J-S47027-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : DHRUVAL T. PATEL : : Appellant : No. 1218 EDA 2025
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered April 28, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-09-CR-0001190-2023
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., OLSON, J., and BECK, J.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED MAY 13, 2026
Appellant, Dhruval T. Patel, appeals from the April 28, 2025 order
entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County that denied his petition
filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
On January 5, 2024, Appellant pleaded guilty to trafficking in individuals
(Count 1), statutory sexual assault – complainant less than 16 years of age
(Count 2), involuntary deviate sexual intercourse – complainant less than 16
years of age (Count 3), unlawful contact with minor – sexual offenses
(Count 4), sexual abuse of children (Count 5), indecent assault – complainant
less than 16 years of age (Count 6), and corruption of minors – sexual J-S47027-25
offenses (Count 8).1 The trial court summarized the circumstances that led
to Appellant’s conviction as follows:
In March 2022, Detective Joseph Camp [(“Detective Camp”)] of the Newtown Township Police Department in Bucks County[, Pennsylvania,] was contacted by the Marlboro Township, New Jersey Police Department in reference to a sexual assault investigation involving a minor, C.D. [The investigation concerned] an incident alleged to have occurred in Newtown Township[, Pennsylvania]. At that time, Marlboro [Township] Police Department detectives were investigating another reported sexual assault [that allegedly occurred] in Marlboro [Township], New Jersey[, involving Appellant and C.D. During the course of the investigation, police detectives determined] that Appellant was involved in several sexual incidents in both Newtown Township and Marlboro Township [related to C.D. Detective] Camp subsequently interviewed C.D. and obtained the following information.
In February 2020, C.D., who was [13] years old at the time, was asked by her friend, another minor, if she was interested in a “sugar daddy[.]” C.D. agreed, and her friend put her in touch with Appellant via [electronic mail (“email”)]. Appellant and C.D. initially communicated via email, and both individuals discussed the “sugar daddy relationship[,]” as well as sending explicit photos for money. C.D. informed Appellant of her age, and Appellant claimed that he was “[19] years old[.]”
In June 2020, Appellant asked for C.D.’s Snapchat username, [2] and they began to communicate on the social media platform. Appellant offered to pay C.D. for explicit pictures and videos, but stated that he would only pay her in cash. C.D. received photo[graph]s of Appellant’s penis and videos of him masturbating. In return, she would send Appellant photo[graph]s ____________________________________________
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3011(a)(1), 3122.1(b), 3123(a)(7), 6318(a)(1), 6312(b)(1), 3126(a)(8), and 6301(a)(1)(ii), respectively.
2 Snapchat is a social media and instant messaging application in which the
pictures and messages posted to the application are only visible to the recipient for a short period of time.
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of her breasts, vagina, and fully unclothed body. Appellant and C.D. also participated in live video calls via Snapchat, in which Appellant would masturbate as he instructed C.D. what to do with her body. Specifically, Appellant requested videos of C.D. masturbating while using a makeup brush.
At the beginning of Fall 2020, Appellant and C.D. started to meet in person in Newtown Township. At that time, C.D. was [14] years old and Appellant was [31] years old. Appellant told C.D. that he “worked for various businesses [near where C.D. lived,]” and he would pick up C.D. in the afternoon, down the street from her residence.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, C.D.’s classes were remote, and [] she was required to complete afternoon walks in her neighborhood for gym class. C.D. advised [Detective] Camp that during these walks, Appellant would pick up C.D. in his vehicle.
C.D. informed [Detective] Camp, that when she and Appellant first met in person, Appellant told C.D. to lie down in the back seat of his vehicle so she could not be seen. Appellant then drove them to [a business located] in Newtown Township, where he parked in a secluded area of the parking lot before he joined C.D. in the backseat. While in the backseat, Appellant told C.D. to perform oral sex on him as he digitally penetrated her vagina. After Appellant ejaculated into her mouth, he paid C.D. between [20 and 40] dollars and drove her back to her residence in Newtown Township.
It was further disclosed to [Detective] Camp that Appellant and C.D. met three [] additional times under similar circumstances, in which Appellant paid C.D. between [20 and 40] dollars after each sexual encounter. During their third encounter, the area where Appellant typically parked was occupied, so he drove C.D. through her neighborhood as she performed oral sex on him and he digitally penetrated her vagina. When they met for the fourth time, C.D. performed oral sex on Appellant in the [business parking lot]. They had planned to have sexual intercourse afterward, however, they decided to leave when a truck parked next to them.
