Com. v. Nattress, R.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: June 18, 2026
• Docket: 705 MDA 2025
• Status: Unpublished
• Author: Bowes

Opinion

J-A07006-26

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : RAYMOND DOUGLAS NATTRESS : : Appellant : No. 705 MDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 16, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-21-CR-0000593-2022

BEFORE: BOWES, J., DUBOW, J., and NEUMAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED: JUNE 18, 2026

Raymond Douglas Nattress appeals from the judgment of sentence of

twenty-three to forty-six years in prison followed by twenty-four years of

probation imposed after a jury convicted him of several sexual assault

offenses committed against his paramour’s minor daughter. We affirm.

In 2020, the twelve-year old victim, S.W., lived with her mother and

Appellant. S.W.’s biological father became concerned that summer when S.W.

rapidly gained eighty pounds, superficially cut her wrists with a razor blade,

quit soccer, and failed almost all her classes, despite previously being a well-

rounded student. Following a suicide attempt, S.W.’s father enrolled her in

counseling, and she disclosed to her counselor that Appellant had been

sexually abusing her. J-A07006-26

Forensic interviewer Megan Briggs met with S.W. on April 21, 2021.

S.W. explained that during her first sexual encounter with Appellant, he had

kissed and sucked on her breasts, digitally penetrated her vagina, which

caused her significant pain and bleeding, shoved her to her knees to place his

penis in her mouth, and ejaculated into her mouth. He forced the victim to

use a vibrator on herself and place a finger and dildo into his anus. These

actions were repeated in subsequent sexual assaults, including rape. Between

August 2020 and February 2021, Appellant, who was more than forty years

older than S.W., sexually abused her at least ten times. S.W. confessed that

she was afraid to disclose this information to anyone due to her fear of

Appellant, and that she would be considered “pathetic” and a “whore.” N.T.

Jury Trial Vol. II, 12/10/24, at 44.

The victim provided to the police descriptions of the sex toys Appellant

would use on her and force her to use on him. Detective Donald Coffey of the

Lower Allen Township Police Department obtained a search warrant for the

mother’s house to seize the sex toys. Upon execution, officers discovered

lubricants, a vibrator, and an empty dildo box, the shape of which matched

the report given by the victim. Forensics confirmed that Appellant’s DNA was

on the vibrator.

When Detective Corporal Michael Scarlato of the Lower Allen Township

Police Department interviewed Appellant, he claimed that he knew what the

interrogation was about and that S.W. fabricated the allegations against him.

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He denied use of the sex toys initially, then asserted that he may have touched

them to remove them from his bed.

Appellant was arrested and charged by information with a litany of

sexual assault offenses. The matter proceeded to a jury trial, during which

S.W. attested to Appellant’s use of emotional manipulation against her and

detailed several instances of sexual abuse perpetrated by him. Investigating

officers, including Detective Coffey, forensic interviewer Ms. Briggs, and

S.W.’s biological father also testified.

Prior to trial, the Commonwealth filed a motion in limine to offer

Veronique Valliere, Ph.D., a clinical and forensic psychologist, as an expert in

the behaviors of sexually abused children. The court deferred its ruling on the

motion, and after reviewing Dr. Valliere’s credentials at trial, the

Commonwealth presented her as an expert in “counterintuitive behavior.”

N.T. Jury Trial Vol. V, 12/11/24, at 9. Appellant did not object and declined

to conduct his own voir dire of her credentials. Id. The court accepted Dr.

Valliere as an expert witness.

Dr. Valliere was given no information about this matter, but she

explained to the jury the typical patterns and behaviors of victims who have

experienced sexual abuse. She reported that children are frequently reluctant

to disclose sexual abuse, which is not as counterintuitive as it may sometimes

appear. She confirmed that signs of a child suffering from sexual abuse

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include self-harm, suicidal threats, and poor grades in school. During cross-

examination of Dr. Valliere, the following relevant exchange took place:

Q: And you’re admitted as an expert in the field of counterintuitive behavior; is that right?

A: Yeah. It’s more properly like phrased as victim dynamics or victims[’] response to assault.

Q: Counterintuitive means things that otherwise don’t make sense, right?

A: Right. That’s why it’s a misnomer. There really is no such thing as counterintuitive behavior.

N.T. Jury Trial Vol. V, 12/11/24, at 31.

Appellant declined to testify in his defense. At the conclusion of trial,

the jury convicted him of three counts of rape of a child, two counts of

involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (“IDSI”), and one count each of

aggravated indecent assault, indecent assault, and corruption of minors.

However, he was acquitted of two counts of IDSI. The court imposed the

aforementioned sentence. Appellant filed a post-sentence motion challenging

the sufficiency and weight of the evidence, and Dr. Valliere’s admission as an

expert witness. The court denied the motion.

