Com. v. Owens, M.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: April 12, 2023
• Docket: 19 EDA 2022
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S37040-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : MICHAEL BRADY OWENS : : Appellant : No. 19 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 18, 2021 In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-45-CR-0001095-2018

BEFORE: BOWES, J., LAZARUS, J., and OLSON, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED APRIL 12, 2023

Appellant, Michael Brady Owens, appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered on November 18, 2021. We affirm.

The trial court ably summarized the underlying facts of this case:

on March 16, 2016, McMichael's Hunting Club members discovered burnt human remains on State Game Lands 38, later identified as Demetria Hughes [(hereinafter “the Victim”)]. An autopsy on the Victim determined that the cause of death was a gunshot wound to the head. On March 21, 2016, Pennsylvania State Troopers conducted an interview with [Appellant’s co-defendant,] Randy Criste-Troutman [(hereinafter “Co-Defendant Criste-Troutman”),] at the Lackawanna County Prison. He related the Victim was an associate of his in dealing heroin and owed him in excess of $1,000.00 for illegal drugs. [Co-Defendant] Criste-Troutman related that he used a ruse to lure the [Victim] into the woods in order to kill him. Specifically, [Co-Defendant] Criste-Troutman told the Victim they would commit a home invasion robbery and the Victim agreed to participate. [Co-Defendant] Criste-Troutman further related that [Appellant] helped lure the [Victim] with J-S37040-22

the robbery ruse. [Co-Defendant] Criste-Troutman related that Appellant shot and killed the Victim in the woods.

On April 26, 2016, Appellant gave sworn testimony to the Monroe County Investigating Grand Jury. During his testimony, Appellant admitted to knowing the Victim, and knew the Victim and [Co-Defendant] Criste-Troutman to be associates. Moreover, Appellant knew [Co-Defendant] Criste-Troutman was involved in the sale of illegal drugs, specifically heroin. Appellant related that [Co-Defendant] Criste-Troutman contacted him and asked to help drop off a friend. Appellant stated that he picked up [Co-Defendant] Criste-Troutman and was advised that the Victim was that friend. Appellant related that he drove [Co-Defendant] Criste-Troutman and the Victim to a wooded area, that [Co-Defendant] Criste-Troutman and the Victim exited the vehicle, and that after a period of time [Co-Defendant] Criste-Troutman returned alone. Appellant advised that he returned to the same spot with [Co-Defendant] Criste-Troutman between one and three days later. Appellant further advised [Co-Defendant] Criste-Troutman brought a gas can filled with gasoline on the return trip.

Finally, cell phone tracking evidence supports finding that: (1) Appellant accompanied [Co-Defendant] Criste-Troutman and the Victim to the scene of the murder on the date the murder occurred; (2) Appellant and [Co-Defendant] Criste-Troutman returned to the scene of the crime that night; and (3) Appellant and [Co-Defendant] Criste-Troutman returned to the scene of the crime three days later. Moreover, Appellant and [Co-Defendant] Criste-Troutman were in frequent contact via text message communications during this time period.

Trial Court Opinion, 2/7/22, at 36-37 (citations omitted).

A jury found Appellant guilty of a number of crimes, including

first-degree murder, criminal conspiracy, tampering with or fabricating

physical evidence, and abuse of a corpse.1 On November 18, 2021, the trial ____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(a), 903(a)(1), 4910(1), and 5510, respectively.

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court sentenced Appellant to serve an aggregate term of life in prison without

the possibility of parole, with a consecutive term of 256 to 552 months in

prison, for his convictions.

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. He numbers four claims on

appeal:

1. Whether, pre-trial, the court erred when it ruled [Appellant] was precluded from receiving the mental health report evaluating [Co-Defendant Criste-Troutman,] and containing exculpatory statements for Appellant?

2. Whether, pre-trial, the court erred when it failed to grant [Appellant’s] motion to dismiss pursuant to [Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure] 600?

