J-S35042-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA v. : : KENNETH NELSON, JR., : : Appellant : No. 1291 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 2, 2015 in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Criminal Division, No(s): CP-51-CR-0006090-2014
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., BENDER, P.J.E. and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED JUNE 08, 2016
Kenneth Nelson, Jr. (“Nelson”) appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed following his conviction of firearms not to be carried without a
license.1 We affirm.
In its Opinion, the trial court set forth the relevant factual and
procedural background, which we adopt herein for purposes of this appeal.
See Trial Court Opinion, 8/4/15, at 1-6.
On appeal, Nelson raises the following issues for our review:
1. Was [Nelson’s] conviction against the clear weight of the evidence where the uncontradicted testimony established that [Nelson] was acting in the scope of his employment at the time of his arrest for possessing an unlicensed firearm?
2. Was the evidence sufficient to support [Nelson’s] conviction [of] violating 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6106, firearms not to be carried without a license, where[,] at the time of his arrest, [Nelson] possessed a certificate of licensure pursuant to the
1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a)(2). J-S35042-16
Lethal Weapons Training Act[ (“the Act”),2] and was carrying his firearm in the scope of his employment?
3. Even if this Court determines that the evidence was sufficient to sustain [Nelson’s] conviction [of] carrying a firearm without a license, was [Nelson] entitled to dismissal of this charge on the basis that [Nelson’s] conduct constituted a de minimus infraction of the law?
Brief for Appellant at 4 (footnote added, some capitalization omitted, issues
renumbered for ease of disposition).
In his first issue, Nelson contends that the trial court found him guilty
of firearms not be carried without a license because it “disbelieved [Nelson’s]
testimony that he was acting within the scope of his employment and[,]
thus[,] determined that [Nelson’s] actions at the time of his arrest were
outside the purview of [the] Act [].” Id. at 15. Nelson asserts that, because
he was on his way to a restaurant supply store and was carrying a large
amount of cash, he was acting within the scope of his duties as a security
guard at the time of his arrest. Id. at 17. Nelson points to the trial court’s
determination that he was not acting as a security guard at the time of his
arrest because he had stopped his car to talk to another individual, and
claims that the trial court’s ruling “imposes an unduly restrictive
interpretation of the Act’s definition of “on duty or going to and from duty.”
Id. (citing 22 Pa.C.S.A. § 48(a)). Nelson argues that the trial court’s
“misunderstanding of the scope and application of [the] Act” constitutes an
abuse of discretion. Brief for Appellant at 18.
2 See 22 Pa.C.S.A. § 41, et seq.
-2- J-S35042-16
The trial court set forth the relevant law, addressed Nelson’s weight of
the evidence claim, and determined that it lacked merit. See Trial Court
Opinion, 8/4/15, at 7-9. We agree with the sound reasoning of the trial
court and affirm on this basis as to Nelson’s first issue. See id.
In his second issue, Nelson contends that he was convicted of firearms
not to be carried without a license because the Commonwealth introduced
into evidence a certificate of non-licensure which showed that he did not
possess a valid license to carry a firearm. Brief for Appellant at 9. Nelson
asserts that, because he possessed a certification issued under the Act, and
was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of his arrest, his
conviction under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a)(2)3 cannot stand. Id. Nelson
concedes that he was in constructive possession of a firearm at the time of
his arrest, but claims that he was exempt from the firearm licensure
requirement pursuant to sub-sections 6106(b)(6) and (11).4 Id. at 12.
3 Section 6106(a)(2) provides that “[a] person who is otherwise eligible to possess a valid license under this chapter but carries a firearm in any vehicle or any person who carries a firearm concealed on or about his person, except in his place of abode or fixed place of business, without a valid and lawfully issued license and has not committed any other criminal violation commits a misdemeanor of the first degree.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a)(2). 4 Sub-sections 6106(b)(6) and (11) provide the following exemptions from the firearms licensing requirement: “(6) [a]gents, messengers and other employees of common carriers, banks, or business firms, whose duties require them to protect moneys, valuables and other property in the discharge of such duties[;] … (11) [a]ny person while carrying a firearm in any vehicle, which person possesses a valid and lawfully issued license for that firearm which has been issued under the laws of the United States or any other state.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(b)(6), (11).
