J-S06024-23
2024 PA Super 127
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : ISAIAH SCOTT NEWTON : No. 1283 MDA 2022
Appeal from the Order Entered August 22, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Columbia County Criminal Division at No: CP-19-CR-0000310-2022
BEFORE: STABILE, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
OPINION BY STABILE, J.: FILED: JUNE 17, 2024
The Commonwealth appeals from an order granting, in part, the habeas
corpus motion of Appellee, Isaiah Scott Newton, and dismissing the charge of
first-degree murder on the ground that the Commonwealth failed to present
prima facie evidence of Appellee’s specific intent. The evidence adduced
during the habeas corpus hearing demonstrates that following an altercation
on the street, Appellee entered a nearby residence, retrieved a large kitchen
knife, returned to the street, and stabbed the victim so deeply in his left arm
that his brachial artery and vein were completely severed, resulting in the
victim’s death. Accepted as true, the totality of this evidence constitutes
prima facie evidence of Appellee’s specific intent to kill the victim and entitles
the Commonwealth to proceed to prosecute Appellee for first-degree murder.
Accordingly, we reverse the portion of the order dismissing the first-degree
murder charge and remand for further proceedings. ____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-S06024-23
On February 12, 2022, Appellee was arrested and charged with
homicide, aggravated assault, and tampering with physical evidence.
Following a preliminary hearing on April 12, 2022, Appellee was held for court
on all charges.
On May 19, 2022, the Commonwealth filed a criminal information.
Count 1 of the information charged Appellee with an open count of homicide,
that is, a count including first-degree murder, second-degree murder, third-
degree murder, voluntary manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter. On
June 22, 2022, Appellee filed a habeas corpus motion seeking dismissal of
Count 1 of the information.1
On August 22, 2022, the court convened an evidentiary hearing on
Appellee’s habeas corpus motion. The evidence demonstrated that at
approximately 11:26 p.m. on Friday, February 11, 2022, Berwick Borough
police officers were dispatched to 1542 Fairview Avenue for a report of
potential shots fired. N.T., 8/22/22, at 5-6. Upon their arrival, they
discovered a large amount of blood at the intersection of Eaton Street and an
unnamed alley, with a fresh blood trail leading behind the rear of 1542
Fairview Avenue. Id. at 7. Patrol officers removed six occupants from the
house at this address, including Appellee. Id. at 10-11. None of these
individuals had any apparent injuries. Id. at 19. As the officers attempted to
identify the source of the blood, they received notice that an injured male had ____________________________________________
1 Appellee did not move to dismiss the charges of aggravated assault or tampering with physical evidence.
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arrived in an emergency room at a nearby hospital. Id. at 12. The victim,
Frederick James McConnell, died despite attempts to save him. Id. at 40.
An autopsy determined that the cause of death was a stab wound to the
victim’s left bicep that “completely severed” the brachial artery and vein,
causing blood loss, and that the manner of death was homicide. Id. at 27-
29. The brachial artery is a major artery that is part of the circulatory system,
which is necessary for life. Id. at 37.
Detective Greg Martin responded directly to the hospital and observed
the deceased victim as well as Jamal Butler, who had driven the victim to the
hospital. Id. at 47. Detective Martin observed large amounts of blood inside
and around the outside of the vehicle. Id. at 48. Butler stated that the victim
was unable to drive himself to the hospital, and that he, Butler, helped the
victim from the driver’s side of the car to the passenger’s side and drove the
victim to the hospital. Id. at 54.
Appellee received Miranda warnings at the police station and consented
to a recorded interview by Detectives Martin and Rafferty. Id. at 50. Appellee
stated that there had been an altercation outside; he did not state what the
altercation was about. Id. Appellee admitted that after the altercation, he
went inside the house, retrieved a knife from the kitchen, returned outside,
and stabbed the victim one time. Id. He said that the knife had a red handle
and that he placed it in the kitchen sink after the stabbing. Id. at 51-52. The
police found a knife fitting this description in the sink. Id. There were no
visible signs of blood on the knife, and its tip appeared to be broken off. Id.
