J-A27014-20
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee
v.
CLARENCE M. PONE
Appellant No. 1439 EDA 2019
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence imposed December 18, 2018 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No: CP-51-CR-0011148-2013
BEFORE: STABILE, J., NICHOLS, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED: MARCH 26, 2021
Appellant, Clarence M. Pone (hereinafter, “Appellant” or “Pone”),
appeals from the judgment of sentence the Court of Common Pleas of
Philadelphia County imposed on December 18, 2018. On appeal, Appellant
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions for
second degree murder, robbery, and conspiracy. Upon review, we affirm.
The relevant factual and procedural background can be summarized as
follows. The victim, Thomas Watson, lived above a Häagen-Dazs ice cream
store at 242 South Street in Philadelphia. He worked across town as a DJ at
the Copabanana Club at 40th and Spruce Streets. At about 2:00 a.m. on May
11, 2013, after finishing work at the Copabanana, the victim texted James
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-A27014-20
Weisbrod, who drove an unlicensed cab in Philadelphia, and asked Weisbrod
for a ride. Weisbrod picked up the victim and another man, co-defendant
Ronnie Robinson,1 who worked as a security guard at the Copabanana.
Weisbrod drove Robinson to an address in North Philadelphia. Weisbrod and
the victim then stopped at a restaurant before driving to the victim’s
apartment. N.T. Trial 10/10/18, at 94-97.
Weisbrod parked his Lincoln Town Car on American Street and then
helped the victim unload his DJ equipment outside his apartment. The victim
entered the closed Häagen-Dazs store, through which he had to walk in order
to get to his second floor apartment. As Weisbrod was about to leave the
area, he noticed that the victim had not moved his DJ equipment, which was
still outside in the rain. Concerned, he returned to South Street and opened
the door to the Häagen-Dazs store. Appellant blocked Weisbrod’s path and
told him, “Get the fuck out of here.” Id. at 98, 101-02. Weisbrod got into his
car, but instead of leaving the area, he circled the block and parked his car in
front of the Häagen-Dazs store. When he heard two gunshots, Weisbrod got
out of his car and walked into the store. As he entered, co-defendant Josephe
Murray left the store. Weisbrod saw the victim lying on the ground behind the
counter and called 911. Id. at 102-04.
At approximately 3:00 a.m., Philadelphia Police Officers Corson and
Duffy were on patrol when they received a radio call for a robbery in progress ____________________________________________
1 Ronnie Robinson is also known as “Lonnie Robinson,” but for purposes of this appeal we shall refer to him only as “Ronnie Robinson”.
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at the Häagen-Dazs store. The officers entered the store and discovered the
victim’s body behind the ice cream counter. Officer Corson observed wounds
to the victim’s chest and head. While on the premises, the officers noticed
signs of a struggle and heard a cell phone ringing, but they could not locate
the phone. Id. at 75-79; N.T. Trial, 10/11/18, at 25-28.
Philadelphia Police Officer Coleman also heard the radio call for the
Häagen-Dazs store robbery and learned that the suspects were last seen
running down American Street wearing dark clothing. As he drove north on
American Street, he noticed a discarded black hoodie and glove lying on the
sidewalk. Officer Coleman covered the items with a heavy paper bag to
protect them from the elements and turned them over to a crime scene
investigator. Forensic testing later demonstrated that victim’s DNA was on
the upper back portion of the hoodie. N.T. Trial, 10/11/18, at 53, 65, 68; N.T.
Trial, 10/22/18, at 208.
Police officers reviewed camera footage from inside and outside the
Häagen-Dazs store depicting the final moments of the victim’s life. The video
showed that one hour before the murder, two vehicles, a Honda and a green
Ford Explorer, parked along the 200 block of South Street, where the drivers
and occupants waited until Weisbrod and the victim arrived in Weisbrod’s
vehicle. As the victim entered the store, two men followed him inside and one
produced a large handgun. The victim struggled with the two men, who kicked
and beat him with the handgun. The video showed that Weisbrod attempted
to enter the store but was stopped by an individual blocking his path. The
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victim was then shot. Weisbrod returned to the store, where a man with a
bloodstained hoodie ran past him in the doorway and ran down the street.