-3- J-S35042-16
Nelson argues that the uncontradicted evidence established that he (1) is
the owner of a restaurant in North Philadelphia; (2) worked as the
establishment’s security guard; (3) in his capacity as security guard, carried
large amounts of money from his restaurant to banks and restaurant supply
stores; and (4) worked as a security guard for several bar owners. Id. at
13. Nelson contends that his qualification for certification under the Act
showed that he was required to perform the duties of a security guard,
thereby rendering him exempt from the firearm licensure requirement
pursuant to section 6106(b)(6). Id. at 14. Nelson further asserts that,
because he possessed a certification under the Act, he was exempt from the
firearm licensure requirement pursuant to section 6106(b)(11). Id.
The trial court set forth the relevant law, addressed Nelson’s
sufficiency claim, and determined that it lacked merit. See Trial Court
Opinion, 8/4/15, at 6-7, 9-10. We agree with the sound reasoning of the
trial court and affirm on this basis as to Nelson’s second issue. See id.
In his third issue, Nelson contends that, in the event that this Court
determines that the evidence was sufficient to convict him under section
6106(a)(2), this Court should nevertheless vacate his judgment of sentence
on the basis that his conduct constituted a de minimus infraction of the law.
Brief for Appellant at 19.
-4- J-S35042-16
Here, Nelson failed to raise this issue in his court-ordered Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b) Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal. Accordingly, Nelson
failed to preserve this issue for our review. See Commonwealth v. Lord,
719 A.2d 306, 309 (Pa. 1998) (holding that, when an appellant is directed to
file a concise statement of matters to be raised on appeal pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), any issues not raised in that statement are waived).
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 6/8/2016
-5- Circulated 05/13/2016 04:25 PM
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA ! CRIMINAL TRIAL DIVISION .._....,:·
COMMONWEALTH OF rFs['~b CP-51-CR-0006090-2014
v. \ AUG O 4 2.0\5 \ Criminal App~a\? Unit'. SUPERIOR COURT KENNETH NELSON JR.f1irst JudiciatD1stnct o~!!, NO. 1291 EDA 2015 '
OPINION
THOMAS STREET, J. August 4, 2015
I. OVERVIEW AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ' ! This is an appeal by the Defendant, Kenneth Nelson Jr., of this Court's Judgment of ' Sentence entered on March Z, 2015. The Defendant was arrested and charged with Firearms Not I
To Be Carried Without a License, 1 Intentionally Possessing A Controlled Substance By A Person i I
Not Registered,2 Possession \of Marijuana,3 and Carrying Firearms on Public Streets or Public l ·~,:;..·.•:'.:'..--""'f-':·
Property in Philadelphia" fdf events that occurred on May 11, 2014. The Defendant filed a I Motion to Suppress physical !evidence and a Motion to Quash on August 5, 2014. On September
30, 2014, a Motion to Quash was heard before Judge Michael Erdos and denied. On March 2, i 2015, a non-jury trial was he~d before thisCourt at whi,~h time the Defendant was found guilty of I ,,.,. :;_;:-·:
Firearms Not To Be Carried Without a License and sentenced to thirty-six (36) months reporting i probation. (N.T. 3/2/2015 p. ~9). CP·51·CR·0006090-2014 Comm. Opinion v, Nelson. Kenneth Jr
1 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6106 I Ill II I II I 111111111111111 7327679121 2 35 Pa. P.S. § 780-113 §§ A16 335Pa.P.S. §780-113 §§A31 4 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6108
1 i On March 9, 2015, the Defendant filed post sentence motions. On April 15, 2015, this
Court denied the Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration without a hearing. On May 4, 2015, 1 . I the Defendant filed a timely fotice of Appeal. On June 24, 2015, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925 (b),
this Court ordered a Concise Statementof Errors Complained of on Appeal within twenty-one ! ' (21) days. On July 6, 2015, the Defendant filed a Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on
Appeal.