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at 52. The tip was not located, and the knife later tested positive for the
presence of blood. Id.
Detective Martin testified that upon subsequent inspection of the vehicle
at a secured location, he observed a puncture on the metal roof above the
driver’s door consistent with the knife blade. Id. at 55-58; see id. at 58 (“the
size of the impact with the roof line is well within the realm of the knife . . .
recovered from the scene”). Based on the detective’s blood spatter training,
he testified that the distinctive blood pattern around the puncture appeared
to be “cast” or high velocity spatter different from the other blood that came
directly from the victim’s injury. Id. at 57-58. This indicated to him that
there were at least two stabbing motions: the first that struck the victim and
the second that struck the car where blood already on the knife was
transferred onto the roof near the puncture. Id. at 58-59. The section of the
roof with the puncture was cut off, and at the time of the hearing, it was being
tested for tool marks in comparison with the knife. Id. at 58.
On the same day as the hearing, the court entered an opinion and order
granting Appellee’s habeas corpus motion in part and dismissing the charges
of first- and second-degree murder.2 On September 9, 2022, the
Commonwealth appealed to this Court, certifying in the notice of appeal that
the court’s order will substantially handicap the prosecution of this case.
____________________________________________
2 The Commonwealth does not appeal the portion of the order dismissing the
second-degree murder charge.
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Accordingly, we have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
311(d).
On September 13, 2022, the court ordered the Commonwealth to file a
concise statement of errors complained of on appeal within the next thirty
days. On October 9, 2022, the Commonwealth filed a concise statement
arguing, inter alia, that the evidence was sufficient to proceed to trial on first-
degree murder. On October 11, 2022, the court filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925 opinion
incorporating its August 22, 2022 opinion by reference. The court further
observed:
[I]t is clear that this court’s dismissal of the first-degree murder charge was primarily based on the uncontradicted evidence presented by the Commonwealth at the hearing that the victim died as a result of a single stab wound to the upper left arm, that a layperson like [Appellee] would not have been aware of the anatomy which included the [brachial] artery and vein, and that the upper arm is not a “vital organ” (See: Discussion regarding Commonwealth v. Predmore, [] 199 A.3d 925 (2018) [(en banc)]). Absent the use of a deadly weapon on a vital organ, the Commonwealth had no evidence of a specific intent to kill. Retrieving a knife from a kitchen, as [Appellee] did, in itself, does not evidence a specific intent to kill any more than the defendant in Predmore bringing a gun to that altercation.
Pa.R.A.P. 1925 Opinion, 10/11/22, at 1.
The Commonwealth raises the following issues in this appeal:
1. Did the trial court err in dismissing the first-degree murder charge by failing to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth when, in a habeas corpus hearing, the Commonwealth presented evidence that [Appellee] retrieved a large kitchen knife from inside a residence, returned to the victim’s location, and fatally stabbed the victim?
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2. Did the trial court err in permitting defense counsel, over the Commonwealth’s objections, to question Commonwealth witnesses regarding inadmissible hearsay statements of [Appellee] and on matters beyond the scope of direct examination?
3. Did the trial court err in concluding in its opinion that “there was a claim of self-defense” at the habeas corpus hearing where no competent evidence supported such a finding, and the affirmative defense of self-defense is immaterial in a habeas corpus hearing?
Commonwealth’s Brief at 7.
In its first issue, which we find dispositive, the Commonwealth asserts
that the court erred in granting Appellee’s habeas corpus petition and
dismissing the charge of first-degree murder due to lack of evidence of specific
intent. A petition for writ of habeas corpus is the correct method for testing
whether the Commonwealth has, prior to trial, established a prima facie case.
Commonwealth v. Karlson, 674 A.2d 249, 251 (Pa. Super. 1996). The
prima facie hurdle is less demanding than the Commonwealth’s burden at trial
of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. McBride,
595 A.2d 589, 591 (Pa. 1991). “[A] prima facie case exists when the
Commonwealth produces evidence of each of the material elements of the
crime charged and establishes probable cause to warrant the belief that the
accused committed the offense.” Commonwealth v. Perez, 249 A.3d 1092,
1102 (Pa. 2021). “Furthermore, the evidence need only be such that, if
presented at trial and accepted as true, the judge would be warranted in
permitting the case to be decided by the jury.” Id. When determining
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whether a prima facie case has been established, we must view the evidence
in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, giving effect to all inferences
reasonably drawn from the evidence to support a verdict of guilt.
