NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA
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v. :
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FURMAN OSBORNE :
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Appellant : No. 1758 EDA 2025
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 2, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0803611-2004
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., LANE, J., and BENDER, P.J.E. MEMORANDUM BY LANE, J.: FILED AUGUST 25, 2026 Furman Osborne1 (“Osborne”) appeals pro se from the order dismissing his third petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 2 We affirm.
In 2004, Osborne shot and killed his business partner, Steven Kennedy (“Kennedy”), inside an uninhabited house at 2019 N. 19th Street that Kennedy owned and the pair used for breeding pit bulls. Several days later, while responding to a complaint of dogs barking inside the house, Pennsylvania SPCA police officers discovered Kennedy’s decomposing body on the third floor. Kennedy had been shot fifteen times, in the head, chest, back, and
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1 We note that the appellant’s name is misspelled “Osbourne” in previous filings. However, it is spelled correctly as “Osborne” in the instant PCRA petition.
2 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
legs, with bullets from two different guns, a .45 caliber and a 9 mm. Osborne admitted that he owned a .45 caliber and a 9 mm.
Relevantly, the evidence adduced at trial showed that Kennedy and Osborne were close friends and worked together breeding pit bulls and running an alarm installation business, for which Osborne had purchased two white utility vans as well as a business cell phone for Kennedy. On the day of the murder, Emerson Pitts (“Pitts”), the owner of a neighboring automotive repair garage at 2015 N 19th Street, arrived at work and saw Osborne’s white van parked outside the house at 2019 N. 19th Street. Later that morning, he heard several gunshots coming from that direction. Pitts went outside and briefly spoke with Donald Jones (“Jones”), another mechanic, about the gunshots. Approximately five minutes later, Pitts returned outside and saw Osborne enter the white van and drive away. Pitts had seen Osborne and Kennedy together several times in the neighborhood, but did not know Osborne’s name. When the police presented him with a photo array, Pitts unequivocally identified Osborne as the man in the white van. Pitts again positively identified Osborne at trial. See N.T., 11/8/06, at 172-87.
Jones provided a signed statement to police regarding his observations on the day of the murder. When interviewed by detectives, Jones identified two individuals from a photo array that he believed looked most like the van driver, and counsel stipulated that one of those individuals was Osborne. At trial, Jones testified that he worked in a garage next door to 2019 N. 19th Street, and knew Kennedy from seeing him walk his dogs around the
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neighborhood. Jones explained that on the day of Kennedy’s murder, he arrived at work and observed a white van parked outside 2019 N. 19th Street. While inside the garage, he heard gunshots and went outside to investigate. After speaking with Pitts, Jones turned to walk back into the garage when he heard more gunshots. Shortly thereafter, he saw a man exit 2019 N. 19th Street, lock the door, and drive away in a white van. Jones did not identify Osborne at trial. Jones disclosed to the jury that he no longer worked at the garage because he was in custody in Delaware participating in a work release program due to unpaid child support. He further admitted that he had been arrested at least forty times in multiple states for receiving stolen property, driving without proper tags or insurance, engaging in fist fights, and failing to pay child support. See N.T., 11/9/06, at 162-73.
The Commonwealth presented several more witnesses who described Osborne’s strange behavior before and after the shooting, including bragging that he could have Kennedy killed at any time, shutting off service to Kennedy’s cell phone the day before the murder, failing to ask anyone about Kennedy’s whereabouts after he went missing, and not attending Kennedy’s funeral. Osborne testified on his own behalf and denied any knowledge of Kennedy’s murder. At the conclusion of trial, a jury convicted Osborne of first- degree murder and possession of an instrument of crime (“PIC”).
On January 22, 2007, the trial court imposed a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for first-degree murder, and a concurrent sentence of one to two years’ incarceration for PIC. Osborne did
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not file a direct appeal. He subsequently filed a PCRA petition asking for his appellate rights to be reinstated nunc pro tunc, which the PCRA court granted. This Court affirmed the judgment of sentence, and on May 18, 2010, our Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal. See Commonwealth v. Osbourne, 988 A.2d 726 (Pa. Super. 2009) (unpublished memorandum); appeal denied, 995 A.2d 352 (Pa. 2010).
