NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA
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v. :
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ANDREW ROBERT PETERSON :
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Appellant : No. 2981 EDA 2025
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 17, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-15-CR-0002176-2021
BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J. MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 16, 2026 Andrew Robert Peterson appeals from the order denying his Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. Peterson argues his plea counsel was ineffective for failing to correctly advise him regarding a potential pre-trial motion to suppress. We affirm.
The underlying facts are as follows:
On or about June 15th of 2021, in the area of the 1300th block of South Hanover Street, North Coventry, Chester County, Pennsylvania, the defendant, Andrew Peterson, was driving a motor vehicle while his license was suspended from a prior DUI conviction. The defendant, prior to driving, had consumed a significant quantity of alcoholic beverages. Around noon on that date, [Peterson] crossed over into oncoming traffic with no effort to correct his driving and struck a vehicle driven by [the victim]
head-on.
[Peterson] was observed by several witnesses on scene, who noted behavior that he appeared intoxicated, as well as a strong smell of alcoholic beverages. This area of roadway was straight with a slight incline, [the victim] had recently crested the hill and had insufficient time to react to [Peterson]’s vehicle in her lane of
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travel and there was nothing in [Peterson]’s lane of travel to necessitate his travel in the oncoming lane, nor was [Peterson]’s vehicle suffering from any mechanical issues.
[Peterson]’s blood was subsequently drawn and tested, which yielded or provided a blood alcohol content [(“BAC”)] of .258 percent.
[The victim] suffered a litany of injuries, including but not limited to neck fractures, a compound ankle fracture, multiple hip fractures, a lacerated aorta and liver, bleeding into the stomach and traumatic brain injury causing memory and motor problems.
She has undergone several surgeries since the crash, but many of the issues cannot be remedied.
Due to the circumstances of the crash, [Peterson’s] driving behaviors, his behavior on scene and the conditions of the roadway, the crash was . . . a result of [Peterson] driving while under the influence and his inability to safely operate a motor vehicle.
Also, at time of the crash, in addition to his driving privileges being suspended, [Peterson] ha[d] no current insurance on the vehicle he was driving, as required by law.
PCRA Court Opinion, filed Oct. 17, 2025, at 1-2 (quoting N.T., Guilty Plea, 12/8/22, at 4-6).1 After his arrest, Peterson filed a pro se motion to suppress, arguing in part that the results of his blood test should be suppressed on the basis that the police had not obtained a warrant prior to his blood draw. See Motion to Suppress Evidence, 4/1/22, at 3-4. However, Peterson was represented by counsel, and the court took no action on the pro se motion. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 241 A.3d 353, 354 n.1 (Pa.Super. 2020).
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1The PCRA court relies on this opinion for purposes of Rule 1925(a). See PCRA Rule 1925(a) statement, filed Dec. 1, 2025, at 1.
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Instead of proceeding to trial, Peterson pleaded guilty on December 8, 2022, to driving under the influence, aggravated assault by vehicle while driving under the influence (“DUI”), accidents involving death or personal injury while not properly licensed, driving while operating privilege is suspended or revoked, and required financial responsibility. 2 Pursuant to the plea agreement, the court imposed an aggregate sentence of five to 10 years of incarceration followed by five years of probation.
On January 8, 2024, through counsel, Peterson filed a timely PCRA petition.3 His counsel filed an amended petition in December 2024. Peterson alleged that his plea counsel had not properly advised him “with respect to a potential pretrial challenge to the admissibility of evidence of his [BAC] as the product of a warrantless, state-directed blood draw in violation of Birchfield
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2 See 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802(c), 3735.1, 3742.1(a)(1), 1543(b)(1)(1.1)(i), and 1786(f), respectively. 3 Peterson’s judgment of sentence became final 30 days after his sentencing,
on January 7, 2023. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3) (stating, “a judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review . . . or at the expiration of time for seeking the review”); Pa.R.A.P. 903(a) (stating a notice of appeal “shall be filed within 30 days after the entry of the order from which the appeal is taken”). Peterson had one year from that date, i.e., until January 7, 2024, to file his PCRA petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). However, because January 7, 2024, fell on a Sunday, Peterson’s petition, filed on Monday, January 8, 2024, was timely. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908 (“Whenever the last day of any [period of time referred to in a statute] shall fall on Saturday or Sunday, . . . such day shall be omitted from the computation”); see Commonwealth v. Hart, 199 A.3d 475, 481 (Pa.Super. 2018).