Commonwealth v. Huggins, 836 A.2d 862, 866 (Pa. 2002).
The evidentiary sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s prima facie case is a
question of law over which our standard of review is de novo and the scope of
review is plenary. Perez, 249 A.3d at 1102. We review a decision to grant
the defendant’s habeas corpus petition by examining the evidence and
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth.
Commonwealth v. Dantzler, 135 A.3d 1109, 1111 (Pa. Super. 2016) (en
banc).
An individual commits first-degree murder when he intentionally kills
another human being; an intentional killing is defined as a “willful, deliberate
and premeditated killing.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2501, 2502(a), (d). To sustain a
conviction for first-degree murder, the Commonwealth must prove that: (1) a
human being was unlawfully killed; (2) the accused was responsible for the
killing; and (3) the accused acted with malice and a specific intent to kill.
Commonwealth v. Ballard, 80 A.3d 380, 390 (Pa. 2013). Specific intent
may be formed in an instant, Commonwealth v. Mollett, 5 A.3d 291, 313
(Pa. Super. 2010), and it can be discerned from the conduct and attending
circumstances that show the perpetrator’s state of mind. Commonwealth v.
Gonzalez, 858 A.2d 1219, 1223 (Pa. Super. 2004).
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A factfinder may presume the intent to kill “based on the accused’s use
of a deadly weapon on a vital part of the victim’s body,” Ballard, 80 A.3d at
390, or in the “general area in which vital organs are located.”
Commonwealth v. Padgett, 348 A.2d 87, 88 (Pa. 1975). The deadly
weapon presumption is a presumption of fact founded on human experience,
since “one does not normally use a deadly weapon on a vital part of another’s
body unless he intends to kill.” Commonwealth v. O’Searo, 352 A.2d 30,
37 (Pa. 1976). As a presumption of fact, the deadly weapon presumption “is
nothing more than a prima facie inference” of intent. Id.
We caution, however, that while a specific intent to kill may be inferred
using a deadly weapon on a vital part of another’s body, the absence of the
use of a deadly weapon against a vital part of the victim’s body does not
necessarily preclude a finding of specific intent to kill; it only precludes the
use of the deadly weapon presumption. Commonwealth v. Kluska, 3 A.2d
398, 402 (Pa. 1939). In the absence of the presumption, the Commonwealth
may still prove specific intent through other evidence. “The only requirement
is that there be sufficient evidence to justify the jury’s verdict which imports
a finding of specific intent to kill.” Commonwealth v. Gidaro, 70 A.2d 359,
362 (Pa. 1950) (citing Commonwealth v. Logan, 63 A.2d 28 (Pa. 1949)).
This point is amply demonstrated in Commonwealth v. Wyche, 467 A.2d
636 (Pa. Super. 1983).
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In Wyche, two men began shooting at the victim and his friend while
they were on their way to pick up pizza. They successfully ran away, but a
short time later were confronted by another man, the defendant. As they
began to run again, the defendant shot at them. The victim was shot three
times, once in the right thigh, once in the right hand, and once in the pelvic
area through the right buttock. He died of bleeding caused by the latter bullet,
which damaged major blood vessels and internal organs after entry. The
defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of
first-degree murder, since no specific intent to kill could be inferred from a
bullet shot into the buttocks. We rejected this argument, stating that all direct
and circumstantial evidence, and all reasonable inferences arising therefrom,
accepted as true, revealed that the defendant aggressively attacked the
victim, shooting four shots, three of which hit their target. Although the fatal
slug entered the victim through the buttock, the jury could properly infer the
specific intent to kill from these circumstances. Id., 467 A.2d at 637 (citing
Commonwealth v. Padgett, 348 A.2d 87 (Pa. 1975)). Thus, without
deciding whether the deadly weapon presumption was applicable, we still
concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support a specific intent to kill.
