, an active Protection from Abuse order (“PFA”) barred

Ray from contact with the victim. See id. at 13, 16. Police subsequently

arrested Ray.

At trial, a jury found Ray guilty of the above-listed offense.2 The court

later sentenced Ray to one-and-one-half to three years’ incarceration. Ray

timely appealed.3

On appeal, Ray raises two issues for our review:

1. Whether the evidence presented was sufficient to support the guilty verdict of criminal trespass?

2. Whether the court erred when it denied trial counsel’s motion to strike a juror for cause?

Ray’s Brief at 6 (capitalization standardized).

In his first issue, Ray challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting his criminal trespass conviction. See Ray’s Brief at 7-9.

Pertinently:

[w]e review claims regarding the sufficiency of the evidence by considering whether, viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact[]finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Further, a conviction may be ____________________________________________

2 The court dismissed charges of burglary and stalking.

3 Ray and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

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sustained wholly on circumstantial evidence, and the trier of fact— while passing on the credibility of the witness and the weight of the evidence—is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence. In conducting this review, the appellate court may not weigh the evidence and substitute its judgment for the fact[]finder.

Commonwealth v. Miller, 172 A.3d 632, 640 (Pa. Super. 2017) (internal

citations and quotation marks omitted).

A person is guilty of criminal trespass as a felony of the third degree

where, “knowing that he is not licensed to do so, he enters, gains entry by

subterfuge or surreptitiously remains in any building or occupied structure or

separately secured or occupied portion thereof[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 3503(a)(1)(i). An “occupied structure” is “[a]ny structure . . . or place

adapted for overnight accommodation of persons . . . whether or not a person

is actually present.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3501. Therefore, to sustain a conviction

under Section 3503(a)(1), the Commonwealth must prove that a defendant

entered a building or occupied structure knowing he was not licensed or

privileged to do so. See Commonwealth v. Butler, 333 A.3d 1283, 1287

(Pa. Super. 2025). “A person acts knowingly with respect to a material

element of an offense when if the element involves the nature of his conduct

or the attendant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature

or that such circumstances exist[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 302(b)(2)(i).

Ray claims there was no evidence he entered the victim’s home by

subterfuge, surreptitiously remained, or broke into the home, and that the

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Commonwealth failed to present evidence he knew he was not licensed to

enter. See Ray’s Brief at 7-9.

The trial court found sufficient evidence to sustain Ray’s conviction of

Section 3503(a)(1)(i). It found an active PFA barred Ray from contact with

the victim and the victim found Ray in her home without her permission, which

established he entered the home knowing he was not licensed or privileged to

do so. See Trial Court Opinion, 03/21/25, at 4.

Following our review, we determine sufficient evidence sustained Ray’s

conviction. The evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom show Ray

entered the victim’s home knowing he was not licensed or privileged to do so,

as made clear by his knowledge of the active PFA barring him from contact

with the victim. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(a)(1)(i); Butler, 333 A.3d at 1289-

90 (holding evidence sufficient to prove violation of Section 3503(a)(1) where

appellant entered victim’s bedroom without license or privilege to do so);

Commonwealth v. Thomas, 336 A.3d 1038, 1050-51 (Pa. Super. 2025)

(same).

Ray asks this Court to review the evidence in the light most favorable

to himself, ignoring the victim’s testimony and the validity of the PFA. See

Ray’s Brief at 8-9. His proposal contravenes our well-settled standard of

review. See Commonwealth v. Risoldi, 238 A.3d 434, 454 (Pa. Super.

2020) (refusing to conduct sufficiency review in the light most favorable to

the appellant). Ray also asserts that the PFA lacked legal effect because the

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victim signed a bond securing his release from jail. See Ray’s Brief at 8-9;

see also N.T., 12/3/2024, at 13 (establishing the victim signed the bond in

2024, after the 2023 events that produced the conviction at issue). Contact

from a victim does not void a PFA. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.