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v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. 438 (2016), and related jurisprudence.” PCRA Ct. Op. at 3.4 The court held a bifurcated hearing. Peterson, Peterson’s plea counsel, the prosecuting attorney, and the police detective who responded to the scene of the accident — Detective Timothy Prouty — testified.
Detective Prouty testified that after he arrived at the scene, and after Peterson had been transported to the hospital, Detective Prouty called the hospital, because “part of their protocol is to draw blood to get a better assessment of their patients.” N.T., 5/22/25, at 54. Detective Prouty “requested that the blood be held and not destroyed, so [he] could obtain a search warrant for the blood.” Id. at 55. Detective Prouty denied that he had ordered the hospital to draw Peterson’s blood. Id. Detective Prouty obtained a warrant prior to having the blood tested.5 The Commonwealth confronted Detective Prouty with an incident report written by another officer who had responded to the scene, which stated, “Detective Prouty was on the scene and advised that he had already contacted Reading Hospital and requested that blood samples be drawn for both operators.” Id. Detective Prouty responded that he had not told the officer that he had asked the hospital to draw the blood, only that he had called to
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4 Peterson raised other claims in his PCRA petition that he does not pursue on appeal. 5 Peterson does not deny that the police obtained a warrant prior to obtaining his blood or having it tested.
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see whether it had already been drawn. Id. He claimed that the other officer had written the report incorrectly. Id. at 57.
Peterson testified that he would have pursued a suppression motion if counsel had advised him that there had been a potential challenge to the admissibility of his blood test results. N.T., 2/25/25, at 81.
Peterson’s plea counsel testified that he discussed a potential motion to suppress with Peterson, but that he (counsel) advised Peterson that the results of the blood draw would have been admissible under a Pennsylvania statute that allowed medical personnel treating a person involved in a motor vehicle accident to preserve blood for testing when they had probable cause that the person was DUI. Id. at 30-31; see 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3755, held unconstitutional by Commonwealth v. Hunte, 337 A.3d 483 (Pa. 2025). Plea counsel also testified that he cautioned Peterson that if he pursued a suppression motion and lost, the Commonwealth would revoke its plea offer. N.T., 2/25/25, at 31.
The court denied relief, and Peterson appealed. He presents the following issue:
1. Did the lower court err in dismissing Appellant Peterson’s PCRA petition where there was clear evidence that Detective Timothy Prouty requested that Reading Hospital personnel draw blood from Appellant Peterson For Blood Alcohol Content (“BAC”) testing without a search warrant in violation of Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. 438 (2016), and thus that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise Appellant Peterson that he could have suppressed the BAC test results if he had gone to trial rather than pleading guilty?
Peterson’s Br. at 2-3.
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Peterson argues his plea counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him that the results of his blood test would be subject to suppression. Peterson argues Birchfield held that “[l]aw enforcement must have a search warrant before they can draw a person’s blood for the purpose of BAC testing, unless there are clearly defined exigent circumstances which do not necessarily include the dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream.” Id. at 8. He alleges the record evidence reveals his blood was drawn at the behest of law enforcement, without a warrant, rather than for independent medical purposes. Peterson relies on the incident report stating Detective Prouty had “advised that he had already contacted Reading Hospital and requested that blood samples be drawn from both operators and that he would be completing search warrants for the blood, medical records, and the inspection and ECM download of both vehicles.” Id. at 3 (quoting Incident Report, North Coventry Township Police Department, at 11); see also id. at 13. Peterson also asserts that the fact the officers arrived at the scene at 12:17 p.m., the blood draw was ordered by a physician at 1:18 p.m., and the blood draw occurred at 2:44 p.m., proves that the blood was drawn at Detective Prouty’s request. Id. at 3, 13, 14. He further argues that the fact the blood was not tested until nine days after the accident proves that it had not been drawn for medical purposes. Peterson asserts the police’s obtaining of a warrant, prior to having the blood tested, did not cure the warrantless seizure of his blood.
