J-S16039-26
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : TINA MARIE PHILLIPS : : Appellant : No. 809 WDA 2025
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 13, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Greene County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-30-CR-0000137-2022
BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., BOWES, J., and LANE, J.
MEMORANDUM BY LANE, J.: FILED: JULY 16, 2026
Tina Maria Phillips (“Phillips”) appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed following her convictions for homicide by vehicle, aggravated assault
by vehicle, involuntary manslaughter, reckless driving, careless driving—
unintentional death, driving on right side of roadway, driving vehicle at safe
speed, and damage to real property by operation of motor vehicle prohibited.1
We affirm.
We summarize the relevant factual and procedural history in this matter
as follows. On October 25, 2021, Phillips was driving, with her mother Patricia
Phillips (“Patricia”) as the front-seat passenger, when her vehicle veered off
the roadway and into the front yard of 180 Andrews Road. There, Phillip’s
vehicle struck and killed Chad Varner (“Varner”), a United States postal ____________________________________________
1See 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3732(a), 3732.1(a), 3736, 3715(b), 3301(a), 3361, 3717(c); 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2504(a). J-S16039-26
worker, as he was delivering mail to the house. The Commonwealth charged
Phillips with, inter alia, the above-listed offenses. The matter proceeded to a
bench trial on October 16-17, 2024. Patricia passed away prior to trial;
therefore, the parties stipulated to the introduction of three separate
statements Patricia made about the incident before her death. See N.T.,
10/16/24, at 97-100; see also Commonwealth Exhibit 6 (Patricia’s
Statements). In her statement to Greene County Regional Police Sergeant
Nathan Ferree (“Sergeant Ferree”), Patricia stated that Phillips began
accelerating quickly while driving and that Patricia yelled at her to slow down.
Patricia noticed that Phillips was unresponsive so she began trying to pull
Phillips’ leg off the accelerator but was unable to do so. Patricia stated that
after they left the roadway and came to a stop, Phillips “seemed out of it and
was trying to move imaginary things around on the dash of the car.”
Commonwealth Exhibit 6.
In her interview with defense investigator Huey Gillespie, Patricia stated
that on the morning of the crash, she realized she was out of cigarettes so
she asked Phillips to take her to the store. Phillips informed her that she was
not feeling well, but Patricia insisted. After shopping at several stores, Phillips
stopped to get pizza because she still did not feel well and needed to eat
something. As they were driving home on Andrews Road, Patricia was
concerned that Phillips was driving too fast but she could not get Phillips’
attention. Patricia yelled at Phillips and attempted to push her leg off the gas
pedal, but Phillips was “unresponsive to her and was simply staring out the
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front of their vehicle.” Id. Patricia stated that after the accident, she and
Phillips exited the vehicle and checked on Varner. She described Phillips at
that time as “relatively normal, made sense, was able to talk to her[,] at that
point she was alert and made complete sense.” Id.
Last, in her statement to defense attorney Marissa Stewart, Patricia
recalled Phillips felt nauseated and was vomiting at home the morning of the
incident, but Patricia insisted that Phillips drive her to Wal-Mart and Dollar
General. She stated that Phillips “seemed fine” while shopping and driving
between stores. Id. They stopped at Domino’s and Phillips ate pizza in the
car. Patricia described Phillips as “quiet” on the way home and she believed
that Phillips “was mad at [her].” Id. Patricia stated that Phillips “turned off
the main road and [she] did not slow down. Patricia said it felt like [Phillips]
was going too fast and it felt like [she] was speeding up. Patricia yelled at
[Phillips] to slow down” and tried to push her leg off the gas pedal. Id. After
the vehicle crashed, Phillips “came to and was looking for her glasses.” Id.
In addition to Patricia’s stipulated statements, the Commonwealth
presented several witnesses. Sean McCollum (“McCollum”) testified that he
was driving on Andrews Road when Phillips and Patricia flagged him down and
asked him to call 911 because Phillips “believed she hit someone.” N.T.,
10/16/24, at 49. There was no cellular service in that location, so McCollum
drove back into town to call 911 from a landline telephone, and then returned
to the scene approximately ten minutes later. McCollum stated Phillips told
him that “she thought she had blacked out.” Id. at 58. After learning Phillips
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and her mother had not attempted to render any aid to Varner, McCollum
located Varner in the nearby woods and administered CPR until firefighters
arrived.