II. FACTUAL HISTORY
On May 11, 2014, at 3:52 p.m., Philadelphia-Police Officer Joseph Czepiel, assigned to
the 14th District was on dutyj.5 (N.T. 3/2/15 p. 9). Officer Czepiel testified that he first came into 1
contact with the Defendant i~i the area of the 5700 block of Germantown Avenue in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, while driving on normal routine patrol in the area at 3:23 p.m. (N.T. 3/2/15 pp. 9,
10). Officer Czepiel stated ~hat the Defendant was.parked in a 2011 Dodge Charger, silver in
color, which the Defendant ~wned and operated. Id. Officer Czepiel stated he saw a gentleman ! leaning into the passenger side window of the Defendant's car, which he believed may have been
a drug transaction due to the area. Id.
Officer Czepiel testified that the-gentleman.iwho was leaning in on the passenger side I l i
window of the Defendant's [vehicle looked in the officers' direction and then started walking i quickly across Germantown Avenue. Id. Officer Czepiel stated that his partner stopped that male
and he did have narcotics on!him, so he was arrested for a narcotics violation. Id. Officer Czepiel
stated he went over to the Defendant's car to talk tohim to find out what was going on with the i
male that had left the Defendant' s vehicle. Id. Officer Czepiel stated the Defendant was very
irate and recording with h~s phone the whole time. Id. Officer Czepiel stated he told the ! '
I 5 References to the record refer to the transcript of the non-jury trial and sentencing recorded on March 2, 2015. l ~
2 Defendant "he was allowed to record, but he was under police investigation at this time and !
needed to put the phone down." Id. I,
Officer Czepiel testi4ed that when backup officers arrived, the Defendant placed a baggie I
I in the glove box of his vehicle, pulled out his registration and insurance, and closed the glove I - . ! . box shut. (N.T. 3/2/15 p. 111" Officer Czepiel stated that the Defendant was then taken out of the i vehicle for a pat down due 1to the other male getting locked up for the narcotics violation. Id. i i Officer Czepiel stated he believed that the Defendant placed narcotics in the glove box or that i there could be a weapon in .the glove box. Id. Officer ...Czepiel stated "we were told from day one ! - ! that when there are drugs, there are guns," so he wanted to make sure he would be safe before ii putting the Defendant back iµ the car. Id. Officer Czepiel testified he then looked into the glove
box and recovered a white\ baggie, which contained a green weed substance alleged to be
marijuana. Id. Officer Cze~iel stated that the D,:[~ndant was then arrested and the officer i conducted a search of the vehicle. (N.T. 3/2/15 pp. 11-12). i
Officer Czepiel testified that during the search, he found a silver Smith & Wesson gun in i ! the trunk containing six (6) Iive rounds in a black holster. (N.T. 3/2/15 p. 12). Officer Czepiel ; i described the trunk as "clean and the gun was the.~n- only thing in there." Id. Officer Czepiel i 1 ~,;.,,'' i
described the placement of tie gun as "on the right side, not tucked under anything, out in plain ! view." Id. Officer Czepiel [stated the Defendant gave him a Pennsylvania registration and 1
insurance card, which showed he was the owner of the vehicle. Id. Officer Czepiel stated the '
Defendant provided him with ! a permit to.carry a firearm ••::,-:- from Floridaand an Act 235 card. (N.T.
3/2/15 p. 13). Officer Czepiel testified that he and his Sergeant tried to confirm the Act 235 card
with the State Police, but were unable to ascertain if it was valid or not. Id. Officer Czepiel stated i i that the Defendant was not wearing a security guard uniform. Id.
i !
3 On cross-examinatioh, Officer Czepiel testified that he gave the Act 23 5 card and the ! - . ' Florida license to carry to t~e assigned detective. (N.T. 3/2/15 p, 14). Officer Czepiel stated that Ii i . he tried to confirm the Act2~5 card by telephone and that State Police couldn't confirm it. Id. He i i then ceased investigation as jf ar as the Act 23 5 card because the Defendant was under arrest for
the narcotics violation. Id. ! . The Commonwealth marked and moved C-1, the report from the Firearms Identification
Unit, indicating that the weapon that was recovered from the Defendant was operable, and C-2, \ : ~ the certificate of nonlicensure, showing that the Defendant did not possess a valid license to II :
carry a firearm under the provisions oL6109 of th,~~.. Crimes Code or under the provisions of ! . ..,,,·.·
6106(c). (N.T. 3/2/15 p. 15). \
The Defendant testified that on May 11, 2014 he was the driver of the vehicle. (N.T. I . I ' . i : 3/2/15 p. 17). The Defendant stated he gave the officer a copy of the Act 235 card. Id. The l !
