J-S59003-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee
v.
RICKY LEE OLDS,
Appellant No. 1319 WDA 2014
Appeal from the PCRA Order July 15, 2014 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0006857-1979 CP-02-CR-0007090-1979
BEFORE: BOWES, DONOHUE, AND FITZGERALD,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED OCTOBER 27, 2015
Ricky Lee Olds appeals from the July 15, 2014 PCRA order denying
him relief. We affirm.
On April 2, 1980, Appellant was found guilty of second-degree murder,
robbery, and conspiracy based on a crime that he committed when he was
fourteen years old. On October 9, 1979, Appellant was riding around
Pittsburgh with Claude Bonner and Tommy Allen, who was armed. Allen
decided to rob Fort Wayne Cigar Store located on Western Avenue,
Pittsburgh. Appellant agreed with this plan.
It was approximately 3:45 a.m. when the three cohorts arrived at the
store. Allen and Appellant entered in time to see Thomas Bietler make a
cash purchase, and he appeared to possess a significant amount of money.
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-S59003-15
Allen and Appellant followed Bietler from the store. The store clerk heard a
shot and went outside. The clerk saw Allen shoot Mr. Bietler twice more
while the victim was holding out his wallet and telling Allen to take it. The
three co-conspirators fled the scene.
On April 28, 1981, Appellant was sentenced to a mandatory term of
life imprisonment without parole (“LWOP”) based upon his second-degree
murder conviction. On November 25, 1983, we affirmed the judgment of
sentence. Commonwealth v. Olds, 469 A.2d 1072 (Pa.Super. 1983).
Appellant litigated his first request for post-conviction relief, which was
counseled, through the trial and appellate courts from 1984 through 1992.
During that proceeding, the court denied relief, we reversed, and our
Supreme Court reversed this Court, reinstating the denial of post-conviction
relief.
Appellant filed his second petition collaterally attacking his judgment of
sentence on July 13, 2010. Therein, he contended that his sentence was
unconstitutional under Graham v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 3011 (2010), which
held that a sentence of LWOP for non-homicide juvenile offenders was
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. Relief was denied, we
affirmed, and our Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal.
Commonwealth v. Olds, 32 A.3d 845 (Pa.Super. 2011) (unpublished
memorandum).
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Appellant filed a third PCRA petition on August 20, 2012, seeking relief
from his sentence under Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012), which
held that a mandatory sentence of LWOP could not be imposed upon juvenile
homicide offenders. Counsel was appointed. The PCRA court stayed the
PCRA proceeding until the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled on whether
Miller would be given full retroactive effect to PCRA petitioners. Our
Supreme Court decided that Miller would not be so applied in
Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2013). The PCRA court
dismissed the PCRA petition, and this appeal followed.
We summarize the positions presented by Appellant on appeal: 1) he
should have been granted leave to amend his PCRA petition; 2) his sentence
is unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits imposition
of a mandatory term of LWOP on juvenile homicide offenders; 3) Appellant is
entitled to relief in the interest of justice; 4) Miller should be applied
retroactively under the Pennsylvania Constitution; and 5) Appellant should
be able to pursue habeas corpus relief.
When reviewing “an order denying collateral relief under the PCRA,”
we must “determine whether evidence of record supports the findings of the
PCRA court and whether its legal conclusions are free of error.
Commonwealth v. Burton, 2015 WL 50762842015, at *2 (Pa.Super. 2015)
(en banc) (citation omitted). PCRA petitions must be filed within the time
parameters outlined in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545. Specifically, any PCRA petition
-3- J-S59003-15
must be filed within one year of when the PCRA petitioner’s judgment of
sentence became final. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). The PCRA's time
restrictions are jurisdictional in nature. Commonwealth v. Chester, 895
A.2d 520 (Pa. 2006). We therefore first must determine if a PCRA petition
was timely filed before we address a substantive claim. See
Commonwealth v. Stokes, 959 A.2d 306 (Pa. 2008).
A judgment of sentence becomes final at the conclusion of direct
review or the time for seeking direct review. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3).
Appellant’s ability to pursue direct review was concluded in 1984, and the
present, 2012 petition is obviously untimely. There are three exceptions to
this one-year time bar, and the one invoked by Appellant was the third one:
“the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the
Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court
to apply retroactively.” 42 Pa.C.S. 9545(b)(1)(iii). Miller recognized an
Eighth Amendment constitutional right in juveniles that prevented them from
being automatically sentenced to a mandatory term of LWOP. Thus, Miller
created a new constitutional right. However, the second aspect of this
exception cannot be invoked by Appellant because that right has not been
held by either the United States Supreme Court or the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court to apply retroactively. Indeed, Cunningham ruled to the
contrary.