Seth Courtwright (“Courtwright”), a nurse and volunteer firefighter who
arrived on the scene shortly after McCollum returned, testified that he asked
Phillips what happened and she responded with “a very flat affect,” meaning
she showed little to no emotion. Id. at 71, 80. He further observed that she
was able to stand and move around without issue. Id. at 71.
Sergeant Ferree testified that upon arrival at the crash scene, he
observed “skid marks, some tire marks through some shrubs and a yard[,
and] a bunch of debris.” Id. at 154. Sergeant Ferree stated that Phillip’s
vehicle was “heavily damaged” and had crashed into a shed at the top of a
wooded hill, approximately 100 feet from the curve in the roadway. Id. at
156, 161. Varner’s body was also at the top of the hill, approximately twenty
feet to the left of the crashed car. Sergeant Ferree asked Phillips if she had
any recollection of the incident, and she stated that “she didn’t remember
anything . . . that she sometimes gets seizures or . . . diabetic seizures. . . ,
but that she hadn’t had one in almost a year or longer.” Id. at 157. Phillips
further stated that she was supposed to take medication for her condition, but
“that she hadn’t been taking it.” Id. at 157-58.
Paramedic Rayanne McDowell (“McDowell”) testified that she spoke with
Phillips, who had already exited her vehicle, and described her as “completely
alert and oriented, walking around on the scene.” Id. at 17. Phillips told
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McDowell that she “did not remember the incident and ha[d] been having
issues with her blood sugar.” Id. McDowell tested Phillips’ blood glucose level
and it was elevated at 511; however, McDowell did not observe any signs that
Phillips was experiencing diabetic ketoacidosis, and therefore she did not
administer any insulin or medication. Id. at 18, 22. Furthermore, McDowell
did not observe Phillips exhibiting any post-ictal, or “after seizure,” symptoms.
Id. at 43. McDowell stated that Phillips initially refused transport to the
hospital for further medical care but eventually agreed.
Cary Amundson, M.D. (“Dr. Amundson”), an emergency room physician
who treated Phillips at the hospital, testified that he reviewed her medical
history, including her history of Type 2 diabetes and seizures, and noted that
she had been prescribed two anti-seizure medications. Dr. Amundson did not
perform an EEG on Phillips to confirm a seizure had occurred because the
hospital did not have the necessary equipment. He tested her blood glucose
level and it was elevated at 546; however, he did not observe any symptoms
of diabetic ketoacidosis. Id. at 112. Phillips told Dr. Amundson that she had
not slept well the night before and “didn’t feel well while she was driving.” Id.
at 106. She further told him that “she remember[ed] waking up with EMS
helping her out of the car.” Id. at 130. Based on her medical history, her
reported symptoms that he “took at face value,” and her physical examination,
Dr Amundson’s “working diagnosis” that day was that Phillips “had seizure like
activity [and] hyperglycemia.” Id. at 107. He submitted a report to the
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Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (“PennDOT”), informing them that
Phillips suffered a seizure and should cease driving immediately.
Susan Albert (“Albert”), a nurse practitioner and Phillip’s primary care
provider, testified that she saw Phillips on November 1, 2021, for a follow-up
appointment after the emergency room visit. Phillips told Albert that “she did
not feel she had a seizure” because “it was nothing like the seizures that she
has had in the past, and she did not have her typical post-ictal symptoms.”
Id. at 136. Phillips further told Albert that “she had not had a seizure in years
and she has never had anything like this happen when she was driving.” Id.
At Phillips’ request, Albert completed a form for PennDOT stating that Phillips
did not have a seizure on October 25, 2021, and could resume driving. See
id. at 137.
