Com. v. Parker, A.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: May 22, 2024
• Docket: 548 EDA 2023
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S04036-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : ABBAS PARKER : : Appellant : No. 548 EDA 2023

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 25, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0008483-2018

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and LANE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LANE, J.: FILED MAY 22, 2024

Abbas Parker (“Parker”) appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed following his convictions for first-degree murder, conspiracy to

commit murder, possession of an instrument of crime, carrying a firearm

without a license, and carrying a firearm in public in Philadelphia.1 We affirm.

Parker and Sherman Williams (“the decedent”) were both rap musicians

who grew up in the same Philadelphia neighborhood and were familiar with

one another. In May 2017, Parker became angry about a “rap diss” that the

decedent released about Parker on the decedent’s Instagram page. On the

evening of September 11, 2017, the decedent was driving a scooter on North

22nd Street in Philadelphia when he was shot six times at close range,

resulting in his death. Responding police officers learned from an eyewitness

____________________________________________

1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502, 903, 907(a), 6106(a)(1), 6108. J-S04036-24

that the shooter got into a white Jeep Cherokee and fled the scene after the

murder. The eyewitness provided the vehicle’s license plate number and,

upon investigation, police learned that it was registered to an individual at

3234 North Sydenham Street in Philadelphia. Officers went to that address,

observed the vehicle on the street, and obtained a search warrant for the

premises.

In their search of the premises, police recovered a cellphone. Police

then obtained a search warrant for the cellphone and determined that it was

owned by Parker. The search of the cellphone revealed that, in the days

leading up to the murder, Parker saved screenshots of the decedent’s

Instagram page, a photo of the decedent in front of his home, and the Redfin

page associated with the decedent’s home. Police recovered surveillance

video of the shooting from a nearby church and pole camera. A Philadelphia

homicide detective, Special Agent Brian Peters,2 was familiar with Parker and

identified him as the shooter from the surveillance videos. Police arrested

Parker and charged him with murder and related offenses. During the ensuing

investigation, police discovered that after the murder, Parker created two rap

music videos, “Bloodos” and “Notorious,” in which the lyrics recounted a

2 At the time of the murder, Special Agent Peters was the assigned detective

on the murder case; however, at the time of trial, he was a special agent in the Attorney General’s office.

-2- J-S04036-24

murder by shooting that was committed under circumstances similar to those

surrounding the decedent’s murder.

In February 2020, the Commonwealth filed a notice of its intent to

admit, inter alia, the evidence from Parker’s cellphone and the rap music

videos of Parker performing “Bloodos” and “Notorious.” In March 2020, Parker

filed a motion in limine seeking to prohibit Special Agent Peters from

identifying him in the surveillance videos. In September 2021, Parker filed a

motion to suppress the evidence recovered from his cellphone on the basis

that police lacked probable cause to obtain the warrant and the warrant was

overbroad.

The trial court held multiple hearings on the pretrial motions. Special

Agent Peters testified regarding his familiarity with Parker based on his

numerous interactions with him over the years. See N.T., 2/18/20, at 120-

23. Special Agent Peters further testified that he was able to identify Parker

in the surveillance videos based on his prior personal interactions with Parker

and his familiarity with Parker’s mannerisms and tattoos. See id. at 123, 127.

Based on this testimony, the trial court ruled that Special Agent Peters was

permitted to provide identification testimony that it was Parker in the

surveillance videos. See N.T., 3/13/20, at 4-5. The trial court also considered

Parker’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of his

cellphone and denied it, finding as a matter of law that there was probable

-3- J-S04036-24

cause for the search warrant and the warrant was sufficiently particular. See

N.T., 9/23/21, at 4-5.

The matter proceeded to a jury trial at which the trial court allowed the

Commonwealth to play the “Bloodos” video for the jury, with sound, and

allowed a portion of the “Notorious” video to be played, without sound, for the

purpose of showing Parker’s movements and mannerisms.3 See N.T.,

10/20/22, at 21-23. At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Parker guilty of

the above-referenced charges. The trial court immediately sentenced Parker

to mandatory life in prison without the possibility of parole for first-degree

murder.4 Parker filed a post-sentence motion, which the trial court denied.

Parker filed a timely notice of appeal, and both he and the trial court complied

with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Parker raises the following issues for our review:

1. Did the court below err in admitting the lyrics from [the] rap videos?

2. Did the court below err in not granting the motion to suppress evidence obtained from the search and seizure of [Parker’s] cell[]phone?