3. Whether, at trial, the court erred where it precluded [Appellant] from cross-examining [Co-Defendant Criste-Troutman] on statements he had made during his mental health evaluation?

4. Whether, at trial, the court erred when it overruled objections to [Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence] 404(b) [] that [Appellant] had previously “beat a body,” which statements were offered through Detectives Thomas McAndrew and Wendy Serfass, and where this evidence’s probative value did not substantially outweigh its potential for unfair prejudice, where it was not relevant for any permissible purpose, and where the Commonwealth had provided no notice and failed to meet a court-imposed deadline for notice of 404(b) evidence prior to trial?

Appellant’s Brief at 6-7.

We have reviewed the briefs of the parties, the relevant law, the certified

record, the notes of testimony, and the opinion of the able trial court judge,

the Honorable Margherita Patti-Worthington. We conclude that Appellant is

not entitled to relief in this case, for the reasons expressed in President Judge

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Patti-Worthington’s August 16, 2021 and February 7, 2022 opinions.

Therefore, we affirm on the basis of President Judge Patti-Worthington’s

thorough opinions and adopt them as our own. In any future filing with this

or any other court addressing this ruling, the filing party shall attach a copy

of President Judge Patti-Worthington’s August 16, 2021 and February 7, 2022

opinions.

Although we adopt the trial court’s opinions as our own, we specifically

address Appellant’s first and third claims on appeal which challenge the trial

court’s rulings precluding Appellant from receiving the mental health

evaluation reports of Co-Defendant Criste-Troutman, and further precluding

Appellant from cross-examining Co-Defendant Criste-Troutman on statements

he made during the mental health evaluations. In its opinion, the trial court

thoroughly and ably explained why Appellant’s claims fail. See Trial Court

Opinion, 2/7/22, at 3-20. We further note that our opinions in

Commonwealth v. Nuzzo, 284 A.3d 1243 (Pa. Super. 2022) and

Commonwealth v. Segarra, 228 A.3d 943 (Pa. Super. 2020) foreclose

Appellant’s ability to obtain relief on these claims.

In the case at bar, the trial court ordered Co-Defendant Criste-Troutman

to undergo incompetency evaluations, pursuant to 50 P.S. § 7402 of the

Mental Health Procedures Act (“MHPA”). Section 7402 of the MHPA declares:

§ 7402. Incompetence to proceed on criminal charges and lack of criminal responsibility as defense

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(a) Definition of Incompetency.--Whenever a person who has been charged with a crime is found to be substantially unable to understand the nature or object of the proceedings against him or to participate and assist in his defense, he shall be deemed incompetent to be tried, convicted or sentenced so long as such incapacity continues.

...

(c) Application for Incompetency Examination.--Application to the court for an order directing an incompetency examination may be presented by an attorney for the Commonwealth, a person charged with a crime, his counsel, or the warden or other official in charge of the institution or place in which he is detained. A person charged with crime shall be represented either by counsel of his selection or by court-appointed counsel.

(d) Hearing; When Required.--The court, either on application or on its own motion, may order an incompetency examination at any stage in the proceedings and may do so without a hearing unless the examination is objected to by the person charged with a crime or by his counsel. In such event, an examination shall be ordered only after determination upon a hearing that there is a prima facie question of incompetency. Upon completion of the examination, a determination of incompetency shall be made by the court where incompetency is established by a preponderance of the evidence.

(e) Conduct of Examination; Report.--When ordered by the court, an incompetency examination shall take place under the following conditions:

(1) It shall be conducted as an outpatient examination unless an inpatient examination is, or has been, authorized under another provision of this act.

(2) It shall be conducted by at least one psychiatrist or licensed psychologist and may relate both to competency to proceed and to criminal responsibility for the crime charged.

(3) The person shall be entitled to have counsel present with him and shall not be required to answer any questions or to perform tests unless he has moved for or agreed to the examination. Nothing said or done by such person during the

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examination may be used as evidence against him in any criminal proceedings on any issue other than that of his mental condition.

