Com. v. Pellow, J.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: August 21, 2025
• Docket: 1040 WDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-A17034-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JESSE D. PELLOW : : Appellant : No. 1040 WDA 2024

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 25, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-07-CR-0002281-2022

BEFORE: McLAUGHLIN, J., LANE, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED: August 21, 2025

Appellant, Jesse D. Pellow, appeals pro se from the April 25, 2024

judgment of sentence of six months’ probation, imposed after he was

convicted, following a non-jury trial, of one count of harassment, 18 Pa.C.S.

§ 2709(a)(7).1 We affirm. ____________________________________________

1 We note that Appellant was represented by court-appointed counsel at his

trial and sentencing proceedings. However, as we discuss infra, Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal and indicated, in subsequent pro se filings, that he desired to represent himself herein. Accordingly, on January 3, 2025, this Court issued an order remanding Appellant’s case to the trial court for it to conduct an on-the-record colloquy to determine if Appellant was eligible for, and wished to proceed with, appointed counsel, or if he desired to proceed pro se. On February 5, 2025, the trial court issued an order stating that, after conducting the colloquy, at which Appellant expressed his wish to proceed pro se on appeal, it found that his waiver of his right to counsel was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Order, 2/5/25, at 1; see also Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81, 82 (Pa. 1998) (holding that “[w]hen a waiver of the right to counsel is sought at the post-conviction and appellate stages, an on- the-record determination should be made that the waiver is a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary one”). J-A17034-25

Briefly, Appellant’s conviction stemmed from evidence that, after he was

terminated from his employment with a nursing home, he “engaged in

repeated communications to annoy, harass[,] or alarm” his former supervisor,

even after being told by a police officer to stop sending messages to that

individual. Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 9/19/24, at 1. On April 25, 2024,

Appellant was sentenced to the term of probation set forth supra. He filed a

timely post-sentence motion, which was denied on July 24, 2024.

On August 7, 2024, Appellant — who was still represented by counsel

at that time — filed a pro se document with this Court entitled, “Appellant

Brief Post Sentence Petition for Permission to Appeal.” On August 27, 2024,

we issued an order forwarding this document to the trial court, and directing

the Blair County Clerk of Courts to docket it as a notice of appeal with a filing

date of August 7, 2024. See Order, 8/27/24, at 1 (single page) (citing

Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(3) and (4); Pa.R.A.P. 1316 (“The appellate court shall treat

a request for discretionary review of an order that is immediately appealable

as a notice of appeal if a party has filed a timely petition for permission to

appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1311.”)); see also Commonwealth v.

Williams, 151 A.3d 621, 624 (Pa. Super. 2016) (holding “that this Court is

required to docket a pro se notice of appeal despite [the a]ppellant being

represented by counsel”).

After Appellant’s pro se notice of appeal was docketed, the trial court

issued a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) order on September 5, 2024. Notably, while the

trial court received Appellant’s pro se Rule 1925(b) statement on September

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16, 2024, see TCO at 4, our review of the record shows that Appellant never

filed his concise statement with the Blair County Clerk of Courts. See

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(1) (“The appellant shall file of record the Statement and

concurrently shall serve the judge.”). In the trial court’s Rule 1925(b) order,

it explicitly directed Appellant to file his concise statement, and warned that

his failure to do so could result in waiver of his claims on appeal. See Order,

9/5/24, at 1-2 (stating “Appellant … shall file of record in this Court and

serve upon the Undersigned and the Commonwealth, a concise statement of

the errors complained of on appeal no later than twenty-one (21) days after

filing and service of this Order. … Failure to do so may be considered by the

appellate court as a waiver of all objections to the order, ruling, or any other

matter complained of.”) (emphasis added). Because the trial court ordered

Appellant to file a Rule 1925(b) statement and he failed to comply, he has

waived his issues on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (“Issues not

included in the Statement and/or not raised in accordance with the provisions

of this paragraph (b)(4) are waived.”); Commonwealth v. Butler, 812 A.2d

631, 634 (Pa. 2002) (concluding that the appellant waived his issues where

he provided the trial court with his concise statement, but did not file the

statement with the clerk of courts).2

____________________________________________

2 We note that the fact Appellant is proceeding pro se does not give him license

to ignore the court’s order and relevant rules of procedure. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975) (stating that the right of self- representation does not give a litigant license to refuse to comply with relevant (Footnote Continued Next Page)