Peterson contends that although Detective Prouty testified at the PCRA hearing that he had not ordered the blood to be drawn, the inconsistent
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evidence on this point “was not sufficient to allow the Commonwealth to meet its burden to prove that the draw was legal.” Id. at 15. Peterson asserts that the Commonwealth was required to prove not only that the police had not requested the blood draw, but that medical personnel had not drawn the blood for law enforcement purposes under Section 3755, a statute which was held unconstitutional in Hunte. Peterson claims that Commonwealth v. Persico, 343 A.3d 311 (Pa.Super. 2025), held that although the Commonwealth had produced evidence that the police had not requested the medical personnel to draw the defendant’s blood, and had obtained a warrant prior to having the previously-drawn blood tested, the Commonwealth had not met its burden to prove medical personnel had drawn the defendant’s blood for medical purposes, rather than under Section 3755.
Peterson argues his plea counsel could have had no reasonable basis for failing to advise him that the evidence would be subject to suppression. He contends that counsel’s error was not harmless, because the Commonwealth’s other evidence – “a paramedic who claimed to smell alcohol on [Peterson] and a witness who observed Peterson’s car drift over the center line” – would not have likely resulted in a conviction. Id. at 17.
We review an order granting or denying PCRA relief to determine “whether the PCRA court’s ruling is supported by the record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Hereford, 334 A.3d 903, 907 (Pa.Super. 2025) (en banc) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 348 A.3d 679 (Pa. 2025). We apply a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court’s legal conclusions. Id.
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at 910. However, “[w]e must defer to the PCRA court’s findings of fact and credibility determinations [if they are] supported by the record.” Id. at 909 (citation omitted). Deference is due because it is “[t]he PCRA court, and not the appellate courts, [that] has personally observed the demeanor of the witnesses[.]” Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 319 (Pa. 2014).
Peterson argues his plea counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him to proceed with a suppression motion, rather than plead guilty. The following precepts guide our review of this claim.
Counsel is presumed to be effective. To overcome this presumption, the petitioner must plead and prove: (1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for his or her action or inaction; and (3)
but for the errors and omissions of counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. A failure to satisfy any of the three prongs is fatal to the claim.
Commonwealth v. Midgley, 289 A.3d 1111, 1119 (Pa.Super. 2023) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
“[W]here a [petitioner] alleges that counsel ineffectively failed to pursue a suppression motion, the inquiry is whether the failure to file the motion is itself objectively unreasonable, which requires a showing that the motion would be meritorious.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 179 A.3d 1153, 1160 (Pa.Super. 2018). The petitioner must also prove there “was no reasonable basis for not pursuing the suppression claim and that if the evidence had been suppressed, there is a reasonable probability the verdict would have been more favorable.” Commonwealth v. Hunter, 355 A.3d 394, 415 (Pa.Super.
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2026) (citation omitted). When determining whether the petitioner has met the burden of proof, we must keep in mind that “[c]ounsel’s stewardship must be judged under the existing law at the time of trial” and counsel is not ineffective “for failing to predict future developments or changes in the law.” Id. (citation omitted).
Here, the PCRA court rejected Peterson’s claim on the basis that a suppression motion would have lacked merit. It drew this conclusion based on the credibility of Detective Prouty’s testimony that he did not request the hospital draw Peterson’s blood, but merely requested the hospital retain the blood it independently drew, and that he obtained and tested the blood only after obtaining a warrant to do so:
At the PCRA hearing held May 22, 2025, Detective Prouty testified that he called West Reading Hospital to confirm that [Peterson]’s blood was drawn. Prouty further testified that he wrote a search warrant for this blood and served it upon West Reading Hospital. Detective Prouty did not order the hospital to draw [Peterson]’s blood. . . .
This Court finds that there is no merit to the claim that Plea Counsel was ineffective by failing to inform [Peterson] of a challenge to the admissibility of evidence of [Peterson]’s [BAC]. A challenge under Birchfield would not be appropriate in [Peterson]’s case because the court credits Detective Prouty’s testimony that he did not direct the blood draw but only inquired if there was one and, if so, for the hospital to retain it as he would be getting a search warrant. There was not a state-directed blood draw. Plea Counsel cannot be found to be ineffective for failing to inform [Peterson] of a meritless challenge to the admissibility of evidence.
PCRA Ct. Op. at 8-9.
