J-S47014-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : DERRICK A RANKINE : : Appellant : No. 3200 EDA 2022
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 14, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No: CP-51-CR-0406501-2000
BEFORE: STABILE, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED MAY 7, 2024
Appellant, Derrick A. Rankine, appeals pro se from the order of the Court
of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County denying his fourth petition for
collateral relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46.
Upon review, we affirm.
The factual and procedural background are not at issue here. Briefly,
on July 16, 2001, a jury convicted Appellant of rape, aggravated indecent
assault, and sexual assault. On October 16, 2001, the trial court sentenced
Appellant to an aggregate term of fifteen to thirty years’ imprisonment for the
charges associated with the assault. Appellant filed a timey notice of appeal.
On September 18, 2022, this Court affirmed his sentence. See
Commonwealth v. Rankine, No. 3103 EDA 2001, unpublished
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-S47014-23
memorandum (Pa. Super. filed September 18, 2002). Appellant did not file a
petition for allowance of appeal in the Supreme Court.
Appellant filed the underlying PCRA petition, his fourth, on November 2,
2021.1 On November 14, 2022, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition
as untimely.
On appeal, we likewise cannot review the instant PCRA petition if it does
not meet the PCRA timeliness requirements.
It is well-established that “the PCRA's timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in nature and must be strictly construed; courts may not address the merits of the issues raised in a petition if it is not timely filed.” Commonwealth v. Walters, 135 A.3d 589, 591 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citations omitted). Generally, a PCRA petition “including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment of sentence becomes final.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment of sentence becomes final at the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking the review. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3).
However, Pennsylvania courts may consider an untimely PCRA petition if the petitioner explicitly pleads and proves one of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 9545(b)(1), which include: (1) the petitioner's inability to raise a claim as a result of governmental interference; (2) the discovery of previously unknown facts or evidence that would have supported a claim; or (3) a newly-recognized constitutional right that has been held to apply retroactively by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).
1 None of the three prior attempts at obtaining PCRA relief were successful.
-2- J-S47014-23
Commonwealth v. Murray, 2024 WL 139580, unpublished memorandum at
*1 (Pa. Super. 2024).2
Here, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on October 18,
2002, after the time for filing a petition for allowance of appeal with the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania expired. Appellant filed the instant petition in
2022, approximately nineteen years later. As such, the underlying petition is
untimely, and Appellant must invoke a timeliness exception to justify a merits
review. A review of the underlying petition reveals that Appellant failed to do
so.
With respect to the issues raised in the underlying petition, the PCRA
court noted: “None of the claims of trial court error, Commonwealth
misconduct, or trial counsel’s ineffectiveness presented in the instant petition
serves as an exception to the timeliness requirement.” PCRA Court Opinion,
2/13/23, at 4; see also PCRA Court’s notice pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of
Criminal Procedure 907, 10/17/22, at 1-2. Upon review, we agree with the
PCRA court’s analysis and conclusions.3
2 Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 126, unpublished, non-
precedential memorandum decisions of the Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for their persuasive value. Pa.R.A.P. 126(b).
3 Appellant also acknowledged that most of the issues raised in the instant PCRA petition were included in previous, unsuccessful PCRA petitions. See Appellant’s Brief at 7, 28; see also Commonwealth v. Rankine, No. 555 EDA 2004, unpublished memorandum (Pa. Super. filed May 3, 2006) (first PCRA petition); Commonwealth v. Rankine, No. 129 EDA 2010, (Footnote Continued Next Page)
-3- J-S47014-23
In the last paragraph of the petition, Appellant asserts, without much
explanation, that the instant matter is not subject to the PCRA timeliness rules
because of the lower court’s errors, citing Commonwealth v. West, 938 A.2d
1034 (Pa. 2007) (holding that substantive due process challenge to continued
validity of defendant’s judgment of sentence after a nine-year delay is not
cognizable under the PCRA); and Commonwealth v. Judge, 916 A.2d 511
(Pa. 2007) (holding that allegation that Canada violated appellant’s rights
under the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights is not cognizable
under the PCRA). Appellant argues that in light of West and Judge, “pre-
trial mistake by the trial court” put his claims out of the scope of the PCRA.
See PCRA Petition, filed 11/2/21, at 16. We disagree.
