Com. v. Monroe, A.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: June 15, 2026
• Docket: 461 MDA 2025
• Status: Unpublished
• Author: Olson

Opinion

J-S07029-26

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : ANTHONY AARON MONROE : : Appellant : No. 461 MDA 2025

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 10, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-41-CR-0000983-2022

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED: JUNE 15, 2026

Appellant, Anthony Aaron Monroe, appeals pro se from the order

entered on March 10, 2025, dismissing his first petition filed pursuant to the

Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

The PCRA court summarized the facts of this case as follows:

[T]he police initially became aware of [Appellant’s] criminal behavior through [] information provided by a confidential source that had been used in other criminal investigations which resulted in the arrest of other defendants and [the] seizure[] of illegal drugs, firearms and other proceeds of illegal drug enterprises. [Therefore, Appellant] agreed to meet with [an] undercover officer (UC) who [posed] as a “black market arms dealer” to trade handguns for cocaine. As a product of their conversation, [Appellant] showed the UC his own gun through FaceTime that he possessed prior to their meeting because he wanted to purchase extended magazines for it [and agreed to sell the UC cocaine in exchange]. The gun was seized from [Appellant after] a search warrant [was] obtained for his residence. The weapon was found in [Appellant’s] bedroom hidden under a dresser.

PCRA Court Opinion, 9/23/2024, at 6 (record citations omitted). J-S07029-26

The Commonwealth initially charged Appellant with persons not to

possess a firearm, receiving stolen property, and possession with intent to

deliver narcotics.1 Thereafter, the case progressed as follows:

On July 10, 2023, [Appellant] entered into a [counseled] negotiated guilty plea to [persons not to possess a firearm], a felony of the first-degree. The negotiated plea agreement was for a sentence of five to ten [] year[s of] incarceration [] with credit for time previously served. After his plea, [Appellant] was sentenced pursuant to the plea agreement and received credit for time served toward the sentence from July 15, 2020 until July 10, 2023. No subsequent motions for reconsideration or appeals were filed. Therefore, [Appellant’s] judgment of sentence became final on August 9, 2023.

[Appellant] filed a timely pro se PCRA petition, in which he alleged that the court failed to inform [him] of the elements of the crimes charged, [that] his sentence was illegal for failing to conduct a hearing to determine if he could pay [] fines, [that] he was entrapped and that his sentence was “null and void, and unconstitutional as applied to [him] based upon Range v. Attorney General, 69 F.4th 96 (3d Cir. 2023) and New York State Rifle Assn. Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S.Ct. 2111 (2022).” [The PCRA] court appointed [counsel to represent Appellant] on February 21, 2024. On May 3, 2024, [PCRA counsel] filed a petition [under Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988) and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988)] to withdraw from [PCRA] representation[.] A PCRA conference was held on May 14, 2024. After consideration of the entire record, [the PCRA] court agree[d] with [PCRA counsel] that [Appellant] failed to raise any meritorious issues in his PCRA petition.

Id. at 1-2 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). On September 23, 2024, the

PCRA court granted PCRA counsel’s petition to withdraw and filed notice of its

intent to dismiss the PCRA petition without a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P.

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6105(a)(1) and 3925(a); 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).

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907, along with an accompanying opinion. By order entered on March 10,

2025, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition. This timely pro se

appeal followed.2

On appeal, Appellant presents the following issues3 for our review:

I. Whether the [PCRA] court’s determination to deny [PCRA] relief was free of legal error?

II. Whether [the] ineffectiveness of trial counsel fell below the standard of reasonableness and prejudiced Appellant, causing Appellant to enter into an unknowing and unintelligent plea?

Appellant’s Pro Se Brief, at vi.

Appellant raises related claims in challenging the PCRA court’s order that

dismissed his petition for collateral relief. First, Appellant claims the

investigating undercover officer falsely represented himself as a black-market

arms dealer to induce Appellant to commit an offense Appellant was not

otherwise predisposed to undertake. See Appellant’s Brief at 1. As such,

2 Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal on April 1, 2025. On the same day, the PCRA court filed an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). The PCRA court’s opinion largely relied upon the court’s earlier decision filed on September 23, 2024 but also addressed Appellant’s claim that his conviction for possession of a firearm under Section 6105(a) was unconstitutional.

