Com. v. Pajuste, C.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: June 3, 2026
• Docket: 560 EDA 2025
• Status: Unpublished
• Author: Lane

Opinion

J-A10024-26

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : CHRISTOPHER PAJUSTE : : Appellant : No. 560 EDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 22, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0005696-2024

BEFORE: STABILE, J., LANE, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY LANE, J.: FILED JUNE 3, 2026

Christopher Pajuste (“Pajuste”) appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed following his conviction for carrying a firearm on the streets of

Philadelphia.1 We affirm.

We glean the following factual history from the evidence and testimony

presented at the suppression hearing conducted in this matter. In July 2024,

Officer Brian Solomon (“Officer Solomon”) was patrolling the streets of

Philadelphia with his partner when he identified a vehicle traveling with “dark

tint on all windows[,] including the front windshield.” N.T., 1/22/25, at 13-

14. As this tint prevented Officer Solomon from being “able to see anybody

inside the vehicle[,]” he activated his vehicle’s lights and sirens and initiated

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6108. J-A10024-26

a traffic stop. Id. at 14. When the vehicle came to a stop, Officer Solomon

pulled up alongside it and used his vehicle’s equipped “PA system” to instruct

the “driver to roll down the windows.” Id. Officer Solomon issued this

command out of a concern for his own safety, as he still could not see the

driver through the vehicle’s window tint. In response, the driver of the vehicle

“rolled down” only the front passenger-side window. Id. When Officer

Solomon directed the driver to open his vehicle’s remaining windows, the

driver stated that they were broken. At this point, because both vehicles had

stopped on a busy section of the road, Officer Solomon directed the driver “to

pull over at the next block” to continue the traffic stop. Id.

En route to this location, Officer Solomon witnessed the vehicle stop at

a red light and begin “shaking from right to left and back and forward as if

somebody was in the car moving around.” Id. at 15, 18. This motion

indicated to Officer Solomon that the driver was “[p]ossibly concealing

something or doing something inside the vehicle [that] wasn’t normal to do.”

Id. at 19. When the light turned green, the shaking ceased and both vehicles

continued on to the location of the traffic stop. There, Officer Solomon again

utilized his vehicle’s equipped PA system to command the driver to open his

remaining windows. Although the driver this time opened both of his vehicle’s

rear windows, he did not open the driver-side window. This prompted Officer

Solomon to exit his vehicle and approach on foot.

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As Officer Solomon approached the vehicle, he could see through the

vehicle’s open rear windows that the driver was “moving around the vehicle,

leaning forward, [and] looking right to left inside the vehicle.” Id. When the

officer reached the driver-side door, the remaining window opened to reveal

the vehicle’s sole occupant, Pajuste, sitting in the driver’s seat. Given that

Pajuste had lied to him about the operability of the vehicle’s windows, as well

as the officer’s belief that Pajuste might have concealed contraband in the

vehicle at the traffic light or just prior to his approach, Officer Solomon

expressed concern for his own safety and directed Pajuste to exit the vehicle.

Pajuste, who “was a little bit irate” as a result of the stop, did not immediately

comply with the officer’s command, and instead informed the officer that “he

couldn’t get out the driver side” of the vehicle because the door was broken.

Id. at 22, 27. Despite Pajuste’s claim that the door was broken, Officer

Solomon opened Pajuste’s door from the outside and allowed him to step out.

While outside of the vehicle, Officer Solomon placed Pajuste in handcuffs

before handing him off to his partner. Officer Solomon then performed a

safety “frisk” with respect to those areas within the vehicle that Pajuste, “as

the driver[,] could readily reach[.]” Id. at 23-24. Officer Solomon inferred

that this distance could encompass anywhere “from the driver seat to the back

of the passenger seat” due to the way Pajuste’s vehicle “was rocking and

shaking” at the traffic light. Id. at 24. At the time of the search, Officer

Solomon knew from his “training in dealing with [Pajuste’s] particular make

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and model of vehicle[,]” that its center console contained “voided areas” which

an individual could access and use as storage. Id. As such, when Officer

Solomon subsequently checked “around the center console where [Pajuste’s]

right arm would be” and found it to be “extremely loose[,]” he suspected that

Pajuste had accessed it in this fashion. Id.

Upon finishing his inspection of the front interior of Pajuste’s vehicle,

Officer Solomon angled behind the driver’s seat to inspect the rear of the

center console, which he once more confirmed to be “very loose[.]” Id.