-4- J-S59003-15
Appellant’s first position is that he should have been permitted to
amend his PCRA petition. The flaw in this request is that Appellant fails to
delineate precisely what exception to the one-year time bar that he would
invoke in any amended PCRA petition. This omission is fatal to our ability to
grant relief in that the PCRA specifically requires a PCRA petitioner to plead
and prove an applicable exception to the one year time bar in order to
invoke the court’s jurisdiction. The PCRA court’s failure to allow the
amendment of a PCRA petition does “not warrant reversal where the claim is
record-based and our review indicates that the issue does not fall within a
timeliness exception.” Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462 (Pa.Super.
2013). As that is the case herein, the PCRA court correctly denied
Appellant’s request to amend his untimely 2012 PCRA petition.
Appellant’s second position is that Miller should be applied
retroactively under principles applied under the Pennsylvania constitution.
As we articulated in Commonwealth v. Seskey, 86 A.3d 237 (Pa.Super.
2014), only a decision by the United States Supreme Court or the
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J-S59003-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee
v.
RICKY LEE OLDS,
Appellant No. 1319 WDA 2014
Appeal from the PCRA Order July 15, 2014 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0006857-1979 CP-02-CR-0007090-1979
BEFORE: BOWES, DONOHUE, AND FITZGERALD,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED OCTOBER 27, 2015
Ricky Lee Olds appeals from the July 15, 2014 PCRA order denying
him relief. We affirm.
On April 2, 1980, Appellant was found guilty of second-degree murder,
robbery, and conspiracy based on a crime that he committed when he was
fourteen years old. On October 9, 1979, Appellant was riding around
Pittsburgh with Claude Bonner and Tommy Allen, who was armed. Allen
decided to rob Fort Wayne Cigar Store located on Western Avenue,
Pittsburgh. Appellant agreed with this plan.
It was approximately 3:45 a.m. when the three cohorts arrived at the
store. Allen and Appellant entered in time to see Thomas Bietler make a
cash purchase, and he appeared to possess a significant amount of money.
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-S59003-15
Allen and Appellant followed Bietler from the store. The store clerk heard a
shot and went outside. The clerk saw Allen shoot Mr. Bietler twice more
while the victim was holding out his wallet and telling Allen to take it. The
three co-conspirators fled the scene.
On April 28, 1981, Appellant was sentenced to a mandatory term of
life imprisonment without parole (“LWOP”) based upon his second-degree
murder conviction. On November 25, 1983, we affirmed the judgment of
sentence. Commonwealth v. Olds, 469 A.2d 1072 (Pa.Super. 1983).
Appellant litigated his first request for post-conviction relief, which was
counseled, through the trial and appellate courts from 1984 through 1992.
During that proceeding, the court denied relief, we reversed, and our
Supreme Court reversed this Court, reinstating the denial of post-conviction
relief.
Appellant filed his second petition collaterally attacking his judgment of
sentence on July 13, 2010. Therein, he contended that his sentence was
unconstitutional under Graham v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 3011 (2010), which
held that a sentence of LWOP for non-homicide juvenile offenders was
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. Relief was denied, we
affirmed, and our Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal.
Commonwealth v. Olds, 32 A.3d 845 (Pa.Super. 2011) (unpublished
memorandum).
-2- J-S59003-15
Appellant filed a third PCRA petition on August 20, 2012, seeking relief
from his sentence under Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012), which
held that a mandatory sentence of LWOP could not be imposed upon juvenile
homicide offenders. Counsel was appointed. The PCRA court stayed the
PCRA proceeding until the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled on whether
Miller would be given full retroactive effect to PCRA petitioners. Our
Supreme Court decided that Miller would not be so applied in
Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2013). The PCRA court
dismissed the PCRA petition, and this appeal followed.
We summarize the positions presented by Appellant on appeal: 1) he
should have been granted leave to amend his PCRA petition; 2) his sentence
is unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits imposition
of a mandatory term of LWOP on juvenile homicide offenders; 3) Appellant is
entitled to relief in the interest of justice; 4) Miller should be applied
retroactively under the Pennsylvania Constitution; and 5) Appellant should
be able to pursue habeas corpus relief.
When reviewing “an order denying collateral relief under the PCRA,”
we must “determine whether evidence of record supports the findings of the
PCRA court and whether its legal conclusions are free of error.