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We will briefly review the applicable law. Prior to the 2025 Hunte decision, Section 3755 provided an exception to the requirement that the police obtain a warrant before having a defendant’s blood tested for BAC:
(a) General rule.--If, as a result of a motor vehicle accident, the person who drove, operated or was in actual physical control of the movement of any involved motor vehicle requires medical treatment in an emergency room of a hospital and if probable cause exists to believe a violation of section 3802 (relating to driving under influence of alcohol or controlled substance) was involved, the emergency room physician or his designee shall promptly take blood samples from those persons and transmit them within 24 hours for testing to the Department of Health or a clinical laboratory licensed and approved by the Department of Health and specifically designated for this purpose. This section shall be applicable to all injured occupants who were capable of motor vehicle operation if the operator or person in actual physical control of the movement of the motor vehicle cannot be determined. Test results shall be released upon request of the person tested, his attorney, his physician or governmental officials or agencies.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3755(a) (as amended, eff. Feb. 1, 2004).
In 2020, in a case where the record was silent as to why the medical personnel drew the defendant’s blood prior to the police arrival on the scene, this Court held Section 3755 to be unconstitutional, as it allowed for the police to obtain the results of blood testing without first obtaining a warrant. Commonwealth v. Jones-Williams, 237 A.3d 528, 537, 543 (Pa.Super. 2020), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 279 A.3d 508 (Pa. 2022). However, the Supreme Court vacated that decision in July 2022, finding this Court should not have reached the constitutionality of the statute where the record was silent as to whether the hospital had in fact drawn the defendant’s blood under
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Section 3755, or for independent medical purposes. Commonwealth v. Jones-Williams, 279 A.3d 508, 520 (Pa. 2022).
In June 2025, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court exercised direct appellate jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of Section 3755. See Hunte, 337 A.3d at 494 (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 722(7)). In Hunte, the police requested the hospital personnel draw the defendant’s blood under Section 3755 and later obtained search warrants before obtaining the blood or having it tested. Id. at 491. The Court held Section 3755 was facially unconstitutional because it “purports to authorize the seizure of a person’s blood on the basis of probable cause to suspect DUI, without the need for a search warrant or the demonstration of any circumstance-specific exception to the warrant requirements[.]” Id. at 489; id. at 499, 518. The Court also explained that warrants obtained before police seizure and analysis of the blood “does nothing to cure the statute’s facial authorization” of the warrantless blood draw. Id. at 515.
The very next month, this Court determined that, in line with Hunte, even where the police obtain a search warrant prior to obtaining or testing the defendant’s blood, the question of the legality of the draw turned on whether the hospital drew the blood pursuant to Section 3755 or for independent medical purposes. Persico, 343 A.3d at 320. We found the Commonwealth had not presented any evidence, such as the testimony of hospital personnel, to prove whether the hospital drew the blood for medical purposes or “because of a perceived duty arising out of section 3755.” Id. at 323; see id. at 322
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(emphasizing Commonwealth bears burden of production and burden of persuasion at a suppression hearing).
Here, we need not determine whether, if Peterson had the opportunity to file a motion to suppress today, after the 2025 Hunte and Persico decisions, the Commonwealth could present sufficient evidence to prove the hospital drew the blood for independent medical purposes, rather than at Detective Prouty’s request or pursuant to Section 3755. Here, it is Peterson who bears the burden of production and persuasion, and we need to determine whether Peterson has carried his burden to prove that his motion to suppress would have had merit at the time he pled guilty in December 2022.
Peterson has not proven his motion would have had merit. He has not proven that the hospital drew his blood at the request of law enforcement prior to their receipt of a warrant; we defer to the PCRA court’s factual finding on this point, as it is supported by the record testimony. Next, at the time Peterson pleaded guilty, Section 3755 had not yet been ruled unconstitutional.6, 7 Therefore, if the Commonwealth had adduced evidence at a suppression hearing at the time Peterson pled guilty that the hospital had drawn Peterson’s blood either based on probable cause under Section 3755, or for medical purposes, the suppression motion would have failed. Peterson
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6 Our 2020 ruling in Jones-Williams invalidating Section 3755 was vacated in July 2022. 7 In addition, Peterson’s argument regarding the legality of a blood draw under Section 3755 is waived, as he did not present it to the PCRA court.
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did not offer any evidence to disprove either of these points, as his factual argument relied on the allegation that Detective Prouty had directed the blood draw.
Peterson’s counsel was not required to anticipate a change in the law, was not ineffective for failing to advise Peterson to pursue a meritless motion, and counsel’s advice to accept the plea offer was reasonable.
Order affirmed.
Date: 9/16/2026