Trooper Jason Hatalsky (“Trooper Hatalsky”), who was qualified as an
expert in collision analysis and reconstruction, testified that he examined the
crash site and then analyzed the downloaded contents of Phillips’ vehicle’s
“black box” recorder. N.T., 10/17/24, at 178, 181-82, 207. The black box
recorder showed that Phillips’ vehicle was traveling 70.8 miles per hour when
it left the roadway, that Phillips applied the brakes and, at some point, had
shifted the gear into neutral, and that the vehicle was traveling 32.3 miles per
hour when it struck Varner. Id. at 221-22, 259. Trooper Hatalsky testified
that the posted speed limit for Andrews Road was forty miles per hour, and
that “the road is very narrow and . . . not marked with any markings, so there
[are] no lane markings, there [are] no fog lines.” Id. at 225-26. Based on
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his investigation, Trooper Hatalsky concluded that Phillips “failed to negotiate
a curve, left the roadway, struck a pedestrian and a tree, causing the death
of the pedestrian.” Id. at 227.
Phillips did not testify on her own behalf and presented no witnesses.
At the conclusion of trial, the court found Phillips guilty of the above-listed
offenses. On January 13, 2025, the trial court imposed standard range
sentences of ten to twenty-three months’ county incarceration on the
homicide by vehicle conviction, and ten to twenty-three months’ county
incarceration on the involuntary manslaughter conviction, to run concurrently
with one another. The court determined that, for sentencing purposes, the
offense of aggravated assault by vehicle merged with the homicide by vehicle.
On the remaining charges, the court imposed an aggregate fine of $775.
Phillips filed a timely post-sentence motion and an amended post-sentence
motion, which the trial court denied. Phillips filed a timely notice of appeal,
and both she and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Phillips raises the following issues for our review:
1. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt abuse its discretion and err by imposing a sentence of incarceration which in this case is a cruel and shocking sentence for this offender?
2. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt abuse its discretion and err by erroneously finding sufficient evidence or erroneously relying on contrary evidence?”
Phillips’ Brief at 4.
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In her first issue, Phillips argues that the trial court’s imposition of a
carceral sentence was “cruel and shocking,” in violation of the Eighth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 13 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution. A challenge to a sentence alleging a violation of
the cruel punishment clause implicates the legality of the sentence and cannot
be waived. Commonwealth v. Brown, 71 A.3d 1009, 1016 (Pa. Super.
2013) (citation omitted). “When reviewing the legality of a sentence, our
standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.”
Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 328 A.3d 1159, 1165 (Pa. Super. 2024)
(citation omitted).
When reviewing such challenges, we observe:
Article 1, Section 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel punishments inflicted.” P.A. Const. art. I, § 13. The guarantee against cruel punishment contained in the Pennsylvania Constitution, Article 1, Section 13, provides no broader protections against cruel and unusual punishment than those extended under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between the crime committed and the sentence imposed; rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime.
Commonwealth v. Lankford, 164 A.3d 1250, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2017)
(citations omitted, emphasis in the original).
The three-prong test for Eighth Amendment proportionality review is
“guided by objective criteria, including (i) the gravity of the offense and the
harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the
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same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same
crime in other jurisdictions.” Id. (citations omitted). This Court is not
required to reach the second and third prongs of this test unless “a threshold
comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an
inference of gross disproportionality.” Id.
Importantly, “[a] punishment authorized by a legislature violates the
proscription against cruel and unusual punishment only if it is so
disproportionate to an offense as to offend evolving standards of decency or
a balanced sense of justice.” Commonwealth v. Carr, 543 A.2d 1232, 1235
(Pa. Super. 1988) (citations omitted). Moreover, a “least restrictive means
type analysis . . . has no place in the review of cruel and unusual punishment
claims.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
Phillips argues that “[s]entences of incarceration for a first-time offender
are not unheard of, but it is an unnecessarily cruel punishment in this case”
and therefore “violates the Eighth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and [section] 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.” Phillips’ Brief
at 12. She avers that “she should receive a mitigated sentence and be
permitted to serve any sentence she receives on house arrest, rather than
through incarceration.” Id. Phillips concedes that “sentences of incarceration
are in the guidelines for the charges against [her,]” but contends that “it is
not mandatory that the trial court sentence according to those guidelines if
the circumstances surrounding the incident compellingly indicate that they
should not be followed.” Id. at 11-12.
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The trial court considered Phillips’ sentencing claim and found it lacked
merit, reasoning:
While it is true that [Phillips] had no prior criminal record and was an otherwise first time offender, those factors are addressed in the sentencing guidelines. There were no factors that would suggest a sentence in the mitigated or aggravated range was appropriate.
