Com. v. Ortiz, I.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: February 17, 2026
• Docket: 1227 MDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished
• Author: Stabile

Opinion

J-S34006-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : IRIS ORTIZ : : Appellant : No. 1227 MDA 2024

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 14, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at No: CP-36-CR-0003885-2021

BEFORE: STABILE, J., SULLIVAN, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED: FEBRUARY 17, 2026

Appellant, Iris Ortiz, appeals from her judgment of sentence of ten to

twenty years’ imprisonment for aggravated assault under 18 Pa.C.S.A. §

2702(a)(1) and two years’ probation for conspiracy to commit simple assault.

Appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain her aggravated

assault conviction, because (1) she did not stab the victim or act as an

accomplice in her stabbing, and (2) the victim did not suffer serious bodily

injury. We affirm.

Appellant and two codefendants, Sherese Jones and Philip Whitted, were

charged with assaulting the victim, Shonda Seals. Appellant, Jones and

Whitted were tried together before a jury.

The evidence adduced during trial establishes that on the evening of

July 17, 2021, Seals went out with friends and relatives in Lancaster to

commemorate the anniversary of her brother’s death. Seals and her family J-S34006-25

eventually made their way to Prince of Subs, where they stayed until closing

time around 1:30 a.m.

At Prince of Subs, Seals observed Whitted arguing with a woman. This

argument continued outside of the bar. Seals said something to Whitted about

arguing with the women, at which point Whitted became upset with Seals. At

the same time, Seals saw her daughter, Jasmine, confronting Appellant. Seals

struck Appellant because Seals believed that Appellant was preparing to strike

her daughter. At this point, Jones swung at Seals’ daughter. General

argument ensued among the two groups. Appellant pulled up in her silver

four-door vehicle with Whitted in the passenger seat. Jones entered the

backseat of Appellant’s vehicle, and Appellant drove away. N.T. 139-48.

A second confrontation took place slightly over one hour later. Seals

returned to the area of her home, drove around looking for a parking spot,

and eventually parked around the corner from her home on Marshall Avenue

in Lancaster. At 2:45 a.m., while parking her car, Seals was on the phone

with a friend. At this moment, Appellant’s vehicle pulled up next to Seals’

vehicle. Appellant was driving the car and was accompanied by Jones and

Whitted. The window was down in Appellant’s vehicle. Seals heard Appellant

state, “got you, got you” and laugh. Id. at 149-53.

Seals testified as follows about the events that followed. Jones exited

the vehicle and came towards Seals, and a fistfight began between Jones and

Seals. Seals did not see anything in Jones’ hands during the fight. Nor did

Seals hear Jones yell to Appellant or Whitted or ask them to join the fight.

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About two minutes after Jones and Seals began fighting, Appellant and

Whitted exited the vehicle and joined the fight. Seals fell and hit her head,

and Whitted, Jones, and Appellant were on top of her and hitting her. At this

point, while all three defendants were standing over her, Seals felt a pain from

“something other than … a punch.” Id. at 154-55, 197-98.

Seals began walking towards her daughter and could feel that her leg

was wet. She put her hand on her leg and saw her hand covered in blood.

Seals’ daughter called 911 while Seals sat on the steps of her home. Seals

could hear her blood coming down her leg and falling on the ground. Deciding

that Seals could not wait for an ambulance to arrive, Seals’ daughter drove

her to the hospital. Seals was unable to tell which defendant stabbed her, but

she testified that all three defendants were near her at the time she was

stabbed. Id. at 157-64.

The court admitted Dr. John Lee, a surgeon at Lancaster General

Hospital, as an expert witness in the fields of trauma surgery and trauma

medicine. Dr. Lee testified that he treated Seals at the hospital on July 18,

2021, for two lacerations on her buttock and back right upper thigh. Dr. Lee

explained that the size of the wounds established that Seals was stabbed

rather than slashed. Dr. Lee considered Seals to be at the highest level of

trauma due to the mechanism of her injury and her low blood pressure. His

immediate assumption was that Seals was bleeding to death. He also believed

that Seals had a life-threatening injury because her blood pressure was low.

