J-S31029-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : ALEXANDER OTT : : Appellant : No. 3995 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence November 6, 2017 In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0005017-2017
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., LAZARUS, J., and DUBOW, J.
MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED JULY 13, 2018
Alexander Ott appeals from his judgment of sentence following the entry
of a negotiated guilty plea to the charge of driving under the influence (“DUI”)
– controlled substance – Schedule I (1st Offense).1 Counsel has filed a petition
to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and its
progeny.2 After careful review, we remand with instructions, deny counsel’s
motion to withdraw, and retain panel jurisdiction.
____________________________________________
1 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(1)(i).
2 Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4), counsel has filed of record and served on the trial judge his intent to file an Anders brief in lieu of a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal. J-S31029-18
On June 2, 2017, Officer Joseph L. Laspina, Jr., of the Morton Borough
Police Department, observed Ott’s car and smelled burnt marijuana. He
followed the car to a Wawa parking lot and conducted a search of Ott’s
vehicle.3 He found seven bags of marijuana (30 grams or fewer) and related
paraphernalia. Officer Laspina wrote in his affidavit of probable cause that,
“Ott was read the DL[-]26 form in its entirety[,] signed, and agreed to provide
blood.” Aff. Of Probable Cause, June 4, 2017, 1. Following arraignment on
September 13, 2017, the court formally charged Ott with, inter alia, DUI–
controlled substance – Schedule I (1st Offense).4
On November 6, 2017, Ott entered a negotiated guilty plea with regard
to the charge and sentence. Accordingly, Ott was sentenced to six months of
intermediate punishment with the first twenty days on electronic home
monitoring, eighty hours of community service, a $1,000 fine, and a $100 cost
assessment. No post-sentence motions were filed. Ott filed a notice of appeal
on December 5, 2017, with the assistance of counsel. On December 6, 2017,
the court ordered Ott to provide a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors
complained of on appeal within twenty-one days. Counsel notified the court
of his intention to file an Anders brief on December 22, 2017.
3 We note that there is a lack of information in the record regarding the stop itself.
4 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(1)(i).
-2- J-S31029-18
In order for counsel to withdraw from an appeal pursuant to Anders,
counsel must: 1) petition the court for leave to withdraw, stating that counsel
made a conscientious examination of the record and that the appeal is
frivolous; 2) file an Anders brief indicating any issues of arguable merit; and
3) provide the defendant with a copy of the brief and inform him of his right
to retain new counsel or raise additional issues before this Court.
Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 351 (Pa. 2009). Counsel’s
Anders brief must:
(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth counsel's conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state counsel's reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.
Id. at 361. In addition to determining whether counsel fulfilled his obligations
under Anders, this Court is obligated to make a “full examination of the
proceedings and make an independent judgement to decide whether the
appeal is in fact wholly frivolous.” Commonwealth v. Flowers, 113 A.3d
1246, 1248 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citing Santiago, 978 A.2d at 354 n.5).
Here, counsel timely petitioned the court for leave to withdraw,
examined the record, determined the appeal was frivolous, and provided Ott
with a copy of the Anders brief. Ott was informed of his right to obtain private
counsel or proceed pro se and file a response. Counsel’s Anders brief,
however, may have overlooked a point of arguable merit.
-3- J-S31029-18
In his Anders brief, counsel notes that whether the sentence is harsh
and excessive under the circumstances may be an issue of arguable merit.
However, counsel failed to address a possible Birchfield issue. See
Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 U.S. 2160 (2016). In Birchfield, the
Supreme Court held that that warrantless blood draws are a violation of the
Fourth Amendment and that drivers cannot be found to have consented to a
warrantless blood draw if they believe that their refusal constitutes a criminal
offense. Id. at 2184-86.
Applying Birchfield, the Pennsylvania Superior Court found that drivers
who refuse to provide blood cannot be charged with a higher penalty than
they would have otherwise received. See Commonwealth v. Giron, 155
A.3d 635, 640 (Pa. Super. 2017); see also Commonwealth v. Ennels, 167
A.3d 716, 721, 724 (Pa. Super. 2017) (holding Birchfield ban on warrantless
blood tests for DUI of alcohol also applied to individuals suspected of DUI of
controlled substances). Thus, a driver who agrees to have blood drawn in
order to avoid increased criminal penalties, which was the language of the
warnings contained on the pre-Birchfield DL-26 form, cannot be said to have
consented to the procedure. See Commonwealth v. Evans, 153 A.3d 323,
331 (Pa. Super. 2016).
As noted above, Ott consented to a blood draw after Officer Laspina read
him the DL-26 form; that form, however, has been modified by the
Pennsylvania Department of Transportation in light of the Supreme Court’s
-4- J-S31029-18
decision in Birchfield. See Commonwealth v. Robertson, 2018 PA Super
110, at *5. (Pa. Super. filed May 3, 2018). The record in this case does not
indicate whether Ott was read the warnings from a pre-Birchfield DL-26
form5 or the language on the revised DL-26B form.