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Appellant timely appealed, and he and the trial court followed the

requirements outlined in Pa.R.A.P. 1925.1 He raises the following questions

for our determination:

1) Did the trial court err and commit an abuse of discretion in admitting testimony from the Commonwealth’s proffered expert in “counterintuitive behavior by victims of sexual assault,” Dr. Veronique Valliere, where the claimed field of expertise lacks meaningful scientific or objective standards, thus failing to meet the threshold for admissibility provided by Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) and Pa.R.E. 702, as evidenced by the witness’s sworn admission that “there really is no such thing as counterintuitive behavior?”

2) Did the trial court err and commit [an] abuse of discretion in denying a mistrial where the prosecutor falsely and prejudicially attributed a purported verbatim quotation to [Appellant] in closing argument via visual aid displayed to the jury, said quotation reading “the evil 13-year-old set me up to get what she wants” without any evidence [Appellant] said this but unambiguously communicating via use of quotation marks and first person pronoun that he did, where the trial court also did not give a curative instruction for the jury to disregard the false claim communicated by the Commonwealth’s attorney?

Appellant’s brief at 4 (cleaned up).

We begin with Appellant’s claim that Dr. Valliere’s testimony was

improperly admitted pursuant to the Frye test, which has been incorporated

____________________________________________

1 The Commonwealth filed a post-sentence motion on April 16, 2025, requesting that the amount of restitution be adjusted, which the court granted the same day. Thereafter, Appellant mistakenly filed his notice of appeal from the order denying his post-sentence motion. See Commonwealth v. Shamberger, 788 A.2d 408, 410 n.2 (Pa.Super. 2001) (en banc) (“In a criminal action, appeal properly lies from the judgment of sentence made final by the denial of post-sentence motions.”). We have corrected the docket to reflect that this appeal lies from the April 16, 2025 amended sentencing order.

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into Pa.R.E. 702(c),2 where she stated on cross-examination that “there is no

such thing as counterintuitive behavior.” Appellant’s brief at 10-11. The trial

court determined that Appellant’s argument was waived because he “never

lodged an objection to either Dr. Valliere or her testimony at trial.” Trial Court

Opinion, 8/22/25, at 10. Appellant contends that he preserved this challenge

in his post-sentence motion, and the opportunity to challenge Dr. Valliere’s

testimony “did not arise until cross-examination.” Appellant’s brief at 16.

This Court has held that “the failure to make a timely and specific

objection before the trial court at the appropriate stage of the proceeding will

result in waiver of the issue.” Commonwealth v. Houck, 102 A.3d 443, 451

(Pa.Super. 2014) (citation omitted). To preserve a challenge to the admission

of evidence, a party must make “a timely objection, motion to strike, or

2 Rule 702 provides:

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:

(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge is beyond that possessed by the average layperson;

(b) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; and

(c) the expert’s methodology is generally accepted in the relevant field.

Pa.R.E. 702.

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motion in limine” and assert “the specific ground, unless it was apparent from

the context.” Pa.R.E. 103(a). The Rules of Appellate Procedure further

provide that “[i]ssues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be

raised for the first time on appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). Where a defendant

seeks to challenge an expert’s testimony pursuant to Frye and Rule 702(c),

they must file a motion in limine or request a Frye hearing. See

Commonwealth v. Einhorn, 911 A.2d 960, 975 (Pa.Super. 2006).

As mentioned, the Commonwealth filed a motion in limine to present

Dr. Valliere as an expert at trial. The record reflects no objection from

Appellant to the Commonwealth’s motion. Instead, Appellant submitted four

motions in limine, none of which mentioned Dr. Valliere. He also declined to

conduct his own voir dire of Dr. Valliere at trial and neglected to object to her

admission as an expert. Accordingly, Appellant has waived this claim.3

3 Even if Appellant preserved this challenge, we would conclude that the trial

court did not abuse its discretion in accepting Dr. Valliere as an expert witness. In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court alternatively held that Appellant’s argument was meritless where Dr. Valliere “never admitted that her field of study was nonexistent,” rather she “expressed disagreement with using the words ‘counterintuitive behavior’ to describe the field because she believes the phrase is a misnomer.” Trial Court Opinion, 8/22/25, at 10. Indeed, Dr. Valliere merely clarified on cross-examination that the title “counterintuitive behavior” could be misleading, as a better label would be “victim dynamics or victims[’] response to assault.” N.T. Jury Trial Vol. V, 12/11/24, at 31. As such, Appellant has failed to make a prima facie showing that Dr. Valliere’s testimony was based on novel scientific evidence. See Commonwealth v. Cramer, 195 A.3d 594, 606 (Pa.Super. 2018) (stating that where a party opposes expert testimony pursuant to Rule 702, they “must demonstrate that the expert’s testimony is based on novel scientific evidence, i.e., that there is (Footnote Continued Next Page)