(4) A report shall be submitted to the court and to counsel and shall contain a description of the examination, which shall include:

(i) diagnosis of the person's mental condition;

(ii) an opinion as to his capacity to understand the nature and object of the criminal proceedings against him and to assist in his defense;

(iii) when so requested, an opinion as to his mental condition in relation to the standards for criminal responsibility as then provided by law if it appears that the facts concerning his mental condition may also be relevant to the question of legal responsibility; and

(iv) when so requested, an opinion as to whether he had the capacity to have a particular state of mind, where such state of mind is a required element of the criminal charge.

50 P.S. § 7402.

In Nuzzo, this Court held that a competency petition and its attached

materials – as filed under 50 P.S. § 7402 – are “documents concerning

persons in treatment,” and are thus encompassed within the MHPA’s general

“confidentiality of records” provision, “when the petition contains factual

averments and materials offered in support of the prima facie showing of

incompetency and which refer, reflect, or relate, inter alia, to mental health

treatment and diagnosis records, including, but not limited to, names of

physicians and treatment facilities, hospitalizations, medical opinions or

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diagnosis (including medical records, letters, and charts), and current or

recommended courses of treatment.” Nuzzo, 284 A.3d at 1256 (emphasis

omitted). The MHPA’s “confidentiality of records” provision, contained at 50

P.S. § 7111, declares:

(a) All documents concerning persons in treatment shall be kept confidential and, without the person's written consent, may not be released or their contents disclosed to anyone except:

(1) those engaged in providing treatment for the person;

(2) the county administrator, pursuant to section 110;

(3) a court in the course of legal proceedings authorized by this act;

(4) pursuant to Federal rules, statutes and regulations governing disclosure of patient information where treatment is undertaken in a Federal agency; and

(5) a covered entity or a covered entity's business associate that makes the use, disclosure or request for disclosure in accordance with 45 CFR Pt. 164 Subpt. E2 (relating to privacy of individually identifiable health information).

In no event, however, shall privileged communications, whether written or oral, be disclosed to anyone without such written consent. . . .

50 P.S. § 7111.

As this Court explained in Segarra:

In construing [s]ection 7111, our [Supreme] Court determined that, by its clear and unambiguous terms, disclosure was allowed only in certain limited enumerated instances, and only to parties designated by the statute. . . . Apart from these express exceptions, our Court held that disclosure is permitted to third parties only where the patient has given his or her written consent:

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The unambiguous terms contained in the provision regarding the confidentiality of medical records leaves little room for doubt as to the intent of the Legislature regarding this section. . . . “[A]ll documents concerning persons in treatment shall be kept confidential and, without the person's written consent, may not be released or their contents disclosed to anyone.” 50 P.S. § 7111(a). The provision applies to all documents regarding one's treatment, not just medical records. Furthermore, the verbiage that the documents “shall be kept confidential” is plainly not discretionary but mandatory in this context — it is a requirement. The release of the documents is contingent upon the person's written consent and the documents may not be released “to anyone” without such consent. The terms of the provision are eminently clear and unmistakable and the core meaning of this confidentiality section of the [MHPA] is without doubt — there shall be no disclosure of the treatment documents to anyone.

Zane v. Friends Hosp., 836 A.2d 25, 31-32 (Pa. 2003).

Segarra, 228 A.3d at 951-952 (some quotation marks omitted), quoting In

re Fortieth Statewide Investigating Grand Jury, 220 A.3d 558, 566-567

(Pa. 2019).

Section 7111(a)(3) exempts from the general confidentiality mandate

“a court in the course of legal proceedings authorized by this act.” 50 P.S.