In addition to the four [] meetings in Appellant’s vehicle, Appellant and C.D. met two [] more times at C.D.’s residence, in Newtown Township, while she was home alone. During their first in-home sexual encounter, Appellant and C.D. had sexual intercourse on the dining room table. Appellant did not wear a condom and
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ejaculated inside of C.D.’s vagina. During their second in-home sexual encounter, Appellant and C.D. had sexual intercourse on the living room couch, and Appellant ejaculated into C.D.’s mouth. C.D. stated to [Detective] Camp that Appellant paid her approximately [$100.00] after each visit.
During the interview, C.D. informed [Detective] Camp that she continued to exchange photo[graph]s and videos with Appellant as recently as 2022. [Detective] Camp viewed C.D.’s cell[ular tele]phone and observed similar videos on Snapchat. C.D. indicated to [Detective] Camp, that the videos were sent to Appellant from her residence in Newtown Township. [Detective] Camp was advised by C.D. that Appellant had previously posted on Snapchat and asked if anyone was looking for a sugar daddy. He also asked C.D. if she had any interested friends.
On March 16, 2022, [Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”)] Special Agent Danica Lute met with C.D. and presented her with a photographic lineup, in which C.D. positively identified Appellant as the perpetrator. Appellant was interviewed at the Marlboro Township, New Jersey Police Department on March 18, 2022. During the interview, Appellant confessed to exchanging explicit videos with C.D. via Snapchat, including videos of him masturbating. Initially, Appellant indicated that he did not have sex with C.D. in Pennsylvania, however, later in the interview, he admitted that they had sex in both Pennsylvania and New Jersey, and he gave C.D. money after their sexual encounters.
PCRA Court Opinion, 6/20/25, at 1-5 (footnotes omitted). On April 10, 2024,
the trial court sentenced Appellant to 5½ to 11 years’ incarceration to be
followed by 3 years’ probation for his conviction of Count 3. The trial court
imposed no further punishment for Appellant’s convictions of Counts 1 - 2 and
Counts 4 - 7. Appellant was subjected to lifetime registration as a Tier III
sexual offender under Subchapter H of the Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act (“SORNA”), codified at 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10 – 9799.41.
The trial court also ordered Appellant’s sentence to run concurrently with the
sentence that was to be imposed by the county court in New Jersey for any
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criminal conviction in that state. Appellant did not challenge his judgment of
sentence on direct appeal. Therefore, Appellant’s judgment of sentence
became final on May 10, 2024, upon expiration of the time in which to seek
appellate review. Pa.R.A.P. 903(a) (stating, a notice of appeal must be filed
“within 30 days after the entry of the order from which the appeal is taken”);
see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3) (stating, “a judgment becomes final at
the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme
Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the
expiration of time for seeking review”).
On March 19, 2025, Appellant filed a PCRA petition, his first. 3 In his
petition, Appellant asserted that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
“advise [Appellant] on the merits of potential defenses and [for affirmatively
recommending that Appellant] plead guilty to [] all of the charges even though
the prosecution was precluded by 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 111 [because of an alleged
prior prosecution in New Jersey based upon the same conduct].” 4 PCRA
Petition, 3/19/25, at ¶34. On March 24, 2025, the PCRA court directed the
Commonwealth to file a response to Appellant’s petition. The Commonwealth
filed its answer on April 2, 2025. On April 7, 2025, the PCRA court provided
Appellant notice, pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 907, of ____________________________________________
3 At the time Appellant filed his first PCRA petition, he was represented by privately-retained counsel, Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire.
4 When Appellant entered his guilty plea, he was represented by Keith J. Bidlingmaier, Esquire.
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its intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition without a hearing on the ground that
trial counsel cannot be ineffective for failure to raise a meritless claim. Rule
907 Notice, 4/7/25. That same day, April 7, 2025, Appellant filed a response
to the PCRA court’s Rule 907 notice. On April 28, 2025, the PCRA court denied
Appellant’s petition seeking collateral relief. This appeal followed. 5
Appellant raises the following issue for our review:
Whether trial counsel was ineffective in recommending a guilty plea instead of moving to dismiss the charges in this case because the charges were barred by 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 111 given that Appellant [faced prior prosecution] in New Jersey for the exact same conduct under statutes designed to prevent the exact same evil of child sexual exploitation[?]