Accordingly, with the belief that Pajuste could have “readily” accessed the

voided area within the center console from the driver’s seat by removing its

“back side panel” with a key or by simply pulling on it manually, Officer

Solomon used his handcuff key to pry it open. Id. at 24-25, 33. In doing so,

the officer discovered a loaded “black Glock 45 nine[-]millimeter” firearm. Id.

at 25. Notably, from the time the officer first inspected the center console to

his discovery of the firearm, approximately only “a minute and a half” had

passed. Id. at 25.

As a result of this discovery, Officer Solomon arrested Pajuste and the

Commonwealth charged him with firearms not to be carried without a license

and carrying a firearm on the streets of Philadelphia. In response, Pajuste

filed an omnibus pretrial motion seeking to suppress the firearm from

evidence. Pajuste claimed that because Officer Solomon had neither a warrant

nor probable cause to support his search of the vehicle, he obtained the

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firearm illegally. On January 22, 2025, the trial court held a hearing on the

matter, during which it heard testimony from Officer Solomon and viewed

footage from his body-worn camera. At the conclusion of the hearing, the

trial court denied suppression. The matter then proceeded directly to a bench

trial, whereupon the trial court found Pajuste guilty of carrying a firearm on

the streets of Philadelphia,2 and imposed a sentence of two years’ probation.

Pajuste filed a timely notice of appeal, and both he and the trial court complied

with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Pajuste raises the following issue for our review: “Did police transform

a frisk of . . . Pajuste’s car into an illegal search by using a specialized tool to

pry open the otherwise inaccessible bottom portion of the car’s center

console?” Pajuste’s Brief at 1.

Pajuste’s sole issue poses a challenge to the trial court’s order denying

suppression. Our standard of review for the denial of a suppression motion is

well settled:

Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the ____________________________________________

2 We clarify that although this Court has since held that section 6108 is unconstitutional as applied to an individual who openly carries a firearm without a license, this result has no effect on the statute’s ability to “criminalize unlicensed concealed carry within the city of Philadelphia[,]” as is the case here. Commonwealth v. Sumpter, 340 A.3d 977, 981 (Pa. Super. 2025) (emphasis in original).

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Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record, we are bound by these findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are erroneous. The suppression court’s legal conclusions are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the court[ ] below are subject to our plenary review.

Moreover, appellate courts are limited to reviewing only the evidence presented at the suppression hearing when examining a ruling on a pre[]trial motion to suppress.

Commonwealth v. Carey, 249 A.3d 1217, 1223 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation

omitted).

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,

Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution protect private citizens from

unreasonable searches and seizures by government officials. See

Commonwealth v. Strickler, 757 A.2d 884, 888 (Pa. 2000) (citing United

States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 551 (1980)). However, not every

encounter between a law enforcement officer and a citizen constitutes a

seizure warranting constitutional protections. See Commonwealth v.

Adams, 205 A.3d 1195, 1199 (Pa. 2019). Indeed, “[t]he law recognizes three

different levels of interaction between police officers and citizens: (1) a mere

encounter; (2) an investigative detention, often described as a Terry[3] stop;

3 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

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and (3) a custodial detention.” Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 256 A.3d

1242, 1247 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted).

Pursuant to our state and federal constitutions, police may submit an

individual to a Terry stop where they have reasonable suspicion or probable

cause to believe that a violation of the Vehicle Code has occurred. See

Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285, 1290-91 (Pa. Super. 2010) (en

banc). Relevantly, where a police officer observes that a vehicle’s windows

are so darkly tinted that he cannot see inside them, he has probable cause to

believe that its driver is in violation of the Vehicle Code’s prohibition on window

tint. See Commonwealth v. Prizzia, 260 A.3d 263, 268-70 (Pa. Super.

2021); see also 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 4107(b)(2), 4524(e)(1).

As a general rule, a member of law enforcement may not perform a

warrantless search of a vehicle during a Terry stop absent both probable

cause and exigent circumstances. See Commonwealth v. Alexander, 243

A.3d 177, 181 (Pa. 2020). However, our Courts have consistently recognized

a limited exception to this rule pursuant to Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032

(1983). See Commonwealth v. Morris, 644 A.2d 721 (Pa. 1994); see also

Commonwealth v. Muhammad, 289 A.3d 1078 (Pa. Super. 2023). In

Long, the United States Supreme Court applied the principles set forth in

Terry to specifically permit a warrantless protective “search of the passenger

compartment of a vehicle, limited to those areas in which a weapon may be

placed or hidden[.]” Muhammad, 289 A.3d at 1088-89 (quoting Long, 463

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U.S. at 1049) (quotation marks omitted). In the wake of Long, our Courts

have since interpreted this holding to more broadly hold that a protective

search “may encompass any area where a weapon could be hidden and

accessible to” the suspected individual while in the vehicle. Commonwealth

v. Tuggles, 58 A.3d 840, 842 (Pa. Super. 2012); see also Muhammad, 289

A.3d at 1090 (interpreting Long to conclude that members of law enforcement

properly restricted their protective search of the defendant’s vehicle “to those

areas that [he] would have immediate control of and could contain a

weapon”).