Brumbaugh, 932 A.2d 108, 110 (Pa. Super. 2007) (stating a defendant is

still subject to a PFA even when a victim initiates contact with him). Both

parties stipulated a PFA was in effect at the time of the offense, providing

sufficient evidence Ray was on notice that he was to have no contact with the

victim. See N.T., 12/03/24, at 16.

Ray’s focus on the alleged lack of evidence he broke into the victim’s

house fails. See Ray’s Brief at 8. As the trial court notes, the Commonwealth

was not required to prove Ray broke into the residence to sustain Ray’s

conviction of criminal trespass as a third-degree felony; rather, that

subsection of the statute requires only proof the accused entered the premises

knowing he was not licensed or permitted to do so. See 18 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 3503(a)(1); Butler, 333 A.3d, at 1287. Accordingly, the means by which

Ray entered the victim’s home are irrelevant to his commission of the charged

crime. Ray’s argument concerning forced entry addresses a different

subsection of statute, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a)(ii), a second-degree felony

with which he was neither charged nor convicted.

Additionally, as the Commonwealth notes, Ray’s sufficiency claim is

based on a credibility challenge, and asserts what is legally regarded as a

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weight challenge. See Commonwealth’s Brief at 10; Commonwealth v.

Palo, 24 A.3d 1050, 1055 (Pa. Super. 2011) (noting claims about credibility

of victim’s testimony challenge the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency

(internal citation omitted)); Commonwealth v. Charlton, 902 A.2d 554, 561

(Pa. Super. 2006) (stating “[a] true weight of the evidence challenge concedes

that sufficient evidence exists to sustain the verdict but questions which

evidence is to be believed” (internal citations and quotations omitted)). Our

review of the record establishes Ray did not preserve a weight claim by

seeking a new trial or requesting reinstatement of his right to file a post-

sentence motion for a new trial. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 607 (requiring a weight of

the evidence claim to be raised in a motion for a new trial). Instead, he makes

this assertion for the first time in this appeal, thereby waiving review. See

Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (stating issues raised for the first time on appeal are

waived); Commonwealth v. Sherwood, 982 A.2d 483, 494 (Pa. 2009)

(holding a weight of the evidence claim not presented to the trial court but

instead raised for the first time in a Rule 1925(b) statement is waived); see

also Commonwealth v. Torsunov, 2025 Pa. Super. 207, at *16-17 (Pa.

Super., filed September 17, 2025) (stating “[a]n appellant’s failure to avail

himself of any of the prescribed methods for presenting a weight of the

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evidence issue to the trial court constitutes waiver of that claim” (internal

citation omitted)).4

In his second issue, Ray alleges that the trial court erred when it denied

defense counsel’s motion to strike a juror for cause. See Ray’s Brief at 6. As

the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated,

[T]he purpose of the voir dire examination is to provide an opportunity to counsel to assess the qualifications of prospective jurors to serve. It is therefore appropriate to use such an examination to disclose fixed opinions or to expose other reasons for disqualification. Thus[,] the inquiry must be directed at ascertaining whether the venireperson is competent and capable of rendering a fair, impartial and unbiased verdict. The law also recognizes that prospective jurors were not cultivated in hermetically sealed environments free of all beliefs, conceptions and views. The question relevant to a determination of qualification is whether any biases and prejudices can be put aside upon the proper instruction of the court.

A challenge for cause to service by a prospective juror should be sustained and that juror excused where that juror demonstrates through his conduct and answers a likelihood of prejudice. The decision whether to disqualify a venireman is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal[,] absent a palpable abuse of that discretion. ____________________________________________

4 Ray’s failure to present a weight claim to the trial court precludes our review.

Our standard of review for a weight claim requires us to assess the trial court’s exercise of discretion in reviewing such a claim, not to consider the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. See Commonwealth v Mucci, 143 A.3d 399, 410-11 (Pa. Super. 2016). Ray requests we re-weigh the evidence and assess the credibility of the witnesses presented at trial. We are not free to do so. See Commonwealth v. Collins, 70 A.3d 1245, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2013) (stating that “[a]n appellate court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the finder of fact”); Commonwealth v. Dunkins, 229 A.3d 622, 631 (Pa. Super. 2020), aff’d, 263 A.3d 247 (Pa. 2021) (“the jury, as the trier of fact—while passing on the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence—is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence” (internal citations omitted)).