First, whether a claim is cognizable under the PCRA is not dependent
upon the number of errors allegedly committed by the lower court. Rather, it
depends on the nature of the claim. Second, both West and Judge are
distinguishable, in that the claims raised therein cannot be construed as
challenges to the underlying convictions or sentences. Here, on the other
hand, Appellant is plainly attacking his conviction and sentence. Accordingly,
the claims raised herein are subject to PCRA rules.
In his appellate brief, Appellant rehashes old claims mixing them with
apparently new substantive claims, in addition to claiming that the underlying ____________________________________________
unpublished memorandum (Pa. Super. filed May 13, 2011) (second PCRA petition); and Commonwealth v. Rankine, No. 360 EDA 2020, unpublished memorandum (Pa. Super. August 20, 2020, appeal denied, 252 A.3d 1085 (Pa. 2021) (third PCRA petition).
-4- J-S47014-23
petition meets the governmental interference and the newly discovered facts
exceptions.
Assuming the claims raised on appeal for the first time are not waived,
see Pa.R.A.P. 302(b), we still would not grant relief to Appellant.
Regarding the governmental interference exception, Appellant seems to
argue that repeated, unsuccessful attempts over the last twenty years to
obtain relief on these issues amount to governmental interference. Appellant
provides no authority for such a bold claim. In fact, the exception requires
that petitioners plead and prove that the failure to raise the claim previously
was the result of governmental interference. See 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9545(b)(1)(i). If anything, the repeated, unsuccessful attempts attest to
the absence of interference from the government.
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J-S47014-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : DERRICK A RANKINE : : Appellant : No. 3200 EDA 2022
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 14, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No: CP-51-CR-0406501-2000
BEFORE: STABILE, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED MAY 7, 2024
Appellant, Derrick A. Rankine, appeals pro se from the order of the Court
of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County denying his fourth petition for
collateral relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46.
Upon review, we affirm.
The factual and procedural background are not at issue here. Briefly,
on July 16, 2001, a jury convicted Appellant of rape, aggravated indecent
assault, and sexual assault. On October 16, 2001, the trial court sentenced
Appellant to an aggregate term of fifteen to thirty years’ imprisonment for the
charges associated with the assault. Appellant filed a timey notice of appeal.
On September 18, 2022, this Court affirmed his sentence. See
Commonwealth v. Rankine, No. 3103 EDA 2001, unpublished
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-S47014-23
memorandum (Pa. Super. filed September 18, 2002). Appellant did not file a
petition for allowance of appeal in the Supreme Court.
Appellant filed the underlying PCRA petition, his fourth, on November 2,
2021.1 On November 14, 2022, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition
as untimely.
On appeal, we likewise cannot review the instant PCRA petition if it does
not meet the PCRA timeliness requirements.
It is well-established that “the PCRA's timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in nature and must be strictly construed; courts may not address the merits of the issues raised in a petition if it is not timely filed.” Commonwealth v. Walters, 135 A.3d 589, 591 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citations omitted). Generally, a PCRA petition “including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment of sentence becomes final.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment of sentence becomes final at the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking the review. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3).
However, Pennsylvania courts may consider an untimely PCRA petition if the petitioner explicitly pleads and proves one of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 9545(b)(1), which include: (1) the petitioner's inability to raise a claim as a result of governmental interference; (2) the discovery of previously unknown facts or evidence that would have supported a claim; or (3) a newly-recognized constitutional right that has been held to apply retroactively by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).
1 None of the three prior attempts at obtaining PCRA relief were successful.
-2- J-S47014-23
Commonwealth v. Murray, 2024 WL 139580, unpublished memorandum at
*1 (Pa. Super. 2024).2
Here, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on October 18,
2002, after the time for filing a petition for allowance of appeal with the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania expired. Appellant filed the instant petition in
2022, approximately nineteen years later. As such, the underlying petition is
untimely, and Appellant must invoke a timeliness exception to justify a merits
review. A review of the underlying petition reveals that Appellant failed to do
so.
With respect to the issues raised in the underlying petition, the PCRA
court noted: “None of the claims of trial court error, Commonwealth
misconduct, or trial counsel’s ineffectiveness presented in the instant petition
serves as an exception to the timeliness requirement.” PCRA Court Opinion,
2/13/23, at 4; see also PCRA Court’s notice pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of
Criminal Procedure 907, 10/17/22, at 1-2. Upon review, we agree with the
PCRA court’s analysis and conclusions.3
2 Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 126, unpublished, non-
precedential memorandum decisions of the Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for their persuasive value. Pa.R.A.P. 126(b).
