Com. v. Peay, J.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: October 15, 2025
• Docket: 178 EDA 2025
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S23036-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JALIK PEAY : : Appellant : No. 178 EDA 2025

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 14, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0014638-2011

BEFORE: STABILE, J., MURRAY, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED OCTOBER 15, 2025

Jalik Peay (“Peay”) appeals from the order dismissing as untimely his

serial petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 1

Because Peay has failed to prove an exception to the PCRA’s jurisdictional

time-bar, the PCRA court correctly concluded that it, like this Court, has no

jurisdiction over Peay’s untimely petition. Consequently, we affirm.

This Court previously set forth the factual history of this case as follows:

Aaron Young [(“Young”)] allegedly had a dispute with inmate Sean Sullivan [(“Sullivan”)] over a [prison cell] block worker job in Curran-Fromhold Correctional Facility. [In June 2011,] Sullivan passed “bangers” [(i.e., prison knives)] to [Peay], Rashawn Edwards [(“Edwards”)], and Haleem Poole [(“Poole”),] and devised a plan of attack; the plan included distracting the prison guards so that the perpetrators could invade cell 15 which housed victims Young and Richard Gyton [(“Gyton”)]. Earl Bostic [(“Bostic”)] was nearby watching television in a dayroom when he was attacked by [Peay], [] Edwards, and [] Poole. Bostic died of ____________________________________________

1 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. J-S23036-25

multiple stab wounds to the neck, chest, back, and right arm, one of which partially severed his aorta. Gyton and Young were seriously injured when they were stabbed in the hand, head, arm, and stomach by [Peay], [] Edwards, and [] Poole. The perpetrators used shanks and bangers to carry out the bloody attacks.

Police officers interviewed Gyton at Hahnemann Hospital at the time he was being treated for his stab wounds. The officers memorialized Gyton’s statements in a document, which was later read into the record at both the preliminary hearing and at [the jury] trial. In the document, Gyton identified [Peay], [] Edwards, and [] Poole[] as the individuals who stabbed the inmate-victims. At trial, however, Gyton testified he did not know who stabbed him, he recanted statements he allegedly made during a prison assessment that indicated he needed to be separated in jail from [Peay], [] Edwards, and [] Poole because he feared they would harm him again, and he testified about a letter he sent to [Peay], [] Edwards, and [] Poole explaining that his “story” about them committing the crimes had been fabricated.

Young did not testify.

The jury convicted [Peay] of third-degree murder, conspiracy, possession of an instrument of crime, and using or possessing a prohibited offensive weapon. The court imposed an aggregate sentence of forty to eighty years’ imprisonment. [Peay] appealed, this Court affirmed [i]n January [] 2015, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied [his] petition for allowance of appeal on July 23, 2015.

Commonwealth v. Peay, 1242 EDA 2017, 2018 WL 4572026 (Pa. Super.

Sept. 25, 2018) (unpublished memorandum at *1) (internal indentation and

citations omitted; some brackets in original).

The PCRA court detailed the procedural history of this case following the

completion of direct review:

. . . [I]n October [] 2015, [Peay] filed a timely pro se [PCRA] petition, his first. [I]n March [] 2017, after an evidentiary hearing, th[e c]ourt dismissed the petition. [Peay] appealed[,] and [i]n

-2- J-S23036-25

September [] 2018, the Superior Court affirmed th[e] dismissal of his petition. [I]n March [] 2019, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied his petition for allowance of appeal.

[I]n October [] 2019, [Peay] filed a subsequent PCRA petition, his second. [I]n December [] 2019, th[e PCRA c]ourt dismissed the petition. [Peay] did not appeal the dismissal.

On August 21, 2024, [Peay] filed the instant PCRA petition, his third. On October 10, 2024, th[e PCRA c]ourt issued a notice of intent to dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. [Peay] sent a response to th[e] court’s [Rule] 907 notice, which was received on October 29, 2024.

PCRA Ct. Op., 11/14/24, at 2 (some unnecessary capitalization omitted). The

PCRA court thereafter dismissed Peay’s petition on November 14, 2024, and

Peay timely appealed.2,3

Peay raises the following issues for our review:

A. Did the Commonwealth’s failure to disclose any of the misconduct on behalf of Detectives Scally and Burke not trigger a Brady[4] violation?