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Notwithstanding waiver, we would conclude that Appellant has failed to

demonstrate relief is warranted on any of the claims he seems to be asserting

herein. At the outset, we note that Appellant states six issues for our review

in his “Statement of the Questions Involved” section of his brief. See

Appellant’s Brief at 6-7. However, he does not present an “Argument” section

that is divided into “as many parts as there are questions to be argued” with

headings indicating “the particular point treated therein….” Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a).

Instead, Appellant presents one, uninterrupted “Legal Argument,” see

Appellant’s Brief at 17-23, followed by sections entitled, “Summary of the

Argument,” id. at 23-25, “Reasons for the Appeal,” id. at 25-26, and “Relief

Sought,” id. at 26-27. Problematically, Appellant’s arguments throughout

these sections are confusing and/or undeveloped. For instance, Appellant

repeatedly alleges that the court erred by admitting “3rd party evidence,”

without any explanation of what this evidence was. See, e.g., id. at 19 (“The

next main issue here is the admission of 3rd party evidence to establish [a]

prima facie case not only during the preliminary process but during the trial

process.”). Appellant also claims that the court prevented him from ____________________________________________

rules of procedure and substantive law). Moreover, while Rule 1925(c)(3) gives recourse in the form of remand to appellants whose counsel acts ineffectively in failing to file a Rule 1925(b) statement, that section is inapplicable to a pro se appellant. Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(3). Appellant cannot claim that his representation of himself was ineffective. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46 (“[W]hatever else may or may not be open to him on appeal, a defendant who elects to represent himself cannot thereafter complain that the quality of his own defense amounted to a denial of ‘effective assistance of counsel.’”).

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presenting evidence “to defend against” the Commonwealth’s case, id., yet

he does not discuss what specific evidence the court precluded.

The only claims that are somewhat developed are allegations that the

Commonwealth failed to make out a prima facie case at Appellant’s

preliminary hearing, id. at 17; that the court’s verdict was contrary to the

weight of the evidence presented at trial, id. at 21; and that the evidence was

insufficient to prove the intent element of Appellant’s conviction for

harassment, id. However, we would find that none of these issues warrants

relief.

First, “it is well-settled that errors at a preliminary hearing regarding

the sufficiency of the evidence are considered harmless if the defendant is

found guilty at trial.” Commonwealth v. Ricker, 120 A.3d 349, 353 (Pa.

Super. 2015) (citing Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 82 A.3d 943, 984 (Pa.

2013); Commonwealth v. Tyler, 587 A.2d 326 (Pa. Super. 1991)). Because

here, Appellant was convicted of harassment following a non-jury trial, his

challenge to the sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s evidence at the

preliminary hearing, had we reached this issue, would be meritless.

In regard to Appellant’s claims that the verdict was contrary to the

weight of the evidence, and that the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient

evidence to prove his intent to commit harassment, we would conclude that

the well-reasoned opinion authored by the Honorable Jackie Atherton Bernard

of the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County accurately explains why these

claims do not warrant relief. See TCO at 3-10. Judge Bernard also addresses

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allegations by Appellant that he was “denied a fair trial because he was not

permitted to call witnesses, including expert witnesses[,]” id. at 10; that the

court erred by not permitting him to issue “3rd [p]arty [s]ubpoena’s [sic] [,]”

id. at 11; and that he was subject to prosecutorial misconduct and malicious

prosecution in this case, id. at 12. To the extent Appellant vaguely seems to

be asserting some or all of these issues herein, we would adopt Judge

Bernard’s decision as our own in rejecting his arguments on these claims as

well.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

DATE: 08/21/2025

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