N.T. Trial, 10/11/18, at 159; N.T. Trial, 10/15/18, at 162-63, 168-79.
On May 12, 2013, one day after the shooting, Detective John Harkins
recovered a Samsung TracFone (a pre-paid cellphone) from inside the store
that had fallen underneath an ice cream machine. The officers submitted an
exigent circumstances request for information to T-Mobile and learned that
the phone had been shipped to a woman named Carmen Melton, who lived at
5718 Reedland Street. The officers reviewed the call logs to see if they could
learn any information about the identities of individuals attempting to contact
the phone. One telephone number was associated with a woman named
Cheneka Jones, who lived at 5706 Reedland Street. The officers used a search
database to determine who else was associated with that address. They saw
a photo of Murray and realized that he was one of the individuals in the video
camera footage inside the Häagen-Dazs store. Detective Joseph Bamberski
assembled a photo array that included Murray’s photograph and showed it to
Weisbrod, who positively identified Murray as the individual who had come to
the door of the Häagen-Dazs store at the time of the shooting. N.T. Trial,
10/10/18, at 112, 116; N.T. Trial, 10/11/18, at 161-62; N.T. Trial, 10/15/18,
at 81-87; N.T. Trial, 10/22/18, at 47.
On May 12, 2013, Detective Theodore Hagan interviewed co-defendant
Robinson, the man who rode with victim in Weisbrod’s vehicle. Robinson told
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the detective that he had left the Copabanana Club after work with the victim,
who dropped him off at his house in North Philadelphia at approximately 2:45
a.m. Robinson also told Detective Hagan that the victim had been in a fight
with someone on South Street. N.T. Trial, 10/15/18, at 43, 44, 49, 56.
Meanwhile, detectives continued to examine call records from Murray’s
cell phone and learned that he had been in communication sixteen times on
the night of the murder with a phone registered to co-defendant Nelson. N.T.
Trial, 10/15/18, at 89.
Detective Bamberski prepared warrants to arrest Murray and search his
residence at 5706 Reedland Street. On the morning of May 15, 2013, Murray
was arrested at his home. Police officers recovered a pair of camouflage
shorts that looked like the ones worn by the shooter in the video and proof of
residency from the house. Id. at 90-92.
After receiving Miranda2 warnings, Murray gave an inculpatory
statement to Detective Bamberski (redacted for trial) in which he admitted
shooting and killing the victim.3 Murray explained that he owed a guy $5,000
for marijuana, so he agreed to rob the victim, who was known to have drugs
in his apartment. Murray and Pone waited for the victim to arrive at the
Häagen-Dazs store. When Weisbrod dropped the victim off at the store,
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3 As discussed infra, Appellant’s trial testimony allowed the Commonwealth to connect all co-defendants to the victim’s murder.
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Murray and Pone ran to the store, grabbed the victim, and dragged him to the
back of the store. Weisbrod returned to the store, but Pone prevented him
from entering the premises. Murray, who was alone with the victim, hit him
with his gun. Murray asked him where the drugs were, but the victim
continued to argue with him. Murray got a call from Nelson and was instructed
to kill the victim. Murray shot him in the head, ran out of the store, and
discarded his hoodie and glove while he fled. He also said that at the time of
the shooting, he was using a TracFone he had purchased on the street. Id.
at 98-119.
On the same day that Murray was arrested, Detective Francis Graf
picked up Robinson at his home because Murray had implicated him in the
murder. Officer Graf told Robinson that the police had more questions for
him, and brought him to the Homicide Division. After reading him the
Miranda rights, the police obtained Robinson’s confession. Specifically,
Robinson gave a statement (redacted for trial) in which he said that he met
the victim when they both worked together at the Copabanana Club. Robinson
provided security for the victim and also picked up and dropped off money
and drugs for him. Robinson stated that he knew the individual who was
responsible for having the victim shot and killed. This individual (Nelson)
came to the club on the night of the shooting and told Robinson that the victim
“was sitting” on a lot of money and drugs and “[they were] going to get that
tonight.” Nelson instructed Robinson to call him to let him know when the
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victim would be getting home. Robinson also admitted that he knew Nelson
planned to rob the victim because he had talked about doing it before in
March. Robinson claimed that he told Nelson he did not want anything to do
with the plan. Nelson, however, told Robinson that he would “take care of
him” by paying Robinson for calling him to tell him when the victim “would be
home.” N.T. Trial, 10/23/18, at 23, 25, 40-43. Robinson further stated that
on the night the victim was killed, he left the Copabanana with the victim in a
cab. After the cab dropped him off, Robinson received a call from Nelson and
told him that the victim was on his way home in a dark-colored Lincoln. The
next day, Robinson read on Facebook that the victim had been killed. Id. at
43-44.