B. Was counsel not ineffective for allowing [Peay’s] due process to be violated by not having the Commonwealth bring specific charges against him?

____________________________________________

2 While Peay’s notice of appeal was contained in an envelope postmarked December 13, 2024, he erroneously sent the notice of appeal to this Court instead of the PCRA court. The clerk of courts docketed the notice of appeal for the mailing date pursuant to the prisoner mailbox rule. See Commonwealth v. DiClaudio, 210 A.3d 1070, 1074 (Pa. Super. 2019).

3 The PCRA court did not order Peay to file a concise statement of matters complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and did not file a Rule 1925(a) opinion.

4 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

-3- J-S23036-25

C. Was counsel not ineffective when he did not properly prepare for trial by only defending [Peay] against the most severe of the charges?

Peay’s Am. Br. at 1-2.

Our standard of review of an order dismissing a PCRA petition is well-

settled:

Our review of a PCRA court’s decision is limited to examining whether the PCRA court’s findings of fact are supported by the record, and whether its conclusions of law are free from legal error. We view the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party in the PCRA court. We are bound by any credibility determinations made by the PCRA court where they are supported by the record. However, we review the PCRA court’s legal conclusions de novo.

Commonwealth v. Staton, 184 A.3d 949, 954 (Pa. 2018) (internal citation

and quotations omitted). The PCRA petitioner “has the burden to persuade

this Court that the PCRA court erred and that such error requires relief.”

Commonwealth v. Wholaver, 177 A.3d 136, 144–45 (Pa. 2018) (internal

citations omitted).

Before proceeding to the merits of Peay’s issues, we must first

determine whether we have jurisdiction over Peay’s appeal. Under the PCRA,

any petition “including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within

one year of the date the judgment becomes final[.]” 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 9545(b)(1). The PCRA’s timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in nature,

and a court may not address the merits of the issues raised if the PCRA petition

was not timely filed. See Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1093

(Pa. 2010); see also Commonwealth v. Woolstrum, 271 A.3d 512, 513

-4- J-S23036-25

(Pa. Super. 2022) (providing that “[i]f a PCRA petition is untimely, courts lack

jurisdiction over the petition”) (internal citations omitted). Pennsylvania

courts may nevertheless consider an untimely PCRA petition if the petitioner

can plead and prove one of three exceptions set forth in section 9545(b)(1)(i)-

(iii), and he filed his PCRA petition invoking a timeliness exception within one

year of the date the claim could have been presented. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §

9545(b)(2).

The newly discovered facts exception in section 9545(b)(1)(ii) provides

that “the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the

petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due

diligence[.]” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii). The focus of the newly discovered

facts exception is on new facts; therefore, the discovery of new sources for

previously known facts will not establish a timeliness exception. See

Commonwealth v. Marshall, 947 A.2d 714, 720 (Pa. 2008). Due diligence

demands that the petitioner take reasonable efforts to protect his own

interests and explain why he could not have learned the new facts earlier

despite such efforts. See Commonwealth v. Medina, 92 A.3d 1210, 1216

(Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc); see also Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 204

A.3d 524, 527 (Pa. Super. 2019) (concluding the petitioner had failed to show

due diligence where he did not explain how the facts “could not have been

ascertained sooner by the exercise of due diligence”). The petitioner’s inability

to ascertain a fact by the exercise of due diligence is a factual question for the

-5- J-S23036-25

PCRA court. See Commonwealth v. Branthafer, 315 A.3d 113, 128 (Pa.

Super. 2024). The focus of this exception is on newly discovered facts, not

on a newly discovered or newly willing source for previously known facts. See

Commonwealth v. Lopez, 249 A.3d 993, 1000 (Pa. 2021).

Any PCRA petition invoking an exception under section 9545(b)(1) “shall

be filed within one year of the date the claim could have been presented.” 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2); see also Commonwealth v. Williamson, 21 A.3d

236, 242 (Pa. Super. 2011) (holding that “a petitioner invoking section

9545(b)(1)[] must still comply with section 9545(b)(2) by presenting the

claim within [one year] of discovering the new fact”) (internal citations

omitted; emphasis in original).

