Com. v. Rainelli, D.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania·Decided January 12, 2021·No. 1853 WDA 2019·Unpublished

Opinion

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant :

:

:

v. :

:

:

DAVID RAINELLI, JR. : No. 1853 WDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered December 17, 2019 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0000012-2019

BEFORE: OLSON, J., MURRAY, J., and McCAFFERY, J. MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED JANUARY 12, 2021 The Commonwealth appeals from the trial court’s order dismissing the charges filed against Appellee, David Rainelli, Jr. (Rainelli), for lack of jurisdiction. After careful review, we affirm.

The trial court summarized the procedural posture of this case as follows:

[Rainelli] was charged on September 21, 2018 with two counts of Aggravated Assault, two counts of Terroristic Threats, one count of Resisting Arrest, two counts of Harassment, and one count of Disorderly Conduct as a result of [an] incident that occurred at the Veterans Affairs Medical Center in O’Hara Township in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania [(VA Medical Center)].[1]

On July 8, 2019, [Rainelli’s] original trial counsel filed a motion to dismiss the charges based on improper venue and jurisdiction. This [c]ourt denied that motion on September 18,

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(3), 2706(a)(1), 5104, 2709(a)(1), and 5503(a)(1).

2019. [Rainelli] then file a pro se Petition for Habeas Corpus on October 11, 2019, which this [c]ourt subsequently denied. On October 16, 2019, this [c]ourt granted a motion filed by original trial counsel to withdraw her appearance in this case and this [c]ourt appointed Corrie Woods, Esquire to continue the representation of [Rainelli]. On November 20, 2019, [Rainelli]

filed a counseled Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction Over Federal Enclave raising new factual and legal issues. The Commonwealth filed a response on December 16, 2019. After hearing argument on the motion, on December 17, 2019, this [c]ourt granted the motion to dismiss. The Commonwealth appeal followed.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/21/20, at 1-2 (footnote added).

Both the Commonwealth and the trial court have complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925. On appeal, the Commonwealth presents a single issue for review:

Whether the Trial Court erred in concluding that proper procedures were not followed by the Commonwealth to establish concurrent jurisdiction over the federal Veterans Affairs property at issue where: (1) the federal government agreed to the retrocession of jurisdictional authority over the property at issue;

(2) the Pennsylvania Legislature enacted legislation giving the Executive the authority to accept the federal government’s offer of jurisdiction over the property and; (3) the federal government’s offer and grant of jurisdiction were accepted by the Commonwealth?

Commonwealth Brief at 4.

The Commonwealth claims the trial court erred “in concluding that there was insufficient evidence that Pennsylvania had established concurrent jurisdiction over the federal [VA] Medical Center where [Rainelli] was alleged to have committed his crimes.” Commonwealth Brief at 13. The Commonwealth argues:

In the [c]ourt below, the Commonwealth demonstrated that the Pennsylvania Legislature enacted legislation consenting to the retrocession of jurisdiction from the federal government over this property and giving the Executive the authority to accept that retrocession. The Commonwealth also demonstrated that the federal government acknowledged the Commonwealth’s consent to the retrocession of jurisdiction over this property, and, in response, manifested its own unequivocal intent to divest itself of exclusive jurisdiction and to establish concurrent jurisdiction with the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania over this property. Finally, the Commonwealth demonstrated that the Executive signed a public notice stating that he intended to accept jurisdiction following a 30-day period for public commentary and the Commonwealth also demonstrated that, following that 30-day period, agents of the parties engaged in actions that are consistent with the transfer of jurisdiction.

Accordingly, the Commonwealth produced sufficient evidence in the [c]ourt below for the [t]rial [c]ourt to conclude that Pennsylvania accepted the retrocession of jurisdiction from the federal government and established concurrent jurisdiction over the property where [Rainelli] was alleged to have committed his crimes. Thus, the [t]rial [c]ourt erred in dismissing [Rainelli’s]

charges prior to trial based upon a perceived lack of jurisdiction of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Id. at 13-14.

Rainelli counters that this Court “should affirm the trial court’s order”

because “the Commonwealth failed to establish that Governor Shapp actually accepted the retrocession.” Rainelli’s Brief at 18.

As the issue before us presents a factual inquiry, we apply a deferential standard of review. See Commonwealth v. Neysmith, 192 A.3d 184, 192 (Pa. Super. 2018) (applying a deferential standard where factual aspects predominate). Thus, “we . . . shall reverse only for an abuse of discretion. We have long held that mere errors in judgment do not amount to abuse of discretion; instead, we look for manifest unreasonableness, or partiality,

prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support as to be clearly erroneous.” Id. (citations omitted).

Pertinently, the Pennsylvania Crimes Code states that “a person may be convicted under the law of this Commonwealth of an offense committed by his own conduct . . . if . . . the conduct which is an element of the offense or the result which . . . occurs within this Commonwealth[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 102(a)(1).

However, the federal enclave doctrine grants exclusive jurisdiction to the federal government when land has been purchased by the United States:

Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o exercise exclusive Legislation . . . over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings[.]

U.S.C.A. Const. Art. I § 8, cl. 17.

“Thus if the United States acquires with the ‘consent’ of the state legislature land within the borders of that State by purchase or condemnation for any of the purposes mentioned in Art. I, [§] 8, cl. 17 . . . the jurisdiction of the Federal Government becomes ‘exclusive.’” Paul v. United States, 83 S.Ct. 426, 438 (1963); see also Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 50 S.Ct. 455, 457 (1930) (“[I]t long has been settled that, where lands for such a purpose are purchased by the United States with the consent of the state legislature, the jurisdiction theretofore residing in the state passes, in virtue of the constitutional provision, to the United States, thereby making the jurisdiction of the latter the sole jurisdiction.”). “The power of Congress over federal

enclaves that come within the scope of Art. I, [§] 8, cl. 17, is obviously the same as the power of Congress over the District of Columbia.” Paul, 83 S.Ct. at 437. Accordingly, “Pennsylvania’s criminal statutes do not apply” to federal enclaves “any more than to a sister state.” Commonwealth v. Mangum, 332 A.2d 467, 468 (Pa. Super. 1974).

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Related

Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook
281 U.S. 647 (Supreme Court, 1930)
Paul v. United States
371 U.S. 245 (Supreme Court, 1963)
Schwartz v. O'Hara Township School District
100 A.2d 621 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1953)
Commonwealth v. Mangum
332 A.2d 467 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1974)
Commonwealth v. Neysmith
192 A.3d 184 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2018)