Here, counsel correctly states that Ott entered into a negotiated guilty
plea, thereby limiting the issues he can raise on appeal. Ott, in entering a
negotiated guilty plea, waived his rights to “challenge on direct appeal all non-
jurisdictional defects except the legality of the sentence and the validity of the
plea.” Commonwealth v. Lincoln, 72 A.3d 606, 609 (Pa. Super. 2013). He
may not, therefore, challenge the discretionary aspects of his sentence.
Commonwealth v. O’Malley, 957 A.2d 1265, 1267 (Pa. Super. 2015).
Moreover, Ott waived the ability to challenge the validity of his plea by failing
to object during the plea colloquy or by failing to file a post-sentence motion
to withdraw the plea within ten days of sentencing. Lincoln, 72 A.3d at 609-
10.
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J-S31029-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : ALEXANDER OTT : : Appellant : No. 3995 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence November 6, 2017 In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0005017-2017
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., LAZARUS, J., and DUBOW, J.
MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED JULY 13, 2018
Alexander Ott appeals from his judgment of sentence following the entry
of a negotiated guilty plea to the charge of driving under the influence (“DUI”)
– controlled substance – Schedule I (1st Offense).1 Counsel has filed a petition
to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and its
progeny.2 After careful review, we remand with instructions, deny counsel’s
motion to withdraw, and retain panel jurisdiction.
____________________________________________
1 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(1)(i).
2 Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4), counsel has filed of record and served on the trial judge his intent to file an Anders brief in lieu of a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal. J-S31029-18
On June 2, 2017, Officer Joseph L. Laspina, Jr., of the Morton Borough
Police Department, observed Ott’s car and smelled burnt marijuana. He
followed the car to a Wawa parking lot and conducted a search of Ott’s
vehicle.3 He found seven bags of marijuana (30 grams or fewer) and related
paraphernalia. Officer Laspina wrote in his affidavit of probable cause that,
“Ott was read the DL[-]26 form in its entirety[,] signed, and agreed to provide
blood.” Aff. Of Probable Cause, June 4, 2017, 1. Following arraignment on
September 13, 2017, the court formally charged Ott with, inter alia, DUI–
controlled substance – Schedule I (1st Offense).4
On November 6, 2017, Ott entered a negotiated guilty plea with regard
to the charge and sentence. Accordingly, Ott was sentenced to six months of
intermediate punishment with the first twenty days on electronic home
monitoring, eighty hours of community service, a $1,000 fine, and a $100 cost
assessment. No post-sentence motions were filed. Ott filed a notice of appeal
on December 5, 2017, with the assistance of counsel. On December 6, 2017,
the court ordered Ott to provide a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors
complained of on appeal within twenty-one days. Counsel notified the court
of his intention to file an Anders brief on December 22, 2017.
3 We note that there is a lack of information in the record regarding the stop itself.
4 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(1)(i).
-2- J-S31029-18
In order for counsel to withdraw from an appeal pursuant to Anders,
counsel must: 1) petition the court for leave to withdraw, stating that counsel
made a conscientious examination of the record and that the appeal is
frivolous; 2) file an Anders brief indicating any issues of arguable merit; and
3) provide the defendant with a copy of the brief and inform him of his right
to retain new counsel or raise additional issues before this Court.
Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 351 (Pa. 2009). Counsel’s
Anders brief must:
(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth counsel's conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state counsel's reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.
Id. at 361. In addition to determining whether counsel fulfilled his obligations
under Anders, this Court is obligated to make a “full examination of the
proceedings and make an independent judgement to decide whether the
appeal is in fact wholly frivolous.” Commonwealth v. Flowers, 113 A.3d
1246, 1248 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citing Santiago, 978 A.2d at 354 n.5).
Here, counsel timely petitioned the court for leave to withdraw,
examined the record, determined the appeal was frivolous, and provided Ott
with a copy of the Anders brief. Ott was informed of his right to obtain private
counsel or proceed pro se and file a response. Counsel’s Anders brief,
however, may have overlooked a point of arguable merit.
-3- J-S31029-18
In his Anders brief, counsel notes that whether the sentence is harsh
and excessive under the circumstances may be an issue of arguable merit.
However, counsel failed to address a possible Birchfield issue. See
Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 U.S. 2160 (2016). In Birchfield, the
Supreme Court held that that warrantless blood draws are a violation of the
Fourth Amendment and that drivers cannot be found to have consented to a
warrantless blood draw if they believe that their refusal constitutes a criminal
offense. Id. at 2184-86.