3 As briefly set forth above, Appellant presented additional issues to the PCRA court including alleged trial court error in failing to inform him of the elements of the crimes charged and to conduct a hearing to determine if he could pay fines, as well as his challenge to the constitutionality of Section 6105(a). Appellant has abandoned these issues and we find them waived. See Commonwealth v. Felder, 247 A.3d 14, 20 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted) (“[A]n issue identified on appeal but not developed in the appellant's brief is abandoned and, therefore, waived.”

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Appellant maintains that the PCRA court wrongly denied relief and dismissed

Appellant’s petition. See id. Next, Appellant asserts that he entered into an

invalid plea agreement because trial counsel failed to request a suppression

hearing based upon Appellant’s entrapment defense. See id. at 5. More

specifically, Appellant argues

counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced Appellant, was the proximate or primary moving cause of Appellant entering into an unknowing and unintelligent plea, and, that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors and deficient performance, a suppression hearing would have been held on Appellant’s entrapment defense and Appellant would have insisted on going to trial where the proceeding would have been different.

Id. at 9. Appellant’s claims merit no relief.

This Court adheres to the following, well-settled standard of review:

[W]e must determine whether the findings of the PCRA court are supported by the record and whether the court's legal conclusions are free from error. The findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record are viewed in a light most favorable to the prevailing party.

The PCRA court's credibility determinations, when supported by the record are binding; however, this Court applies a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court's legal conclusions. We must keep in mind that the petitioner has the burden of persuading this Court that the PCRA court erred and that such error requires relief. Finally, this Court may affirm a valid judgment or order for any reason appearing of record.

Commonwealth v. Montalvo, 205 A.3d 274, 286 (Pa. 2019) (citations

omitted).

We have carefully reviewed the certified record, the submissions of the

parties, the opinions of the PCRA court, and the pertinent case law. Based

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upon our review, we conclude for the reasons expressed by the PCRA court

that Appellant is not entitled to relief. More specifically, the PCRA court set

forth the prevailing law regarding the entry of a knowing, voluntary, and

intelligent guilty plea. See PCRA Court Opinion, 9/23/2024, at 3. The PCRA

court then examined the notes of testimony from the guilty plea hearing and

concluded that Appellant’s guilty plea was made knowingly, voluntarily, and

intelligently. Id. Thus, the PCRA court determined that by entering a valid

guilty plea, Appellant waived all of his trial defenses, including the defense of

entrapment and, by extension, the need to seek suppression based upon that

claim.4 Id. at 5. Accordingly, the PCRA court determined that trial counsel

could not be deemed “ineffective for failing to assert a meritless claim.” Id.

at 8. We find that the PCRA court has adequately and accurately addressed

4 However, the PCRA court also determined that, regardless, entrapment was not a defense available to Appellant at trial because:

[Appellant] possessed the firearm prior to any contact by the police or the confidential source. [Appellant] was not induced to possess the firearm; he already possessed it. He also already had multiple felony drug convictions from 2006 to 2019 which made it unlawful for him to possess a firearm in 2022 He might have been induced to show [the firearm] to a law enforcement officer, but not by any false representations that it was lawful for [Appellant] to possess firearms and ammunition. The only false representation was that the law enforcement officer was an illegal arms dealer, who could obtain an extended magazine for the firearm which [Appellant] already possessed.

PCRA Court Opinion, 9/23/2024, at 6-7. This portion of the PCRA court’s opinion, however, is superfluous after finding waiver of the entrapment defense.

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the issues raised in this appeal and we adopt the PCRA court's opinion as our

own. Accordingly, the parties are directed to attach a copy of the PCRA court's

September 23, 2024 opinion5 to all future filings relating to our disposition in

this appeal.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 06/15/2026

5 It is not necessary to attach the PCRA court’s April 1, 2025 supplemental opinion. That decision addressed Appellant’s challenge to the constitutionality of Section 6105(a), an issue that Appellant has abandoned on appeal.