3 The trial court required the Commonwealth to redact all portions of the “Notorious” video which depicted guns, masks, violence, money, or other unlawful activity, so as to remove any potentially prejudicial material or sound from that video. See Trial Court Opinion, 5/2/23, at 4 n.5.

4 The trial court imposed an aggregate consecutive sentence of twenty-five years and six months to fifty-seven years in prison for Parker’s other convictions.

-4- J-S04036-24

3. Did the court below err in allowing [Special A]gent Peters to identify [Parker] from the pole camera and church video when those identifications were not based solely on personal observation of [Parker] but, rather, were the product of collective knowledge of the police department and other law enforcement agencies?

4. Did the prosecutor commit prosecutorial misconduct in her closing?

Parker’s Brief at unnumbered 6 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

In his first issue, Parker challenges the trial court’s decision to admit the

lyrics from the rap video “Bloodos.” In reviewing a challenge to the

admissibility of evidence, our standard of review is well-settled and very

narrow:

Questions concerning the admissibility of evidence are within the sound discretion of the trial court and we will not reverse a trial court’s decision concerning admissibility of evidence absent an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but is rather the overriding or misapplication of the law, or the exercise of judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice, ill-will or partiality, as shown by the evidence of record. If in reaching a conclusion the trial court overrides or misapplies the law, discretion is then abused and it is the duty of the appellate court to correct the error.

Commonwealth v. LeClair, 236 A.3d 71, 78 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation

omitted).

Relevance is the threshold for the admissibility of evidence. See Pa.R.E.

402. A court may exclude otherwise relevant evidence if its probative value

is outweighed by its potential to cause unfair prejudice. See Pa.R.E. 403.

However, evidence will not be excluded merely because it is harmful to the

-5- J-S04036-24

defendant. See Commonwealth v. Kouma, 53 A.3d 760, 770 (Pa. Super.

2012) (noting that “exclusion is limited to evidence so prejudicial that it would

inflame the jury to make a decision based on something other than the legal

propositions relevant to the case”). The court is not required to sanitize the

trial to eliminate all unpleasant facts from the jury’s consideration where those

facts are relevant to the issues at hand. Id.

Rap lyrics are a form of artistic expression which “may employ

metaphor, exaggeration, and other artistic devices, and can involve abstract

representations of events or ubiquitous storylines.” Commonwealth v.

Talbert, 129 A.3d 536, 541 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted). However,

“these features do not exempt such writings from jury consideration where

the lyrics describe details that mirror the crime charged.” Id. (citation

omitted); see also id. (concluding that the defendant’s rap video was relevant

to show his involvement in the murders at issue because the inconsistencies

between the facts of the murders and the slang meaning of the words in the

rap song were not significant enough to change the overall meaning of the rap

lyrics); Commonwealth v. Flamer, 53 A.3d 82, 89 (Pa. Super. 2012)

(holding that the trial court abused its discretion by finding defendant’s rap

lyrics to be irrelevant and prejudicial, where lyrics about people “keeping their

mouths shut,” sending friends to kill for him, and “popping shells” in people

that “run their mouth” had a tendency to show a conspiratorial agreement to

murder the Commonwealth’s key witness before trial); see also U.S. v.

-6- J-S04036-24

Stuckey, 253 Fed. Appx. 468, 482 (6th Cir. 2007) (concluding that rap lyrics

were relevant because the lyrics concerning the killing of government

witnesses were precisely what the government accused the defendant of

doing). Indeed, “[t]o expect rap lyrics . . . to communicate a criminal event

in precise detail would be wholly unreasonable.” Talbert, 129 A.3d at 541

(citation omitted). Accordingly, “the courts of this Commonwealth have

permitted the admission of rap lyrics where the content of those lyrics

sufficiently dovetailed with real-world events and persons, so as to dispel the

risk that the lyrics were purely fictional.” Commonwealth v. Lehman, 275

A.3d 513, 521 (Pa. Super. 2022).

Parker asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the

lyrics to the “Bloodos” video.5 Parker points out that, whereas the trial court

permitted the “Notorious” video to be played to the jury without sound, the

5 We observe that in both his concise statement and his statement of questions

involved, Parker confined his first issue to the narrow question of whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the lyrics to the rap videos at trial. See Concise Statement, 3/16/23, at 1; see also Parker’s Brief at unnumbered 6. As the lyrics to “Notorious” were not admitted at trial, Parker’s first issue is necessarily confined to the admission of the lyrics to “Bloodos.” However, in his brief, Parker impermissibly attempts expand his first issue to present a wider challenge to the admission of both videos, generally, and not merely to the lyrics of “Bloodos.” As this broader question was not preserved for our review, we decline to address it. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (providing that issues not included in the concise statement are waived); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) (providing that “[n]o question will be considered unless it is stated in the statement of questions involved or is fairly suggested thereby”); Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing that issues not raised in the lower court are waived and may not be raised for the first time on appeal).

