Com. v. Muhammad, M.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: May 11, 2026
• Docket: 579 EDA 2025
• Status: Unpublished
• Author: Kunselman

Opinion

J-A05012-26

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : MALIK MUHAMMAD : : Appellant : No. 579 EDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered November 26, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0006690-2022

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., NICHOLS, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED MAY 11, 2026

Malik Muhammad appeals nunc pro tunc from his 3-to-10-year

judgment of sentence for persons not to possess firearms.1 He challenges the

sufficiency and weight of the evidence. We affirm.

This case arose from a vehicle stop on August 29, 2022, by Sergeant

(then-Officer) Edward Perez of the Philadelphia Police. On September 27,

2024, the case proceeded to a non-jury trial.

The Commonwealth presented testimony from Sergeant Perez, as well

as documentary evidence. Sergeant Perez testified that he was patrolling in

the area of 3800 Wallace Street when he observed a situation involving a red

Mazda and requested back up. Another police car arrived; Sergeant Perez

was behind the Mazda, and the other police car was in front of it.

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1 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1). J-A05012-26

Sergeant Perez testified that when he activated his vehicle’s lights, the

Mazda slammed on its brakes, the driver’s door opened, and the driver—later

identified as Muhammad—exited and dropped an item. Muhammad ran away.

Sergeant Perez and Officer Lutz, who was a passenger in the other police car,

ran after him. After about a minute, Muhammad ran into Officer Lutz.

Sergeant Perez identified Muhammad as the driver of the Mazda. Once

Muhammad was detained, Sergeant Perez searched him and recovered three

clear sandwich bags, tied in a knot with a green leafy substance. 2

Sergeant Perez testified that he returned to the Mazda, where Officer

Canela (who drove the other police car) had detained the other occupant of

the Mazda, a female front-seat passenger. Outside the Mazda, Sergeant Perez

saw the item that Muhammad had dropped, a cell phone. On the driver’s seat,

he saw another sandwich bag tied in a knot with a green leafy substance. And

on the driver-side floorboard, Sergeant Perez saw a handgun. The parties

stipulated that the handgun was a firearm, see 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(i), and that

Muhammad was disqualified from possessing a firearm.

The trial court credited Sergeant Perez’s testimony and found

Muhammad guilty of persons not to possess firearms. Prior to sentencing,

Muhammad did not challenge the weight of the evidence.

2 The trial court sustained objections to Sergeant Perez’s testimony about why

he stopped the Mazda and what the green leafy substance was. Neither fact affects our analysis of Muhammad’s issues in this appeal.

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On November 26, 2024, Muhammad appeared for sentencing. Through

counsel, he presented an oral motion for extraordinary relief. The trial court

denied the motion and sentenced Muhammad to 3 to 10 years of incarceration.

Muhammad did not file post-sentence motions or a timely appeal.

On January 15, 2025, Muhammad moved to reinstate his appellate

rights nunc pro tunc. The trial court granted reinstatement and appointed

appellate co-counsel. Muhammad filed this direct appeal. 3 Muhammad and

the trial court complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925.

On appeal, Muhammad challenges (1) the sufficiency of the evidence to

sustain his conviction and (2) the trial court’s discretion in denying his motion

that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.

Muhammad’s first issue is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence

that he possessed the handgun. Muhammad argues that his presence in the

Mazda, even viewed in combination with his flight from the scene, is not

sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he—rather than the female

passenger—possessed the handgun.

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for a ____________________________________________

3 Muhammad mistakenly indicated he was appealing from the order granting

reinstatement of his direct appellate rights, rather than his judgment of sentence. We treat his appeal as properly filed from his judgment of sentence, and we have corrected the caption accordingly. Commonwealth v. Walter, 119 A.3d 255, 258 n.1 (Pa. 2015) (citing Pa.R.A.P. 105(a)).

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fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all evidence received must be considered. Finally, the trier of fact, while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Williams, 255 A.3d 565, 578–79 (Pa. Super. 2021)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Smith, 97 A.3d 782, 790 (Pa. Super. 2014))

(brackets omitted).

The statute at issue prohibits certain people (including Muhammad)

from, among other actions, possessing firearms in Pennsylvania. 18 Pa.C.S.

§ 6105(a)(1); see Commonwealth v. McClellan, 178 A.3d 874, 878 (Pa.

Super. 2018). The Commonwealth can meet its burden under a theory of

“constructive possession,” which “is an inference arising from a set of facts

that possession of the contraband was more likely than not.” McClellan, 178

A.3d at 878 (citing Commonwealth v. Mudrick, 507 A.2d 1212, 1213 (Pa.

1986)).

When contraband is not found on the defendant’s person, the Commonwealth must establish “constructive possession,” that is, the power to control the contraband and the intent to exercise that control. The fact that another person may also have control and access does not eliminate the defendant’s constructive possession. As with any other element of a crime, constructive possession may be proven by circumstantial evidence. The requisite knowledge and intent may be inferred from the totality of the circumstances.