“The standard for a valid Terry frisk and the standard for a valid

protective vehicle search are identical[,]” as each turns on “whether a

reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief

that his safety or that of others was in danger.” Commonwealth v.

Cartagena, 63 A.3d 294, 304 n.25 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citing Long, 463 U.S.

at 1049-50; Terry, 392 U.S. at 27). Accordingly, to conduct a protective

search of a vehicle, an officer must have “a reasonable belief based upon

specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences

from those facts, reasonably warrant the officer to believe that [a] suspect is

dangerous and . . . may gain immediate control of weapons.” Long, 463 U.S.

at 1049-50. Lastly, it is of no moment to this analysis that a detainee “is

under police supervision outside the vehicle” during a protective search, as it

is presumed “that a suspect who is not placed under arrest will be free to leave

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and reenter his automobile[,]” whereupon “he will then have access to any

weapons inside.” See Commonwealth v. Buchert, 68 A.3d 911, 913 (Pa.

Super. 2013) (quoting Long, 463 U.S. at 1051) (quotation marks omitted).

Pajuste argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to

suppress the firearm found within his vehicle. Pajuste initially concedes that:

(1) “Officer Solomon legitimately stopped [him] to investigate whether his

windows were tinted in violation of” section 4524(e)(1); and (2) a protective

search of his car “was likely justified” given that the officer had observed his

car “rocking back and forth at a traffic light as if he were moving around inside

the vehicle[,]” and he had “misled the officer about the functionality of his

windows and driver[-]side door.” Pajuste’s Brief at 9. However, Pajuste

claims that these circumstances alone did not justify the “full search” that

Officer Solomon thereafter performed on his vehicle. Id.

Pajuste emphasizes that at the time of the stop, Officer Solomon had

neither a search warrant for the vehicle, nor a combination of probable cause

and exigent circumstances. Pajuste therefore asserts that Officer Solomon

could only search those areas of his vehicle that he would have immediate

access to while inside, or upon his return to the vehicle at the conclusion of

the stop. However, Pajuste avers that Officer Solomon exceeded this

permissible scope “by prying open an otherwise inaccessible compartment at

the rear of the car’s center console.” Id. at 9-10. To support this conclusion,

Pajuste relies on this Court’s analysis in Commonwealth v. Bozeman, 205

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A.3d 1264 (Pa. Super. 2019), which he claims “elaborates on those areas that

may be legitimately searched during the protective frisk of a car.” Pajuste’s

Brief at 10. Pajuste maintains that in Bozeman, “[t]his Court agreed that

prying open [an] air vent” with a screwdriver found within a vehicle “went

beyond the scope of a protective frisk” where the officer had only “noticed

[the] screwdriver near the driver’s door and pry marks on” the driver-side air

vent. Id. at 11. Pajuste asserts that “Bozeman thus supports the conclusion

that an officer’s use of a specialized tool to pry open an otherwise inaccessible

compartment of a car transforms a protective frisk into a full search.” Id.

This is the case, he suggests, “even when the tool required to access the

compartment is close at hand[,] and . . . the compartment itself is easily within

the driver’s reach.” Id.

In contrast to the above fact pattern, Pajuste avers that Officer

Solomon’s body-worn camera “makes clear” that the compartment in the rear

of his vehicle’s center console “was even harder to access than” that located

behind the air vent in Bozeman, which had taken only “ten seconds” to

access. Id. at 11-12. Accordingly, Pajuste maintains that despite Officer

Solomon “checking inside the storage area of the console, shaking the rear of

the console, reexamining the contents of the console, shaking the console

from the side and rear, and examining the panels and cupholders adjacent to

the console[,]” these efforts were insufficient to open the compartment

containing the firearm. Id. (citations omitted). Pajuste instead highlights

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that the officer only managed to discover the firearm after “several minutes”

of searching, and only after he “entered the rear passenger area and used his

handcuff key to pry open the console compartment by force[.]” Id. at 12.

