Com. v. Piner, T.
Opinion
J-S32040-15 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellee :
:
v. :
:
TRACEY CAMILLE PINER, :
:
Appellant : No. 86 WDA 2015
Appeal from the PCRA Order entered on December 9, 2014 in the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County, Criminal Division, No(s): CP-07-CR-0000680-2012;
CP-07-CR-0002684-2011
BEFORE: SHOGAN, OLSON and MUSMANNO, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED JUNE 03, 2015 Tracey Camille Piner (“Piner”) appeals from the Order denying her Petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We affirm.
In its December 9, 2014 Opinion, the PCRA court summarized the relevant factual and procedural history, which we adopt as though fully restated herein. PCRA Court Opinion, 12/9/14, at 1-6 (unnumbered).
After an evidentiary hearing, the PCRA court denied Piner’s Petition.
Thereafter, Piner filed the instant timely appeal, followed by a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement of matters complained of on appeal.
Piner presents the following claims for our review:
1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
J-S32040-15
A. Whether the PCRA Court erred/abused its discretion by failing to find that [Piner’s] constitutional rights were violated and PCRA relief [should have been] granted due to the fact that [Piner] was threatened with an unconstitutional mandatory minimum [sentence] during the plea negotiation process?
B. Whether the PCRA Court erred/abused its discretion by failing to find that [Piner’s plea] counsel was ineffective, as the record demonstrates [that plea] counsel was ineffective for failing to properly communicate a plea offer?
C. Whether the PCRA Court erred/abused its discretion by failing to find that [Piner’s plea] counsel was ineffective, as the record demonstrates [that plea] counsel was ineffective for failing to file a pretrial motion to suppress?
D. Whether the PCRA Court erred/abused its discretion by failing to find that [Piner’s plea] counsel was ineffective, as the record demonstrates [that plea] counsel was ineffective for failing to withdraw her guilty plea?
E. Whether the PCRA Court erred/abused its discretion by failing to find that [Piner’s plea] counsel was ineffective, as the record demonstrates [that plea] counsel was ineffective for failing to file what would have been a meritorious appeal?
F. Whether the PCRA Court erred/abused its discretion by failing to find [that Piner’s] plea was unknowing and involuntary, as the record demonstrates [that] the plea was induced by her prior counsel’s ineffectiveness?
G. Whether the PCRA court erred/abused its discretion by failing to allow [Piner] to withdraw her guilty plea, as the evidence adduced at the PCRA hearing showed [that Piner] was medicated at her plea hearing to the extent [that] she did not fully grasp the consequences of her actions?
Brief for Appellant at 4-5.
Piner first claims that the PCRA court improperly denied relief on her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, which caused her to tender an unknowing and involuntary plea. Id. at 9. Piner asserts that, during plea
J-S32040-15 negotiations, she was threatened with the imposition of a seven-year mandatory minimum sentence for her drug possession charge. Id. at 11. Piner states that at the PCRA hearing, “she agreed that she thought she would be subject to that mandatory sentence if she was convicted at trial.” Id. In addition, Piner asserts, her plea counsel testified that he had communicated to Piner the possible seven-year mandatory minimum sentence. Id. According to Piner, the threatened mandatory minimum sentence has since been declared illegal. Id. at 12. Therefore, Piner argues, the plea induced by that sentence was unknowing and involuntary, and her counsel rendered ineffective assistance by advising her to accept the plea agreement. Id.
An appellate court’s standard of review regarding an order denying a PCRA petition is whether the determination of the PCRA court is supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Kretchmar, 971 A.2d 1249, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2009). The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record. Commonwealth v. Treadwell, 911 A.2d 987, 989 (Pa. Super. 2006).
To be eligible for relief based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a PCRA petitioner must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that (1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) no reasonable basis existed for counsel’s action or omission; and (3) there is a
J-S32040-15 reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different absent such error. Commonwealth v. Hammond, 953 A.2d 544, 556 (Pa. Super. 2008). A failure to satisfy any prong of this test requires rejection of the claim. Id.
In its Opinion, the PCRA court addressed Piner’s claim, and concluded that it lacks merit:
[] Piner has argued that her PCRA [Petition] should be granted and her guilty plea withdrawn due to the fact that she was threatened with a mandatory minimum sentence. The mandatory minimum sentence that would have applied has now been held unconstitutional by Alleyne v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 186 L.Ed. 2d 314 (2013). Alleyne has not been held to apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. Commonwealth v. Miller, 2014 PA Super 214, [102 A.3d 988, 995] (Pa. Super. 2014). Thus, [] Piner’s argument based on Alleyne is without merit.
PCRA Court Opinion, 12/9/14, at 6 (unnumbered). We agree with the PCRA court’s reasoning and affirm on this basis with regard to Piner’s claim. See id.
In her second claim, Piner argues that her plea counsel miscommunicated a plea offer from the Commonwealth as a 3-10 year prison term, when, in actuality, the offer was for a prison term of 5-10 years. Brief for Appellant at 12. Piner argues that when she found out the actual plea offer, “she was coerced into accepting, as she was informed by [plea counsel] that she ‘didn’t have a chance’ otherwise.” Id. at 13 (citation omitted).
J-S32040-15 The PCRA court addressed this claim, and concluded that it lacks merit. PCRA Court Opinion, 12/9/14, at 7 (unnumbered). In addition, the PCRA court reviewed the evidence regarding the plea deal as follows:
The letters sent to [] Piner from [her plea counsel] show that he was attempting to negotiate for a three[-]year minimum sentence. The letters also show that once Kenneth Piner began cooperating with the Commonwealth, the possibility of [Piner]
getting three years was off the table. In addition, [Piner’s plea counsel] advised that the Commonwealth now had additional discovery implicating [] Piner. [Plea counsel] advised that without cooperating[,] the minimum [sentence] she could get in a plea deal was five years. [] Piner testified that she wanted to accept the five to ten[-]year sentence because she wanted to avoid a much longer sentence of about forty-seven years.
Id. at 6 (unnumbered). We agree with the PCRA court’s reasoning, and its ultimate conclusion that Piner is not entitled to relief. See id. at 6, 7. Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the PCRA court’s Opinion with regard to this claim. See id.
Piner next claims that her plea counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not filing a motion to suppress evidence derived from wiretaps. Brief for Appellant at 14. Piner argues that she requested that her counsel file a suppression motion, but her counsel responded that “filing pretrial motions would have made it more difficult to deal with the prosecution[,]” and that the wiretap evidence benefitted her defense that “she was begging for drugs” for personal use. Id. (citations omitted). Piner argues that had the wiretap evidence been suppressed, there is a reasonable probability that she
J-S32040-15 would have been acquitted at trial, or had the charges against her dismissed. Id.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Com. v. Piner, T. (Com. v. Piner, T.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.