In 2011, Osborne filed a timely first PCRA petition raising numerous issues of ineffective assistance of counsel. 3 The PCRA court appointed counsel; however, Osborne requested to proceed pro se. After conducting a hearing pursuant to Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998), the PCRA court permitted Osborne to proceed pro se. Ultimately, the PCRA court dismissed the petition as meritless, and this Court affirmed the dismissal order. See Commonwealth v. Osbourne, 159 A.3d 57 (Pa. Super. 2016) (unpublished memorandum). In 2016, Osborne filed a second PCRA petition, which the PCRA court dismissed as untimely, and this Court affirmed the dismissal order. See Commonwealth v. Osborne, 221 A.3d 270 (Pa. Super. 2019) (unpublished memorandum).
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3 Although this was technically Osbourne’s second PCRA petition, the first petition restored his appellate rights, thereby resetting the clock for purposes of the PCRA and calculating the finality of the judgment of sentence. See Commonwealth v. Karanicolas, 836 A.2d 940, 944 (Pa. Super. 2003) (holding that “once an Appellant had permission to and filed his direct appeal nunc pro tunc with this Court, his judgment of sentence was not final for purposes of [the PCRA]”). Therefore, Osborne’s petition filed in 2011 “will be considered a first PCRA petition for timeliness purposes.” Commonwealth v. Turner, 73 A.3d 1283, 1286 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations omitted).
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On September 27, 2022, Osborne filed the instant counseled PCRA petition, his third. He raised two claims of newly discovered evidence: (1) that Jones recanted his testimony in a sworn statement to a private investigator on August 20, 2022;4 and (2) that two detectives who worked on the case, Detective Dominic Mangoni (“Detective Mangoni”) and Detective James Griffin, were under investigation for misconduct. Osborne subsequently filed a counseled amended petition on August 22, 2023, adding a claim that the Commonwealth committed a Brady5 violation by not disclosing two letters Jones wrote to Detective Mangoni from prison in 2004. 6 The Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss the amended petition, and Osborne filed a response in opposition to the Commonwealth’s motion to dismiss. The Commonwealth later withdrew its objection to an evidentiary hearing with respect to the witness recantation and Brady violation, but maintained its position that the PCRA court should dismiss as untimely Osborne’s claim regarding police misconduct. 7
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4 We note that the private investigator dated the statement “8/02/22” at the
top; however, Jones dated each page at the bottom next to his signature as “8/20/22.” In subsequent filings, Osborne uses the 8/20/22 date when referring to the statement.
5 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
6 We note that Osborne discovered these letters when his counsel was permitted to review the police homicide file and the district attorney’s file in July 2023. 7 It appears Osborne abandoned this claim as there is no further mention of
it.
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On June 5, 2025, the PCRA court held an evidentiary hearing. Osborne introduced the two letters Jones wrote to Detective Mangoni in 2004 after he was interviewed by police in connection with Kennedy’s murder. In the first letter, dated June 22, 2004 (“6/22/04 Letter”), Jones asked the detective to help him set up “a payment plan,”8 send him a five-dollar money order, and talk to the “Honorable Rayford Means.” Osborne’s Amended Petition, 8/22/23, at Exhibit 2. In the second letter, dated July 31, 2004 (“7/31/04 Letter”), Jones told the detective that he wanted to move to another facility because other inmates were threatening him and he felt unsafe. He stated that his wife was telling people that he “work[s] for the law” and asked the detective to “get in touch with [her] and close her mouth up” because “she is try[ing] to get me hurt.” Osborne’s Amended Petition, 8/22/23, at Exhibit 3. When asked whether the detective did any of the things that Jones requested, including arranging for Osborne to be transferred to a different facility, defense counsel replied, “We don’t know. . . . I couldn’t find anything . . . on record.” N.T. 6/2/25, at 131, 133.
Osborne further introduced a sworn statement Jones made to a private investigator on August 20, 2022, in which Jones: (1) denied ever giving a statement to police; (2) denied signing a police statement; (3) then admitted that it actually was his signature at the bottom of each page of the police
statement; (4) admitted that some of the information in the police statement
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8 At the time he wrote these letters, Jones was in a work-release program in Delaware due to unpaid child support for his eleven children.