Presently, the trial court granted habeas relief on the charge of first-
degree murder on the following grounds: (1) the uncontradicted evidence was
that the victim died as a result of a single stab wound to the upper left arm,
(2) a layperson like Appellee would not have been aware of the anatomy of
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the upper arm, which included the brachial artery and vein, and (3) the upper
arm is not a “vital organ”. The court concluded that absent the use of a deadly
weapon on a vital organ, there was no evidence of a specific intent to kill. Our
discussion above demonstrates that the court erred by not fully considering
the totality of the Commonwealth’s evidence. The law provides that even in
the absence of the presumption, a specific intent to kill may be inferred when
the totality of the evidence and reasonable inferences arising therefrom are
properly considered. Gidaro, Wyche, supra.
In this case, the evidence adduced during the habeas corpus hearing,
accepted as true, demonstrates that Appellee fatally stabbed the victim with
a kitchen knife in his left arm, severing the brachial artery, during the second
confrontation on the street. Plausibly, the deadly weapon presumption may
apply on the ground that the brachial artery was a vital part of the victim’s
body. Even assuming that the deadly weapon presumption does not apply,
other evidence introduced during the habeas corpus hearing, viewed in its
totality, constitutes prima facie evidence of Appellee’s specific intent to kill.
First, the sequence of events leading up to the fatal attack indicates that
Appellee harbored the intent to kill the victim. After Appellee and the victim
had their initial confrontation on the street, Appellee then walked into the
house and retrieved a deadly weapon (the kitchen knife), returned to the
street, and then confronted the victim for a second time and inflicted the fatal
wound. When, as here, the defendant procures a deadly weapon and brings
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it from some distance to the scene of a fatal attack, the factfinder may infer
that the defendant planned to commit murder. See Commonwealth v.
Pursell, 495 A.2d 183, 187 (Pa. 1985) (“[s]ince the victim was assaulted with
a rock [that the defendant] carried two hundred feet from its natural resting
place, the jury could conclude that the killing was premeditated”).
Second, Appellee killed the victim by stabbing him at close range. As
our Supreme Court recently observed, “the intimacy involved in stabbing one’s
victim to death clearly indicates malice and specific intent.” Ballard, 80 A.3d
at 390.
Third, Detective Martin testified that the puncture on the roof appeared
consistent with the knife blade used to kill the victim. He stated that the
distinctive blood pattern around the roof puncture appeared to be “cast” or
high velocity spatter different from the other blood that came directly from
the victim’s injury. From these facts, the detective deduced that Appellee
made at least two stabbing motions: the first that struck the victim and the
second that transferred the victim’s blood from the knife blade to the car. The
fact that Appellee made multiple stabbing motions is indicative of his intent to
commit murder. Accepted as true, the detective’s testimony of two stabbing
motions and blood on the roof puncture demonstrates that Appellee first
stabbed the victim and then pierced the roof in a second attempt to stab the
victim.
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Fourth and finally, after the stabbing, Appellee exited the scene, cleaned
off the knife, and left it in the kitchen sink inside the house, details that show
Appellee’s consciousness of guilt. Commonwealth v. Taylor, 2021 WL
4453459, *4 (Pa. Super., Sep. 29, 2021)3 (where defendant fatally stabbed
victim, left their apartment, and threw murder weapon onto roof of apartment
building, such evidence was consciousness of guilt and may form the basis of
a conviction along with other evidence from which guilt may be inferred);
Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 858 A.2d 1219, 1223 (Pa. Super. 2004)
(actions that attempt to conceal crime or destroy evidence are admissible to
prove malice in first degree murder case and to show consciousness of guilt).
Notably, Appellee also was held for court at the preliminary hearing on a
charge of tampering with evidence of a crime which the trial court did not
dismiss after the habeas corpus hearing.