-6- Circulated 05/13/2026 01:43 PM

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LYCOMING COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA

COMMONWEALTH of PENNSYLVANIA :

V. CM1-CR-098M022

Notice of Intent to Dismiss PCRA ANTHONY AARON MONROE, and Order Granting Counsel’s Petitioner Motion to Withdraw

OPINION AND ORDER

On May 3, 2024, Counsel for Anthony Monroe(Petitioher) filed a Petition to Withdraw

from Representation of Post-Cbnviction. Collateral Relief pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner,

544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988) and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 21 3 (Pa. Super. 1988). After an / independent review of the entire record, this Court agrees with Post-Conviction Relief Act

(PCRA) Counsel and finds that Petitioner has failed to raise any meritorious issues in his PCRA

Petition, the Petition therefore should be dismissed.

Background

On July 10, 2023, Petitioner entered a negotiated one count of Possession : :

of a Fi rearm by a Prohibited Person, a felony Of the first degree. 1The negotiated plea agreement

was for a sentence of five to ten-year incarceration in State prison with credit, for time previously

served. After his plea, Petitioner was sentenced pursuant to the plea agreement and received

credit for time served toward the sentence from July 15, 2020 until July 10, 2023. No

.... subsequent motions for reconsideration or appeals were filed. Therefore, Petitioner’s sentence

b'^I^ final on August 9, 2023,

- ^Petitioner filed a timely pro se PCRA Petition on January 9, 2024, in: whidh he alleged Q <-'.O ‘ ; thit-fee. Court failed to inform him of the elements; of the crimes charged, his sentence was illegal .- SrluJ , , J _ j _ ‘ ’ 18 Pa. C.S,A, § 6105(a)(1) for failing to conduct a hearing to determine if he could pay the fines, he was entrapped and that

his sentence was “null, void, and unconstitutional as applied to defendant based upon Range v.

Attorney General, 69 R4tb 96 (3d Cif. 2023). and New York State Rifle Assn Inc. v-. Rruen, 142

S.Ct. 211 1 (2022)”. This Court appointed Donald F. Martino, Esquire as Petitioner’s attorney on

February 21 , 2024. On May 3, 2024, Attorney Martino filed a Petition to Withdraw from

Representation of Post-Conviction. Collateral Relief following a TurnerlFinley “No Merit

Letter.” A PCRA conference was held on May 14, 2024. After consideration Of the entire record,

this Court agrees with Attorney Martino that Petitioner has failed to raise any meritorious issues

in his PCRA Petition.

To prevail in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must overcome the

presumption that counsel is effective by establishing all of the following three elements, as set

forth in Commonwealth v. Pierce, 515 Ra. 153, 527 A.2d 973, 975—76 (1987): (1) the underlying

legal claim has arguable merit; (2) counsel had no reasonable basis for his or her action or

inaction; and (3) the petitioner suffered prejudice because of counsel's ineffectiveness.

Commonwealth v. Dennis, 597 Pa. 159, 950 A.2d 945, 954 (2008).

Whether the guilty plea was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent

In a PCRA claim where a guilty plea was entered and honored by the sentencing judge,

the Court is directed to look to whether the plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily

entered. Commonwealth v: Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 175 (Pa. Super. 20 IQ). Manifest injustice is

required to withdraw guilty plea which is requested after a sentence has beeri imposed.

Commonwealth v. Flick, 802 A.2d 620, 623 (Pa. Super. 2002). Such a manifest injustice occurs

only when a plea is not tendered knowingly, intelligently, voluntarily, and understandihgly.

Commonwealth v. Persinger, 615 A,2d 1305, 1 30 8 (Pa. 1992). It does not matter if Petitioner is

2 pleased with the outcome of his decision to plead guilty as long as he did so knowingly,

voluntarily, and intelligently. Commonwealth v. Yager, 685 A.2d 1000, 1004 (Pa. Super. 1996).

