Com. v. Quailes, M.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: November 7, 2023
• Docket: 1640 MDA 2022
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S19025-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : MASON DAVON QUAILES : : Appellant : No. 1640 MDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 20, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0000991-2021

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED: NOVEMBER 7, 2023

Mason Davon Quailes appeals the judgment of sentence entered

following his convictions for second-degree murder, burglary, and conspiracy.1

Quailes challenges the admission of evidence and both the sufficiency and

weight of the evidence. We vacate the judgment of sentence imposed for the

burglary conviction, but affirm in all other respects.

The Commonwealth presented the following evidence at trial. A retired

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Special Agent, William Anderson, testified that on the

day in question, while driving home, he heard three gunshots. N.T., Trial,

10/17/22, at 127-28. He then saw a thin African American male running down

the stairs outside of a home, later determined to be the victim’s home. Id.

129, 131. The male was wearing all black. Id. at 132. As Anderson drove past

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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(b), 3502(a)(1)(i), and 903, respectively. J-S19025-23

the home, he saw another African American male lying on the ground and an

African American male standing over the male on the floor. Id. at 129-30. The

male who was standing was aiming a gun at the male on the ground and

yelling at him. Id. at 130. As Anderson continued driving past the home, he

heard two loud bangs. Id. at 131. After hearing this noise, Anderson called

911. Id. at 128.

Chief Anthony Minium testified that on the day in question, he

responded to a home in Steelton, Pennsylvania, after receiving a call for shots

fired. Id. at 105-06. He arrived at approximately 1 p.m. Id. at 106. There, he

found the victim unresponsive and lying in front of the doorway, with no pulse.

Id. at 107. Chief Minium testified that before he received the call, there was

a call for a domestic disturbance involving the victim and Shnasia Peterson,

at a home four blocks away. Id. at 108, 111, 118; N.T., Trial, 10/18/22, at

283.

Officer Brett DeGroat testified that he arrived on the scene after

receiving a call for shots fired. N.T., Trial, 10/17/22, at 95. He saw the victim

lying on the floor with blood on his shirt. Id. at 97. Officer DeGroat removed

the shirt to see if the victim had bullet wounds and saw a bullet wound in the

victim’s lower back. Id.

Wayne Rosse, a forensic pathologist, testified that the victim died from

multiple gunshot wounds and ruled his manner of death as a homicide. N.T.,

Trial, 10/18/22, at 204. The victim sustained five gunshot wounds, the fatal

one entering his left upper back. Id. at 215-16.

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Robert Gerrity, Jr. testified that he installs electronic monitoring devices

for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Id. at 261. These devices record the

movements of an individual throughout the day. Id. He testified that he

installed a monitoring device on Quailes on June 10, 2020. Id. at 263. He

testified that he reviewed Quailes’ movements from the day of the murder.

Id. at 264. The information from the monitoring device recorded that Quailes

was in the area of 523 North Front Street in Steelton, PA at approximately

12:42 p.m. Id. at 271. Quailes stayed in the area between 531 and 532 North

Front Street between 12:43 p.m. to 12:49 p.m. Gerrity also testified that the

following day, Quailes’ monitor was cut off and no longer working. Id. at 273.

Shnasia Peterson testified that she was in a relationship with the victim.

Id. at 289. On the day of the murder, while at the victim’s home, the two

began arguing. Id. at 288-89. Peterson testified that the victim began hitting

her and at one point kicked her in the face. Id. at 288-89, 291. She left the

victim’s home and returned to her own where she called her friend Aubriana

Parisi. Peterson told Parisi what happened and the two talked about having

someone rob and fight the victim. Id. at 292. Parisi suggested that her

boyfriend, Quailes, could do it because that is what he “got into.” Id. Peterson

and Parisi “set everything up” and after speaking with Parisi, Peterson called

911 to report the domestic incident. Id. at 294. She testified that she called

the police because she wanted the victim to get in trouble for hitting her. Id.

The same day, Parisi called Peterson and told her that the “boys” were

on the way. Id. at 296. When Peterson went outside, Quailes and another

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man, Marcus Garner, were outside. Id. Peterson told the men what happened

with the victim, gave them his address, and told them that the victim had

multiple bank cards. Id. Before the two men left, Peterson told the men not

to kill the victim. Id. After the men left her home, the police contacted

Peterson. She informed them of the fight between her and the victim. Id. at

297. Quailes returned to Peterson’s house and said, “[S]hit went left.” Id. at

298. Peterson testified that she then heard police sirens. Id. at 299. Following

this, Garner ran up the street and it appeared to Peterson that he had a gun

in his pants. Id. She testified that as he ran, Garner gripped his shorts tightly

as if he was holding something. Id.

