Com. v. Owens, C.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: January 15, 2026
• Docket: 1532 EDA 2025
• Status: Unpublished
• Author: Bender

Opinion

J-S38039-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : CHASE LANDRELL OWENS : : Appellant : No. 1532 EDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 18, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-45-CR-0000068-2017

BEFORE: McLAUGHLIN, J., KING, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED JANUARY 15, 2026

Chase Landrell Owens (hereinafter, Appellant) appeals from the

judgment of sentence imposed following his conviction for one count of

resisting arrest, 18 Pa.C.S. § 5104. Herein, Appellant maintains that his

conviction is improper, primarily because a corrections officer is not a public

servant as contemplated by the statute. We affirm.

Appellant was charged via a criminal information filed on May 25, 2017.

At the time of the offense, Appellant was an inmate at the Monroe County

Correctional Facility (hereinafter, MCCF). N.T. Jury Trial, 2/12/25, at 38. After

entering the MCCF following his arrest on other, unrelated charges, Appellant

was brought to the male intake unit, where Appellant refused to change out

of his civilian clothes and put on the jail’s uniform. Id. at 37-40. Appellant

was in a small closet-type room, called the clothing changeover room, which

contained clothing racks and the jail’s inventory of inmate clothing. Id. at 37. J-S38039-25

Appellant engaged in loud arguments with the correctional officers (COs) and

grabbed the metal clothing racks to brace himself and resist the officers’

attempts to get him to change clothes. Id. at 39-40. Appellant verbally

challenged the COs to fight him. Id. at 40. Because of Appellant’s grip on

the metal shelving, he could not be removed from the room. Thus, two COs

attempted to loosen his grip by striking his forearms on the radial nerve in his

arm, without success. Id. at 42. Additional staff came to assist, and, during

a scuffle, the shelving fell apart and piles of clothing fell to the ground. Id. at

44. Ultimately, through the use of body weight, the COs were able to put

Appellant into shackles. Id. at 45-46. This incident caused a shoulder injury

to one CO, a back injury and black eye to another, and hand pain to a third.

Id. at 47. Appellant also had lacerations to some of his fingers. Id. at 48. He

was charged after this incident with one count of simple assault and one count

of aggravated assault.1

Appellant was subsequently released from the MCCF and, thereafter, a

bench warrant was issued due to Appellant’s failure to appear at his

preliminary hearing on January 17, 2017. On September 17, 2020, Appellant

was found to be incarcerated in Ohio and returned to Pennsylvania. However,

after he was released from prison and a guilty plea was scheduled for the

charges, Appellant again failed to appear and a second bench warrant was

issued on February 17, 2021.

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1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2701(a)(1) and 2702(a), respectively.

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Appellant ultimately appeared in court on January 21, 2025. Thereafter,

with the trial court’s permission, the Commonwealth filed an amended

information, adding additional charges before Appellant’s jury trial on

February 4, 2025. After trial, Appellant was convicted of one count of resisting

arrest, 18 Pa.C.S. § 5104. The trial court then imposed a sentence of 77 days

(time served) to 1 year of incarceration on March 17, 2025. Appellant filed a

timely post-sentence motion on March 27, 2025. The motion was denied by

order dated June 10, 2025. A timely notice of appeal was filed the next day,

June 11, 2025. Both Appellant and the trial court have complied with

Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant raises two issues in this appeal, as follows:

1. Whether, for resisting arrest or other law enforcement (18 Pa.C.S.[] § 5104), there was insufficient evidence to convict because a [CO] is not a “public servant” under the statute?

2. Whether, for resisting arrest or other law enforcement (18 Pa.C.S.[] § 5104), there was insufficient evidence to convict because the [COs] were not arresting … Appellant or discharging some other law enforcement duty?

Appellant’s Brief at 6 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

As both of Appellant’s issues challenge the sufficiency of the evidence

presented to support his convictions, we analyze them together. Because a

determination of the sufficiency of the evidence presents a question of law,

“our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.”

Commonwealth v. Williams, 176 A.3d 298, 305 (Pa. Super. 2017). Further,

we analyze this issue under the following guidelines:

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When reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, we evaluate the record in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, giving the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict when it establishes each material element of the crime charged and the commission thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a mathematical certainty, and it may sustain its burden by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, this Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the factfinder, and where the record contains support for the convictions, they may not be disturbed. Lastly, we note that the finder of fact is free to believe some, all, or none of the evidence presented.

Commonwealth v. Toomer, 159 A.3d 956, 960–61 (Pa. Super. 2017) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Commonwealth v. Ewida, 333 A.3d 1269, 1279 (Pa. Super. 2025).

Resisting arrest is set forth in our Crimes Code as follows:

§ 5104. Resisting arrest or other law enforcement

A person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if, with the intent of preventing a public servant from effecting a lawful arrest or discharging any other duty, the person creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to the public servant or anyone else, or employs means justifying or requiring substantial force to overcome the resistance.

18 Pa.C.S. § 5104. This offense requires proof that a public servant was

affecting a lawful arrest or discharging a legal duty other than an arrest, which

the defendant intended to prevent. See Commonwealth v. Karl, 476 A.2d

908, 911 (Pa. Super. 1984). The Commonwealth does not need to establish

actual injury. Commonwealth v. Lyons, 555 A.2d 920, 925 (Pa. Super.

1989). To support a conviction for resisting arrest, the Commonwealth may

prove either that the defendant’s actions created a substantial risk of serious

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bodily injury, or that the defendant employed means justifying or requiring

substantial force to overcome the resistance. Id.