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was correct but that the police had made changes; (5) denied that any deals or favorable treatment were promised to him to give a statement to police or to testify at trial; (6) denied making an identification from a photo array; (7) denied Osborne was the driver of the white van; (8) stated that he felt he had to testify at trial or he “would be in trouble,” but denied anyone threatened him. Osborne’s Amended Petition, 8/22/23, at Exhibit 1.
Osborne then called Jones to testify regarding his police interview and the letters he wrote to Detective Mangoni. Jones testified that in June 2004, detectives picked him up from his work-release facility in Delaware and drove him back to Philadelphia, where police questioned him and he signed a written statement. See N.T., 6/2/25, at 13, 15, 17-18, 24. He stated that he remained in custody overnight and that the police took him to the courtroom the very next day, where he testified against Osborne. See id. at 17-18, 75. Jones further testified that his signed written statement to police was inaccurate, alleging that the police had left sections blank when he signed it and later typed in questions and answers. At the PCRA court’s direction, Jones circled the portions of the statement that he believed were blank when he signed the document. See id. at 48. After reviewing the heavily circled statement, the PCRA court asked Jones several questions about why he circled certain parts, and Jones’ answers were non-responsive. See id. at 52-56. The court then asked Jones to review the statement again and circle the lines he believed were not there when he signed it, warning him that he could be held in contempt for giving false testimony:
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THE COURT: Circle the lines that were blank.
JONES: Mr. Pitts—on that stuff.
THE COURT: What’s that, sir?
JONES: That’s all I can say about it.
THE COURT: Sir, circle the—
JONES: Now I don’t know nobody in the neighborhood.
THE COURT: Sir, you have to answer—
JONES: Now—put me in there for this man like that. Quick—
the corner. He—into something that I don’t know about.
THE COURT: --give me another sheriff, please. The next lie out of your mouth, you’re going to be in jail. I’m asking you a very simple question. I’m not asking if cops lied, if you lied, if he did the murder. I’m only asking you the most simple questions. And you, for the seventh time, don’t get—answer the questions you feel like answering today. You get to answer the questions that the lawyer and I ask you. Do you understand that? Yes or no?
JONES: Yes.
THE COURT: So the next time you do it, the sheriff is going to put you in custody for contempt. Because you don’t get to just scream out stuff you feel like. Do you understand that?
JONES: Yes.
Id. at 56-57.
The PCRA court also questioned the veracity of Jones’ claim that he testified at Osborne’s trial the day after his interview with detectives. The prosecutor informed the court that police had not even arrested Osborne at the time of Jones’ statements to police in 2004, and that Osborne’s trial took
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place more than two years later, in November 2006. The court then asked Jones to explain this discrepancy:
THE COURT: --you told me, “I gave this statement, and they drove me right to the courthouse, and I testified.” Did you not tell me that today under oath?
JONES: Yes.
THE COURT: Is that a true statement?
JONES: Yes. Can I—
THE COURT: How can it be a true statement, in that this man wasn’t even arrested at that point? So there was no courtroom to go testify in. Do you understand that?
JONES: --okay. Can I answer you now?
THE COURT: Oh. Please do.
JONES: Okay. Now when they questioned me and this stuff.
When I came in the courtroom was the very first time I ever seen that man. And I had signed—
THE COURT: That was the next day. Right?
JONES: --Yeah. Then so what year—
THE COURT: How do you explain that that didn’t happen for—
JONES: --was that they brought me up here from Delaware?
THE COURT: --okay.
JONES: They brought me from Delaware. And they took me right—see that man in the courtroom.
* * * *
DEFENSE COUNSEL: How many times did you see the detectives to give a statement?
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JONES: That one morning that they questioned me and everything. And then that’s when I—the next time I seen them, I had met that brother there in the [c]ourt.
THE COURT: The next day.
JONES: Now that’s what I’m saying. How is the dates not adding up?
