Com. v. O'Neill, S.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania·Decided June 30, 2026·No. 1048 MDA 2025·Unpublished·Bender

Opinion

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

:

STEPHEN MICHAEL O'NEILL :

:

Appellant : No. 1048 MDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 25, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Wyoming County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-66-CR-0000040-2024

BEFORE: BECK, J., NEUMAN, J., and BENDER, P.J.E. MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED JUNE 30, 2026 Stephen Michael O’Neill (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed following his plea of nolo contendere. He challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence. After careful review, we find no abuse of discretion and affirm.

Appellant was charged with multiple sexual offenses involving his minor daughter. On February 5, 2024, Appellant was charged with five counts: aggravated indecent assault without consent, aggravated indecent assault – complainant less than 13, indecent assault without consent, indecent assault – complainant less than 13, and endangering the welfare of children.1 On March 6, 2025, Appellant tendered a plea of nolo contendere to count four of

1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3125(a)(1), 3125(a)(7), 3126(a)(1), 3126(a)(7), and 4304, respectively.

the information, indecent assault, a felony of the third degree.2 The trial court accepted Appellant’s plea and, following Appellant’s evaluation by the Sexual Offender Assessment Board, sentenced Appellant to a term of 18 to 60 months of incarceration, followed by three years of probation, on June 24, 2025.3 Appellant was not deemed to be a sexually violent predator, but was ordered to register for life under the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.15(a)(3) (providing that an offender convicted of indecent assault, a Tier III offense, must register for his or her lifetime). On June 25, 2025, the trial court filed an amended sentencing order, granting Appellant time credit of 534 days on his sentence.4 On July 2, 2025, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion to reconsider his sentence, claiming that his sentence was excessive and asking for a standard range sentence to be imposed. The motion was denied on July 9, 2025. On July 29, 2025, counsel filed a motion for leave to withdraw his appearance on Appellant’s behalf. On July 31, 2025, Appellant filed a pro se

2 The court granted the Commonwealth’s petition to nolle pros the remaining counts on July 18, 2025.

3 The consecutive three-year period of probation was mandatory due to Appellant’s conviction for indecent assault. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9718.5.

4 Appellant’s pro se appeal asserted that it was taken from the denial of his

motion to reconsider his sentence. However, when a court amends the judgment of sentence that was imposed during the period it retains jurisdiction, as occurred here, the direct appeal properly lies from the amended judgment of sentence. See Commonwealth v. Garzone, 993 A/2d 1245, 1254 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2010). We have corrected the caption accordingly.

motion for reconsideration in the trial court along with a pro se notice of appeal. On August 4, 2025, the trial court granted counsel’s request to withdraw and appointed new counsel for this appeal. Both Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant raises the following issue on appeal:

1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by imposing a manifestly excessive sentence, disproportionate to the circumstances, which was placed at the highest level of the aggravated range of the sentencing guidelines, by failing to consider the mitigating circumstances present and to analyze or consider the rehabilitative needs of [Appellant], the impact upon the community, and the actual need for protection of the public under 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 9721(b) of the Pennsylvania Sentencing Code, and, more particularly, by failing to consider [Appellant’s]

characteristics, including his age, military service, gainful employment, mental health issues, and acceptance of responsibility, in contravention of 42 Pa.C.S.[] §§ 9721(b) and 9725, resulting in a sentence that was not individualized?

Appellant’s brief at 4.

Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence. Initially, we note that there is no absolute right to appeal the discretionary aspects of a sentence. Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 812 A.2d 617, 621 (Pa. 2002).

An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:

(1) whether [the] appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether [the] appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code.

Commonwealth v. Morrobel, 311 A.3d 1153, 1156 (Pa. Super. 2024)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, Appellant has sufficiently complied with the requirements for appellate review of his sentence. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and preserved his sentencing claim in his timely post-sentence motion. Appellant’s brief includes the required statement under Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). With respect to whether Appellant has raised a substantial question for our review, we note that “[a] substantial question exists only when the appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. Grays, 167 A.3d 793, 816 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted). We determine on a case-by-case basis whether an appellant has raised a substantial question regarding the discretionary aspects of his sentence. Commonwealth v. Shroat, 272 A.3d 523, 527 (Pa. Super. 2022).

Appellant asserts that his sentence is manifestly excessive and disproportionate to the circumstances of his case because the trial court sentenced him in the aggravated range and because the trial court solely focused upon the seriousness of the offense, ignoring both the factors contained in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b) and certain mitigating factors, including his status as an honorably discharged veteran of the Marine Corps. We have held that these claims raise substantial questions. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. White, 193 A.3d 977, 983 (Pa. Super. 2018) (a substantial question exists where the claim is that the court disregarded the defendant’s rehabilitative

needs)); see also Commonwealth v. Booze, 953 A.2d 1263, 1278 (Pa. Super. 2008) (claim that the sentencing court abused its discretion in imposing an aggravated range sentence based upon its consideration of impermissible sentencing factors is a substantial question). We thus conclude that Appellant has presented a substantial question.

In considering the discretionary aspects of a sentence on review, we note that sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of that discretion. Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 313 A.3d 265, 285 (Pa. Super. 2024). In this context, an abuse of discretion requires the sentencing court to have ignored or misapplied the law, otherwise acted with manifest unreasonableness, or made its decision while exhibiting partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will; a sentence will be affirmed unless the sentencing court’s determination suffers from such a lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous. Id.

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