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Due to her low blood pressure, Seals was required to undergo a blood

transfusion. Id. at 378-92.

Appellant testified in her defense. According to Appellant, on the night

of July 17, 2021, she was partying at a bar in Lancaster until around 1:30

a.m. and left the bar alone in her 2007 Chrysler Sebring. She drove past

Prince of Subs and saw Whitted arguing with a group of women. She exited

her vehicle and approached Whitted, began arguing with Seals’ daughter, and

was struck by a hard object, causing her head to bleed. She returned to her

car with Whitted and Jones. The three left Prince of Subs and drove around

Lancaster trying to decide where to take Whitted. While driving, Appellant

saw Seals and pointed her out to Whitted and Jones. Jones jumped out of

Appellant’s vehicle and began fighting Seals. Appellant testified that she

exited her vehicle at the same time1 and joined in the fight. The fight lasted

for about 45 seconds, and Appellant admitted punching Seals’ face and upper

body. Appellant denied stabbing Seals, having a knife, or seeing a knife that

night. Appellant admitted, however, that she never saw Jones get behind

Seals. After the fight, Appellant drove Jones home but could not remember

where she dropped off Whitted. She claimed that she did not find out that

Seals had been stabbed until the police contacted her. Id. at 431-52.

____________________________________________

1 Appellant’s testimony on this point differed from Seals’ testimony. Seals testified that Appellant did not leave the vehicle until two minutes after Jones exited the vehicle.

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Whitted also testified in his defense. He testified that he saw Seals hit

Appellant in the face with a shoe outside Prince of Subs. After leaving Prince

of Subs, he and Jones drove around in Appellant’s car, and Appellant was very

upset about being hit by Seals. Whitted testified that he wanted Appellant to

drop him off, but Appellant told him to wait. Whitted then saw Appellant and

Jones fighting Seals and saw Seals on the ground during the fight. Following

the fight, he heard Appellant and Jones saying “yeah, we fucked that bitch

up.” He did not see who stabbed Appellant, but he testified that he never saw

Jones get behind Seals. Id. at 479-523.

On the final day of trial, the Commonwealth argued that each defendant

could be found guilty for aggravated assault either as an accomplice or as a

co-conspirator. The court charged the jury that it could find each defendant

guilty of aggravated assault on either or both of these theories of liability. Id.

at 648-50. On the separate charge of conspiracy, the court instructed that if

the jury found any defendant guilty of conspiracy, it should specify on the

verdict slip whether the defendant was guilty of conspiracy to commit

aggravated assault or conspiracy to commit simple assault. Id. at 656-57.

The jury found Appellant guilty of aggravated assault (causing serious

bodily injury) and conspiracy to commit simple assault. The jury found Jones

guilty of the same offenses, and it acquitted Whitted of all charges. On August

14, 2024, the court entered sentence. Appellant filed a timely appeal to this

Court, and both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant raises two issues in this appeal:

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1. Whether the trial court erred in accepting the jury’s verdict where the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence to prove Appellant stabbed the complainant or was an accomplice to a stabbing.

2. Whether the trial court erred in accepting the jury’s verdict where the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence the complainant suffered serious bodily injury.

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

Both of Appellant’s arguments are challenges to the sufficiency of the

evidence underlying her conviction for aggravated assault. Appellant does not

challenge her conviction for conspiracy to commit simple assault.

In a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, our standard of review

is

whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all evidence received must be considered. Finally, the finder of fact, while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Smith, 206 A.3d 551, 557 (Pa. Super. 2019).

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The jury found Appellant guilty of aggravated assault under 18 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 2702(a)(1), which provides that a person is guilty of aggravated assault if

he “attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury

intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting

extreme indifference to the value of human life.” Id. Appellant argues that

the evidence failed to satisfy Section 2702(a)(1) because

(1) Seals did not suffer “serious bodily injury”; and

(2) she did not “cause” Seals’ injuries, because there was no proof

that she was the individual who stabbed Seals, and she was not

an accomplice to the stabbing.