N.T., 6/2/25, at 70-75. Jones then abruptly changed his testimony and emphatically denied ever testifying at Osborne’s trial. See id. at 106-07 (wherein he stated, “I was not to a jury trial for that man in no kind of way. . . . I have never been to a jury trial.”). When questioned regarding the 6/22/04 and 7/31/04 Letters to Detective Mangoni, Jones denied writing either one. See id. at 80, 84, 96.
The PCRA court found Jones’s testimony to be incredible and rejected his recantation, stating “[T]here is no worse testimony that this. I mean he obviously lied.” Id. at 94. The court further found that, under Brady, the Commonwealth should have disclosed Jones’s letters to the defense. See id. at 216. However, the court determined that the letters were not favorable to Osborne, and therefore did not warrant a new trial. With respect to the 6/22/04 Letter, the court reasoned:
The first one is can you help me have a payment plan? I don’t know a jury is going to find that someone writing a letter saying, “Hey, I’m in jail. Can you help me set up a payment plan so I can pay my obligation? [i]s of such consequence that that person be disbelieved.
So I’ll go to the next two. I’m doing in ascending order.
“Can you give me a $5 money order?” It was never given. Again, I’m not really going to find that asking for a $5 money order that
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was never given so impugns someone[’s] integrity and character that would change their mind.
The third, and last one, that we spent a lot of time on.
Because this would be something that is vital and important. And that the jury could very well have a problem with. And that’s why I spent so much time with it and took breaks. “Could you talk to [Judge] Means for me?” The problem is there was no case to talk to [Judge] Means about. 2004. 2019. I don’t know what he’s talking about.
Id. at 217-18 (paragraph breaks added).
Regarding the 7/31/04 Letter, the court determined that “there was absolutely nothing favorable [to Osborne] in this letter.” Id. at 217. Indeed, the court found that the letter was actually harmful to Osborne:
[Jones is] basically saying, “My wife is telling people I’m cooperating. And it’s getting out that I’m a rat. And they’re threatening me.” . . . I think that’s bad for a [d]efense [c]ounsel to come out. He’s being threatened for giving a statement. That’s really bad for a defendant, not good. “I been threatened. They said the family.” Again, that’s not helping you.”
Id. at 124.
Based on these findings, the PCRA court dismissed Osborne’s petition.
Osborne filed a timely pro se notice of appeal. The PCRA court did not order Osborne to file a concise statement, nor did it author an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925.9 Osborne raises the following issues for our review:
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9 On November 6, 2025, the Court of Judicial Discipline entered an order suspending the Honorable Scott DiClaudio, the PCRA court judge in this matter. See In Re: Judge Scott DiClaudio Court of Common Pleas First Judicial District of Pennsylvania, Dkt. Nos. 1 and 2 JD 2025.
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1. Did the PCRA [c]ourt err as a matter of law, and abuse its discretion, when it determined that [the] Commonwealth’s suppression of the [7/31/04] letter withheld from the defense could not be used for impeachment purposes, as it was not material to the case and did not constitute a Brady violation?
2. Did the PCRA [c]ourt err as a matter of law in misapplying the Brady rule, by applying a heightened standard of review, requiring [Osborne] to prove the Commonwealth witness in this case received favorable treatment?
3. Did the PCRA [c]ourt err as matter of law, and abuse its discretion, in failing to consider cumulative effect and materiality of the withheld evidence?
4. Did the PCRA [c]ourt err as a matter of law, and abuse its discretion, by limiting the scope of [Osborne’s] witness during the PCRA hearing by employing intimidation tactics and threats to have this witness removed or held in contempt for testifying favorabl[y] on [Osborne’s] behalf?
Osborne’s Brief at 4 (issues reordered for ease of review).
Our standard of review of an order dismissing a PCRA petition is well settled:
We review an order dismissing a petition under the PCRA in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA level.
This review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record. We will not disturb a PCRA court’s decision on any grounds if the record supports it. Further, we grant great deference to the factual findings of the PCRA court and will not disturb those findings unless they have no support in the record.
However, we afford no such deference to its legal conclusions.
Where the petitioner raises questions of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review plenary.
Commonwealth v. Ford, 44 A.3d 1190, 1194 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations omitted.