-7- J-S04036-24

court nevertheless permitted the “Bloodos” video to be played to the jury in

its entirety, with sound. Parker claims that “[t]he trial court was aware of the

potential of unfair prejudice when it ordered “notorious to be played without

audio . . . [but] [i]inexplicably, the court did not do the same with “Bloodos.”

Parker’s Brief at unnumbered 17. Parker asserts that the content was “graphic

and shocking,” and theorizes that “[t]he emotional impact on the jury must

have been significant.” Id. at 17-18. Parker argues that the probative value

of the lyrics was outweighed by the prejudicial effect on the jury. Parker

contends that the lyrics were not a literal recounting of the murder but were

more allegorical in nature.6

The trial court considered Parker’s first issue and determined that it

lacked merit. The trial court aptly reasoned:

Here, [Parker] challenges the admission of lyrics from both rap videos, “Notorious” and “Bloodos.” However, lyrics from “Notorious” were never presented at trial. . . .

In “Bloodos”, [Parker] raps several lyrics that mirror the actual events surrounding the decedent’s murder. First, in the chorus of the song, [Parker] states, “broad day I shoot ya, I take ya head Medusa.” The decedent was shot before 6 p.m. in early September, during daylight hours, on a busy thoroughfare next to an active shopping center. Furthermore, the decedent wore his hair in dreadlocks, which resemble the hair of Greek mythical figure Medusa.

6 Parker additionally argues that the admission of the lyrics was unnecessary

because the lyrics were cumulative of other evidence. However, our review of the record indicates that Parker’s counsel failed to raise this argument before the trial court. See N.T., 2/18/20, at 87-95. Accordingly, the argument is waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).

-8- J-S04036-24

Next, [Parker] raps that he “and Moss . . . pick you off[”] as the music video pans to Malik West sitting next to [him]. Video evidence established that Malik West followed [Parker] immediately after [he] shot the decedent and that the two men returned to a residence on North Sydenham Street . . . immediately following the murder. Additionally, [Parker] raps that his last murder was “brutal” and “unsolved[”.] The song was released in early 2018, while the case was still being investigated.

Next, [Parker] raps “best man get tha drop, shot with a hollow.” The decedent was shot with .40 caliber Hornady ammunition. Police recovered a carton of Hornaday .40 caliber with seven remaining cartridges, all of which were hollow point, at the North Sydenham residence.

Finally, [Parker] raps that he does not care to aim because he “gets close.” The decedent was shot at close range. In fact, eyewitness Greg[or]y Alston told detectives that [Parker] “stood over top of [decedent]” as he fired. Video evidence corroborates Mr. Alston’s recollection showing [Parker] firing while standing directly over the decedent.

Therefore, in “Bloodos,” [Parker] raps about a previous murder he committed that was “unsolved” right after a chorus that references shooting “Medusa” in broad daylight. He additionally references hollow point ammunition and shooting at close range. As stated above, each of these lyrics corresponded with details of the decedent’s murder. As such, the lyrics sufficiently mirrored actual events enough to dispel risk that the lyrics were purely fictional. Accordingly, the lyrics of “Bloodos” were properly admitted and no relief is due.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/24/23, at 4-6 (citations omitted).

We discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court in admitting the

lyrics to the “Bloodos” video. The lyrics described details that mirrored the

crime charged and sufficiently dovetailed with the circumstances of the

decedent’s murder to such a degree that the unmistakable parallels between

the lyrics and the decedent’s murder dispelled any risk that the lyrics were

-9- J-S04036-24

purely fictional. See Lehman, 275 A.3d at 521. While the admission of the

lyrics may have been prejudicial, Parker has not shown that the lyrics were so

prejudicial that they would inflame the jury to make a decision based on

something other than the legal propositions relevant to the case. See

Kouma, 53 A.3d at 770. Moreover, the trial court was not required to sanitize

the evidence admitted at trial to eliminate the lyrics from the jury’s

consideration, particularly where those lyrics were relevant to the murder at

issue. Id. Accordingly, Parker’s first issue merits no relief.