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
Our scope and standard of review of an order denying a PCRA petition
is well-settled. Proper appellate review of a PCRA court’s dismissal of a
petition is limited to an examination of “whether the PCRA court’s
determination is supported by the record and free of legal error.”
Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 A.3d 988, 992 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation
omitted). “The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no
support for the findings in the certified record.” Commonwealth v. Lawson,
90 A.3d 1, 4 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations omitted). “This Court grants great
deference to the findings of the PCRA court, and we will not disturb those
____________________________________________
5 Appellant and the PCRA court complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate
Procedure 1925.
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findings merely because the record could support a contrary holding.”
Commonwealth v. Hickman, 799 A.2d 136, 140 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citation
omitted). In contrast, we review the PCRA court’s legal conclusions de novo.
Commonwealth v. Henkel, 90 A.3d 16, 20 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc),
appeal denied, 101 A.3d 785 (Pa. 2014).
Appellant asserts that “trial counsel provided [] ineffective assistance of
counsel by recommending a guilty plea[, instead of recommending] that
Appellant move to dismiss [his Pennsylvania] charges pursuant to 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 111.” Appellant’s Brief at 17. Appellant contends that if he had
“filed a motion to dismiss [the charges] prior to sentencing, the [trial] court
would have been compelled to grant [the motion], and the case would have
been dismissed.” Id. Appellant argues that trial counsel “had a professional
obligation to advise Appellant on the merits of a potential motion to dismiss
before recommending [that Appellant accept the plea agreement.]” Id.
“It is well-established that counsel is presumed effective[.]”
Commonwealth v. Koehler, 36 A.3d 121, 132 (Pa. 2012), citing Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-691 (1984). To plead and prove a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel, “a petitioner must establish: (1) that the
underlying issue has arguable merit; (2) counsel’s actions lacked an
objective[ly] reasonable basis; and (3) actual prejudice resulted from
counsel’s act or failure to act.” Commonwealth v. Stewart, 84 A.3d 701,
706 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc), appeal denied, 93 A.3d 463 (Pa. 2014); see
also Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973, 975 (Pa. 1987). “A claim of
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ineffectiveness will be denied if the petitioner’s evidence fails to meet any of
these prongs.” Commonwealth v. Martin, 5 A.3d 177, 183 (Pa. 2010). “In
determining whether counsel’s action was reasonable, we do not question
whether there were other more logical courses of action which counsel could
have pursued[. R]ather, we must examine whether counsel’s decision[] had
any reasonable basis.” Commonwealth v. Washington, 927 A.2d 586, 594
(Pa. 2007). A petitioner establishes prejudice when he or she demonstrates
“that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s [acts or
omissions], the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 966 A.2d 523, 533 (Pa. 2009).
Appellant asserts that he would have succeeded on the merits of his
underlying claim that trial counsel should have moved to dismiss his
Pennsylvania charges pursuant to Section 111, rather than advise Appellant
to accepting a plea agreement. Appellant’s Brief at 23. Appellant contends
that “[t]rial counsel had no reasonably strategic basis for recommending
Appellant plead guilty to the Pennsylvania charges and receive a sentence
longer than that which he had already received from the prior [New Jersey]
prosecution[.]” Id. Appellant avers that he “suffered prejudice because he
was convicted in this case instead of having the charges dismissed.” Id.
It is well-established that
a criminal defendant’s right to effective counsel extends to the plea process, as well as during trial. However, allegations of ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of a guilty plea will serve as a basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness caused the defendant to enter an involuntary or unknowing plea. Where the
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defendant enters his plea on the advice of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel’s advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.
Commonwealth v. Allen, 833 A.2d 800, 802 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citations,
original brackets, and quotation marks omitted), appeal denied, 860 A.2d 488
(Pa. 2004); see also Commonwealth v. Timchak, 69 A.3d 765. 769
(Pa. Super. 2013); Commonwealth v. Ramiriz-Contreras, 320 A.3d 756,
764 (Pa. Super. 2024). “The law does not require that the defendant be
pleased with the outcome of his [or her] decision to enter a plea of guilty[.]
All that is required is that his [or her] decision to plead guilty be knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently made.” Timchak, 69 A.3d at 770 (citation and
original brackets omitted).
Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim implicates the applicability of Section
111 of the Crimes Code, which states,
§ 111. When prosecution barred by former prosecution in another jurisdiction
When conduct constitutes an offense within the concurrent jurisdiction of this Commonwealth and of the United States or another state, a prosecution in any such other jurisdiction is a bar to a subsequent prosecution in this Commonwealth under the following circumstances:
(1) The first prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in a conviction as defined in section 109 of this title (relating to when prosecution barred by former prosecution for same offense) and the subsequent prosecution is based on the same conduct unless:
(i) the offense of which the defendant was formerly convicted or acquitted and the offense for which he is subsequently prosecuted each requires proof of a fact
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not required by the other and the law defining each of such offenses is intended to prevent a substantially different harm or evil; or
(ii) the second offense was not consummated when the former trial began.
(2) The former prosecution was terminated, after the indictment was found, by an acquittal or by a final order or judgment for the defendant which has not been set aside, reversed or vacated and which acquittal, final order or judgment necessarily required a determination inconsistent with a fact which must be established for conviction of the offense of which the defendant is subsequently prosecuted.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 111.
The PCRA court, in finding that Appellant’s underlying claim was without
arguable merit because Section 111 was “wholly inapplicable[,]” explained
that
[w]hen reading the relevant statutes [(referring to Section 109 and Section 111 of the Crimes Code),] in conjunction, the first inquiry is whether Appellant’s Pennsylvania conviction is considered the “subsequent prosecution.” If the [Pennsylvania] conviction is determined to be the “first prosecution[,]” then Section 111 has no applicability[.]
In the present case, the record undoubtedly establishes that Appellant was first convicted in Pennsylvania. During [his Bucks County] guilty plea hearing on January 5, 2024, Appellant acknowledged that the charges to which he was pleading involved conduct similar to the underlying charges [confronting him] in Monmouth County, New Jersey[. However, Appellant did not enter a guilty plea in New Jersey until three] days later on January 8, 2024. Despite this clear prosecution sequence, Appellant erroneously asserted in his PCRA petition that his Pennsylvania conviction constituted the “subsequent prosecution” under Section 111, based upon the fact that he was initially charged in New Jersey.
[The PCRA] court, however, finds that Appellant’s assertion is unsupported by the record and is contradictory to his own
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exhibits. [Appellant’s conviction in Pennsylvania] constituted the “first prosecution[,]” defined by 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] §§ 109 and 111, as Appellant’s guilty plea in Pennsylvania preceded his guilty plea entered in New Jersey. Appellant’s argument that his conviction [in Pennsylvania] should be precluded as both his Pennsylvania and New Jersey cases covered the same conduct need not be addressed, as Section 111 does not statutorily bar the charges against him, given that Pennsylvania was considered the “first prosecution.”
PCRA Court Opinion, 6/20/25, at 11 (extraneous capitalization and record
citations omitted). We agree.
It is well-established that “Section 111 only applies to a subsequent
prosecution in this Commonwealth.” Commonwealth v. Ramirez, 533 A.2d
116, 118 (Pa. Super. 1987), appeal denied, 548 A.2d 255 (Pa. 1988). “A
‘prosecution’ has been defined as ‘a proceeding instituted for the purpose of
determining the guilt or innocence of a person charged with crime.’”
Ramirez, 533 A.2d at 118 (ellipsis omitted), citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at
1099 (5th ed. 1981). Based upon statutory interpretation, the Ramirez Court
went on to find that “[a] prosecution against a defendant, consequently, is not
completed, and therefore cannot be a ‘former prosecution,’ until a defendant
is acquitted or convicted.” Ramirez, 533 A.2d at 119 (basing its analysis on
an examination of the terms “former prosecution” and “subsequent
prosecution” as interpreted in the context of Section 110 of the Crimes Code).
In reaching its conclusion, the Ramirez Court first looked to our Supreme
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Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Beatty, 455 A.2d 1194 (Pa. 1983).6
The Ramirez Court noted that, in Beatty, our Supreme Court held that the
terms “former prosecution” and “subsequent prosecution” within the context
of Section 110(1)(ii) “did not depend on the time the particular offenses were
filed[,]” but, rather, referred to the “completed prosecution” and the “pending
prosecution,” respectively.7 Ramirez, 533 A.2d at 119, citing Beatty, 455 ____________________________________________
6 Certain aspects of the Beatty decision were subsequently superseded by a
legislative amendment to Section 110. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 247 A.3d 981, 985 (Pa. 2021) (stating that, “in 2002, the Legislature modified Section 110(1)(ii) to remove the ‘within the jurisdiction of a single court’ proviso”). This amendment to Section 110 is of no consequence to our reliance on separate and distinct aspects of the decisions in Ramirez, supra, or Beatty, supra, for the purposes of defining the terms “former prosecution” and “subsequent prosecution” within the context of Section 111.