Although we recognize that [Phillips’] conduct was not intentional, charges of involuntary manslaughter and homicide by vehicle do not contemplate intentional conduct, and we determine that the sentence imposed was appropriate.
Trial Court Opinion and Order, 5/29/25, at 4.
Although Phillips purports to challenge her sentence as a violation of the
cruel punishment clause, she does not acknowledge, let alone address, the
three-prong test for Eighth Amendment proportionality review. Rather, she
simply argues that as a first-time offender, the sentencing guidelines should
not apply to her and she should serve her sentence on house arrest instead
of in jail. This argument would apply only to the first prong of the
proportionality review—“the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the
penalty.” Lankford, 164 A.3d at 1253. However, as explained above, a “least
restrictive means” argument, as Phillips advances here, “has no place in the
review of cruel and unusual punishment claims.” Carr, 543 A.2d at 1235
(rejecting appellant’s claim that his sentence constituted cruel and unusual
punishment because the sentencing court imposed a term of incarceration
over a probationary term that would equally protect the public and
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accommodate appellant’s health issues). Based on her convictions for
homicide by vehicle, graded as a felony of the third degree, and involuntary
manslaughter, graded as a misdemeanor of the first degree, Phillips faced a
maximum aggregate sentence of six to twelve years’ incarceration. Given the
seriousness of these convictions, which resulted in a man’s death, we
determine that Phillip’s sentence of ten to twenty-three months’ incarceration
was not grossly disproportionate to the crime and does not violate the cruel
punishment clause. Since Phillips failed to show that her sentence “led to an
inference of gross proportionality,” we have no obligation to continue with the
proportionality review. See Lankford, 164 A.3d at 1253. We therefore
conclude that Phillips’ sentence is not violative of the Eighth Amendment to
the United States Constitution and section 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
Accordingly, no relief is due on Phillips’ first issue.
In her second issue, Phillips argues that the trial court abused its
discretion “by erroneously finding sufficient evidence or erroneously relying
on contrary evidence.” Phillips’ Brief at 4. As a threshold matter, we note
that the manner in which Phillips phrased her second issue implicates both the
sufficiency of the evidence and the weight of the evidence. Thus, we will
address both claims.
Initially, we must determine whether Phillips’ claim challenging the
sufficiency of evidence on all charges is preserved for our review. This Court
has explained that:
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It is well-settled that the failure to develop an adequate argument in an appellate brief may result in waiver of the claim under Pa.R.A.P. 2119. Arguments which are not appropriately developed are waived. When issues are not properly raised and developed in briefs, or when the briefs are wholly inadequate to present specific issues for review, a Court will not consider the merits thereof. Where an appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review that claim is waived.
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 277 A.3d 577, 590-91 (Pa. Super. 2022)
(quotation marks and citations omitted).
Although Phillips purports to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence
on all her convictions, she does not present any arguments in her appellate
brief regarding her convictions for aggravated assault by vehicle, involuntary
manslaughter, reckless driving, careless driving—unintentional death, driving
on right side of roadway, driving vehicle at safe speed, and damage to real
property by operation of motor vehicle prohibited. Indeed, nowhere in the
discussion section does Phillips even mention these charges except in a brief
recitation of the procedural history. See Phillips’ Brief at 13-15. This
deficiency prevents us from conducting a meaningful review of the sufficiency
of the evidence supporting these convictions. See Taylor, 277 A.3d at 590-
91. We therefore conclude that Phillips has waived her challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence with respect to all of these charges. Accordingly,
we will address Phillips’ sufficiency challenge only with respect to her
conviction for homicide by vehicle.
When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence:
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[W]e evaluate the record in light most favorable to the verdict winner giving the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict when it establishes each material element of the crime charged and the commission thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, the Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a mathematical certainty. Any doubt about the defendant’s guilt is to be resolved by the fact finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances.
The Commonwealth may sustain its burden by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Accordingly, [t]he fact that the evidence establishing a defendant’s participation in a crime is circumstantial does not preclude a conviction where the evidence coupled with the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom overcomes the presumption of innocence. Significantly, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder; thus, so long as the evidence adduced, accepted in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, demonstrates the respective elements of a defendant’s crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellant’s convictions will be upheld.