Nelson also was arrested on May 15, 2013. Philadelphia Police Officer
Hindley was instructed to look for Nelson in the area of the 5400 block of
Angora Terrace. Officer Hindley noticed Nelson’s 1997 Ford Explorer parked
in the neighborhood, a vehicle that looked the same as one seen waiting
outside the store on the surveillance video. Officer Hindley saw Nelson
approach the vehicle and placed Nelson under arrest. Inside the car, police
officers found Nelson’s license and registration, as well as binoculars, black
gloves and a box of ammunition. On Nelson’s phone was information relating
to Murray’s arrest and a news report of the victim’s homicide. N.T. Trial,
10/22/18, at 6, 9-12, 26, 33-35; N.T. Trial, 10/23/18, at 112-19. On the
morning of May 16, 2013, Nelson gave an inculpatory statement to Detective
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John Harkins. Nelson claimed that another guy had planned the robbery, and
that his role was limited to introducing some of the participants to each other
and acting as a lookout. Nelson called someone to tell him the victim was on
his way home and he stated that he was also supposed to notify the other guy
when the robbery was complete. N.T. Trial, 10/22/18, at 57, 64-65.
On May 16, 2013, as detectives learned more about the shooting, they
prepared a photographic array that included a photo of Appellant and showed
the array to Weisbrod. Weisbrod identified Appellant as one of the two men
he saw at the Häagen-Dazs store, and Detective Bamberski obtained an arrest
warrant and warrant to search Pone’s residence at 5622 Angora Terrace. The
search warrant was executed on May 17, 2013. Inside Pone’s house, police
recovered a red Nike hat that resembled the hat worn by one of the men on
the video, and proof of residence for Pone. N.T. Trial, 10/15/18, at 137-41.
Pone was arrested several days later, on June 4, 2013. He, too, gave
an inculpatory statement admitting to his involvement in the killing of victim.
According to Pone, he was approached a few days before the shooting by
Nelson who asked him if he wanted to make some quick cash. When he said
that he did, Nelson told Pone that “he had somebody that . . . was a pretty
easy score . . . just rough up the guy up and take his money.” A couple of
nights later, Nelson, who was driving his green Ford Explorer, picked up Pone
and told him the plan was to go to the victim’s house and steal his money and
drugs. Pone, Nelson, and Murray waited on South Street until the victim
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arrived. After the victim entered the Häagen-Dazs store, Pone and Murray
followed him, fought with the victim, and dragged him to the back of the store.
Murray pulled out a gun and they both roughed the victim up a “little bit.”
Pone then saw Weisbrod return to Häagen-Dazs, so he intercepted Weisbrod
at the front door and prevented him from entering the store. Pone told the
man to “get the fuck out of here” and followed him outside. Pone then went
home with Nelson. N.T. Trial, 10/24/18, 138-55.
On October 26, 2018, following a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of
second degree murder, robbery, burglary, and conspiracy to commit robbery.
On December 18, 2018, Appellant was sentenced, inter alia, to life without
the possibility of parole. On December 27, 2018, Appellant filed a post-
sentence motion challenging the sufficiency and weight of the evidence. The
motion was denied by operation of law on April 26, 2019.
This appeal followed. The trial court did not order Appellant to file a
Rule 1925(b) statement, Appellant did not file a statement pursuant to Rule
1925(b), and the trial court did not file an opinion pursuant to Rule 1925(a).4
In an inartfully drafted brief,5 Appellant argues that there was
insufficient evidence supporting his convictions for robbery and second degree
4 The record shows that the presiding judge, the Honorable Steven Geroff, retired after the trial.
5In violation of Pa.R.A.P. 2111, 2117, and 2119, Appellant failed to: (i) include a statement of the facts, (ii) provide any authority for any of his claims, and
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murder. Additionally, Appellant claims that the evidence is insufficient to find
him guilty of conspiracy to commit robbery because he had abandoned the
conspiracy by leaving the crime scene. We disagree.