We first address whether the evidence demonstrates that Seals suffered

serious bodily injury. The Crimes Code defines “serious bodily injury” as

“bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes

serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the

function of any bodily member or organ.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2301 (emphasis

added). The term “or” in this statute “is disjunctive. It means one or the

other of two or more alternatives.” In Re Paulmier, 937 A.2d 364, 373 (Pa.

2007). “This Court must interpret ‘or’ in its normal disjunctive meaning unless

such an interpretation would produce an absurd result.” Commonwealth v.

Nobles, 198 A.3d 1101, 1110 (Pa. Super. 2018).

Appellant contends that Seals did not suffer serious bodily injury

because she was not stabbed in a vital part of her body, her injuries only

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required stitches, and there was no protracted loss of a bodily member or

permanent disfigurement. Even though these points are correct, they do not

help Appellant’s cause. This is because Section 2301 also defines serious

bodily injury to include “bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of

death.” Id. Evidence that satisfies this phrase is, by itself, sufficient to prove

serious bodily injury due to Section 2301’s disjunctive phrasing.

Here, Dr. Lee, a trauma surgeon, testified that when he treated Seals

on the night of the stabbing, he believed that she was bleeding to death and

that her blood pressure was dangerously low. As a result, Dr. Lee found it

necessary to order a blood transfusion. Construed in the light most favorable

to the Commonwealth, this evidence demonstrates that Seals suffered bodily

injury that created a substantial risk of death, thus satisfying the element of

serious bodily injury. See Commonwealth v. Williamson, 330 A.3d 407,

418 (Pa. Super. 2025) (in appeal from aggravated assault conviction, evidence

was sufficient to prove serious bodily harm where victim suffered blood loss

from stabbing, and trauma surgeon who treated victim testified that knife

wounds to neck could have caused blood loss leading to death).

We turn to Appellant’s argument that she did not “cause” Seals’ injuries

because she did not stab Seals. We acknowledge that the evidence leaves

unclear which defendant stabbed Seals. Nor does the Commonwealth argue

in its brief that Appellant stabbed Seals. The Commonwealth merely states

that Appellant “assaulted” Seals. Commonwealth’s Brief at 11. Nevertheless,

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despite the lack of clarity as to which assailant stabbed Seals, the evidence

establishes Appellant’s guilt as an accomplice to the stabbing.

“A person is an accomplice, and equally liable for the acts of another[,]

if he acts with the intent of promoting or facilitating the commission of an

offense and agrees, aids, or attempts to aid such other person in either

planning or committing that offense.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 339 A.3d

493, 503 (Pa. Super. 2025). The “least degree of concert or collusion in the

commission of the offense is sufficient to sustain a finding of responsibility as

an accomplice.” Id.

Appellant argues that the evidence fails to prove that she was an

accomplice, because “[t]here was no evidence … that Appellant acted with the

intent of promoting a stabbing; no evidence Appellant agreed to stab [] Seals;

no evidence Appellant aided Jones in stabbing [] Seals and no evidence

appellant attempted to aid Jones in stabbing [] Seals.” Appellant’s Brief at

12.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence

demonstrates that even if Jones or Whitted stabbed Seals instead of Appellant,

Appellant was an accomplice to the stabbing. Earlier that night, Appellant,

Jones and Whitted had an altercation with Seals and others at Prince of Subs

in Lancaster. Appellant, Jones and Whitted drove away from Prince of Subs

in Appellant’s car. Appellant was angry that Seals hit her during the

altercation. Over one hour later, while Appellant, Jones and Whitted were

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driving around Lancaster, they saw Seals in her car on Marshall Avenue, and

Appellant exclaimed “got you, got you.” These facts indicate they had been

searching for Seals after leaving Prince of Subs. Appellant and Jones

immediately jumped out of Appellant’s car2 and violently attacked Seals.

Whitted also joined in the attack. Seals was stabbed twice from behind.

Appellant drove Jones home after the attack, and they congratulated each

other by saying “yeah, we fucked that bitch up.”