The totality of evidence presented against Appellee distinguishes this
case from Predmore, a decision relied upon by the trial court in its Rule 1925
opinion and in this Court by the learned dissent. In Predmore, a woman’s
current and former boyfriends had an argument in a parking lot outside the
woman’s residence. The current boyfriend (the defendant) retrieved a gun
from his vehicle in the parking lot and fired three shots at the former
boyfriend, two of which struck his calves. This Court affirmed the trial court’s
3 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (non-precedential memoranda of Superior Court filed
after May 1, 2019 may be cited for their persuasive value).
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order granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge of attempted
murder for failure to present prima facie evidence of specific intent. The
majority reasoned, despite vigorous dissents:
When we review evidence in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we are not obliged to outright ignore undisputed evidence so as to strengthen the reasonableness of inferences we draw from the remaining evidence. Instead, we review all of the evidence, and ascertain whether certain inferences suggested by the Commonwealth are reasonable; that is, whether it is reasonable to permit a jury to conclude that Appellee possessed the specific intent to kill [the former boyfriend] in the unique circumstances of this case. In this regard, the Commonwealth essentially asks this Court to ignore: the victim’s unprovoked instigation of a confrontation with the new boyfriend of his ex- girlfriend, the complete lack of any verbal expression of intent to kill by Appellee despite the scuffle that occurred before the shooting, and the near impossibility of Appellee’s missing any area near a vital portion of the victim’s body from the range at which he fired, but for an intent to scare or harm that fell short of specific intent to kill. To ask a jury to find that Appellee possessed the specific intent to kill in these circumstances is tantamount to asking them to rest a verdict on mere speculation or conjecture that Appellee just happens to be the world’s worst shot, or that the victim only escaped more serious injury due to divine intervention. While not impossibilities in the strictest sense, such inferences are simply not reasonable in the unique circumstances of this case.
Id., 199 A.3d at 934.
Multiple distinctions exist between the present case and Predmore. All
events in Predmore took place in the same location, a parking lot, and in
rapid sequence. In the present case, the events were more drawn out and at
more than one location. An initial confrontation between Appellee and the
victim took place in the street. Then, Appellee left the street, went into the
residence, procured a knife from the kitchen, returned to the street, and
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stabbed the victim. Given this more protracted chain of events, Appellee’s
decision to attack the victim could be deemed more deliberate and cold-
blooded, raising a stronger inference of specific intent than in Predmore.
Further, unlike in Predmore, Appellee committed a stabbing at close range.
As we said above, “the intimacy involved in stabbing one’s victim to death
clearly indicates malice and specific intent.” Ballard, 80 A.3d at 390.
Additionally, Predmore expressly acknowledged that damage to a major
blood vessel by a deadly weapon constitutes a wound to the victim’s vital part
for purposes of the intent presumption. Id. at 934. While that injury did not
occur in Predmore, it is precisely what took place here. Finally, in
Predmore, there was no evidence that the defendant fled from the scene or
discarded the weapon. Here, Appellee fled from the scene of the stabbing,
wiped blood off of the knife to conceal its use as the murder weapon, and
discarded it in a sink. In view of these many differences, Predmore does not
govern the outcome of this case.
Respectfully, for the reasons discussed above, the learned dissent
misapplies Predmore but moreover, does not consider all the prima facia
evidence presented against Appellee.
The dissent fails to give the Commonwealth the benefit of all reasonable
inferences from its prima facia evidence and instead engages in its own
weighing of the evidence. The dissent insists that the fact Appellee left the
initial altercation and returned with a kitchen knife, does not prove specific
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intent absent “further evidence concerning the circumstances of the initial
altercation, Appellee’s involvement, or the nature of any conflict between
Appellee and the victim.” Dissent at 3; see also id. at n.1 (“in the absence
of other evidence reflecting Appellee’s specific intent to kill, I cannot conclude
that by bringing a kitchen knife to the scene of an altercation, Appellee had a
conscious purpose to bring about death”). The dissent overlooks that there
indeed was considerable additional prima facie evidence of specific intent after
Appellee’s return (the stabbing, Appellee’s flight, the puncture on the car roof,
and Appellee’s cleaning and abandonment of the knife) that the dissent does
not consider. Under this totality of the circumstances, the Commonwealth
was entitled to a logical inference from Appellee’s conduct under Huggins
that Appellee’s reason for leaving the initial altercation and returning to the
scene with a kitchen knife was to engage in deadly violence against the victim.