Peay’s judgment of sentence became final in October 2015, ninety days

after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Peay’s petition for allowance of

appeal in July 2015 and the time expired for Peay to petition the U.S. Supreme

Court for a writ of certiorari. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Harris, 972 A.2d

1196, 1202 (Pa. Super. 2009). Accordingly, Peay had until October 2016 to

file a timely PCRA petition. Peay’s present serial petition, filed in August 2024,

nearly eight years after his judgment of sentence became final, is thus facially

untimely.5 Accordingly, we must determine whether Peay invoked an

exception to the PCRA’s jurisdictional time-bar.

5 Accord PCRA Ct. Op., 12/5/19, at 3-4 (concluding Peay’s prior PCRA petition, filed in October 2019 was untimely by approximately three years).

-6- J-S23036-25

The PCRA court concluded Peay’s petition was untimely and declined to

exercise jurisdiction over it. See PCRA Ct. Op., 11/14/24, at 3-4.6 Our review

of the record confirms that Peay did not plead a specific exception to the

PCRA’s timeliness requirement. See generally PCRA Pet., 8/21/24; see also

Mem. of Law in Support of Petition for Post Conviction Relief Act, 8/21/24.

Similarly, in his appellate brief, Peay fails to expressly state which timeliness

exception, if any, he asserted. On this basis, Peay has failed to invoke the

PCRA court’s, and additionally this Court’s, jurisdiction over his facially

untimely PCRA petition.

While Peay did not expressly invoke a specific timeliness exception in

his PCRA petition, we observe that, as he passingly asserted in his PCRA

petition, Peay on appeal argues that he learned on July 27, 2024 that two

detectives involved in his case, Timothy Scally and Jeffrey Burke, were

accused of misconduct in unrelated cases which occurred in 2008 and 2014,

respectively. See Peay’s Am. Br. at 2.7 Peay does not assert or develop a

6 The Commonwealth likewise observes that Peay “did not raise or even attempt to prove the applicability of any of the statutory exceptions to the timeliness requirements of the PCRA.” Commonwealth’s Br. at 8.

7 As noted above, Peay did not invoke in his PCRA petition a timeliness exception or mention governmental interference. See generally PCRA Pet., 8/21/24. Nor did Peay invoke a specific timeliness exception in the accompanying memorandum of law, in which he argued the merits of his petition, rather than explain how the petition satisfied a timeliness exception. See generally Mem. of Law, 8/21/24. In his response to the PCRA court’s Rule 907 notice, Peay again argued the merits of his Brady issue, but still did (Footnote Continued Next Page)

-7- J-S23036-25

governmental interference timeliness exception pursuant to section

9545(b)(1)(i), but he does reference his discovery of these allegedly “new

facts” concerning the misconduct allegations. See id.

Assuming arguendo Peay intended to invoke the newly discovered fact

exception pursuant to section 9545(b)(1)(ii), we conclude Peay is

nevertheless due no relief. While Peay notes that he sent a request to his

prison law library on July 21, 2024, requesting information about officers

accused of misconduct, he does not explain why he could not have inquired,

or learned, about these accusations earlier, nor does he explain what steps, if

any, he took prior to July 2024 to learn of these accusations against the

detectives. For these reasons, Peay has failed to plead due diligence, and,

accordingly, has failed to invoke the PCRA court’s, or this Court’s jurisdiction

over his facially untimely PCRA petition. See Marshall, 947 A.2d at 720;

Medina, 92 A.3d at 1216 (providing that due diligence demands that the

petitioner take reasonable efforts to protect his own interests and explain why

he could not have learned the new facts earlier despite such efforts);

Sanchez, 204 A.3d at 527 (concluding the petitioner had failed to show due

not specify which of the PCRA’s timeliness exceptions he was attempting to invoke. We note that while a Brady claim may satisfy the governmental interference exception, the petitioner must plead and prove that the failure to previously raise the claim was the result of interference by government officials, and that the information could not have been obtained earlier with the exercise of due diligence. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 194 A.3d 126, 133 (Pa. Super. 2018).

-8- J-S23036-25

diligence where he did not explain how the facts “could not have been

ascertained sooner by the exercise of due diligence”). Accordingly, we affirm

the PCRA court’s order dismissing Peay’s untimely serial PCRA petition.

Order affirmed.

Date: 10/15/2025

-9-