3 Appellant also acknowledged that most of the issues raised in the instant PCRA petition were included in previous, unsuccessful PCRA petitions. See Appellant’s Brief at 7, 28; see also Commonwealth v. Rankine, No. 555 EDA 2004, unpublished memorandum (Pa. Super. filed May 3, 2006) (first PCRA petition); Commonwealth v. Rankine, No. 129 EDA 2010, (Footnote Continued Next Page)
-3- J-S47014-23
In the last paragraph of the petition, Appellant asserts, without much
explanation, that the instant matter is not subject to the PCRA timeliness rules
because of the lower court’s errors, citing Commonwealth v. West, 938 A.2d
1034 (Pa. 2007) (holding that substantive due process challenge to continued
validity of defendant’s judgment of sentence after a nine-year delay is not
cognizable under the PCRA); and Commonwealth v. Judge, 916 A.2d 511
(Pa. 2007) (holding that allegation that Canada violated appellant’s rights
under the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights is not cognizable
under the PCRA). Appellant argues that in light of West and Judge, “pre-
trial mistake by the trial court” put his claims out of the scope of the PCRA.
See PCRA Petition, filed 11/2/21, at 16. We disagree.
First, whether a claim is cognizable under the PCRA is not dependent
upon the number of errors allegedly committed by the lower court. Rather, it
depends on the nature of the claim. Second, both West and Judge are
distinguishable, in that the claims raised therein cannot be construed as
challenges to the underlying convictions or sentences. Here, on the other
hand, Appellant is plainly attacking his conviction and sentence. Accordingly,
the claims raised herein are subject to PCRA rules.
In his appellate brief, Appellant rehashes old claims mixing them with
apparently new substantive claims, in addition to claiming that the underlying ____________________________________________
unpublished memorandum (Pa. Super. filed May 13, 2011) (second PCRA petition); and Commonwealth v. Rankine, No. 360 EDA 2020, unpublished memorandum (Pa. Super. August 20, 2020, appeal denied, 252 A.3d 1085 (Pa. 2021) (third PCRA petition).
-4- J-S47014-23
petition meets the governmental interference and the newly discovered facts
exceptions.
Assuming the claims raised on appeal for the first time are not waived,
see Pa.R.A.P. 302(b), we still would not grant relief to Appellant.
Regarding the governmental interference exception, Appellant seems to
argue that repeated, unsuccessful attempts over the last twenty years to
obtain relief on these issues amount to governmental interference. Appellant
provides no authority for such a bold claim. In fact, the exception requires
that petitioners plead and prove that the failure to raise the claim previously
was the result of governmental interference. See 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9545(b)(1)(i). If anything, the repeated, unsuccessful attempts attest to
the absence of interference from the government. Additionally, Appellant
provides no support for the allegation that denial of relief by the PCRA court,
which was affirmed by this Court, and later the Supreme Court, qualifies as
governmental interference.
To the extent that Appellant argues that, for purposes of the newly-
discovered facts exception, he has been diligent in raising his claims, Appellant
fails to acknowledge that he must also prove that the facts upon which the
claim is predicated were unknown to him. See Pa. 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9545(b)(1)(ii). The facts upon which the instant claim is predicated upon
were known to Appellant for quite some time, as the numerous unsuccessful
PCRA petitions easily suggest. Appellant, therefore, failed to establish the
newly-discovered facts exception.
-5- J-S47014-23
“Our courts have emphasized that a petitioner must specifically plead
and prove that one of the PCRA timeliness exceptions applies to the untimely
petition to avoid the PCRA time-bar.” Murray, supra (citing
Commonwealth v. Beasley, 741 A.2d 1258, 1261 (Pa. 1999)). As Appellant
failed to plead and prove that one of the PCRA timeliness exceptions applies
to his petition, we conclude that neither this Court nor the PCRA court has
jurisdiction to further consider Appellant’s petition. Accordingly, we affirm the
PCRA court’s order dismissing Appellant’s fourth PCRA petition.
Order affirmed.
President Judge Emeritus Steves joins the memorandum.
Judge Kunselman concurs in the result.
Date: 5/7/2024
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