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Appellant next challenges the trial court’s denial of a mistrial where the

Commonwealth during closing arguments presented a visual aid to the jury

that stated in quotation marks “the evil 13-year-old set me up to get what she

wants.” Appellant’s brief at 17. It is well-settled that “[t]he trial court is in

the best position to assess the effect of an allegedly prejudicial statement on

the jury, and as such, the grant or denial of a mistrial will not be overturned

absent an abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Simpson, 754 A.2d

1264, 1272 (Pa. 2000) (citation omitted). A mistrial is appropriate “only

where the incident upon which the motion is based is of such a nature that its

unavoidable effect is to deprive the defendant of a fair trial by preventing the

jury from weighing and rendering a true verdict.” Commonwealth v. Cash,

137 A.3d 1262, 1273 (Pa. 2016) (cleaned up).

Here, the motion is based upon alleged prosecutorial misconduct. In

this vein, we have explained that “prosecutorial misconduct will not be found

where comments made were done so for oratorical flair.” Commonwealth

v. Miller, 897 A.2d 1281, 1291 (Pa.Super. 2006) (cleaned up). A prosecutor

“may ‘argue all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the record’ and

‘respond fairly to arguments made in the defense closing argument.’”

a legitimate dispute regarding the reliability of the expert’s conclusions.” (cleaned up)). Moreover, Dr. Valliere’s expertise has been discussed and accepted in numerous cases. See, e.g., id. at 607.

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Commonwealth v. Clancy, 192 A.3d 44, 62 (Pa. 2018) (quoting ABA

Standards §§ 3-6.8(a), (d)).

Appellant asserts that the Commonwealth’s visual aid was misleading

where he “did not testify at trial and there was no evidence that he uttered

these claimed words to any person at any time, yet the prosecutor deceptively

displayed this as a verbatim quotation, communicating to the jury that

Appellant had said words which he had not.” 4 Appellant’s brief at 17. The

error was not harmless, he maintains, because “quotation marks are used

chiefly to indicate the beginning and the end of a quotation reflecting the exact

phraseology of another,” and “it cannot be said beyond a reasonable doubt

that the jury understood the use of this punctuation here to mean anything

other than a false quotation from Appellant nor that it did not contribute to

their verdict.” Id. at 23.

The trial court determined that Appellant ignored the fact that quotation

marks can be used in contexts other than to cite exact phraseology. See Trial

Court Opinion, 8/22/25, at 11. For example, as here, the quotation marks did

not denote a phrase Appellant stated, but characterized the essence of

4 Appellant preserved this issue by objecting to the Commonwealth’s visual

aid after closing arguments and specifying the grounds upon which he objected. See N.T. Jury Trial Vol. VI, 12/12/24, at 7; Commonwealth v. Rose, 960 A.2d 149, 154 (Pa.Super. 2008) (holding that appellant’s counsel timely objected to a purported prejudicial statement made during the Commonwealth’s closing argument where there was “no factual dispute over the content of the prosecutor’s argument” and counsel objected immediately after closings with specificity).

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Appellant’s defense and his attorney’s closing argument. Id. at 11-12. During

closings, the court explained, Appellant’s counsel “walked the jury through

eleven examples of lies by the victim” and “proceeded to challenge the victim’s

credibility because she had been ‘constantly changing the nature of the

allegations against Appellant.’” Id. at 12 (cleaned up) (citing N.T. In re

Closing Arguments, 12/12/24, at 7). The court opined that “the evil 13-year-

old was a fair summation of what the defense was arguing all along.” Id. at

13 (cleaned up). It also reminded the jury “of its role as factfinder and was

instructed to regard counsel’s arguments as argument, not as evidence.” Id.

at 14.

We discern no abuse of discretion. During closing arguments,

Appellant’s counsel reviewed several instances where the victim was

purported to have lied. See N.T. In re Closing Arguments, 12/12/24, at 4-8.

His cross-examination of S.W. further revealed his strategy of disparaging her

credibility and highlighting her potential motivations to fabricate her

allegations. See N.T In re S.W., 12/10/24, at 67 (questioning whether S.W.

conspired to end the relationship between her mother and Appellant because

she “d[idn]’t like [Appellant]”). The Commonwealth’s visual aid was therefore

a fair response to and a summation of Appellant’s defense and closing

argument. See Clancy, 192 A.3d at 62. The court further instructed the jury

beforehand that closing arguments are not facts, and “the law presumes that

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the jury will follow the instructions of the court.” Commonwealth v.

Patterson, 180 A.3d 1217, 1228 (Pa.Super. 2018) (cleaned up).

Overall, Appellant has failed to demonstrate his entitlement to relief,

and we affirm his judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 06/18/2026

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