Petitioner must demonstrate a “miscarriage of justice .,, which no civilized society could

tolerate, in order to be entitled to relief.” Commonwealth v. Allerr, 732 A.2d 582, .588 (Pa. 1999),

A trial court must, at a minimum, evaluate the following six areas:

(1) Does the Petitioner understand the nature of the charges to which he is pleading guilty? (2) Is there a factual basis for the plea? (3) Does, the Petitioner understand that he has a right to trial by jury? (4) Does the Petitioner Understand that he is presumed innocent until he is found guilty? (5) Is the Petitioner aware of the permissible ranges of sentences and/or fines for the offenses charged? (6) Is the Petitioner aware that the judge is not bound by the terms of any plea agreement tendered Unless the judge accepts such agreement?

Commonwealth v. Young, 695 A.2d 414, 417 (Pa. Super. 1 997).

In Yeomans, the Superior Court farther summarized:

In order for a guilty plea to be constitutionally valid, the guilty plea colloquy must affirmatively show that the Petitioner understood what the plea connoted arid its consequences. This determination is to be made: by examining the totality of the circumstances surrounding the entry of the plea. Thus, even though there is an omission or defect in the guilty plea colloquy, a plea of .guilty will not be deemed invalid if the circumstances surrounding the. entry of the plea disclose that the Petitioner had a fall understanding of the nature and consequences of his plea and that he knowingly and voluntarily decided to enter the plea.

Commonwealth v. Yeomans, 24 A.3d 104.4, 1047 (Pa- Super. 2011) (citing

Commonwealth v. Fluharty, 632 A.2d 312, 31.4 (Pa, Super. 1993)).

A review of the transcripts of the guilty plea arid sentencing hearing in this ease confirms

that Petitioner did in fact enter into his pjea knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. This Court

informed Petitioner of the nature of the charges to which he was pleading. N.T., Guilty Plea,

7/10/2023, at 5, 22-23. The Court also advised the Petitioner that it Was not bound by any plea

agreement. Id. at 23. Petitioner was asked questions to establish the factual basis for the

underlying charge and he admitted to the elements of the charge to which he was pleading guilty.

3 Id. at 23-24. The Court informed Petitioner of his right to a jury trial and the maximum sentences

and finesthat accompanied his charges. Id. at 22, 26. The Court explained to Petitioner that he

did not have to enter a plea and that there were jurors waiting ready to pick a jury for him to go

to trial if he wished. Id. at 26. Petitioner indicated that he went through the guilty plea colloquy

with the assistance of an attorney, he had adequate time to consult with his attorney, it was his

decision to plead guilty, and that he was not threatened, coerced, or forced into making his

decision. Id. at 26-27. Since the Petitioner had come down to court to speak prior to his plea, this

Court also made certain by asking Petitioner if anything it did anything in the earlier

conversation which made him feel as though the Court was forcing, threatening him or putting:

any pressure on him to enter a plea. Id. at 21 -22. After a Complete review of the record, the Court

finds that this issue has no merit.

Petitioner in his pro se petition, also contends that the Court failed to explain the elements

of the charges to him. As discussed above, the Court did review the elements of the offense to

which he pled guilty. In fact, Petitioner initially came down to court as his case was fisted for

jury selection and trial counsel explained that the Petitioner was not effectively communicating

with her and so he was brought down to explore why. During the questioning of Petitioner, the

Court reviewed all of the charges against him. Id. at 5. When the Petitioner came down later to

enter his plea, the Court reviewed the only charge to which the Petitioner was pleading. Id. at22-

23. In fact, the Petitioner told the Court Tm guilty, obviously, I mean I’m pleading guilty so.

you know.” Id, at 29. Therefore, this issue has no merit.

Petitioner next asserts that his sentence is illegal; because the court failed to hold an

assessment hearing to determine if Monroe could pay the fines imposed. This issue is frivolous.