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Commonwealth v. Ingber, 531 A.2d 1101, 1103 (Pa. 1987) (internal

quotations and citations omitted, italics added).

Stated another way, the test for disqualification is the juror’s ability and willingness to eliminate the influence of his scruples and render a verdict according to the evidence. This determination is to be made by the trial judge based on the juror’s answers and demeanor and will not be reversed absent a palpable abuse of discretion.

Commonwealth v. Penn, 132 A.3d 498, 502 (Pa. Super. 2016) (internal

citation and quotation marks omitted).

Further:

A challenge for cause should be granted when the prospective juror has such a close relationship, familial, financial, or situational, with the parties, counsel, victims, or witnesses that the court will presume a likelihood of prejudice[,] or demonstrates a likelihood of prejudice by his or her conduct and answers to questions.

Commonwealth v. Clemat, 218 A.3d 944, 951 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citing

Commonwealth v. Briggs, 12 A.3d 291, 332-33 (Pa. 2011)) (quotations

omitted).

There are two types of situations in which challenges for cause should be granted: (1) when the potential juror has such a close relationship, be it familial, financial or situational, with parties, counsel, victims, or witnesses, that the court will presume the likelihood of prejudice; and (2) when the potential juror's likelihood of prejudice is exhibited by his conduct and answers to questions at voir dire. In the former situation, the determination is practically one of law and as such is subject to ordinary review. In the latter situation, much depends upon the answers and demeanor of the potential juror as observed by the trial judge and therefore reversal is appropriate only in case of palpable error.

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Commonwealth v. Kelly, 134 A.3d 59, 61-62 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citing

Commonwealth v. Colon, 299 A.2d 326, 327–28 (Pa. Super. 1972))

(footnotes omitted).

Ray claims the trial court should have removed a juror for cause when

that juror indicated during voir dire he was familiar with, and knew of, the

judge and/or staff in Fayette County. Ray asserts that, even absent a personal

relationship with the trial court, there was a “prospect of appearance of

partiality or bias.” Ray’s Brief at 9-10. He cites Cordes v. Association of

Internal Medicine, 87 A.3d 829, 846–47 (Pa. Super. 2014), for the

proposition that a “taint of potential conflict of interest [cannot] be cured.”

See Ray’s Brief at 9-10.

Voir dire is aimed at ascertaining the competence of the potential juror

and their capability of rendering a fair, impartial and unbiased verdict. See

Commonwealth v. Walker, 2025 WL 2402237, at *2 (Pa. Aug. 19, 2025)

(internal citations omitted). Ray asks this Court to extend Clemat and related

caselaw to exclude from jury service venirepersons who are familiar with the

trial court and staff, based solely on a perceived appearance of impropriety

without any evidence of a familial, financial, or situational relationship. The

trial court found the juror was able to put aside any possible biases or

prejudices, did not have a personal relationship with [the c]ourt or its staff,

and did not demonstrate a likelihood of prejudice by his conduct or answers

to voir dire questions. See Trial Court Opinion, 03/21/25, at 6.

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Thus, Ray has failed to demonstrate the court abused its discretion by

declining to strike the juror for cause. The trial court and her staff were not

in a close situational, familial or financial relationship with the juror and the

juror said he could put aside any potential bias. See N.T., 12/03/24, at 5.

Cordes is limited to cases in which a juror had such a relationship. See

Cordes, 87 A.3d at 833. As such, Cordes does not support Ray’s claim for

relief. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Ray’s second claim.5

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

10/7/2025

5 Although Ray raised an additional issue in his Rule 1925(b) statement, he

has abandoned that issue by failing to raise it in his brief. See Commonwealth v. Rodgers, 605 A.2d 1128, 1239 (Pa. Super. 1992) (stating that “[w]e must deem an issue abandoned where it has been identified on appeal but not properly developed in the appellant’s brief” (citation omitted)).

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