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As a threshold matter, we must determine whether Osborne’s third PCRA petition is timely. Under the PCRA, any petition, including a second or subsequent petition, must be filed within one year of the date the judgment of sentence becomes final. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment of sentence becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court or the Supreme Court of the United States, or at the expiration of time for seeking review. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). The PCRA’s timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in nature, and a court may not address the merits of the issues raised if the PCRA petition was not timely filed. See Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1093 (Pa. 2010).
In the case at bar, this Court affirmed Osborne’s judgment of sentence, and our Supreme Court denied his petition for allowance of appeal on May 10, 2010. Osborne then had ninety days, or until August 10, 2010, to seek review before the United States Supreme Court. He did not do so; therefore, his judgment of sentence became final on August 10, 2010, for purposes of the PCRA. Osborn had until August 10, 2011, to file a timely PCRA petition. Osborne did not file the instant PCRA petition until September 27, 2022. Thus, Osborne’s petition is facially untimely.
However, Pennsylvania courts may consider an untimely PCRA petition if the petitioner explicitly pleads and proves one of three exceptions set forth under section 9545(b)(1):
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(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). A petition invoking one of these exceptions must “be filed within one year of the date the claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).
In his petition, Osborne sought to invoke the newly discovered facts exception. To invoke this exception to the time bar, a petitioner must show that:
he did not know the facts upon which he based his petition and could not have learned those facts earlier by the exercise of due diligence. Due diligence demands that the petitioner take reasonable steps to protect his own interests. A petitioner must explain why he could not have learned the new fact(s) earlier with the exercise of due diligence.
Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 A.3d 171, 176 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted). We emphasize that this exception “does not require any merits analysis of an underlying after-discovered evidence claim.” Id. at 177 (citation omitted).
In his petition, Osborne argued that Jones’ statement to the private investigator constituted newly discovered evidence under section
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9545(b)(1)(ii). See Osborne’s Petition, 9/27/22, at unnumbered 9. Osborne claimed that he did not learn of Jones’ recantation until the private investigator interviewed Jones on August 20, 2022. See id. Osborne attached a copy of Jones’ August 20, 2022 signed statement to his petition. See Osborne’s Petition, 9/27/22, at Exhibit 1. Osborne averred that he could not have learned of the existence of this new fact any earlier through the exercise of due diligence because there was no evidence that “Jones recanted his trial testimony or admitted to anyone that his trial testimony was false at any time before August 20, 2022.” See id.; see also Osborne’s Letter Brief in response to the Commonwealth’s Motion to Dismiss, 4/8/24, at unnumbered 2-4. Thus, he asserted that the instant petition, filed on September 27, 2022, one month after learning about Jones’ recantation, was timely filed. The PCRA court appears to have determined that Osborne successfully pleaded and proved the newly discovered facts exception. 10 After careful review, we conclude that the record supports the PCRA court’s determination that Osborne successfully invoked the newly discovered facts exception. In his petition, Osborne claimed that he learned of Jones’ recantation on August 20, 2022, the date of his interview with the private
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10 As indicated above, the PCRA court did not prepare a Rule 1925(a) opinion,
nor did it provide anywhere in the record a specific ruling on the timeliness of the petition. However, the fact that the PCRA court scheduled the matter for an evidentiary hearing and then ruled on the merits of Osborne’s issues leads us to conclude that the court determined that the petition was timely, and that it therefore had the requisite jurisdiction to rule on the merits of Osborne’s issues. See Albrecht, 994 A.2d at 1093.
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investigator, and that he could not have ascertained this information any earlier through the exercise of due diligence, as Jones had never spoken to anyone about his trial testimony prior to that date. Osborne then filed the instant petition the following month, on September 27, 2022, well within one year of the date the claim could have been presented. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). We therefore conclude that the PCRA court’s determination that Osborne satisfied the PCRA’s timeliness requirements is supported by the record. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9454(b)(1)(ii). Accordingly, we have jurisdiction to review the merits of his claims.