The court did not impose any fines in this case. The only fees imposed on Monroe were the

4 costs of prosecution. The court is not required to hold an ability to pay hearing prior to the

assessment of costs. Commonwealth v. Lopez, 280 A,3d 887 (Pa. 2022),

Next, Petitioner next asserts that his conduct occurred in response to entrapment. This

claim fails for several reasons.

First, this claim, was waived when Monrpe entered his guilty plea. To be entitled to relief

on a PCRA petition, the petitioner must plead and prove that, is claim is hot previously litigated

or waived. 42 Pa. C.S. §9544. An issue is waived if the petitioner could have raised it but failed

to do so before trial, at trial, on appeal or in a prior PCRA proceeding. 42 Pa. C.S, §9544(b).

Second, entrapment is a defense; it is. not an element of an offense. Entrapment is defined

as

(a) General rule. —A public law enforcement official or a person acting in cooperation with sUch an official perpetrates an entrapment if for the purpose of obtaining evidence of the commission of an offense, he induces or encourages another person to engage in conduct constituting such offense by either: (1) making knowingly false representations designed to induce the belief that such conduct is not prohibited; or (2) employ ing .methods of persuasion or inducement which create a Substantial risk that such ah offense will be committed by persons other than those who are ready to commit it. (b) Burden off proof. — Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, a person prosecuted for an offense shall be acquitted i f he proves by a preponderance of the evidence that his conduct occurred in response to an entrapment. (c) Exception. —The defense afforded by this section is unavailable when Causing or threatening bodily injury is ah element of the Offense charged and the prosecution is based on conduct causing or threatening such injury to a person other than the person perpetrating the entrapment.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 313 . The defense of entrapment is based on an objective standard intended to

deter overreaching on the part of law enforcement arid those individuals acting in Cooperation

with law enforcement such as confidential informants. Commonwealth v. Pf'illis, .990 A.2d 773,

775 (Pa. Super, 2010) (citations omitted). The police generally are permitted to. use artifice and

deception to catch criminals. Rather,, the defense of entrapment is ‘ aimed at condemning certain

5 impermissible conduct which falls belbw standards for the proper use of governmental

power.” Commonwealth v. Joseph, 848 A.2d 934, 939 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted).

In order for the Petitioner to prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, he must first

establish that his claim has arguable merit. In reviewing the affidavit of probable cause, the

police initially became aware of his criminal behavior through the information provided by a

confidential source that had been used in other criminal investigations which resulted in the

arrest of other defendants and seizures of illegal drugs, firearms and other proceeds of illegal

drug enterprises. Affidavit of Probable Gause, 7/26/2022. He would have agreed to meet with the

undercover officer (UC) who was posing as a “black market arms dealer” to trade handguns for

cocaine. Id. As a product of their conversation, Petitioner showed the U.C his own gun through

FaceTime that he possessed prior to their meeting because he wanted to purchase extended

magazines for it. The gun Was seized from the Petitioner when a search warrant had been

obtained for his residence.. The weapon was found in Petitioner’s bedroom hidden under a

dresser. Id. “Where police do no more than afford a defendant an. opportunity to commit an

illegal act, their actions are not considered sufficiently outrageous police conduct to support an

entrapment defense.” Commonwealth v. Marion, 981 A.2d 230, 239 (Pa, Super, 2009) (citation

omitted). Therefore; Petitioner possessed a firearm prior to any contact by the police or the

confidential source. Petitioner was not induced to possess the firearm; he already possessed it.

He also already had multiple felony drug convictions from 2006 to 2019 which made it unlawful

for him to possess a firearm in 2022. He might have been induced to Show it to a law

enforcement officer, but not by ally false representations that it was lawful for Petitioner to

possess firearms and ammunition. The only false representation was that the law enforcement

6 officer was an illegal arms dealer, who could obtain an extended magazine for the firearm which

Petitioner already possessed.

Since the Commonwealth merely provided Petitioner with the opportunity to commit the

crimes here and did not engage in behavior that would constitute entrapment he could have

presented this defense at trial but he instead knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered a

guilty plea, this issue is waived. Counsel will not be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a

baseless claim, this argument is without merit.