Regarding sufficiency of the evidence challenges, our standard of review
is de novo, however, our scope of review is limited to considering the evidence
of record, and all reasonable inferences arising therefrom, viewed in the light
most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner. See
Commonwealth v. Rushing, 99 A.3d 416, 420-21 (Pa. 2014).6
In connection with the robbery conviction, Appellant argues in a single
sentence that he could not be convicted of robbery because “the evidence
does not show that Appellant attempted to commit a theft.” Appellant’s Brief
at 10. We interpret this statement as a challenge to the jury’s finding that
Appellant was vicariously liable for others’ conduct, which we address infra.
(iii) elaborate on his claims. We also note that the statement of questions involved “must state concisely the issues to be resolved, expressed in the terms and circumstances of the case[.] . . . No question will be considered unless it is stated in the statement of questions involved or is fairly suggested thereby.” Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a). Here, Appellant’s statement of questions involved reads as follows: “Did the trial court err in their [sic] judgment of sentence of Appellant?” Appellant’s Brief at 7. Under well-established law, a finding of waiver is inescapable. See Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a); Commonwealth v. Bryant, 57 A.3d 191, 196 n.7 (Pa. Super. 2012) (defendant waived challenges to weight and sufficiency of evidence supporting indecent assault conviction for failure to include such challenges in his statement of questions). Despite being clearly inadequate, however, we decline to find waiver on this basis. 6 Appellant does not challenge any facts. Appellant merely challenges the legal conclusions drawn from those facts.
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Elsewhere, however, Appellant seems to suggest that the claim can be
interpreted as a challenge to whether a robbery was committed, not whether
Appellant could be found liable for others’ conduct. To the extent that
Appellant argues no robbery was committed because there is no evidence of
an attempted theft, Appellant fails to point to anything in the record that would
support the claim, a violation of Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c). The claim is therefore,
waived.
In any event, the record shows otherwise. It shows that Nelson
recruited Pone as a part of a plan to get “quick cash” from an “easy score.”
Pone and Murray entered the Häagen-Dazs store demanding the victim to
surrender his drugs and money. In the process, the victim was repeatedly
hit. Reviewing the claim in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as
the verdict winner, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence that a robbery
took place.
Appellant also seems to argue that a robbery was not committed
because there is no indication that anything was taken from the victim. A
conviction for robbery, however, will stand regardless of whether the accused
succeeds in obtaining any money or other property from the victim. See,
e.g., Commonwealth v. Brandon, 79 A.3d 1192, 1195 (Pa. Super. 2013).
In connection with the second-degree murder conviction, Appellant’s
entire argument consists of the following sentence: “Appellant argues that
since there was no attempt to commit a theft, and Appellant had left the scene
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of the crime before decedent was shot, he cannot be held responsible for
second-degree murder as either the principal or an accomplice.” Appellant’s
Brief at 10.
Failure to provide this Court with appropriate argument and citation to
applicable legal authority usually results in waiver. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Spotz, 18 A.3d 244, 281 n.21 (Pa. 2011) (“without a
developed, reasoned, supported, or even intelligible argument[, t]he matter
is waived for lack of development”); Commonwealth v. Hunzer, 868 A.2d
598, 509 (Pa. Super. 2005) (“[a]ppellant has failed to cite any legal authority
whatsoever in support of this argument, and has thereby waived the claim. .
. . Pa.R.A.P. 2119(b)”); Commonwealth v. Heilman, 867 A.2d 542, 546 (Pa.
Super. 2005) (recognizing that failure to provide “such discussion and citation
of authorities as are deemed pertinent” may result in waiver).