As Osborne’s first, second, and third issues allege Brady violations, we will review them together. To succeed on a Brady claim, a defendant must show that:
(1) the evidence at issue was favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory or because it impeaches; (2) the evidence was suppressed by the prosecution, either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) prejudice ensured. The defendant carries the burden to prove, by reference to the record, that evidence was withheld or suppressed by the prosecution. Additionally, the evidence at issue must have been material evidence that deprived the defendant of a fair trial. Favorable evidence is material and constitutional error results from its suppression by the government, if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1061-62 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citations and quotation marks omitted). “A reasonable probability does not mean that the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence; it means only that the likelihood of a different result
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is great enough to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 353 A.3d 609, 632 (Pa. 2026). In addition, the “materiality of withheld evidence must be considered collectively, not item by item.” Commonwealth v. Natividad, 200 A.3d 11, 39 (Pa. 2019).
Our Supreme Court has further explained that
Brady does not require the disclosure of information “that is not exculpatory but might merely form the groundwork for possible arguments or defense,” nor does Brady require the prosecution to disclose “every fruitless lead” considered during a criminal investigation. The duty to disclose is limited to information in the possession of the government bringing the prosecution, and the duty does extend to exculpatory evidence in the files of police agencies of the government bringing the prosecution. Brady is not violated when the appellant knew, or with reasonable diligence, could have uncovered the evidence in question, or when the evidence was available to the defense from other sources.
Commonwealth v. Roney, 79 A.3d 595, 607 (Pa. 2013) (citations omitted).
Importantly, “[a]ny implication, promise or understanding that the government would extend leniency in exchange for a witness’s testimony is relevant to the witness’s credibility.” Commonwealth v. Burkhardt, 833 A.2d 233, 241 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation omitted). While proof of an “ironclad agreement” between the witness and the government is not required, “simply suggest[ing] that under the circumstances a deal . . . must have been made, without proffering any evidence,” is insufficient to implicate Brady. Commonwealth v. Simpson, 66 A.3d 253, 266 (Pa. Super. 2013); see also Commonwealth v. Strong, 761 A.2d 1167, 1171 (Pa. 2000) (holding that “Brady does not require a signed contract between the
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prosecution and the witness” but a petitioner must show evidence of an “understanding”). In addition, a witness’s “impressions and expectations” of favorable treatment, “without more, cannot trigger the rules laid down in Brady [and its] . . . progeny.” Burkhardt, 833 A.2d at 242-43.
Furthermore, “for a defendant to be entitled to a new trial based on the prosecution’s failure to disclose information relating to a witness’ credibility, the defendant must demonstrate that the reliability of the witness may well be determinative of his guilt or innocence.” Simpson, 66 A.3d at 266 (citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Burkhardt, 833 A.2d at 241 (holding “[i]mpeachment evidence is material, and thus subject to disclosure, if there is a reasonable probability that had it been disclosed the outcome of the proceedings would have been different”).
In his first issue, Osborne argues that the PCRA court abused its discretion when it determined that the Commonwealth did not commit a Brady violation when it withheld the 7/31/04 Letter that Jones sent to Detective Mangoni. He contends that this letter was “classic impeachment evidence because it directly bore on [Jones’s] credibility, bias and motive,” “could have been used to expose personal interest, or expectation of benefit,” and “would have shown the jury [that] Jones [made] numerous requests for favorable treatment.” Osborne’s Brief at 32, 34. He further avers that the letter was “material” because “Jones was the linchpin to the Commonwealth’s case.” Id. at 33.
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In his second issue, Osborne claims that the PCRA court misapplied the Brady rule by requiring Osborne to prove that Jones received favorable treatment in exchange for his testimony against Osborne. He argues that the PCRA court “determined that the undisclosed information constituted impeachment evidence . . . [that was] favorable, as it could be used to attack the credibility of the Commonwealth’s key witness.” Osborne’s Brief at 22 He contends that “the legal analysis should have ended there,” but that the court “wrongfully required [him] to prove something Brady never requires— additional Brady material that the witness actually received a specific benefit, deal or favorable treatment.” Id. Osborne further avers that “[b]y requiring [him] to present additional material to prove actual favorable treatment, the PCRA [c]ourt imposed an unconstitutional “[h]eightened [s]tandard” contrary to [the] Supreme Court and Pennsylvania [p]recedent.” Id. at 25-26.
