Com. v. Raffensberger, W., Jr.

CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedMarch 21, 2025
Docket1119 MDA 2024
StatusUnpublished

This text of Com. v. Raffensberger, W., Jr. (Com. v. Raffensberger, W., Jr.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Com. v. Raffensberger, W., Jr., (Pa. Ct. App. 2025).

Opinion

J-A07015-25

NO-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : WARREN HARDING : RAFFENSBERGER, JR. : : No. 1119 MDA 2024 Appellant :

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 26, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0003515-2022

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and STABILE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED: MARCH 21, 2025

Warren Harding Raffensberger, Jr. appeals from the no-contact

provision of his judgment of sentence of eight to eighteen years of

imprisonment. We vacate the no-contact condition, but affirm the judgment

of sentence in all other respects.

By way of background, on August 13, 2022, Appellant struck his wife,

causing bruising to her chest, after he threatened to “beat her like a man and

. . . beat her face in.” N.T. Guilty Plea, 5/2/24, at 5. The victim informed the

responding police officers that Appellant kept a firearm, which he was barred

from possessing due to his prior convictions for burglary and aggravated

assault. See N.T. Trial, 3/13/24, at 91-93, 177.

Based on this incident, Appellant was charged with terroristic threats,

simple assault, and persons not to possess a firearm. After a jury found him J-A07015-25

guilty of persons not to possess, Appellant pled guilty to the first two charges.

As part of his sentence, the court ordered that Appellant was prohibited from

contacting his wife. See N.T. Sentencing, 6/26/24, at 16; Sentencing Order,

6/26/24, at 2. Appellant filed a post-sentence motion, which the court denied.

He thereafter timely appealed, and he and the trial court complied with

Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant raises the following issue for our consideration: “Did the trial

court err in imposing a condition of no contact with the victim, where the court

had no jurisdiction to impose this condition, as the Pennsylvania Department

of Probation and Parole has exclusive authority over state parole conditions?”

Appellant’s brief at 5. In its opinion, the court concedes that it erred in issuing

a no-contact provision as part of Appellant’s sentence.1 See Trial Court

Opinion, 9/6/24, at 1.

Appellant’s challenge implicates the legality of his sentence. See

Commonwealth v. Merced, 308 A.3d 1277, 1283 (Pa.Super. 2024) (“The

matter of whether the trial court possesses the authority to impose a particular

sentence is a matter of legality.” (cleaned up)). Therefore, “our scope of

review is plenary, and our standard of review is de novo. If no statutory

authorization exists for a particular sentence, that sentence is illegal and must

____________________________________________

1 The Commonwealth also agrees that the court did not have the authority to

impose this condition. See Commonwealth’s brief at 3-5.

-2- J-A07015-25

be vacated.” Commonwealth v. Derrickson, 242 A.3d 667, 673 (Pa.Super.

2020) (cleaned up).

This Court has recognized that pursuant to 61 Pa.C.S. § 6132, “[w]here

the trial court imposes a maximum imprisonment sentence of two or more

years, the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (‘PBPP’) has exclusive

authority over the terms of the defendant’s parole.” Merced, 308 A.3d at

1283. Additionally, “the authority to impose a [no]-contact provision as a

special condition of a defendant’s state incarceration rests with the

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (‘DOC’).” Id.

Accordingly, we agree with both parties and the trial court that the no-

contact provision was improperly ordered. Appellant’s maximum term of

imprisonment of his aggregate sentence was eighteen years. Therefore, only

the DOC and PBPP would have authority to impose a no-contact restriction on

Appellant’s incarceration and parole, respectively. The trial court could

recommend a no-contact provision, however “it could not impose [that

condition] as a matter of law.” Id. Thus, we vacate the no-contact provision

of Appellant’s judgment of sentence but affirm in all other respects.

Judgment of sentence vacated in part and affirmed in part. Jurisdiction

relinquished.

-3- J-A07015-25

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 3/21/2025

-4-

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Related

Com. v. Derrickson, R.
2020 Pa. Super. 264 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2020)
Com. v. Merced, A.
2024 Pa. Super. 11 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2024)

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Bluebook (online)
Com. v. Raffensberger, W., Jr., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/com-v-raffensberger-w-jr-pasuperct-2025.