In consideration of the above, Pajuste asserts that it was unreasonable

for the trial court to conclude that he could have accessed the firearm either

in the moments leading up to the stop, or immediately upon his return to the

vehicle following the conclusion of the stop. Pajuste argues that such a

determination directly contradicts the fact that the compartment containing

the firearm “was functionally impossible to access unless one was in the rear

passenger area of the car,” as demonstrated by the officer’s above-described

search, as well as the fact that police did not find any “kind of specialized tool

required to access the compartment” on his person or in his vehicle. Id. at

12-13. Consequently, Pajuste insists that because the firearm was not readily

accessible at the time of the stop, the trial court should have suppressed it as

the result of an illegal search.

The trial court determined that its order denying suppression was proper

in light of the circumstances leading up to Officer Solomon’s discovery of the

firearm, reasoning as follows:

Pajuste claims that the search of the vehicle was illegal because it “was unsupported by probable cause and a search warrant[,]” and that police had no basis for conducting a frisk of the vehicle for safety. This claim is without merit. The law is clear that a police officer may perform a warrantless search of the area within the driver’s reach in order to ensure officer safety. Here, Officer Solomon’s warrantless limited search of the area around Pajuste’s driver’s seat was reasonable under the totality of the

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circumstances. The record shows that Pajuste was driving a vehicle that had heavily tinted windows, including the front windshield. When asked to roll down his windows, Pajuste claimed that they did not work and only the passenger[-]side window could be rolled down. While stopped at the red light, Pajuste’s car was rocking and shifting around as though someone inside was moving around vigorously inside the vehicle, possibly to conceal contraband. After Pajuste pulled over, he eventually rolled down all the windows except the driver’s[,] but then claimed that he could not exit because the driver[-]side door was broken. This also turned out to be false since Officer Solomon opened the driver[-]side car door from the outside. Officer Solomon described Pajuste’s demeanor as “irate” when asked to exit the car. Based upon the totality of the circumstances, Officer Solomon had reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity may be afoot[,] and that a frisk of the driver’s immediate reach area was necessary for officer safety.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/24/25, at 5 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

After review, we determine the trial court’s order denying suppression

is supported by the record and free of legal error. Here, we reiterate that

Pajuste does not challenge on appeal the fact that Officer Solomon had

probable cause to initiate the underlying Terry stop, nor does he challenge

the reasonability of the officer’s belief that a protective search was necessary.

Instead, he challenges only that Officer Solomon’s inspection of his vehicle

exceeded the limits of a protective search — an assertion with which we

disagree. The record is clear that Officer Solomon located the at-issue firearm

in the rear of the vehicle’s center console, which was well within Pajuste’s

reach as the driver of the vehicle. Additionally, when the officer inspected the

center console’s rear panel as part of his protective search, his training and

experience with respect to the vehicle’s make and model led him to reasonably

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believe that Pajuste could have “readily” accessed the voided area underneath

its “extremely loose” panel by simply pulling on it. N.T., 1/22/25, at 24-25,

33. Pursuant to this Court’s interpretation of Long, this alone supports the

trial court’s determination that the officer’s recovery of the firearm was within

the scope of a lawful protective search. See Muhammad, 289 A.3d at 1090;

see also Tuggles, 58 A.3d at 842. As such, we conclude that Pajuste’s

suppression claim is without merit.

Moreover, as it pertains to Pajuste’s argument that Bozeman dictates

that we grant him relief, we find his reliance on this case to be misplaced. We

clarify that in Bozeman, the Commonwealth appealed from the trial court’s

determination that “the search of [Bozeman’s] vehicle was not permissible as

a search incident to arrest or a protective sweep because Bozeman was ‘far

removed’ from his vehicle” at the time. Bozeman, 205 A.3d at 1277. Upon

review, however, this Court preliminarily intuited that because police

conducted this search after they had already arrested Bozeman following the

discovery of narcotics on his person, they could have only supported it via a

finding of probable cause. See id. at 1277 n.9. Such a conclusion inherently

resulted from the fact that Bozeman’s arrest obviated any need for a

subsequent protective search of his vehicle, as he would no longer be

returning to it at the conclusion of the stop. See Long, 463 U.S. at 1049-50.

Accordingly, when the Bozeman Court thereafter held that police had

“the requisite probable cause” to search Bozeman’s vehicle, and therefore

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remove its air vent to recover a firearm, it did so without providing any

consideration for whether this action would have also been permissible as part

of a protective search, as it had already concluded that such a search could

not have justifiably occurred. Bozeman, 205 A.3d at 1279. Consequently,

we determine that Bozeman is inapplicable to the instant appeal.

For the reasons discussed above, we hold that Pajuste’s sole issue is

without merit, and we affirm his judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 6/3/2026

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