Whether Jones or Whitted stabbed Seals, the evidence demonstrates

that Appellant, Jones and Whitted searched together for Seals, found Seals

together, attacked Seals together, and left the scene together, pleased with

the outcome. This chain of events demonstrates that Appellant acted in

concert with Jones and is liable for Seals’ stabbing as an accomplice. See

Jones, 339 A.3d at 503 (the “least degree of concert” is sufficient to prove

accomplice liability). Stated another way, the evidence fulfilled the elements

of accomplice liability because Appellant “acted with the intent of promoting

or facilitating the commission of [the stabbing]” and “agree[d], aid[ed], or

attempt[ed] to aid [Jones] in … committing that offense.” Id.; see also

Commonwealth v. Anderson, 2025 WL 845106, *1, 4-5 (Pa. Super., Mar.

2 As discussed above at n.1, the testimony on this point is inconsistent. We resolve this discrepancy in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth by determining that Appellant and Jones left the car at the same time.

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18, 2025) (non-precedential)3 (evidence supported conviction for aggravated

assault on basis of accomplice liability, where defendant accompanied

codefendant to victim’s house, codefendant demanded that victim repair wall

that victim had damaged while defendant stood by silently, codefendant shot

victim, and defendant and codefendant ran away together).

Relying on Commonwealth v. Chambers, 188 A.3d 400 (Pa. 2018),

Appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove that she was an

accomplice. Chambers is distinguishable from this case. In Chambers, the

victim (Wilson) had an argument on the street with the defendant

(Chambers). When the argument began, Chambers was standing next to a

white Jeep, talking to individuals inside the Jeep. A fistfight ensured between

Chambers and Wilson. Chambers pinned Wilson to the ground and began

striking his ribs and midsection. While Wilson was underneath Chambers, a

woman wearing floral-patterned shoes sprayed mace in Wilson’s face. It

appears that this woman had been one of the occupants in the Jeep and had

gotten out of the vehicle to join in the fray. Id., 188 A.3d at 405-06. Wilson

suffered broken ribs, a burned retina, a concussion, and a laceration above

his eye (allegedly from a knife) that required sutures.

The trial court, sitting without a jury, found Chambers guilty of

aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. The trial court determined that the

3 We may cite this Court’s unpublished memoranda filed after May 1, 2019 for

their persuasive value. See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b).

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mace, not the alleged knife, constituted a deadly weapon. On direct appeal,

this Court affirmed Chambers’ judgment of sentence. We held, inter alia, that

Chambers was an accomplice to the mace-spraying woman, because when he

began punching the victim, he prompted the woman to spray mace at Wilson.

Id. at 407.

Our Supreme Court held that the evidence was insufficient to sustain

Chambers’ conviction on the basis of accomplice liability:

[F]or Chambers to have been an accomplice to the floral-shoed, mace-spraying woman, the Commonwealth would have had to prove that he agreed to aid, aided, or attempted to aid her in assaulting Wilson with the mace. We explained above why the record lacks evidence of such an agreement. There is a similar dearth of evidence demonstrating that Chambers aided or attempted to aid the woman. Chambers was in the midst of a fist- fight when the woman began to spray Wilson with the mace. There is no indication in the testimony that Chambers knew she was going to join the fight, knew she had mace, or knew she was going to use the mace. Additionally, Chambers did nothing to assist the woman in deploying the mace. At one point during the melee, Chambers held Wilson to the ground. But the testimonial record establishes only that Chambers did so for the purpose of continuing his own assault upon Wilson, not to facilitate the woman’s aggravated assault.

Id. at 415.

Unlike the present case, the defendant in Chambers did not act in

concert with the mace-spraying woman, since he did not know or anticipate

that she would join the fight or use mace. Id., 188 A.3d at 415. Nor did he

promote, aid or assist the woman’s act of spraying the victim with mace. His

only purpose was to “continu[e] his own assault on Wilson, not to facilitate

the woman’s aggravated assault.” Id. The evidence in the present case, on

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the other hand, demonstrates that Appellant acted in concert with Jones and

Whitted because they searched for Seals together, found Seals together,

attacked Seals together, left the scene together, and congratulated one

another for injuring Seals. The evidence further establishes that Seals was

stabbed twice during the attack. By acting in concert with Jones and Whitted,

Appellant is subject to criminal liability as an accomplice to the stabbing.

For these reasons, we affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 02/17/2026

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