§ 7111(a)(3). However, as this Court has held, “a criminal prosecution is not

a legal proceeding authorized by the act” and, thus, does not fall under the

general confidentiality exception. Segarra, 228 A.3d at 953 (quotation

marks, citations, and corrections omitted). As we explained:

A strict construction of Section 7111 reveals that all documents concerning persons in treatment are to be kept confidential and may not be released or disclosed to anyone, absent the patient's written consent, with certain exceptions. The third exception to

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the privilege of confidentiality conferred by the MHPA on a patient's records allows a court to review the records in the course of legal proceedings authorized by the MHPA. 50 P.S. § 7111(3).

The unambiguous language of section 7111(3) leads us to conclude that a patient's inpatient mental health treatment records may be used by a court only when the legal proceedings being conducted are within the framework of the MHPA, that is, involuntary and voluntary mental health commitment proceedings. See 50 P.S. § 7103 (MHPA establishes the rights and procedures for all involuntary treatment of mentally ill persons, whether inpatient or outpatient, and for all voluntary inpatient treatment of mentally ill persons). We can find no language within the act itself which includes criminal proceedings within the framework of the act, nor can we find any caselaw in the Commonwealth which supports such a proposition.

Absent any authority to the contrary, we conclude that a criminal prosecution is not a legal proceeding authorized by the act.

Segarra, 228 A.3d at 952-953 (quotation marks and corrections omitted)

(emphasis in original), quoting Commonwealth v. Moyer, 595 A.2d 1177,

1179 (Pa. Super. 1991).

On appeal, Appellant claims that he should have been able to receive

the mental health evaluation reports of Co-Defendant Criste-Troutman. He

also claims that he should have been able to cross-examine Co-Defendant

Criste-Troutman on statements he made during his mental health evaluations,

some of which were placed into evidence during Co-Defendant

Criste-Troutman’s incompetency hearings. See Appellant’s Brief at 17-30.

However, the mental health evaluation reports and incompetency hearings

were all ordered by the trial court and conducted in accordance with 50 P.S.

§ 7402. As explained above, in Nuzzo, this Court held that a competency

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petition and its attached materials – as filed under 50 P.S. § 7402 – are

“documents concerning persons in treatment,” and are thus encompassed

within the MHPA’s general “confidentiality of records” provision, “when the

petition contains factual averments and materials offered in support of the

prima facie showing of incompetency and which refer, reflect, or relate, inter

alia, to mental health treatment and diagnosis records, including, but not

limited to, names of physicians and treatment facilities, hospitalizations,

medical opinions or diagnosis (including medical records, letters, and charts),

and current or recommended courses of treatment.” Nuzzo, 284 A.3d at

1256 (emphasis omitted). By definition, Co-Defendant Criste-Troutman’s

mental health evaluation reports and incompetency hearings “refer, reflect, or

relate [to Co-Defendant Criste-Troutman’s] mental health . . . diagnosis

records.” See id.; see also 50 P.S. § 7402(e)(4) (“[a mental health

evaluation] report shall be submitted to the court and to counsel and shall

contain a description of the examination, which shall include . . . [a] diagnosis

of the person’s mental condition”) (emphasis added). Thus, as in Nuzzo,

Co-Defendant Criste-Troutman’s mental health evaluation reports and

incompetency hearing transcripts are “documents concerning persons in

treatment,” and are thus encompassed within the MHPA’s general

“confidentiality of records” provision.

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Further, pursuant to Segarra and the plain language of Section 7111,

Co-Defendant Criste-Troutman’s records must “be kept confidential and,

without the person's written consent, may not be released or their contents

disclosed to anyone.” 50 P.S. § 7111. Co-Defendant Criste-Troutman has not

given his written consent. Therefore, in accordance with Segarra, Appellant

is not entitled to receive Co-Defendant Criste-Troutman’s mental health

evaluation reports or cross-examine him on the statements he made during

these mental health evaluations. See Segarra, 228 A.3d at 953 (holding: “a

criminal prosecution is not a legal proceeding authorized by the act” and, thus,

does not fall under Section 7111(a)(3)’s exception to the general

confidentiality requirement). Appellant’s claim to the contrary thus fails.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 4/12/2023

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