Commonwealth v. Franklin, 69 A.3d 719, 722-23 (Pa. Super. 2013)
(internal quotations and citations omitted).
The Crimes Code2 defines homicide by vehicle as:
Any person who recklessly or with gross negligence causes the death of another person while engaged in the violation of any law of this Commonwealth or municipal ordinance applying to the operation or use of a vehicle or to the regulation of traffic except section 3802 (relating to driving under influence of alcohol or controlled substance) is guilty of homicide by vehicle, a felony of the third degree, when the violation is the cause of death.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3732(a).
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2 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 101-9546.
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Importantly, an assertion that an appellant’s “theory of the case” should
have been credited over the Commonwealth’s version of events “actually
sounds in weight of the evidence . . . and is not truly a sufficiency challenge.”
Commonwealth v. Perez, 93 A.3d 829, 840 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted).
Indeed, “a sufficiency of the evidence review does not include an assessment
of credibility of testimony offered by the Commonwealth.” Commonwealth
v. Juray, 275 A.3d 1037, 1043 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation omitted)
(emphasis added). “An appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
must fail, where an appellant phrases an issue as a challenge to the sufficiency
of the evidence but the argument that the appellant provides goes to the
weight of the evidence.” Id.
Phillips does not dispute that she violated a law of this Commonwealth
or that the violation resulted in a death. Instead, she challenges only the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the mens rea requirement of
recklessness or gross negligence for homicide by vehicle. See Phillips’ Brief
at 13. In support of her purported sufficiency challenge, Phillips simply
reiterates the testimony adduced at trial favorable to her, and asserts that
“[t]his testimony all goes towards the defense’s theory of the case” and
“proves that this tragic accident was just that—an accident.” Phillips’ Brief at
15. We emphasize that an assertion that an appellant’s theory of the case
should have been credited over the Commonwealth’s “actually sounds in
weight of the evidence . . . and is not truly a sufficiency challenge.” Perez,
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93 A.3d at 840. Thus, we conclude that because Phillips’ purported sufficiency
claim in fact goes to the weight of the evidence, her challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence must fail. See Juray, 275 A.3d at 1043.
Phillips further contends that the trial court “erroneously reli[ed] on
contrary evidence.” Since Phillips’ arguments in her appellate brief discuss
the weight of the evidence, and she challenged the weight of the evidence in
both her post-sentence motion and Rule 1925(b) concise statement, we will
address her weight claim. See Pa.R.A.P. 607(A).
Our standard of review when considering a challenge to the weight of
the evidence is well settled:
A motion for new trial on grounds that the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence, concedes that there is sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict. Thus, the trial court is under no obligation to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner. An allegation that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. A new trial should not be granted because of a mere conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same facts would have arrived at a different conclusion. A trial judge must do more than reassess the credibility of the witnesses and allege that he would not have assented to the verdict if he were a juror. Trial judges, in reviewing a claim that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence do not sit as the thirteenth juror. Rather, the role of the trial judge is to determine that “notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice.”
Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751-52 (Pa. 2000) (citations and
footnote omitted). “The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of
fact, who is free to believe all, none or some of the evidence and to determine
the credibility of the witnesses.” Commonwealth v. Talbert, 129 A.3d 536,
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545 (Pa. Super. 2015) (brackets and citation omitted). Thus, in order for a
defendant to prevail on a challenge to the weight of the evidence, “the
evidence must be so tenuous, vague and uncertain that the verdict shocks the
conscience of the trial court.” Id. at 546 (citation omitted).
An appellate court’s standard of review when presented with a weight
of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of review applied by the
trial court:
Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented, an appellate court will give the gravest consideration to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial judge when reviewing a trial court’s determination that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. One of the least assailable reasons for granting or denying a new trial is the lower court’s conviction that the verdict was or was not against the weight of the evidence and that a new trial should be granted in the interest of justice.
Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1055 (Pa. 2013) (citations omitted,
emphasis in the original).
Phillips argues that the bulk of the testimony presented at trial
“indicated that there was a medical incident that caused the accident,” and
that if Phillips experienced a “seizure or medical episode [during] the accident
[it] would not meet the required recklessness standard of the statute.”