Defendant stated the Act 23~ card is for. the Lethal i Yf eapons · .. :,,.;.~---·· Training Program, which he is a
part of in Pennsylvania. Id. the Defendant stated the Act 235 lcard's expiration was September
30, 2014 and that it was valid on the day of May 11, 2014. (N.T. 3/2/15 p. 18). The Defendant i i
also stated the Act 235 card remains valid for a period of five (5) years. Id. The Defendant . '1
explained that the Act 235 card provided him with The Lethal Weapons Act 235 status, which ! ·--,_\_.,_. ,,,.:.;-"' .
allows him to carry a firearmlto work, from work, and during work, (N.T. 3/2/15 pp. 18-19). The
Defendant stated that he owned his own business and went through the Lethal Weapons Training
Program, so he could carry a firearm for work. Id.
The Defendant stated! he is the business own~·~" of Sit Down Restaurant, located at 3557 i . North s" Street in North Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Id. The Defendant stated that he carries his I firearm to get food and to the bank because he is carrying large' amounts of money. (N.T. 3/2/15
4 p. 21 ). The Defendant also explained i that he doessecurity for. different bar owners who do the j i
same thing. Id. On the day ip question, he was on his way to Restaurant Depot to prepare for a I Mother's Day event later ~at evening when was arrested. (N:,T. 3/2/15 p. 20). The Defendant ! testified the weapon was in his trunk because he stabbed himself in the hand earlier in the I '
morning, which required him to leave Sit Down Rest;~rant and have someone else drive him to I
the hospital. (N.T. 3/2/15 p. 22). The Defendant stated that he was going to put the weapon in the ! !
kitchen but since he had to leave the business he placed it in the trunk. Id. He later stated that he
wrapped the gun in an aprori because he was in the kitchen. (N.T. 3/2/15 p. 24). The Defendant ' .
stated that the hospital had p}escribed him two (2) Pefcocet, (N.T 3/2/15 p. 22). ;
The Defendant testified that while picking up his cook, after he woke up late later that
day, a man named Melvin Carson was on the passenger side of his vehicle and asked him if he
was open that day. Id. The Defendant clarified that Melvin Carson was "nowhere near my ! vehicle." Id. The Defendant! stated he answered "Yeah" to Melvin Carson's question and that
was the end of their encounter, Id. The Defendant stated that five (5) or ten (10) minutes later he ' saw Melvin Carson being slammed by one of the police officers on the car. (N.T. 3/2/15 p. 23). ;
The Defendant explained that he started recording the incident because Melvin Carson was j
slammed at least ten ( 10) or fifteen ( 15) times by the police officer. Id. The Defendant stated the
police officers did not notice the Defendant at first but then noticed that he was recording. Id.
The Defendant stated that a police officer walked towards his car and said "Stop recording, stop !
recording." Id.
On cross-examination,! the Defendant affirmedthat his restaurant ' is located at 3557 North I
5th Street, which is on the east side of Broad Street. (N.T. 3/2/l5 p. 24). The Defendant testified I 'l . !
that he lives at 6053 Philip S~reet in Philadelphia which is also: on the east side of Broad Street.
5 Id. The Defendant stated that it is basically a straight shot north to get from his home to his
restaurant. (N.T. 3/2/15 p. 2~). The Defendant affirm~d that he was stopped at 5700 Germantown
Avenue in Philadelphia, on the west side of Broad Street. (N.T. 3/2/15 p. 25). He explained that
he was on the west side of Broad Street because he was going towards the Restaurant Depot to ;
get supplies. (N.T. 3/2/15 ppl. 25-26). The Defendant testified he left the hospital and went home.
