Com. v. Neal, G.

CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedJune 20, 2023
Docket1336 EDA 2022
StatusUnpublished

This text of Com. v. Neal, G. (Com. v. Neal, G.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Com. v. Neal, G., (Pa. Ct. App. 2023).

Opinion

J-A28005-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : GERALD NEAL : No. 1336 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered April 22, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-45-CR-0001793-2019

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED JUNE 20, 2023

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the order granting

Gregory Neal’s omnibus pretrial motion to suppress statements he made to

Pennsylvania State Troopers while in custody. The trial court found that the

Troopers continued to question Neal after he invoked his right to silence. After

careful review, we affirm.

The essential facts underlying this appeal are not in dispute.

Pennsylvania State Police sought to question Neal concerning the shooting

death of Neal’s paramour, Jeanette Sancho. Neal was subsequently detained

in Flushing, New York. Two Pennsylvania State Police Troopers, Trooper Brian

Noll and Trooper Brian Janoski, drove to the police station in Jamaica, New

York to interview Neal. J-A28005-22

The Troopers identified themselves to Neal, informed him that they were

investigating Sancho’s death, and then provided Miranda1 warnings to Neal.

The Commonwealth concedes that, at this point, Neal invoked his right to

remain silent, but argues that Neal, “a sophisticated criminal,” then “initiated

further communication” with the Troopers. Appellant’s Brief, at 9. In contrast,

the trial court concluded that the Troopers failed to honor Neal’s invocation of

his right to remain silent, and therefore suppressed the entirety of the

interview. The Commonwealth filed this timely interlocutory appeal, certifying

that suppression of the statement would substantially handicap the

prosecution of its case pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311(d).

On appeal, the Commonwealth contends that Neal “reinitiated a

discussion with the Troopers” and the circumstances reflect that Neal made “a

free and deliberate choice … to engage the police in a long-winded and mostly

random discussion, not a confession obtained through intimidation, coercion

or deception.” Appellant’s Brief, at 9.

We review an order suppressing evidence de novo. See

Commonwealth v. Petty, 157 A.3d 953, 955 (Pa. Super. 2017). However,

the suppression court’s findings of fact are binding on appeal if they are

supported by the record created at the suppression hearing. See id. The

Commonwealth bore the burden of establishing that Neal knowingly and

____________________________________________

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467–69 (1966).

-2- J-A28005-22

voluntarily waived his right to silence. See Commonwealth v. Baez, 21 A.3d

1280, 1283 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted).

We begin by noting that a hearing on Neal’s suppression motion was

scheduled for March 7, 2022. While it is undisputed that some form of hearing

occurred that day, it was not transcribed and therefore is not of record. Neither

party disputes the trial court’s statement that “the Commonwealth submitted

a thumb drive containing … a video/audio recording and a transcript” of the

June 6, 2019 interrogation of Neal. This thumb drive is in the certified record.

As neither the parties nor the trial court reference evidence outside the

interrogation itself, we conclude that the deficiencies in the record do not

hinder our ability to review the Commonwealth’s issue on appeal.2

We have reviewed both the transcript of the interrogation and the

video/audio recording itself and conclude that there are no meaningful

differences between them. The recording does provide additional context in

that it reveals the length of pauses between questions and answers, as well

as the time spent by Trooper Noll in responding to Neal’s invocation of his

right to silence. Based on this review, we note that when the Troopers asked

Neal to sign a waiver of his Miranda rights, Neal stated, “I wish to adhere to

2As the appellant, “the ultimate responsibility of ensuring that the transmitted record is complete” rested squarely with the Commonwealth. See Commonwealth v. Preston, 904 A.2d 1, 7 (Pa. Super. 2006) (en banc).

-3- J-A28005-22

my rights. … I haven’t a desire to speak.” Transcript of interview, 6/6/2019,

at 6.

The Commonwealth does not dispute that this statement constituted an

invocation of Neal’s right to silence. See Appellant’s Brief, at 12. Rather, the

Commonwealth correctly argues that even though Neal invoked his right to

silence, he still retained the power to waive this right. See Commonwealth

v. Frein, 206 A.3d 1049, 1065 (Pa. 2019). An explicit statement of waiver is

not necessary. See Commonwealth v. Bomar, 826 A.3d 831, 843 (Pa.

2003). Instead, “[w]aiver can be clearly inferred from the actions and words

of the person interrogated.” Id. (citations omitted). “[T]he admissibility of

statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent

depends under Miranda on whether his right to cut off questioning was

scrupulously honored.” Frein, 206 A.3d at 1065 (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted).

There are few bright-line standards in determining whether a defendant

has waived his previously invoked right to silence; each case must be

addressed based on its own particular circumstances. See id. To the extent

there are standards, they are the same regardless of whether the accused

invoked their right to silence or their right to counsel. See id. at 1066; see

also Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 381 (2010) (noting that “there

is no principled reason to adopt different standards” for the right to silence in

contrast to the right to counsel”).

-4- J-A28005-22

One bright-line standard that does exist is that the Commonwealth

cannot establish a valid waiver of the right to silence “by showing only that

[the defendant] responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation

even if he has been advised of his rights.” See Frein, 206 A.3d at 1065

(citation and italicization omitted). In other words, if “an individual indicates

in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to

remain silent, the interrogation must cease.” Id. at 1064 (citation and internal

Here, Trooper Noll responded to Neal’s invocation of his right to silence

by encouraging Neal to cooperate with the investigation:

Okay. Like we said, that’s – that’s your right, you don’t have to talk to us. [Basically, the deal is] out in the area [of] Saw Creek [and] again, I think what you kind of have an idea of what we’re … talking to you about, but they – they found Jeanette, right? … [S]o basically we’re trying to figure out what went wrong here and … why Jeanette’s out there.

[Again,] there’s – there’s nothing that says that … we gotta force you here, but … everybody’s got their reasons on that. As we go through it here, all this stuff is gonna kind of spin out of control.

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Related

Miranda v. Arizona
384 U.S. 436 (Supreme Court, 1966)
Commonwealth v. Baez
21 A.3d 1280 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2011)
Commonwealth v. Frein, E., Aplt.
206 A.3d 1049 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 2019)
Commonwealth v. Preston
904 A.2d 1 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2006)
Commonwealth v. Petty
157 A.3d 953 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2017)
Berghuis v. Thompkins
176 L. Ed. 2d 1098 (Supreme Court, 2010)

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Com. v. Neal, G., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/com-v-neal-g-pasuperct-2023.