In his second issue, Parker challenges the trial court’s denial of his

motion to suppress evidence obtained from the search of his cellphone. Our

standard of review is well-established:

Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record, we are bound by these findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are erroneous. The suppression court’s legal conclusions are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts below are subject to our plenary review.

Moreover, appellate courts are limited to reviewing only the evidence presented at the suppression hearing when examining a ruling on a pre[]trial motion to suppress.

- 10 - J-S04036-24

Commonwealth v. Carey, 249 A.3d 1217, 1223 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation

With respect to search warrants, our Supreme Court has explained:

It is a fundamental rule of law that a warrant must name or describe with particularity the property to be seized and the person or place to be searched . . .. The particularity requirement prohibits a warrant that is not particular enough and a warrant that is overbroad. These are two separate, though related, issues. A warrant unconstitutional for its lack of particularity authorizes a search in terms so ambiguous as to allow the executing officers to pick and choose among an individual’s possessions to find which items to seize. This will result in the general “rummaging” banned by the [F]ourth [A]mendment. A warrant unconstitutional for its overbreadth authorizes in clear or specific terms the seizure of an entire set of items, or documents, many of which will prove unrelated to the crime under investigation. . .. An overbroad warrant is unconstitutional because it authorizes a general search and seizure.

Commonwealth v. Orie, 88 A.3d 983, 1002-03 (Pa. 2014).

However, search warrants should be read in a common sense fashion

and should not be invalidated by hypertechnical interpretations. See

Commonwealth v. Rega, 933 A.2d 997, 1012 (Pa. 2007). This may mean

that when an exact description of a particular item is not possible, a generic

description will suffice. Id. Where the items to be seized are as precisely

identified as the nature of the activity permits, the searching officer is only

required to describe the general class of the item he is seeking. Id.

Moreover, when police are searching for items related to a crime, the

warrant must be “sufficiently broad to encompass all of the items that possibly

could contain material of evidentiary value.” Commonwealth v. Johnson,

- 11 - J-S04036-24

42 A.3d 1017, 1032 (Pa. Super. 2012) (holding that, because police were not

certain as to the details of the assault and could not know exactly what to

specify in the warrant application, they needed only to describe the class of

items to be seized). Further, where a warrant contains limiting language

which only permits officers to search for evidence of a particular crime, it is

specific enough to prevent rummaging or use of the warrant as a general

investigatory tool. See Commonwealth v. Green, 265 A.3d 541, 555 (Pa.

2021).

Parker contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to

suppress the evidence found on his cellphone. Parker argues that the warrant

to search his phone did not state with particularity what was to be searched,

and instead simply stated an intent to search all digital communications.7

Parker argues that this constituted an overbroad search of his phone.

The trial court considered Parker’s second issue and concluded that it

lacked merit. The court provided the following basis for its determination:

As stated above, the police had probable cause to believe that evidence of the identity of the shooter could be found in the phones discovered at the Sydenham Street residence. Police encountered numerous individuals outside of [the] Sydenham Street residence, which was connected to a vehicle seen leaving the scene of the murder. Police specifically sought a search ____________________________________________

7 We note that instead of citing to the suppression hearing record, Parker has

cited trial testimony to support his argument that the trial court erred in denying suppression. As explained above, when addressing a suppression challenge, we may only consider the suppression record and are unable to consider trial testimony in our review of the issue. See Carey, 249 A.3d at 1223.

- 12 - J-S04036-24

warrant to “forensically examine the contents” of the phone in order to “assist in identifying potential witnesses, suspects, persons present at 3234 N Sydenham St[reet] and present inside the described Jeep Cherokee at the time of the shooting and immediately after.” As such, police sought evidence in the phone that would help them identify persons connected to the vehicle and the murder. Logically, police could not know what form this information would take. Similarly, the police could not know when this information would have been placed on the phone, which would make any temporal limit to the search unreasonable. The police, therefore, described, as specifically as is reasonably possible, the items they sought. Namely, various digital files that would help them identify persons present inside the Jeep that fled the scene.

Furthermore, the wa[rr]ant explicitly limited the search to items “of evidentiary value to the investigation.” Such limiting language winnowed the search to a particular crime, the decedent’s murder, and did not grant police free rein to generally rummage for evidence of any crime.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/24/23, 10-11 (citations omitted, emphasis in original).

