Com. v. Ravenell, L.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania·Decided November 19, 2024·No. 1600 EDA 2023·Unpublished

Opinion

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

:

LIONELL R. RAVENELL :

:

Appellant : No. 1600 EDA 2023

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 16, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0000563-2022

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., NICHOLS, J., and COLINS, J. * MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, P.J.: FILED NOVEMBER 19, 2024 Lionell R. Ravenell appeals from the judgment of sentence, imposed in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, after the trial court, sitting in a nonjury trial, convicted him of one count of possession of firearm prohibited.1 On appeal, Ravenell challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss under Pa.R.Crim.P. 600. Upon review, we vacate the judgment of sentence and discharge Ravenell.

Ravenell was charged with possession of firearm prohibited after federal agents entered his home to execute an arrest and search warrant and found a loaded handgun. Ravenell was ineligible to possess a firearm due to a prior disqualifying conviction. On February 20, 2023, Ravenell filed a Rule 600

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1).

motion to dismiss. Following a hearing on February 24, 2023, the trial court denied Ravenell’s motion. On February 27, 2023, Ravenell proceeded to a nonjury trial, after which the court found him guilty of the above offense. On May 16, 2023, the court sentenced Ravenell to 2½ to 5 years’ incarceration, followed by 5 years’ probation. Ravenell did not file post-sentence motions. On June 8, 2023, he filed a timely notice of appeal, followed by a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. Ravenell raises the following claim for our review:

Did the [trial] court err and abuse its discretion when it denied []

Ravenell’s motion to dismiss pursuant to [Rule 600] where the trial did not begin until long after the adjusted run date and the Commonwealth failed to exercise due diligence in bringing the case to trial?

Brief of Appellant, at 3.

Our standard of review of a Rule 600 determination is whether the trial court abused its discretion. Commonwealth v. Solano, 906 A.2d 1180, 1186 (Pa. 2006). “An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but[,] if in reaching a conclusion the law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias[,] or ill-will . . . discretion is abused.” Commonwealth v. Wright, 961 A.2d 119, 142 (Pa. 2008) (citations omitted). Our scope of review is “limited to the trial court’s findings and the evidence on the record[.]” Commonwealth v. Womack, 315 A.3d 1229, 1237 (Pa. 2024).

Additionally, when considering the trial court’s ruling, this Court is not permitted to ignore the dual purpose behind Rule [600]. Rule [600] serves

two equally important functions: (1) the protection of the accused’s speedy trial rights, and (2) the protection of society. In determining whether an accused’s right to a speedy trial has been violated, consideration must be given to society’s right to effective prosecution of criminal cases, both to restrain those guilty of crime and to deter those contemplating it. However, the administrative mandate of Rule [600] was not designed to insulate the criminally accused from good faith prosecution delayed through no fault of the Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Bethea, 185 A.3d 364, 370 (Pa. Super. 2018).

Rule 600 provides, in relevant part, as follows:

(A) Commencement of Trial; Time for Trial

(1) For the purpose of this rule, trial shall be deemed to commence on the date the trial judge calls the case to trial, or the defendant tenders a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.

(2) Trial shall commence within the following time periods.

(a) Trial in a court case in which a written complaint is filed against the defendant shall commence within 365 days from the date on which the complaint is filed.

***

(C) Computation of Time

(1) For purposes of paragraph (A), periods of delay at any stage of the proceedings caused by the Commonwealth when the Commonwealth has failed to exercise due diligence shall be included in the computation of the time within which trial must commence. Any other periods of delay shall be excluded from the computation.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 600.

To establish whether there has been a Rule 600 violation under paragraph (A), a court must determine whether the delay is caused solely by the Commonwealth when the Commonwealth has failed to exercise due diligence. Id., Cmt. (citations omitted). “If the delay occurred as the result of circumstances beyond the Commonwealth’s control and despite its due diligence, the time is excluded.” Id. (citations omitted). “[D]ue diligence is fact-specific, to be determined case-by-case; it does not require perfect vigilance and punctilious care, but merely a showing the Commonwealth has put forth a reasonable effort.” Commonwealth v. Bradford, 46 A.3d 693, 701–02 (Pa. 2012).

“When the defendant or the defense has been instrumental in causing the delay, the period of delay will be excluded from [the] computation of time.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600, Cmt. (citations omitted). Such excludable time may include: “such period of delay at any stage of the proceedings as results from either the unavailability of the defendant or the defendant’s attorney or any continuance granted at the request of the defendant or the defendant’s attorney.” Id.

“Delay in the time for trial that is attributable to the judiciary may be excluded from the computation of time.” Id. (citation omitted). However, “a trial court may invoke ‘judicial delay’ in order to deny a defendant’s Rule 600 motion to dismiss only after the Commonwealth has demonstrated that it complied with the due diligence requirements of Rule 600 at all relevant periods throughout the life of the case.” Commonwealth v. Harth, 252 A.3d

600, 603 (Pa. 2021). The failure of the Commonwealth to fulfill its discovery obligations constitutes a lack of due diligence. Id. at 621-22, citing Commonwealth v. Edwards, 595 A.2d 52 (Pa. 1991).

Here, charges were filed against Ravenell on September 23, 2021.

Thus, the Commonwealth was required to bring him to trial on or before September 23, 2022. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2)(a). Ravenell was brought to trial on February 27, 2023, 522 days after the filing of the complaint. Accordingly, the Commonwealth was required to demonstrate that it exercised due diligence in bringing Ravenell to trial. The Commonwealth argues that only 72 of those 522 days are “potentially includable.” Brief of Commonwealth, at 11. Specifically, the Commonwealth delineates the periods of delay as follows:

Date Continued Event: Delay: Excludable:

until:

Rule 600

9/23/21 10/1/21 suspended 8 days Yes

Preliminary No, normal 10/1/21 10/8/21 hearing 7 days progression

Preliminary Yes, defendant 10/8/21 12/27/21 hearing 80 days not brought down

Preliminary No, 12/27/21 1/28/22 hearing 32 days Commonwealth continuance

Trial scheduling No, normal 1/28/22 3/2/22 conference 33 days progression

Yes, judicial

3/2/22 2/27/23 Trial 362 days delay

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Com. v. Ravenell, L., (Pa. Ct. App. 2024).

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Related

Commonwealth v. Wright
961 A.2d 119 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 2008)
Commonwealth v. Edwards
595 A.2d 52 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1991)
Commonwealth v. Johnson
852 A.2d 315 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2004)
Commonwealth v. Solano
906 A.2d 1180 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 2006)
Commonwealth v. Bethea
185 A.3d 364 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2018)
Commonwealth v. Preston
904 A.2d 1 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2006)
Commonwealth v. Bradford
46 A.3d 693 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 2012)
Commonwealth v. Mills
162 A.3d 323 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 2017)