Id. From his home, he wokb up for the event "stil(high off the medication" the hospital had i '
given him and rushed to th~ Restaurant Depot on Hunting Park Avenue in Philadelphia to get i supplies. Id. The Defendant stated he has a membership to shop at the Restaurant Depot. Id.
III. ISSUES
In the Pa.R.A.P. 192*b) Concise.,StatementofMatters Complained of on Appeal, the I . Defendant identified the following issues:
1. The verdict was against the weight of the evidence concerning the conviction ofVUFA Section 6106 (a) (2).
2. The evidence was. insufficient to support a conviction as there lwas no proof beyondTa reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty of a violation of VUFA Section 6106 (a) (2)J
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW ! l A challenge to the ~ufficiency of evidence is a question of law. Commonwealth v.
Heater, 2006 PA Super 86, 11, 899 A.2d· 1126, 1131'''(2006) (citing Commonwealth v. Widmer,
560 Pa. 308, 319, 744 A.2d \745, 751 (2000)). The role of an appellate court in reviewing the
weight of the evidence is very limited. Commonwealth v. Holmes, 444 Pa. Super. 257, 264, 663 ! .
A.2d 771, 774 (1995). WheJ reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, a court must review
the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the lightmost favorable to the Commonwealth as I !
the verdict winner, and musf determine if the evidence, thus viewed, is sufficient to enable the '
6 fact-finder to find every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. ' Valette, 531 Pa. 384, 388, 6)3 A.2d 548, 549 (1992); Commonwealth v. Marks, 704 A.2d 1095
(Pa. Super. 1997).
A reviewing court may not weigh the evidence or substitute its own judgment for that of
the fact-finder, who is free' to believe all, part, or none of the evidence. Commonwealth v.
Adams, 2005 Pa. Super. 296, 882 A.2d. 496, 498-99 (Pa. Super. 2005). An appellate court may
reverse a lower court's verdict only in the instance that it is so contrary to the evidence as to
shock one's sense of just~ce. See Commonwealth v. Hunzer, 868 A.2d 498, 506-507
(Pa.Super.2005), appeal denied, 584 Pa. 673, 880 A.2d 1237 (2005). Whether a new trial should
be granted on the ground that a conviction was against the weight of the evidence is addressed to
the sound discretion of the trial judge, and that decision will not be reversed on appeal absent a
showing of abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Petteway, 847 A.2d 713, 716 (Pa. Super.
2004) (citing Commonw~alth v. Davis, 799 A.2d 860, 865 (Pa. Super. 2002)).
Additionally, the Commonwealth may "s;tisfy its burden of proof entirely by
circumstantial evidence. See, Commonwealth v. Adams, 2005 Pa. Super 296, 882 A.2d. 496, 499
(Pa. Super 2005); see also Commonwealth , v. Murphy, 2002 PA Super 84, 795 A.2d 1025, 1038-
39 (Pa. Super. 2002) ("The \fact that the evidence establishing a defendant's participation in a
crime is circumstantial does not preclude a conviction where the evidence coupled with the
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom overcomes the presumption of innocence."). "If the
record contains support for the verdict, it may not be disturbed." Adams, 882 A.2d. at 499. '
V. DISCUSSION
First, the Defendant argues that the convictio~,~der VUFA Section § 6106 (a) (2) is not ! .
supported by the greater weight of the evidence. This Court disagrees. l '
7 Section 6106 (a)(2) states: ' ' (2) A person! who is otherwise eligible to possess a valid license under this chapter but carries a firearm in any vehicle or any person who tarries a firearm concealed on or about his person, except in his :place of abode or fixed place of business, without a valid and lawfully issued license and has not committed any other criminal violation commits a misdemeanor of the first degree.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106.
Here, the Commonwealth presented sufficientevidence which the fact finder was free to
accept as true to sustain the Defendant's convictions.
It is undisputed that on the day in question, the Defendant was carrying a firearm in his
vehicle and did not have a valid license to carry a firearm. The Defendant presented evidence
that he was licensed to carry a firearm in Philadelphia under The Lethal Weapons Training Act
235. The Lethal Weapons Training Act, 22 Pa.C.S. § 41, et seq. (Act 235), was enacted to
provide training in lethal weapons to private security enforcement personnel. Commonwealth. v.