Peterson also testified regarding her phone’s call log on the day of the

murder. She agreed that she received a FaceTime call from “Aubri” at 12:10

p.m., a call from Quailes around the same time, another call from “Aubri” at

12:13 p.m., two FaceTime calls with Aubriana at 12:35 p.m., and a 911 call

at 12:25 p.m. Id. 301-03.2 She also had a FaceTime call with Aubriana and

Quailes at 12:30 p.m. Id. at 303.

Peterson further testified that she accepted a plea agreement relating

to her involvement in the case. Id. at 284. She pled guilty to robbery,

burglary, and two counts of conspiracy. Id. at 285.

Aubriana Parisi testified that she received a call from her friend Peterson

on the day of the murder. N.T., Trial, 10/19/22, at 353. Peterson told her that ____________________________________________

2Peterson identified “Aubri,” as her friend Aubriana Parisi. See N.T., Trial, 10/18/22, at 302.

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“she had a domestic dispute with her boyfriend” but Parisi testified that she

did not know his name. Id. at 354-55. Parisi told Peterson to call the police.

Id. at 355. She testified that at some point she had a three-way Facetime call

with Peterson and Quailes but did not recall what they talked about. Id. at

356. The Commonwealth confronted Parisi with her police statement and after

reviewing the statement Parisi testified that while on the phone with Peterson

and Quailes, they discussed that the victim had a lot of bank cards and that

Peterson wanted someone to rob him. Id. at 357-59. Parisi saw Quailes on

the day of the murder, and he was wearing all black. Id. 361-62 She also told

detectives that Quailes told her the gun was in the river. Id. at 364.

Parisi testified that while Quailes was in jail, he sent her a letter which

she handed over to the police. Id. at 365. When the Commonwealth

attempted to present the letter to the witness, counsel asked to approach for

a sidebar where the following exchange occurred:

[Defense Counsel]: I believe the Commonwealth’s attempting to introduce this letter and I would object to admitting this letter because I don’t believe it’s relevant. There’s only one mention of this actual sort of case where they -- where he mentions the name Shnasia. Other than that, the whole letter is about infidelity and then it’s about – he’s upset that he believes she is seeing another man and I don’t think that’s relevant. I think under 403(b) it’s more prejudicial than it is probative and I don’t think it’s relevant.

[Commonwealth]: Your Honor, I think the fair reading of the letter is that he is threatening her as a potential witness against him and I think it’s highly relevant for consciousness of guilt.

[Defense Counsel]: See, I don’t think the letter shows him threatening her as a witness. It’s threatening her – it’s a

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threat about sleeping with another man, not about a witness in this case.

[Commonwealth]: He can certainly argue that.

THE COURT: All right. Give me a minute to look at it. Stay here.

All right. So it appears there are different aspects here. Certainly there is a significant portion of it dealing with threats towards the witness because she’s the one who got him under investigation with Shnasia. I don’t know the first part, Mr. Sprow, that talks about, I’m going to kill him when he come home, you did this. I don’t know if that first few sentences --

[Commonwealth]: I’m not sure but I think in its entirety it’s fairly clear that this is a message to her communicating threats because of her role as a witness against him in this case.

THE COURT: Mr. Deyo, you are objecting to its entirety?

[Defense Counsel]: In the first paragraph it says: “Shaking my head, I thought you was my wife.” I mean, this is a letter -- the tone of the letter is more about the infidelity aspect than it is her testifying as a witness, just as a witness.

THE COURT: We’ll allow it, but if it goes out to the jury is another matter.

Id. at 365-67. Parisi testified that she handed the letter over to the police

because she did not want to be involved any further with the case and

“because when you tell on somebody, bad stuff happens.” Id. at 377, 378.

In the letter, Quailes wrote, “You better hope I don’t kill you cause you

the one who got me under investigation for the shit with Shnasia and you

trying to do me dirty.” Id. at 370. He also wrote, “I know where you sleep. I

will wait till you leave the crib if I have to and if you tell the cops about this

I’m [sic] tell my folks to get to you.” Id. He further wrote, “I don’t care about

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my life I want yours, Shnasia and a couple others. Watch I’ma [sic] end up

doing something to you that’s how I’m feeling. Hope that money was worth

ya life.” Id. at 370-71.