The Court should also note that trial Counsel, did provide Petitioner With the law Of

entrapment which was discussed prior to the entry of his plea. Guilty Plea, 7/10/2023 at 7-12.

Trial counsel stated that she had mUltiple conversations With the Petitioner about the possibility

of getting the charges dismissed against him due to entrapment. Id. She even provided him. with

the. law and explained to him why entrapment did not exist. Id at 11-12. Monroe has failed to

allege sufficient facts to show that he had a Viable entrapment defense. He just makes a

boilerplate assertion that the conduct resulted from entrapment and cites case law regarding the

defense of entrapment. He never alleges any facts to show what the: police or the confidential

source said or did. If trial counsel had no basis upon which to raise ;an entrapment defense, she

cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise it at trial. Commonwealth v. Spatz, 896 A.2d

1191, 1210 (Pa. 2006).

Finally, Petitioner alleges that his sentence is unconstitutional as applied based on Range

v. Atty General, 69 F 4h 96 (3d Cir. .2023) arid NY State RifleAssn v. Bruen, 142 S.Ct. 21 1 1

(2022). Petitioner appears to be arguing that he has a Second. Amendment right to possess a

firearm despite his prior convictions. These cases ate distinguishable from Petitioner’s case.

Bruen involved a NY statute that prohibited anyone, even law-abiding citizens With no criminal record from possessing afirearm unless they had some particular need for it. Range was

convicted of some minor offense that the 3d Circuit found was not similar or equivalent to the

types of offenses that result in the loss of the right to hear arms.

A quick look at Mr. Monroe’s conviction history shows that he bad multiple prior felony

drug convictions. The Pennsylvania Superior Court rejected a similar claim in Conimifh^ealth v.

McIntyre, 314 A.3d 828 (Pa. Super. 2024)2and found that section 61 05 of the Crimes Code was

constitutional. The United States Supreme Court also held this term that the ban on a person

with a domestic violence order from possessing firearms 1was constitutional in United States v,

Rahimi, 144 S.Ct. 1889 (2024).

Conclusion

The Court finds that Petitioner’s guilty plea was entered knowingly, voluntarily, and

intelligently. In addition, his claims of entrapment, sentence illegality and a violation of his

rights under the Constitution lack merit. Counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to assert a

meritless claim. Additionally, had counsel asserted such claims, the Court would have denied

them. Therefore, Petitioner was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to assert these claims.

Based on the foregoing, this Court finds no basis upon which to grant Petitioner’s PCRA

petition. Additionally, the Court finds that no purpose would be served by conducting any further

hearing. As such, no further hearing, will be scheduled. Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of

Criminal Procedure 907(1), the parties are. hereby notified of this Court’s intention to dismiss

Petitioner’s PCRA Petition. Petitioner may respond to this proposed dismissal within twenty (20)

days. If no response is received within that time period, the Court will enter an Order dismissing

the petition.

2 McIntyre stipulated that he had prior felony convictions for burglary, robbery, aggravated assault, and corrupt

Organizations.

8 ORDER

AND NOW, this 23 rd day of September, 2024, it is hereby ORDERED and DIRECTED

as follows:

1. Petitioner is hereby notified pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure

907(1), that it is the intention of this Court to dismiss his PCRA petition unless he

files an objection to that dismissal within twenty (20) days of today’s date.

2. The application for leave to withdraw appearance filed December 7, 2023, is hereby

GRANTED and Donald F. Martino, Esq. may withdraw his appearance in the above

captioned matter;

3. Petitioner will. be. notified at the address below through means of certified niaiL

By the Court,

Nancy L. Butts, President Judge

xc: ^DA Ddnald F. Martino, Esquire .Anthony Monroe QF 9835 (certified mail) SCI Coal Township. 1 Kelley Prive - Coal Towriship PA 1 7866-1 020 /0ary Weber, Esquire ^efri Rook

NLB/