Mitchell, 81 Pa. D. & C.4th 75, 81 (Pa. Com. Pl. 2007) aff'd, 935 A.2d 17 (Pa. Super. 2007).
Upon satisfactory completion of''a program developed under Act 235, an individual is
issued a certificate, which such person is required to possess whenever on duty or going to and
from duty and carrying a lethal weapon. Id. This certificate essentially eliminates the need for
privately employed security: personnel, like the Defendant, to maintain a license to carry a
firearm while that person is on duty or is going to and from duty. Id.
The Defendant argue~ that he was headed to the Restaurant Depot to get supplies for his
restaurant, so he was on duty.and within the scope of his Act 235 status permitting him to carry a
firearm. This Court disagrees.
By way of the Defendant's own adrnission.jie.carried a firearm in his vehicle without a
valid and lawfully issued license by carrying it outside of the purview of Act 235. The Defendant
'y> stated that he went through the Act 235 program because "If you're carrying a firearm, you can
carry to work, from work, and during work." (N.T. 3/2/15 p. 19). The Defendant stated that on : ,,-,-
the morning of his arrest he woke up late and was rushing to the Restaurant Depot to get supplies
for an event at his restaurant, However, the Defendant admitted that he was on the West side of
Broad Street when he was stopped, when his home and restaurant are on the East side of Broad
Street. (N.T. 3/2/15 p. 25).
Moreover, the Defendant stated he was sitting in his car talking to his cook for ten (10)
minutes, which indicates that he was not in a rush. The Defendant also admitted to putting the
gun in the trunk of his vehicle. Officer Czepiel conducted a search of the Defendant's vehicle
and found a gun in the trunk. Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to establish the charges of _.;.,
which the Defendant was found guilty. Upon review of the challenge, this Court concludes that
the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence and does not reveal a verdict that is
shocking to one's sense of justice.
Second, the Defendant argues that the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient
evidence to sustain a conviction under§ 6106 (a) (2). This Court disagrees.
Section 6106 (a) (2) states:
(2) A person who is otherwise eligible to possess a valid license under this chapter but carries a firearm in any vehicle or any person who carries a firearm concealed on or about his person, except in his place of abode or fixed. place of business, without a valid and lawfully issued license and has not committed any other criminal violation commits a misdemeanor of the first degree.
As mentioned above: it is undisputed that on the day in question, the Defendant was
carrying a firearm in his. vehicle and did not have-a valid license to carry a firearm. The
Defendant had an Act 235: card after completing the Lethal Weapons Training Program.
9 However, he was in fact parked on a public Philadelphia street interacting and talking with others
when stopped and investigated by the police. As stated earlier, the Defendant was not actually
travelling· to or from work ~t the time of his arrest and therefore, he was carrying the firearm
outside of the purview of Act 235.
As such, there was fufficient evidence presented to this Court to find the Defendant
guilty of Firearms Not To Be Carried Without A License in Philadelphia.
VI. CONCLUSION.
For all of these reasons, this Court's decision should be affirmed.
BY THE COURT:
Dated: Au~u 5+- ~. """, 2015
... ,<>-·...(,..
10 ·, ...... ~
Re: Commonwealth v. Kenneth Nelson Jr. CP-51-CR-0006090-2014 1291 EDA 2015
PROOF OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am this'. day serving the foregoing Court Order upon the person(s), and in the manner indicated below, which service satisfies the requirements of Pa.R.Crim.P. 114: !
Defense Counsel: Glenn] Gilman, Esquire 123 S. Broad St., Suite 2500 Philadelphia, PA 19109
Type of Service: ( ) Personal Service (X) First Class Mail ( ) Other: Inter-Office
District Attorney: Hugh J. Burns Jr., Esquire Chief.Appeals Unit Philadelphia District Attorney's Office Widener Building - Three South Penn Square Philadelphia, PA 19102 '-··
Type of Service: ( ) Personal Service ( ) FirsfClass Mail (X) Other: Inter-Office
Date: August 4, 2015
,,_. .• r..-·-