Appellant argues that the text of the resisting arrest statute shows it

does not apply to acts involving COs because the title of the statute specifically

refers only to arrests, which must be performed by police officers. Appellant

argues, “[a] public servant concerned with law enforcement must be a law

enforcement officer, through logical necessity.” Appellant’s Brief at 14. Thus,

he concludes, the statute applies only to activities involving law enforcement

officers. Id. Appellant asserts that the COs here were not enforcing any laws

and could not effectuate an arrest. Thus, he maintains that the statute does

not apply to his case.

Appellant also argues that a valid arrest is required to support a charge

of resisting arrest. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jackson, 924 A.2d 618

(Pa. Super. 2007). Thus, Appellant maintains that since he was not being

arrested, he could not be convicted of that offense. However, Appellant is

discussing only one clause in the resisting arrest statute. Notably, as this

Court set forth in In the Interest of Barry W., 621 A.2d 669 (Pa. Super.

1993), there are two scenarios contemplated by the resisting arrest statute.

The provisions of 18 Pa.C.S. § 5104 are clearly disjunctive. To be convicted under the first provision of § 5104, it is essential that there be a lawful arrest. See Commonwealth v. Eberhardt, [] 450 A.2d 651 ([Pa. Super.] 1982); Commonwealth v. Whitner, [] 361 A.2d 414 ([Pa. Super.] 1976); Commonwealth v. Bartman, [] 367 A.2d 1121 ([Pa. Super.] 1976); Commonwealth v. Stortecky, [] 352 A.2d 491 ([Pa. Super.] 1975). In this case there is no evidence to show that the arrest underlying the resisting arrest charge was lawful….

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[Thus,] the latter provision of § 5104, pertaining to “discharging any other public duty” besides effecting a lawful arrest, must be relied upon. To be convicted under the latter provision of § 5104, it is essential that there be a “discharge of any other duty” within the meaning of the statute. … An indication of what was contemplated is found by turning to Section 242.2 of the Model Penal Code, which § 5104 was modeled after. The Model Penal Code § 242.2 comment 5 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980), which deals with the physical obstruction of discharge of public duty, states:

Section 242.2 covers physical interference in a host of circumstances in which public servants discharge legal duties other than arrest. These include, for example, a policeman executing a search warrant, a fireman putting out a blaze, a forest or agricultural official making required inspections, an election official charged with monitoring balloting, and the like….

Commonwealth v. Karl, [] 476 A.2d 908, 911 (Pa. Super. 1984) (emphasis in original).

Barry W., 621 A.2d at 673–74.

Following Barry W., the fact that a lawful arrest was not being

performed at the time of this incident does not mandate a finding that the

evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for resisting arrest; rather,

the second portion of the statute makes it unlawful to prevent a public servant

from discharging any other legal duty, such as executing a search warrant or

putting out a fire. Id. Here, the COs were performing a lawful duty other

than an arrest — that of delivering inmates to the proper detention facilities

within the jail. Thus, Appellant’s argument that his conviction cannot be

sustained because he was not being lawfully arrested is meritless.

Our next task, then, is to determine whether the COs qualify as “public

servants” under the statute. Appellant stresses that the term is not defined

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therein. Nonetheless, the term “public servant” is defined elsewhere in the

Crimes Code as “any officer or employee of government [… that is] performing

a governmental function[.]” 18 Pa.C.S. § 4501 (definitions). Appellant fails

to recognize that COs are employees of the government; specifically, the

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 501 (defining a

CO as a full-time employee assigned to the Department of Corrections whose

principal duty is the care, custody and control of inmates of a penal or

correctional institution). Further, COs are clearly performing governmental

functions by facilitating the supervision and management of inmates who are

serving incarcerable sentences. Thus, a CO is a public servant, and the

resisting arrest statute applies to Appellant’s interactions with these officers.

Appellant also argues that, considering the resisting arrest statute in

pari materia with the statute immediately following it in the Crimes Code, that

of “Disarming a Law Enforcement Officer,” 18 Pa.C.S. § 5104.1, supports his

claim that a CO is not a “public servant” under the meaning of the resisting

arrest statute.2 Appellant asserts that, “because the legislature did not

2 Disarming a law enforcement officer is defined as:

(a) Offense defined.--A person commits the offense of disarming a law enforcement officer if he:

(1) without lawful authorization, removes or attempts to remove a firearm, rifle, shotgun or weapon from the person of a law enforcement officer or corrections officer, or deprives a law enforcement officer or corrections officer of (Footnote Continued Next Page)

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expressly include [COs] in [section] 5104, even though it could have and did

in [section] 5104.1, it is clear that 5104 was not intended to encompass

[COs].” Appellant’s Brief at 21. However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court

has explained that “the rule requiring statutes in pari materia to be construed

together is only a rule of construction to be applied as an aid in determining

the meaning of a doubtful statute[; …] it cannot be invoked where the

language of a statute is clear and unambiguous.” Goodwin v. Goodwin, 280

A.3d 937, 948 n.7 (Pa. 2022) (citation omitted). Here, there is no ambiguity

in the resisting arrest statute, and thus no need for a statutory construction

analysis.

Having concluded that the evidence demonstrated that Appellant

prevented a public servant from discharging a legal duty, his challenge to the

sufficiency of the evidence fails.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

the use of a firearm, rifle, shotgun or weapon, when the officer is acting within the scope of the officer’s duties; and

(2) has reasonable cause to know or knows that the individual is a law enforcement officer or corrections officer.

18 Pa.C.S. § 5104.1(a).

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Date: 1/15/2026

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