To the extent that the argument is reviewable, Appellant fails to explain
why he could not be found criminally liable for murder and robbery under a
vicariously liability theory. Much can be said about the substantial differences
between conspiracy and complicity,7 how differently the two concepts may
affect the instant matter, and how criminal liability may extend to include
responsibility for others’ conduct as a result of a finding of conspiracy or
complicity. Yet, Appellant failed to do so. In fact, Appellant merely argues
7 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Roebuck, 32 A.3d 613 (Pa. 2011).
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that he could not be found guilty of second degree murder or robbery because
he was not present at the time of the commission of said crimes. It is well-
established law that absence (or presence) at the crime scene alone is not
dispositive of a defendant’s criminal liability; similarly, it is well-established
that one can be found criminally liable for others’ conduct under a vicariously
liability theory.
In Commonwealth v. Fisher, 80 A.3d 1186 (Pa. 2013), our Supreme
Court noted:
Where the existence of a conspiracy is established, the law imposes upon a conspirator full responsibility for the natural and probable consequences of acts committed by his fellow conspirator or conspirators if such acts are done in pursuance of the common design or purpose of the conspiracy. Such responsibility attaches even though such conspirator was not physically present when the acts were committed by his fellow conspirator or conspirators and extends even to a homicide which is a contingency of the natural and probable execution of the conspiracy, even though such homicide is not specifically contemplated by the parties [.]
Id. at 1192 (quoting Commonwealth v. Eiland, 301 A.2d 651, 653 (Pa.
1973) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)).
In Commonwealth v. Gross, 101 A.3d 28 (Pa. 2014), our Supreme
Court noted: “Absence or presence at the scene and the participant’s role in
the complicity are not dispositive of whether accomplice liability exists.” Id.
at 35.
Finally, in Commonwealth v. Murphy, 884 A.2d 1228 (Pa. 2004), our
Supreme Court noted:
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It is well-established, however, that a defendant, who was not a principal actor in committing the crime, may nevertheless be liable for the crime if he was an accomplice of a principal actor. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 306; see also Commonwealth v. Bradley, 481 Pa. 223, 392 A.2d 688, 690 (1978) (the actor and his accomplice share equal responsibility for commission of a criminal act).
Id. at 1234.
In light of the foregoing, we conclude Appellant’s claim that his absence
from the crime scene shields him from criminal liability is meritless.
Finally, Appellant, in a similarly undeveloped fashion, claims that the
evidence is insufficient to find him guilty of conspiracy to commit robbery
because he had abandoned the conspiracy by leaving the crime scene. To this
end, Appellant cites Commonwealth v. Lambert, 795 A.2d 1010 (Pa. Super.
2002), for the proposition that “a conspiracy exists when the alleged
conspirator is present at the scene of the crime.” Appellant’s Brief at 10. No
relief is due. First, the record is devoid of any evidence—nor does Appellant
argue otherwise—that Appellant did anything to repudiate the conspiracy. To
the extent that the only evidence of withdrawal from the conspiracy is that he
left the ice cream store shortly before the murder, we conclude that the
evidence is not sufficient to show abandonment. Indeed, “[i]n order to justify
a finding of withdrawal or abandonment, . . . the actor must have abandoned
the scheme appreciably before the homicide occurs, and he must have
communicated his intention to his co-conspirator so that he also had an
opportunity to abandon the scheme.” Commonwealth v. Ruffin, 463 A.2d
1117, 1120-21 (Pa. Super. 1983); see also 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 306(f)(3).
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Second, to the extent that Appellant relies on Lambert, such reliance
is misplaced. Contrary to Appellant’s allegation, Lambert does not hold “a
conspiracy exists when the alleged conspirator is present at the scene of the
crime.” Appellant’s Brief at 10. Rather, it explained, as we have repeatedly
done here, that the presence of the accused at the scene is among the relevant
factors in assessing whether a conspiracy has been established.8 Indeed,
Lambert, whose felony murder conviction was upheld, was not in the house
where the murder occurred but in a nearby vehicle. Again, presence or
absence alone is not determinative of Appellant’s criminal liability under a
conspiracy theory. See, Fisher, supra.
We also conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support Appellant’s
conviction on the grounds of conspiracy and accomplice liability.