In his third issue, Osborne argues that the PCRA court failed to consider the cumulative effect and materiality of the withheld evidence. Osborne argues that the PCRA court erred when it “improperly analyzed each piece of withheld evidence in isolation instead of assessing their collective impact on the credibility of the Commonwealth’s key witness and the overall integrity of the verdict.” Osborne’s Brief at 37. He avers that the PCRA court “examined each suppressed item separately [and] evaluat[ed] each letter [and the recantation testimony] individually to determine[] whether ‘by itself’ it would have changed the verdict.” Id. Osborne contends that “the combined impeachment evidence would have reshaped the jury’s understanding of
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Jones’ motive, bias, and how, when read together, the suppressed material create[d] a powerful narrative that [Jones] was seeking help from detectives. . . .” Id. at 37-38.
After careful review, we conclude that all three claims are meritless. As a threshold matter, contrary to the PCRA court’s finding that the Commonwealth should have disclosed the 6/22/04 and 7/31/04 Letters, we conclude that these letters were not material impeachment evidence under Brady requiring disclosure. See Burkhardt, 833 A.2d at 242-43 (holding that a witness’s “impressions or expectations” of favorable treatment, without more, are insufficient to compel disclosure); see also Roney, 79 A.3d at 607 (holding that the Commonwealth is not required to turn over information “that is not exculpatory but might merely form the groundwork for possible arguments or defense”). The record shows Osborne introduced two letters that Jones wrote to Detective Mangoni, in which Jones asked for help with a payment plan, a five-dollar money order, someone to speak with Judge Means, and transfer to a different facility because he was facing threats. These letters, without more, are not favorable to Osborne and do not establish the existence of an “understanding” between Jones and the Commonwealth that would have impacted Jones’s credibility at trial. Osborne produced no evidence that the detective responded to Jones’s letters or complied with his requests in exchange for his testimony. Without actual “evidence of an understanding or promise of leniency regarding testimony,” Jones’s letters are
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not relevant to his credibility and do not implicate Brady. Simpson, 66 A.3d at 266 (citation omitted).
Moreover, even if the letters had been material impeachment evidence, Osborne failed to show that Jones’s reliability as a witness would have been “determinative of his guilt or innocence.” Id. The trial record shows that Jones told the jury about his lengthy criminal history and incarcerated status, which the jury could consider when weighing credibility. Further, contrary to Osborne’s assertion, Jones was not the “linchpin” in the Commonwealth’s case. Osborner’s Brief at 33. In fact, he was one of several witnesses who testified at trial and his testimony was largely duplicative of Pitts’s, whose testimony provided more detail than Jones’. Importantly, Pitts unequivocally identified Osborne, both in a photo array and at trial, as the man who left the murder scene in a white van shortly after the gunshots. In contrast, Jones testified that he did not know the man in the van and chose two photos of similarly looking men from a photo array, one of which was Osborne. Thus, Osborne would not be entitled to a new trial based on the Commonwealth’s failure to disclose the letters since Jones’s testimony and reliability as a witness was not determinative of Osborne’s guilt.
Likewise, we find meritless Osborne’s claim that the PCRA court held him to a “heightened standard” by requiring him to show that Jones actually received favorable treatment from the Commonwealth in exchange for his testimony. As explained above, this was not a “heightened standard;” rather, a PCRA petitioner is required to provide evidence that the witness and the
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Commonwealth had some kind of agreement or understanding. See Simpson, 66 A.3d at 266. Here, Osborne did not present any evidence that Jones entered into an understanding with Detective Mangoni or anyone else with the prosecution. There was no evidence that the Commonwealth granted any of Jones’s requests, and simply showing that Jones made the requests is insufficient. See Burkhardt, 833 A.2d at 243 (holding that a witness’s expectations, without more, does not trigger Brady).
