Com. v. Moats, J.

CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedMarch 5, 2025
Docket1006 WDA 2023
StatusUnpublished

This text of Com. v. Moats, J. (Com. v. Moats, J.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Com. v. Moats, J., (Pa. Ct. App. 2025).

Opinion

J-A02044-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JESSEE LEE MOATS : : Appellant : No. 1006 WDA 2023

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 19, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Greene County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-30-CR-0000097-2019

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., MURRAY, J., and BECK, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BECK, J.: FILED: March 5, 2025

Jessee Lee Moats (“Moats”) appeals from the order entered by the

Greene County Court of Common Pleas dismissing his first petition filed

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We vacate and remand.

On February 27, 2020, a jury convicted Moats of one count each of

insurance fraud and making false reports to law enforcement authorities. On

June 5, 2020, the trial court sentenced Moats to a term of incarceration of

thirty days to twenty-three and one-half months for the insurance fraud

conviction and a concurrent term of one year probation for the false reports

conviction. This Court affirmed the judgment of sentence, and the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal. See

____________________________________________

1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. J-A02044-25

Commonwealth v. Moats, 661 WDA 2020 (Pa. Super. Sept. 2, 2021) (non-

precedential decision), appeal denied, 274 A.3d 717 (Pa. 2022).

On March 30, 2022, Moats filed a timely, pro se PCRA petition alleging

ineffective assistance of counsel.2 The PCRA court did not appoint Moats

counsel or conduct a hearing pursuant to Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713

A.2d 81, 82 (Pa. 1998). Subsequently, the PCRA court denied Moats’ PCRA

petition. Moats timely appealed. Upon noticing that Moats had proceeded pro

se below, this Court entered an order directing the PCRA court to clarify

whether Moats was entitled to the appointment of counsel in this matter, as it

was his first PCRA petition. Order, 9/25/2023. Specifically, we stated:

If [Moats] was entitled to counsel and counsel was not appointed, the PCRA court shall appoint counsel to represent [Moats] and the PCRA court shall notify this Court in writing forthwith so that the July 19, 2023 order can be vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings. If [Moats] was not entitled to the appointment of counsel, or if [Moats] waived any right to counsel, the PCRA court shall notify this Court in writing forthwith so that the instant appeal may proceed.

Id.

The PCRA court responded that Moats was not indigent; however, Moats

responded that he was indigent. As a result, this Court issued another order,

directing the PCRA court to hold a hearing to determine whether Moats is

indigent, and if so, to appoint counsel to represent Moats. Order, 11/27/2023.

Upon determining that Moats was in fact indigent, the PCRA court appointed

2 Moats’ direct appeal counsel was permitted to withdraw on April 4, 2022.

-2- J-A02044-25

counsel to represent Moats for the instant appeal. It did not, however, make

any determination as to Moats’ right to counsel in pursuing his PCRA petition

before the court below.

Moats, through counsel, raises one issue on appeal: “Did the PCRA court

err in failing to appoint counsel for [Moats] at his [PCRA] hearing?” Moats’

Brief at 3. Moats argues that the PCRA court erred as a matter of law by

failing to determine whether he was indigent, was entitled to appointed

counsel, or properly waived his right to appointed counsel. Id. at 10. Moats

asserts the case should be remanded to the PCRA court to make a proper

determination about counsel. Id. at 10-11.

At the outset, we note that although Moats’ sentence was less than two

years, and he was sentenced on June 5, 2020, he remains eligible for PCRA

relief because the record shows that he has yet to begin serving his sentence.

See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(1)(i) (to be eligible for PCRA relief, the petitioner

must be serving a sentence of imprisonment, probation, or parole for that

crime at the time relief is granted); Commonwealth v. Kirwan, 221 A.3d

196, 200 (Pa. Super. 2019). On June 10, 2020, the trial court originally

ordered Moats to report to Greene County Prison to serve his sentence. See

Commitment Order, 6/10/2020. At the PCRA hearing, however, the PCRA

court stated that Moats “was convicted, sentenced, filed a direct appeal, was

on bail, has been on bail the whole time, and when the direct appeal was --

when the Superior Court affirmed the Trial Court’s decision, then [] Moats filed

-3- J-A02044-25

a timely [PCRA petition].” N.T., 5/16/2023, at 3. Thereafter, on July 19,

2023, following the denial of his PCRA petition, the PCRA court entered an

order directing Moats to report to Greene County Prison for the

commencement of his sentence on October 2, 2023. PCRA Court Order,

7/19/2023. Based on this record, Moats has not completed the sentence, and

therefore, he is still eligible for PCRA relief. See Kirwan, 221 A.3d at 199-

200.

Turning to Moats’ claim, the law is well settled that first-time, indigent

PCRA petitioners have a rule-based right to appointed counsel. See

Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(C) (stating that “when an unrepresented defendant satisfies

the judge that the defendant is unable to afford or otherwise procure counsel,

the judge shall appoint counsel to represent the defendant on the defendant’s

first petition for post-conviction collateral relief.”); see also Commonwealth

v. Betts, 240 A.3d 616, 624 (Pa. Super. 2020) (“An indigent petitioner has

the right to appointment of counsel to assist in prosecuting a first PCRA

petition”). “The indigent petitioner’s right to counsel must be honored

regardless of the merits of his underlying claims, … so long as the petition in

question is his first.” Commonwealth v. Kelsey, 206 A.3d 1135, 1139 (Pa.

Super. 2019) (citation omitted). A defendant can waive the right to PCRA

counsel only if that waiver is “knowing, voluntary, and intelligent[.]”

Pa.R.Crim.P. 121(A)(2). The judge must make that determination on the

record. Grazier, 713 A.2d at 82.

-4- J-A02044-25

Here, the record confirms that Moats is indigent, the current petition is

his first PCRA petition, and the PCRA court did not appoint Moats counsel to

prosecute his petition and/or file an amended petition if warranted. See, e.g.,

N.T., 05/16/2023 at 3, 9, 10, 72 (wherein the PCRA court noted that Moats

was proceeding pro se). Therefore, Moats was entitled to counsel before the

PCRA court. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(C). That the PCRA court appointed counsel

to represent Moats on appeal from the denial of his first PCRA petition does

not cure this defect. See Betts, 240 A.3d at 624 (noting that a first time

PCRA petitioner is entitled to “competent counsel at each stage of the post-

conviction review.”) (citation omitted).

We therefore vacate the PCRA court’s order dismissing Moats’ PCRA

petition and remand for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

Order vacated. Case remanded with instructions. Jurisdiction

relinquished.

DATE: 3/5/2025

-5-

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Related

Commonwealth v. Grazier
713 A.2d 81 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1998)
Commonwealth v. Kelsey
206 A.3d 1135 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2019)
Com. v. Kirwan, P.
2019 Pa. Super. 311 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2019)
Com. v. Betts, T.
2020 Pa. Super. 225 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2020)

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Com. v. Moats, J., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/com-v-moats-j-pasuperct-2025.