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Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Haskins, 677 A.2d 328, 330 (Pa. Super.

1996)) (citations and ellipsis omitted).

Notably, “a defendant’s mere presence at a place where contraband is

found or secreted is insufficient, standing alone, to prove that he exercised

dominion and control over those items.” Commonwealth v. Wright, 255

A.3d 542, 553 (Pa. Super. 2021) (quoting Commonwealth v. Parrish, 191

A.3d 31, 37 (Pa. Super. 2018)). However, a person’s proximity to contraband

in combination with other circumstantial evidence can support a reasonable

inference that he constructively possessed it. E.g., Commonwealth v.

Mumford, _ A.3d _, _, 2026 WL 469008, at *8–9 (Pa. Super. 2026).

This Court’s recent decision in Mumford illustrates how one’s presence

near a firearm, as well as other circumstantial evidence, can be sufficient to

show constructive possession of the firearm. That case involved two firearms

offenses, requiring proof that the defendant possessed a firearm and that he

carried a firearm inside a vehicle. Id. at *1 n.1. The jury heard evidence that

a police officer stopped a van, and the passenger fled and dropped a firearm

on the sidewalk. Id. at *2. In the passenger side of the van, there was a

wallet containing cards with the defendant’s name, and testing showed that

the defendant was likely a contributor to a DNA mixture found on the firearm.

Id. at *2–3. On appeal, we first ruled the evidence was sufficient to establish

that the defendant was the person who possessed the firearm when it was

discarded. Id. at *7–8. Further, we rejected the defendant’s claim that the

evidence was not sufficient to show he (rather than the driver) possessed the

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firearm in the van. Id. at *8–9. Even if the driver possessed the firearm, the

jury could reasonably infer from the defendant’s actions that he also exercised

dominion and control of the firearm inside the vehicle. Id. “[T]he power and

intent to control a firearm necessary for constructive possession need not be

exclusive to the defendant.” Id. at *9 (citing Commonwealth v. Rojas-

Rolon, 256 A.3d 432, 438 (Pa. Super. 2021)).

A person’s flight can indicate consciousness of guilt. Commonwealth

v. Hargrave, 745 A.2d 20, 23 (Pa. Super. 2000) (citing Commonwealth v.

Miller, 721 A.2d 1121, 1125 (Pa. Super. 1998)). But when a person flees the

scene and the only other evidence indicates that he was present “both

immediately prior to and subsequent to the commission of a crime,” our courts

have held this insufficient to sustain a conviction. Id. at 23–24 (ultimately

quoting Commonwealth v. Goodman, 350 A.2d 810, 811–12 (Pa. 1976)).

“The additional element of flight, which is as consistent with fear as with guilt,

does not convert presence into proof of guilt.” Id. at 24 (quoting Goodman,

350 A.2d at 811). Thus, where a defendant was at the scene of a department

store burglary and near a box with stolen merchandise, his later

disappearance (after charges were filed) was insufficient to prove that he had

participated in the burglary. Id.

Here, the evidence from Muhammad’s trial was sufficient to prove that

he constructively possessed the handgun that police first saw on the driver-

side floorboard of the Mazda. Because Muhammad fled from the driver’s side

of the Mazda, the trial court could find that he was the driver. The trial court

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could also find from the matching sandwich bags on Muhammad’s person and

on the driver’s seat that Muhammad had the power and intent to control the

items on that side of the Mazda. The court could infer that the handgun slid

out from under the driver’s seat when Muhammad slammed on the brakes.

Thus, even if the female passenger also had a possessory interest in the

handgun, it would still be reasonable to find that Muhammad had dominion

and control over it. Mumford, _ A.3d at _, 2026 WL 469008, at *9. As the

evidence showed that Muhammad constructively possessed the handgun, the

court could consider his immediate flight as further evidence of his mental

state. Hargrave, 745 A.2d at 23. Muhammad’s first issue fails.

Muhammad’s second issue is a challenge to the weight of the evidence.

Because this claim implicates the trial court’s discretion, an appellant must

preserve it by moving for a new trial in one of three ways:

(1) orally, on the record, at any time before sentencing;

(2) by written motion at any time before sentencing; or

(3) in a post-sentence motion.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A).

Under this rule, “a challenge to the weight of the evidence must be

raised with the trial judge or it will be waived.” Commonwealth v. Gillard,

850 A.2d 1273, 1277 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citing Pa.R.Crim.P. 607, comment).

Importantly, “A motion for extraordinary relief shall have no effect on the

preservation or waiver of issues for post-sentence consideration or appeal.”

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Pa.R.Crim.P. 704(B)(3); see Commonwealth v. Askew, 907 A.2d 624, 627

(Pa. Super. 2006).

Here, Muhammad did not move for a new trial under Rule 607(A).

Furthermore, his oral motion for extraordinary relief did not preserve his

weight issue. We therefore do not reach the merits of Muhammad’s second

issue.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 5/11/2026

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