Finally, we reject Osborne’s contention that the PCRA court should have considered the two letters and Jones’s recantation testimony cumulatively. We first note that Jones’ recantation statement was not part of the alleged undisclosed Brady material, therefore the PCRA court was not required to review it cumulatively with the two letters. See Natividad, 200 A.3d at 39. We further determine that Osborne’s claim that the court viewed the effect of each letter in isolation from each other is belied by the record. The PCRA court reviewed the letters one after the other, first finding that “there is absolutely nothing favorable in [the 7/31/04 Letter where Jones felt threatened and asked to be moved]. There [are] probably ten references that are disfavorable [sic]. . . .” N.T., 6/2/26, at 217. The court then immediately reviewed the 6/22/04 Letter, and determined that: (1) asking for help with a payment plan would not affect a witness’s credibility, (2) asking for a five dollar money order, with no proof that the detective gave him the money, did not “impugn someone[‘s] integrity and character,” and (3) asking to talk to Judge Means was irrelevant because Jones did not have any matters pending
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before Judge Means at that time. Id. at 217-19. The two letters, whether viewed separately or together, are not favorable to Osborne and, without more, do not create any kind of “powerful narrative” that would have affected Jones’s credibility in front of the jury. Osborne’s Brief at 38. Thus, as the PCRA court’s determinations are supported by the record, we conclude that no relief is due on Osborne’s first three issues.
In his final issue, Osborne argues that the PCRA court abused its discretion when it threatened to have Jones removed from the courtroom or held in contempt during the evidentiary hearing. It is well settled that Pennsylvania courts “have inherent power and statutory authority to impose summary punishment for direct criminal contempt” which includes “[d]isobedience or neglect by . . . witnesses of or to the lawful process of the court” and “[t]he misbehavior of any person in the presence of the court, thereby obstructing the administration of justice.” Commonwealth v. Outlaw, 306 A.3d 406, 409 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation omitted); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 4132(2), (3). Judges may “warn[] individuals that their conduct is considered contumacious, or may issue warnings to the parties involved in order to permit the individuals to conform their conduct to the norms expected by the trial judge.” Commonwealth v. Pruitt, 764 A.2d 569, 576 (Pa. Super. 2000) (citation omitted).
Osborne argues that the PCRA court “repeatedly cut off the witness while the witness was attempting to recant prior statements and offer testimony favorable to the defense” and that these interruptions “confused . .
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. and intimidated the witness. . . .” Osborne’s Brief at 27-28. He avers that the PCRA court brought in “additional [s]heriffs into the [c]ourtroom [and] went beyond permissible warnings about perjury and instead coerced the witness, effectively chilling his willingness to testify freely.” Id. at 28. Osborne contends that the court’s “threats of incarceration conveyed an unmistakable message that the witness’s recantation was unacceptable” and “rendered the court’s credibility determination unreliable.” Id. at 29.
After careful review, we determine that the PCRA court did not abuse its discretion when it warned Jones that he could be held in contempt for his behavior on the witness stand. The record shows that during the evidentiary hearing, Jones repeatedly refused to answer questions, replied with non- sequiturs, or gave contradictory answers when asked the same question more than once. N.T., 6/2/25, at 20, 45-46, 53-57, 61-72, 74-84, 90-93, 98-100, 106-107. As relayed above, Jones initially claimed that he testified at Osborne’s trial the day after his police interview; however, the trial did not occur until more than two years later. Jones then changed his testimony and denied ever testifying at a jury trial when, in fact, the record confirms that he testified at Osborne’s trial. See id. at 70-75, 106-07. The PCRA court was within its authority to warn Jones that he could be held in contempt or charged with perjury for this demonstrably false testimony. See Pruitt, 764 A.2d at 576.
Furthermore, there is no evidence that the PCRA court admonished Jones for his lack of candor in order to dissuade him from “offer[ing] testimony
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favorable to the defense.” Osborne’s Brief at 27-28. The record shows that Jones testified in an incoherent, contradictory manner from the beginning of his testimony, and that it was not in response to the court’s warnings of contempt. Over the course of the hearing, the PCRA court grew increasingly frustrated with Jones’s ever-changing testimony, stating, “This man should be arrested for giving me perjured, fake testimony. He should be. . . . Because there is no worse testimony than this. I mean he obviously lied.” Id. at 94. As we find no evidence that the PCRA court coerced or intimidated Jones in order to dissuade him from testifying, no relief is due on Osborne’s final issue. Accordingly, we affirm the order dismissing the PCRA petition.
Order affirmed.
Date: 8/25/2026