Phillips’ Brief at 14. She avers that testimony from McDowell, Courtright, Dr.
Amundsun, Patricia, and Sergeant Ferree all suggested Phillips experienced a
“medical incident that caused the accident,” and that the trial court should
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have rejected Albert’s testimony to the contrary. Id. at 14-15. Phillips
contends that all of the testimony she cites in her brief “goes towards the
defense’s theory of the case. It proves that this tragic accident was just that—
an accident. It was caused by a medical issue with Phillips.” Id. at 15.
The trial court considered Phillips’ weight claim and found it meritless,
reasoning, “[t]he verdict does not shock the conscience of the [c]ourt and
certainly was clearly supported by the evidence. Again, we have fully
considered the theory of the defense and rejected that notion.” Trial Court
Opinion and Order, 5/29/25, at 6.
After careful review, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court
in denying Phillips’ challenge to the weight of the evidence. As explained
above, this Court will give the gravest consideration to the findings and
reasons advanced by the trial court judge when reviewing its determination
as to whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. See Clay, 64
A.3d at 1055. Moreover, one of the least assailable reasons for denying a new
trial is the lower court’s conviction that the verdict was not against the weight
of the evidence. Id.
Here, Phillips’ claim that the verdict was against the weight of the
evidence is premised on the trial court not crediting testimony that supported
her assertion that she experienced a sudden seizure while driving, thus
negating the mens rea necessary for a homicide by vehicle conviction. While
the parties introduced Patricia’s statements that Phillips was not feeling well
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on the day of the crash and became unresponsive while driving, and the
Commonwealth presented the testimony of certain witnesses which provided
some support for Phillips’ theory, the record is nevertheless replete with
testimony that contradicted Phillips’ theory. For example, McDowell, a
paramedic who responded to the crash scene, testified that Phillips appeared
completely oriented and alert, and did not exhibit any post-seizure symptoms.
See N.T. 10/16/24, at 17, 22, 43. Further, nurse and volunteer firefighter
Courtright described Phillips as having a “flat affect” after the crash, but was
able to stand and move around without assistance. Id. at 70. Additionally,
Dr. Amundson, who treated Phillips in the emergency department, did not
observe any symptoms of diabetic ketoacidosis despite her elevated blood
sugar level, but formed a working diagnosis of seizure-like activity and
hyperglycemia based on Phillips’ medical history and the symptoms she
reported to him. See id. at 110-12. Similarly, Albert, Phillips’ primary care
provider, testified that Phillips told her she did not suffer a seizure and asked
Albert to submit a form to PennDOT confirming this so that she could resume
driving. See id. at 136-39. Lastly, Trooper Hatalsky stated that although
Phillips’ vehicle was traveling 70.8 miles per hour when it left the road, she
applied the brake pedal as her vehicle crashed through shrubbery and struck
Varner, which tended to negate her theory that she was having a seizure
during the incident. See N.T., 10/17/24, at 221-22, 226-27.
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Phillips is essentially asking this Court to reweigh the evidence, and to
give all weight to testimony supporting her theory that she experienced a
sudden seizure while driving, and to accord no weight to testimony that she
was driving more than 70 miles per hour when her vehicle left the road but
applied her brakes prior to hitting Varner, that she did not exhibit any post-
seizure symptoms after the crash, and that Phillips herself told her primary
care provider that she did not experience a seizure. This we cannot do, as
this Court may not reweigh the evidence. See Talbert, 129 A.3d at 545-46
(holding that the weight to be accorded to the evidence and testimony
presented at trial was exclusively for the fact-finder, which was free to believe
all, part, or none of the evidence and testimony and to determine credibility).
Rather, this Court’s role is to review the exercise of discretion by the
trial court in ruling on the weight claim. In this regard, we discern no abuse
of such discretion. The trial court considered all of the testimony presented
at trial and rejected Phillips’ version of events, finding instead that Phillips
acted recklessly or with gross negligence when she drove her vehicle at a high
rate of speed off the road and into a yard, where she stuck and killed Varner
as he delivered mail. Thus, as we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial
court denying Phillips’ weight challenge, this issue merits no relief.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that none of Phillips’ claims merit
relief. We thus affirm the judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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DATE: 7/16/2026
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