Commonwealth v. Burton, 2015 WL 50762842015, at *2 (Pa.Super. 2015)
(en banc) (citation omitted). PCRA petitions must be filed within the time
parameters outlined in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545. Specifically, any PCRA petition
-3- J-S59003-15
must be filed within one year of when the PCRA petitioner’s judgment of
sentence became final. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). The PCRA's time
restrictions are jurisdictional in nature. Commonwealth v. Chester, 895
A.2d 520 (Pa. 2006). We therefore first must determine if a PCRA petition
was timely filed before we address a substantive claim. See
Commonwealth v. Stokes, 959 A.2d 306 (Pa. 2008).
A judgment of sentence becomes final at the conclusion of direct
review or the time for seeking direct review. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3).
Appellant’s ability to pursue direct review was concluded in 1984, and the
present, 2012 petition is obviously untimely. There are three exceptions to
this one-year time bar, and the one invoked by Appellant was the third one:
“the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the
Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court
to apply retroactively.” 42 Pa.C.S. 9545(b)(1)(iii). Miller recognized an
Eighth Amendment constitutional right in juveniles that prevented them from
being automatically sentenced to a mandatory term of LWOP. Thus, Miller
created a new constitutional right. However, the second aspect of this
exception cannot be invoked by Appellant because that right has not been
held by either the United States Supreme Court or the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court to apply retroactively. Indeed, Cunningham ruled to the
contrary.
-4- J-S59003-15
Appellant’s first position is that he should have been permitted to
amend his PCRA petition. The flaw in this request is that Appellant fails to
delineate precisely what exception to the one-year time bar that he would
invoke in any amended PCRA petition. This omission is fatal to our ability to
grant relief in that the PCRA specifically requires a PCRA petitioner to plead
and prove an applicable exception to the one year time bar in order to
invoke the court’s jurisdiction. The PCRA court’s failure to allow the
amendment of a PCRA petition does “not warrant reversal where the claim is
record-based and our review indicates that the issue does not fall within a
timeliness exception.” Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462 (Pa.Super.
2013). As that is the case herein, the PCRA court correctly denied
Appellant’s request to amend his untimely 2012 PCRA petition.
Appellant’s second position is that Miller should be applied
retroactively under principles applied under the Pennsylvania constitution.
As we articulated in Commonwealth v. Seskey, 86 A.3d 237 (Pa.Super.
2014), only a decision by the United States Supreme Court or the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court to render a new constitutional right retroactive
is sufficient to invoke the third exception contained in § 9545((b)(1)(iii) to
the one-year filing deadline for a PCRA petition. This Court cannot afford a
PCRA petitioner relief from § 9545(b) by finding that Miller is retroactive
under the Pennsylvania Constitution. Hence, this averment does not afford
Appellant relief in this Court.
-5- J-S59003-15
Appellant’s third assertion is that relief should be granted in the
interest of justice. We do not have jurisdiction in this matter unless
Appellant is able to successfully invoke an exception to the one-time
limitation on his ability to seek PCRA relief. Additionally, the PCRA does not
permit the courts “to fashion ad hoc equitable exceptions to the PCRA time-
bar in addition to those exceptions expressly delineated in the Act.”
Commonwealth v. Watts, 23 A.3d 980, 983 (Pa. 2011); accord
Commonwealth v. Harris, 972 A.2d 1196, 1199 (Pa.Super. 2009) (it is
settled that “there is no generalized equitable exception to the jurisdictional
one-year time bar pertaining to post-conviction petitions”) (citation omitted).
Since we lack jurisdiction over this PCRA petition, we cannot grant
Appellant’s request for relief in the interests of justice.
Appellant also claims that he should be permitted to file a habeas
corpus petition. It is beyond cavil that the PCRA is the sole avenue for
seeking post-conviction relief unless that statute could not provide a
potential remedy for the wrong for which the defendant seeks redress.
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462 (Pa.Super. 2013). A defendant
cannot avoid the PCRA’s time bar by framing his relief as one sounding in
habeas corpus.
In this case, Appellant is asking for relief from a sentence, LWOP, that
he asserts is unconstitutional. The PCRA provides relief for illegal sentences,
42 Pa.C.S. § 9542 (the PCRA creates an avenue by which “persons serving
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illegal sentences may obtain collateral relief”), and Appellant’s claim is
cognizable under the PCRA. Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214 (Pa.
1999); Taylor, supra. Hence, it must be raised in a timely PCRA petition.
Fahy, supra. Since Miller has not been held to be retroactive by the
United States Supreme Court or the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, this
petition does not fall within an exception to the one-year time bar, and the
PCRA court correctly dismissed it. Appellant cannot file a habeas corpus
petition because his claim for relief is cognizable under the PCRA, and he
cannot presently invoke an exception to the one-year time bar. Hence, we
reject his fourth position.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 10/27/2015
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