7 At the time of our Supreme Court’s decision in Beatty, Section 110(1)(ii) read as follows:
§ 110. When prosecution barred by former prosecution for different offense
Although a prosecution is for a violation of a different provision of the statutes than a former prosecution or is based on different facts, it is barred by such former prosecution under the following circumstances:
(1) The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in a conviction as defined in section 109 of this title (relating to when prosecution barred by former prosecution for the same offense) and the subsequent prosecution is for:
...
(ii) any offense based on the same conduct or arising from the same criminal episode, if such offense was known to the
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A.2d at 289. The Ramirez Court concluded that Beatty’s “interpretation of
the terms ‘former prosecution’ and ‘subsequent prosecution’ [] should apply
also to Section 111.” Ramirez, 533 A.2d at 119.
We find the conclusion reached by the Ramirez Court to be further
supported by a plain-reading of Section 111. As set forth supra, the “first
prosecution” is a prosecution that results in either an acquittal or conviction
as defined by Section 109. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 111(1). Section 109 states that a
prosecution results in a conviction when “the prosecution resulted in a
judgment of conviction which has not been reversed or vacated, a verdict of
guilty which has not been set aside and which is capable of supporting a
judgment, or a plea of guilty accepted by the [trial] court.” 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 109(3) (emphasis added). Thus, a prosecution cannot be a “first
prosecution” until the prosecution has resulted in, inter alia, the acceptance
of a guilty plea by the trial court. See Ramirez, 533 A.3d at 119 (finding
that, a prosecution is completed when the trial court accepts the defendant’s
plea of guilty); see also Commonwealth v. Davis, 207 A.3d 341, 345
(Pa. Super. 2019) (stating, a “‘prosecution is completed when a defendant is
acquitted or convicted”), aff’d, 243 A.3d 7 (Pa. 2020); Beatty, 455 A.2d at
appropriate prosecuting officer at the time of the commencement of the first trial and was within the jurisdiction of a single court unless the court ordered a separate trial of the charge of such offense[.]
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 110(1)(ii) (effective Dec. 6, 1972, to Aug. 27, 2002).
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289. The term “first prosecution” does not refer to the first set of criminal
charges filed against a defendant but, rather, refers to the first set of criminal
charges that result in a criminal conviction because, inter alia, a defendant
entered a plea of guilty to the criminal charges and the trial court accepted
the plea. Imposition of a judgment of sentence is not a requirement for a
“prosecution” to qualify as a “first prosecution” for purpose of Section 111.
In the case sub judice, the Marlboro Township Police Department
charged Appellant, on March 18, 2022, with various criminal offenses in New
Jersey stemming from his inappropriate sexual contact with C.D. On
September 21, 2022, the Newtown Township Police Department charged
Appellant with the aforementioned criminal offenses in Pennsylvania based
upon his inappropriate sexual contact with C.D. On January 5, 2023, a grand
jury sitting in New Jersey indited Appellant on the charges filed by the
Marlboro Township Police Department. On March 13, 2023, the
Commonwealth filed a bill of information against Appellant. On January 5,
2024, Appellant pleaded guilty in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County,
as set forth supra. On January 8, 2024, three days after he entered his plea
of guilty in Pennsylvania, Appellant pleaded guilty to second degree statutory
sexual assault in New Jersey.8 On April 10, 2024, Appellant was sentenced
by the Pennsylvania trial court, as set forth supra, for his criminal convictions
in Pennsylvania. On April 19, 2024, Appellant was sentenced by the New ____________________________________________
8 N.J.S. § 2C:14-2(c)(4).
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Jersey court for his New Jersey conviction.9 On appeal, Appellant’s position is
that, because he was first charged in New Jersey, his New Jersey “prosecution”
constituted a “former prosecution” for the purpose of Section 111.