Quailes testified that he was present at the victim’s home the day of the

murder along with his friend, Keyshawn Carter. Id. at 391-92. He testified

that when he tried speaking with the victim, the victim started “swinging” at

him and the two began fighting. Id. at 393. Quailes heard gunshots but did

not know where they were coming from. Id. Quailes then saw the victim fall

to the ground. Id. Quailes also testified that he wrote a letter to Parisi because

he believed she was dating another man. Id. at 394. He testified that on the

day of the murder, he was wearing all black and identified himself as the male

seen in a surveillance footage showing the rear of the victim’s home on the

day of the murder. Id. at 395.3

On rebuttal, William Shaub, an interim police chief, testified that during

a proffer with Quailes, Quailes identified Marcus Garner as the other individual

who was with him the day of the murder. Id. at 399, 400.

The jury found Quailes guilty of the above referenced offenses and the

trial court sentenced him to mandatory life imprisonment for second-degree

murder. It imposed no further penalty for conspiracy and a concurrent term

of five to 10 years’ incarceration for the burglary conviction. Quailes filed a ____________________________________________

3 The parties stipulated to the admission of three separate surveillance videos

“captur[ing] events . . . contain[ing] the rear portions of the odd numbered residences in the 500 block of North Front Street, including 517 North Front Street.” N.T, Trial, 10/18/22, at 280-82.

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post-sentence motion challenging the sufficiency and weight of the evidence.

The court denied the motion and this timely appeal followed.

Quailes raises the following issues:

A. Whether the trial court erred in accepting the jury’s verdict where the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence [Quailes] was a participant or accomplice to the burglary.

B. Whether the trial court erred in accepting the jury’s verdict which went against the weight of the evidence which established [Quailes] did not engage in a burglary.

C. Whether the trial court erred in permitting the introduction of a letter to Ms. Parisi allegedly from [Quailes] in that the prejudicial effect outweighed any possible probative value.

Quailes’ Br. at 4 (suggested answers omitted).

Quailes argues that the Commonwealth presented insufficient evidence

to support his convictions for second-degree murder and burglary because the

evidence was insufficient to prove burglary. He maintains that there was no

evidence that he entered the victim’s residence with the intent to commit a

crime. He also argues that there was no evidence that he shot the victim or

that he had a gun. He notes that while it was alleged that he went to the

residence to rob the victim of his bank cards, “[o]fficers did not find ‘cards’ on

[Quailes], in his residence, in his vehicle or anywhere else.” Id. at 12.

When reviewing a sufficiency claim, we must determine whether, when

viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict winner, the evidence at trial

and all reasonable inferences therefrom were sufficient for the trier of fact to

find that each element of the crime charged is established beyond a

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reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. Neysmith, 192 A.3d 184, 189

(Pa.Super. 2018). “The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving

every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly

circumstantial evidence.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 23 A.3d 544, 559

(Pa.Super. 2011) (en banc) (quoting Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 947

A.2d 800, 806 (Pa.Super. 2008)). The trier of fact is also free to believe all,

some, or none of a witness’s testimony. Commonwealth v. Morales, 91

A.3d 80, 89 (Pa. 2014).

Second-degree murder is a criminal homicide committed while the

defendant was engaged as a principal or an accomplice in the perpetration of

an enumerated felony, including burglary. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(b), (d). A

person is guilty of burglary if he “enters a building or occupied structure, or

separately secured or occupied portion thereof, that is adapted for overnight

accommodations in which at the time of the offense any person is present”

and he “commits, attempts or threatens to commit a bodily injury crime

therein[.]” Id. at § 3502(a)(1)(i). “[M]ere presence on the scene both

immediately prior to and subsequent to the commission of a crime and flight

therefrom is not,” without more, “sufficient evidence to prove involvement in

the crime.” Commonwealth v. Hargrave, 745 A.2d 20, 23-24 (Pa.Super.

2000) (cleaned up).

Quailes’ claim is meritless. There was ample evidence to prove burglary.

The evidence showed that Peterson and Parisi conspired to have Quailes and

Garner fight and rob the victim. Peterson gave the men the victim’s address

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and told them that he had bank cards on him. The men subsequently went to

the victim’s house and while they were there, the victim was shot. Even

considering Quailes’ suggestion that there is no evidence that he shot the

victim or that he had a gun, the evidence sufficiently established that Quailes

entered the victim’s home with the intent to commit a bodily injury crime,

namely, to assault and rob the victim. Additionally, Quailes admitted to being

present at the victim’s home. Although he maintains that he was only there

to speak with the victim, it was within the jury’s purview to believe all, part,

or none of his testimony.