Based on our review, we conclude that the suppression court’s factual

findings are supported by the record and its legal conclusions drawn from

those facts are free from error. Because the police were searching for items

related to the decedent’s murder and the identity of the individuals who fled

the scene of the shooting to the residence at 3234 North Sydenham Street,

the warrant needed to be sufficiently broad to encompass all items that could

possibly contain material of evidentiary value. See Johnson, 42 A.3d at

1032. Given that the officers could only describe the general class of the items

they were seeking, the warrant described the contents they were seeking as

specifically as possible. Moreover, the warrant limited the search to

information “of evidentiary value to this investigation.” Search Warrant,

- 13 - J-S04036-24

9/25/17, at unnumbered 1. Accordingly, the search warrant contained

limiting language to prevent rummaging or its use as a general investigative

tool. Thus, Parker’s second issue merits no relief.

In his third issue, Parker challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion

to suppress Special Agent Peters’ identification testimony. In addition to the

above-noted standard of review for a suppression ruling, we observe that an

officer’s testimony regarding their identification of a defendant in surveillance

video constitutes a lay opinion subject to Pa.R.E. 701, which states as follows:

If a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony in the form of an opinion is limited to one that is:

(a) Rationally based on the witness’s perception;

(b) Helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to determining a fact in issue; and

(b) Not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.

Pa.R.E. 701.

“Generally, lay witnesses may express personal opinions related to their

observations on a range of subject areas based on their personal experiences

that are helpful to the factfinder.” Commonwealth v. Berry, 172 A.3d 1, 3-

4 (Pa. Super. 2017). We have previously found it proper for a witness to offer

a lay opinion as to the identity of an individual in security footage when the

witness’s identification is rationally based upon his or her own perception. See

Commonwealth v. Palmer, 192 A.3d 85, 100-01 (Pa. Super. 2018)

(admitting lay opinion concerning identity of individual in surveillance videos

- 14 - J-S04036-24

where “testimony about the [surveillance] videos was based upon [the

witness’s] perception of them, placed his subsequent actions in context, and

was helpful in allowing the jury to reach a clear understanding of all his

testimony”).

Parker claims that Special Agent Peters’ identification testimony was not

based on his own perception but, instead, was a product of the collective

knowledge of law enforcement. This theory is defined as follows:

Where officers work together on an investigation, we have used the so-called “collective knowledge” theory to impute knowledge of one officer to others. We impute information if there has been “some degree of communication” between the officers. This requirement distinguishes officers functioning as a team from officers acting as independent actors who merely happen to be investigating the same subject.

Commonwealth v. Young, 177 A.3d 876, 886 (Pa. 2018) (citations

Parker concedes that Special Agent Peters testified that he had up to

ten contacts with Parker during the agent’s tenure as a Philadelphia police

detective in the homicide unit, and that Special Agent Peters further testified

that, based on these contacts, he could independently identify Parker.

Nevertheless, Parker contends that Special Agent Peters “also had the

collective knowledge of law enforcement, and it is impossible to tease out one

from the other. They are hopelessly intertwined.” Parker’s Brief at

unnumbered 20. Parker argues that, although the collective knowledge

doctrine applies in determining probable cause, “it does not exist in

- 15 - J-S04036-24

identification cases[.]” Id. at unnumbered 21. Thus, Parker claims, “the

doctrine is of no avail in Agent Peters[’] mixed source identification of

[Parker].” Id.

The trial court determined that Special Agent Peters’ lay opinion

identification testimony was properly admitted:

While Special Agent Peters was not present at the North Sydenham residence or the church, his testimony was rationally based on his perception of the videos. Moreover, his testimony was helpful to the jury because Special Agent Peters was familiar with [Parker], his appearance, and his mannerisms.

. . . Special Agent Peters consistently maintained that he had previous interactions and familiarity with [Parker]. Special Agent Peters testified that he knew [Parker] from his time with Central Detectives and was aware of [Parker] because of [his] membership in the rap group “Body Snatchers.” He stated that he had known [Parker] for well over a decade since the mid- 2000s. . . .

As such, Special Agent Peters was familiar with [Parker’s] appearance and mannerisms and, therefore, able to assist the jury in identifying him in the video[s].

Trial Court Opinion, 5/24/23, at 14-15 (citations omitted).