Applying Birchfield, the Pennsylvania Superior Court found that drivers
who refuse to provide blood cannot be charged with a higher penalty than
they would have otherwise received. See Commonwealth v. Giron, 155
A.3d 635, 640 (Pa. Super. 2017); see also Commonwealth v. Ennels, 167
A.3d 716, 721, 724 (Pa. Super. 2017) (holding Birchfield ban on warrantless
blood tests for DUI of alcohol also applied to individuals suspected of DUI of
controlled substances). Thus, a driver who agrees to have blood drawn in
order to avoid increased criminal penalties, which was the language of the
warnings contained on the pre-Birchfield DL-26 form, cannot be said to have
consented to the procedure. See Commonwealth v. Evans, 153 A.3d 323,
331 (Pa. Super. 2016).
As noted above, Ott consented to a blood draw after Officer Laspina read
him the DL-26 form; that form, however, has been modified by the
Pennsylvania Department of Transportation in light of the Supreme Court’s
-4- J-S31029-18
decision in Birchfield. See Commonwealth v. Robertson, 2018 PA Super
110, at *5. (Pa. Super. filed May 3, 2018). The record in this case does not
indicate whether Ott was read the warnings from a pre-Birchfield DL-26
form5 or the language on the revised DL-26B form.
Here, counsel correctly states that Ott entered into a negotiated guilty
plea, thereby limiting the issues he can raise on appeal. Ott, in entering a
negotiated guilty plea, waived his rights to “challenge on direct appeal all non-
jurisdictional defects except the legality of the sentence and the validity of the
plea.” Commonwealth v. Lincoln, 72 A.3d 606, 609 (Pa. Super. 2013). He
may not, therefore, challenge the discretionary aspects of his sentence.
Commonwealth v. O’Malley, 957 A.2d 1265, 1267 (Pa. Super. 2015).
Moreover, Ott waived the ability to challenge the validity of his plea by failing
to object during the plea colloquy or by failing to file a post-sentence motion
to withdraw the plea within ten days of sentencing. Lincoln, 72 A.3d at 609-
10. However, Ott may have a valid claim of ineffectiveness of counsel.
The failure of trial counsel to file a motion to suppress the blood test
results and failure to file a post-trial motion withdrawing the plea may amount
5 The warnings contained on the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation’s former DL-26 form provide that if a person refuses to consent to a blood test he or she will face more severe criminal penalties because of the refusal. See Robertson, supra at *6. The DL-26 form was revised within one week of the Supreme Court’s decision in Birchfield. Robertson, supra at *5. The new form, the DL-26B, states that there may be civil penalties associated with refusal, but the language regarding enhanced criminal penalties was removed. See id.
-5- J-S31029-18
to ineffectiveness of counsel. Such challenges are typically appropriate for
collateral review, not direct appeal. Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.3d
726, 738 (Pa. 2002). There are, however, “extraordinary” cases where a trial
court may “determine that a claim (or claims) of ineffectiveness is both
meritorious and apparent from the record so that immediate consideration
and relief is warranted.” Commonwealth v. Holmes, 621 Pa. 595, 621 (Pa.
2013). The Holmes Court noted that such “unitary review” allows
“defendants with shorter prison sentences or probationary sentences the
prospect of litigating their constitutional claims sounding in trial counsel
ineffectiveness; for many of these defendants, post-appeal PCRA review may
prove unavailable.” Id. at 622.
Ott may fall into the category of defendants for whom PCRA relief may
be unavailable due to his short sentence, and for whom a Holmes exception
may be appropriate. Furthermore, Ott may have grounds to claim
ineffectiveness of counsel if he did not voluntarily consent to have his blood
drawn under Birchfield and Evans, since no post-sentence motions were filed
preserving his right to challenge the validity of his plea. Indeed, the plea
colloquy specifically notes that the Affidavit of Probable Cause and the
Toxicological Report formed the basis of Ott’s guilty plea. N.T. Sentencing,
11/6/17, at 6. Whether Ott may claim counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to
address the possible Birchfield issue hinges on the content of the warnings
on the form he was read before consenting to have his blood drawn. As noted
-6- J-S31029-18
above, the record before us does not reflect whether the officer used the pre-
Birchfield DL-26 form or the revised version of the form, the DL-26B. Thus,
we are unable to conclude that there are no non-frivolous issues or that the
appeal is wholly frivolous.
In sum, our review of the certified record indicates that the form the
officer read to Ott has not been included in the record submitted to this Court.
Without this form, neither counsel nor this Court can fulfill its obligations under
Anders and its progeny. Accordingly, we deny counsel’s petition to withdraw
and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this
memorandum.
Upon remand, counsel must obtain the form used at Ott’s arrest and
ensure its inclusion in the certified record within twenty days of the filing of
this decision. After review of the entire certified record, counsel shall, within
thirty days, file either an advocate’s brief or a new petition to withdraw and
an Anders brief that fully complies with the requirements detailed above. The
Commonwealth shall have fifteen days to file a response brief or notify this
Court that it does not intend to file a response brief.
Motion for leave to withdraw denied. Case remanded with instructions.
Panel jurisdiction retained.
-7- J-S31029-18
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 7/13/18
-8-