Simply stated, Appellant’s interpretation of Section 111 and related case
law is incorrect. The chronology of charging events is not material to
determining which prosecution is the “former prosecution” and which
constitutes the “subsequent prosecution.” Rather, we look to see which
prosecution resulted in a conviction, as defined by Section 109. See 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 111(1) (explaining that, a prosecution in another state, or “first”
prosecution, bars a subsequent Pennsylvania prosecution where, inter alia,
the first prosecution results in an acquittal or in a conviction as defined in
Section 109 and the subsequent Pennsylvania prosecution is based on the
same conduct). In this instance, Appellant’s prosecution in Pennsylvania is
the “former prosecution” for purpose of Section 111 because Appellant
entered a plea of guilty, which was accepted by the trial court, for the criminal
charges filed against him in Pennsylvania before he entered a plea of guilty
for the criminal charges filed against him in New Jersey. By its terms, Section
111 bars only a subsequent Pennsylvania prosecution, not a first or former
Pennsylvania prosecution. Appellant’s Pennsylvania prosecution was not a
“subsequent prosecution” by the Commonwealth because the Pennsylvania
prosecution was the first prosecution to result in a conviction, as defined by ____________________________________________
9 The New Jersey county court sentenced Appellant to five years’ incarceration.
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Section 109. As such, we concur with the PCRA court that Appellant’s criminal
conviction in Pennsylvania did not trigger any protection contemplated by
Section 111. Because Section 111 was not applicable to Appellant’s
underlying claim, we concur with the PCRA court that Appellant’s trial counsel
was not ineffective for failing to raise a claim that lacked merit.
Relatedly, to the extent that Appellant claims that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to challenge the sentence imposed by the Court of
Common Pleas of Bucks County on the ground that the sentence violated
Appellant’s right against double jeopardy and, therefore, was illegal, we again
agree that Appellant is not entitled to collateral relief. See Appellant’s Brief
at 23 (arguing that trial counsel’s ineffectiveness led to Appellant receiving “a
sentence longer than that which had already received from the prior [New
Jersey] prosecution”); see also Appellant’s Reply Brief at 8 (stating, trial
counsel’s ineffectiveness “resulted in Appellant receiving a duplicate sentence
for conduct already prosecuted in New Jersey”).
“The Double Jeopardy Clause, applicable to the [s]tates through the
Fourteenth Amendment [of the United States Constitution], provides that no
person shall ‘be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb.’” Commonwealth v. Jackson, 10 A.3d 341, 344-345
(Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted); see also U.S. CONST. amend. V. Simply
stated, “the Double Jeopardy Clause protects against a second prosecution for
the same offense after acquittal[, it] protects against a second prosecution for
the same offense after conviction[, and it] protects against multiple
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punishments for the same offense.” Jackson, 10 A.3d at 345 (citation and
original brackets omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Gross, 232 A.3d
819, 835 (Pa. Super. 2020) (en banc) (stating, “[a]s a general rule, [t]he
double jeopardy protections afforded by the United States and Pennsylvania
Constitutions are coextensive and prohibit successive prosecutions and
multiple punishments for the same offense[;]” the Pennsylvania Constitution
provides greater protections only in cases involving allegations of
prosecutorial misconduct (original quotation marks and citation omitted)),
appeal denied, 242 A.3d 307 (Pa. 2020).
Here, as discussed supra, Appellant was sentenced for his Pennsylvania
criminal convictions before a sentence was imposed by the New Jersey court
for his criminal conviction in that state. Without consideration of whether, or
not, the Pennsylvania and New Jersey sexual offenses for which Appellant was
convicted involved the same elements and, therefore, constituted the “same
offenses,”10 the protections afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause did not
bar the imposition of Appellant’s Pennsylvania sentence because it was the
first sentence to be imposed upon Appellant. See Jackson, 10 A.3d at 345 ____________________________________________
10 To determine whether a defendant’s double jeopardy protection from multiple punishments for the same offenses has been violated, a court must apply the “same-elements test” first announced in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). Hill v. Randolph, 24 A.3d 866, 871 (Pa. Super. 2011). Under the Blockburger or same-elements test, a court “inquires whether each offense contains an element not contained in the other[. If] not, they are the ‘same offense’ and double jeopardy bars additional punishment[.]” Hill, 24 A.3d at 872, quoting United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696 (1993).
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(stating, the double jeopardy clause protects against “multiple punishments
for the same offense”). In other words, Appellant’s double jeopardy challenge
cannot lie with his Pennsylvania sentence because it was the first-in-time
sentence to be imposed upon Appellant and, therefore, did not run afoul of
any protection under the Double Jeopardy Clause against multiple
punishments for the same offense.
For the reasons set forth herein, we concur with the PCRA court that
Appellant’s trial counsel cannot be ineffective for failure to raise an underlying
claim that was without merit. Therefore, we discern no error of law or abuse
of discretion in the PCRA court’s order that dismissed Appellant’s petition.
Order affirmed.
Date: 5/13/2026
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