Based on our review, we conclude that the suppression court’s factual

findings are supported by the record and its legal conclusions drawn from

those facts are free from error. At a suppression hearing, the court credited

the testimony provided by Special Agent Peters regarding his interactions and

dealings with Parker for more than a decade, starting in the early to mid-

2000s. See N.T., 2/18/20, at 120-23. The agent explained that he worked

for Central Detectives for eight years and that, during this time, he became

- 16 - J-S04036-24

familiar with a street gang/rap group called the “Body Snatchers,” of which

Parker was an original member. Id. at 120. The agent explained that he had

“at least 15 to 20” contacts with Parker, both in his neighborhood and also

downtown Philadelphia at the courthouse. Id. at 121. The agent further

indicated that at least four of those contacts were “good solid conversations”

which were “not just, hey, what’s up[?]” Id. at 122. According to the agent,

at the time of the decedent’s murder and ensuing investigation, he had known

Parker for more than a decade and was able to recognize him through, inter

alia, his mannerisms, tattoos, and his music. Id. at 123. Special Agent Peters

specifically testified that, when he viewed the surveillance videos, he was able

to recognize Parker. Id. at 124. Thus, the suppression record support’s the

court’s finding that Special Agent Peters’ identification was based on his

rational perception of the surveillance videos. Parker points to no evidence in

the suppression record that Special Agent Peters’ identification was based on

the opinions or knowledge of other law enforcement officers.8 Accordingly,

Parker’s third issue lacks merit.

In Parker’s fourth issue, he claims that the prosecutor committed

prosecutorial misconduct in her closing argument by improperly vouching for

8 We observe that Parker’s discussion of his third issue is woefully underdeveloped. See Parker’s Brief at unnumbered 20-21. Thus, had we not found it lacked merit, we would have found waiver of his third issue based on lack of development. See Commonwealth v. Hardy, 918 A.2d 766 (Pa. Super. 2007) (finding waiver of issues not adequately developed through discussion of pertinent case law and citation to the record).

- 17 - J-S04036-24

Commonwealth witnesses. Specifically, the prosecutor stated, “. . . it is hard

to be a witness to a crime. It is harder still to be a witness to a crime in

Philadelphia. And it is harder yet to be a witness to a murder in Philadelphia.”

N.T., 10/24/22, at 115. Parker contends that these comments amounted to

vouching for Commonwealth witnesses and constituted prosecutorial

misconduct.

To preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct for appellate review, a

defendant must raise a contemporaneous objection before the trial court, and

then request either a mistrial or curative instructions. See Commonwealth

v. Barkman, 295 A.3d 721, 740 (Pa. Super. 2023). Failure to raise a timely

and contemporaneous objection results in waiver of the issue on appeal. See

Commonwealth v. Ali, 10 A.3d 282, 293 (Pa. 2010); see also Pa.R.A.P.

302(a).

Our review of the record discloses that Parker’s counsel did not raise a

contemporaneous objection to these comments before the trial court, or

thereafter request either a mistrial or curative instructions. See Barkman,

295 A.3d at 740; see also Ali, 10 A.3d at 293. Parker concedes that his

- 18 - J-S04036-24

counsel did not object to these comments and did not request a curative

instruction. See Parker’s Brief at 21.9 Accordingly, the issue is waived.10

Having found that each of Parker’s issues is either meritless or waived,

we affirm his judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

9 We observe that, in his concise statement, Parker suggested that his trial counsel may have been ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s statements. See Concise Statement, 3/16/23, at 2. However, Parker did not raise counsel’s ineffectiveness in his statement of questions involved or elsewhere in his appellate brief. See Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) (providing that “[n]o question will be considered unless it is stated in the statement of questions involved or is fairly suggested thereby”). In any event, claims of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness are generally deferred to collateral review except in limited circumstances not herein applicable. See Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726 (Pa. 2002) (explaining general rule that petitioner should wait to raise claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel until collateral review); see also Commonwealth v. Holmes, 79 A.3d 562, 563-64 (Pa. 2013) (recognizing two very limited exceptions to the general rule: (1) in extraordinary circumstances where claims of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness are apparent from the record and immediate consideration best serves the interests of justice and/or (2) where there is good cause shown and review of the claim is preceded by a waiver of the right to seek collateral review).

10 We observe that Parker’s discussion of his fourth issue is also woefully underdeveloped. See Parker’s Brief at unnumbered 21-24. Thus, had we not found waiver based on Rule 302(a), we would have found waiver of his fourth issue based on lack of development. See Lackner v. Glosser, 892 A.2d 21, 29-30 (Pa. Super. 2006) (holding that arguments which are not appropriately developed are waived).

- 19 - J-S04036-24

Date: 5/22/2024

- 20 -