The dissent only reaches a contrary conclusion by impermissibly weighing the
evidence.
The dissent also engages in impermissible weighing when it claims the
fact that the stabbing took place at close range does not constitute prima facie
evidence of specific intent. The dissent seems to suggest that firing a gun at
close range is indicative of specific intent, but stabbing the victim at close
range is not. This distinction is unpersuasive; there is simply no reason why
use of a knife at close range may not be as indicative of specific intent as use
of gun at close range. Moreover, the dissent’s attempt to downplay use of a
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knife at close range flies in the face of our Supreme Court’s pronouncement
in Ballard that the “intimacy involved in stabbing one’s victim to death clearly
indicates . . . specific intent.” Id., 80 A.3d at 390.
The dissent, again by impermissibly weighing the evidence, further
insists that the police detective’s testimony about the puncture on the car roof
demonstrates nothing, because “none of the witnesses testified that anyone
had stabbed the vehicle . . . nor was there any evidence that the knife or
object used to strike the vehicle was specifically directed towards the victim,
who was not the driver.” Dissent at 6 (emphasis in original). The dissent fails
to interpret the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light
most favorable to the Commonwealth. The detective testified that the
puncture was both bloody and consistent with the knife used to stab the
victim. This testimony, conjoined with the fact that Appellee stabbed the
victim, establishes prima facie evidence of specific intent by demonstrating
that Appellee repeatedly thrust his knife during the altercation.
Finally, with regard to Appellee’s conduct after the stabbing, the dissent
contends that cleaning the knife and returning it to the sink only indicates
“consciousness of guilt with respect to the stabbing, rather than evidence of
Appell[ee]’s intent to commit first-degree murder.” Id. We read the dissent
to mean that the evidence shows Appellee’s consciousness of guilt only for
aggravated assault (a charge for which he was held for court but did not seek
to dismiss in his habeas corpus motion) but not for first-degree murder. This
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attempt to draw a line between consciousness of guilt for aggravated assault
and consciousness of guilt for murder is wholly unconvincing, given our duty
at this stage of the case to construe the evidence in the light most favorable
to the Commonwealth. Appellee’s acts of flight, washing the blood off the
knife and abandoning the knife in the kitchen, read collectively with the other
evidence, constitutes prima facie evidence of his consciousness of guilt for
both aggravated assault and first-degree murder. Taylor, Gonzalez, supra.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the evidence adduced during
the habeas corpus hearing constituted prima facie evidence of Appellee’s
specific intent to kill to support a charge of first-degree murder. Accordingly,
the court below erred by concluding that the Commonwealth failed to present
prima facie evidence of specific intent and by dismissing the charge of first-
degree murder. We, therefore reverse the portion of the trial court’s order
dismissing the charge of first-degree murder from Count 1 of the information
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and remand with instructions to hold Appellee for trial on that charge as
well.4,5
Order affirmed in part and reversed in part. Case remanded for further
proceedings to include a charge of first-degree murder. Jurisdiction
relinquished.
President Judge Emeritus Stevens joins the Opinion.
Judge Nichols files a Dissenting Opinion.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 6/17/2024
4 The Commonwealth raises two additional issues in its brief: whether the court erred by (1) permitting defense counsel to question Commonwealth witnesses during the habeas corpus hearing with regard to Appellee’s inadmissible hearsay and (2) concluding in its opinion that there was a claim of self-defense at the habeas corpus hearing. According to the Commonwealth, both of these issues demonstrate that the court below allowed evidence that fell outside the bounds of habeas corpus proceedings and failed to examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. We need not consider these issues given our decision that the evidence during the habeas corpus hearing permits the Commonwealth to proceed to trial on the first-degree murder charge.
5We affirm the portions of the order that dismissed the charge of second- degree murder and that left intact the remaining charges in Count 1, third- degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter.
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