Next Quailes maintains that the verdict was against the weight of the

evidence because he did not participate in the burglary. He argues that he

was not “an active part” of the burglary or shooting and that his mere presence

at the victim’s home does not amount to him being an active participant in

the burglary. Quailes’ Br. at 14.

We review the trial court’s ruling on a challenge to the weight of the

evidence for an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049,

1054–55 (Pa. 2013). “Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to hear

and see the evidence presented, an appellate court will give the gravest

consideration to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial judge when

reviewing a trial court’s determination that the verdict is against the weight of

the evidence.” Id. at 1055 (quoting Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d

745, 753 (Pa. 2000)). A trial court should not grant a new trial unless the

verdict “is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice and

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the award of a new trial is imperative so that right may be given another

opportunity to prevail.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Brown, 648 A.2d

1177, 1189 (Pa. 1994)).

Quailes does not contest that he was at the victim’s home but rather

argues that he was merely present. Quailes’ argument that he was merely

present at the victim’s home focuses solely on his testimony. However, the

evidence presented to the jury included evidence that Quailes went to the

victim’s home with an instruction from Peterson to fight and rob the victim.

Again, the jury was free to believe all, part, or none of the testimony and

evidence presented. We see no abuse of discretion.

In his final issue, Quailes argues that the court erred in admitting the

letter he wrote to Parisi. He maintains that the letter was irrelevant and greatly

prejudiced him before the jury. In his view, it had little probative value

because the Commonwealth did not charge him with intimidation of a witness.

He also argues that any probative value was outweighed by the letter’s

prejudicial effect.

We review the admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion. See

Commonwealth v. Elliott, 80 A.3d 415, 446 (Pa. 2013). Evidence is

admissible if it is relevant. Pa.R.E. 402. However, even relevant evidence may

be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the “danger” of “unfair

prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting

time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Pa.R.E. 403. Unfair

prejudice “means a tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis or to

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divert the jury’s attention away from its duty of weighing the evidence

impartially.” Id. at comment.

Here, the court determined the probative value of the letter outweighed

any prejudicial effect. It explained:

Here, the contents of the letter from [Quailes] to Ms. Parisi were more probative than prejudicial because it contained what she perceived as threats based on her cooperation with the police investigation surrounding the September 2, 2020 incident and [Quailes’] involvement. The letter also helped explain Ms. Parisi’s reluctance to testify.

Trial Court Opinion [Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)], filed 3/6/23, at 16.

The court did not abuse its discretion. The letter was strong evidence of

Quailes’ consciousness of guilt. “[A]ny attempt by a defendant to interfere

with a witness’s testimony is admissible to show a defendant’s consciousness

of guilt.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 838 A.2d 663, 680 (Pa. 2003). The

letter here also explained Parisi’s reluctance to testify. Though Quailes

maintains that the letter was more prejudicial than probative, he does not

explain how it tended “to suggest decision on an improper basis or to divert

the jury’s attention away from its duty of weighing the evidence impartially.”

Pa.R.E. 403, comment. We cannot say that the trial court committed an abuse

of discretion in admitting it.

Though Quailes did not raise it, we must address whether Quailes’

murder and burglary convictions merge, as the issue goes to the legality of

the sentence. See Commonwealth v. Hill, 238 A.3d 399, 407-08 (Pa. 2020)

(stating appellate court may raise and address challenge to legality of

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sentence sua sponte); Commonwealth v. Leaner, 202 A.3d 749, 784

(Pa.Super. 2019) (stating claim that crimes should have merged is a challenge

to the legality of sentence).

Here, the trial court erred in sentencing Quailes for both burglary and

second-degree murder. See Learner, 202 A.3d at 784 (“a sentencing court

has no authority to impose a sentence for felony murder as well as a sentence

for the predicate offense”). As such, we vacate the sentence for burglary.

However, because the remaining sentence of life imprisonment does not upset

the overall sentencing scheme, remand for resentencing is not necessary. See

Commonwealth v. Thur, 906 A.2d 552, 569 (Pa.Super. 2006) (stating if this

Court’s grant of relief on a sentencing issue “does not alter the overall

[sentencing] scheme, there is no need for a remand”).

Judgment of sentence vacated as to burglary. Judgment of sentence

affirmed in all other aspects.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 11/7/2023

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