8 In Lambert, we noted:
Among the circumstances which are relevant, but not sufficient by themselves, to prove a corrupt confederation are: (1) an association between alleged conspirators; (2) knowledge of the commission of the crime; (3) presence at the scene of the crime; and (4) in some situations, participation in the object of the conspiracy. The presence of such circumstances may furnish a web of evidence linking an accused to an alleged conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt when viewed in conjunction with each other and in the context in which they occurred. Commonwealth v. Carter, 272 Pa.Super. 411, 416 A.2d 523 (1979).
Lambert, 795 A.2d at 1017 (quoting Commonwealth v. Olds, 469 A.2d 1072, 1075 (Pa. Super. 1983) (emphasis added)).
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A person commits criminal conspiracy if (1) he intends “to commit or
aid in the commission” of a crime; (2) he enters “into an agreement with
another [a ‘co-conspirator’] to engage in the crime;” and (3) he “or one or
more of the other co-conspirators” commits an overt act in furtherance of their
agreement. Commonwealth v. Le, 208 A.3d 960, 969 (Pa. 2019). Because
direct evidence of criminal intent and conspiratorial agreement is rarely
available, these elements are generally proven through circumstantial
evidence, such as “the relations, conduct[,] or circumstances of the parties,
or overt acts on the part of co-conspirators.” Id. Among the circumstances
that are relevant, but not sufficient by themselves, to prove a corrupt
confederation are: (1) an association between alleged conspirators; (2)
knowledge of the commission of the crime; (3) presence at the scene of the
crime; and (4) in some situations, participation in the object of the conspiracy.
Commonwealth v. Jordan, 212 A.3d 91, 97 (Pa. Super. 2019). “While such
circumstances are insufficient standing alone, they may furnish a web of
evidence linking an accused to an alleged conspiracy beyond a reasonable
doubt when viewed in conjunction with each other and in the context in which
they occurred.” Commonwealth v. Carter, 416 A.2d 523, 524 (Pa. Super.
1979) (internal quotations omitted).
Accomplice liability does not create a new or separate crime, but merely
“provides a basis of liability for a crime committed by another person.” Gross,
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101 A.3d at 35. This Court has described the concept of accomplice liability
as follows:
Two prongs must be satisfied for a person to be labeled an accomplice. First there must be evidence that the person intended to aid or promote the underlying offense. Second there must be evidence that the person actively participated in the crime by soliciting, aiding, or agreeing to aid the principal. Further, a person cannot be an accomplice simply based on evidence that he knew about the crime or was present at the crime scene. There must be some additional evidence that the person intended to aid in the commission of the underlying crime, and then aided or attempted to aid. For purposes of accomplice liability, no agreement is required, only aid. With regard to the amount of aid, it need not be substantial so long as it is offered to the principal to assist him in committing or attempt to commit the crime. The least degree of assistance in committing the offense is adequate to sustain the finding of responsibility as an accomplice.
Commonwealth v. Adams, 39 A.3d 310, 324 (Pa. Super. 2012) (quotation
marks and citations omitted), aff’d 104 A.3d 511 (Pa. 2014); see also 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 306. Moreover, accomplice liability “may be established wholly
by circumstantial evidence.” Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 135 A.3d 1097,
1102 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 145 A.3d 725 (Pa.
2016).
Viewing the evidence detailed above in a light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, the record shows that Pone was approached by Nelson to
check whether Pone would be interested in making some quick cash. As a
condition for his reward, Pone had to rough up and rob the victim. Pone
accepted the offer from Nelson. On the night of the crimes, Nelson picked up
Pone and drove to the victim’s address. There, they waited for the victim’s
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arrival. Upon the victim’s arrival, Pone and Murray entered the Häagen-Dazs
store, fought with the victim, and dragged him to the back of the store.
Murray pulled out a gun and they both roughed the victim up a “little bit.”
Pone then saw Weisbrod return to Häagen-Dazs, so he intercepted Weisbrod
at the front door and prevented him from entering the store. Pone told the
man to leave the premises and followed him outside. Pone then went home
with Nelson. See N.T. Trial, 10/24/18, at 138-157.
In light of the foregoing evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to
the Commonwealth, we conclude that the Commonwealth proved Pone’s
criminal liability for the robbery and murder of the victim under theories of
conspiracy and accomplice liability.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 3/26/21
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