Com. v. Moats, J.
This text of Com. v. Moats, J. (Com. v. Moats, J.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
J-A02044-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JESSEE LEE MOATS : : Appellant : No. 1006 WDA 2023
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 19, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Greene County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-30-CR-0000097-2019
BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., MURRAY, J., and BECK, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BECK, J.: FILED: March 5, 2025
Jessee Lee Moats (“Moats”) appeals from the order entered by the
Greene County Court of Common Pleas dismissing his first petition filed
pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We vacate and remand.
On February 27, 2020, a jury convicted Moats of one count each of
insurance fraud and making false reports to law enforcement authorities. On
June 5, 2020, the trial court sentenced Moats to a term of incarceration of
thirty days to twenty-three and one-half months for the insurance fraud
conviction and a concurrent term of one year probation for the false reports
conviction. This Court affirmed the judgment of sentence, and the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal. See
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1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. J-A02044-25
Commonwealth v. Moats, 661 WDA 2020 (Pa. Super. Sept. 2, 2021) (non-
precedential decision), appeal denied, 274 A.3d 717 (Pa. 2022).
On March 30, 2022, Moats filed a timely, pro se PCRA petition alleging
ineffective assistance of counsel.2 The PCRA court did not appoint Moats
counsel or conduct a hearing pursuant to Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713
A.2d 81, 82 (Pa. 1998). Subsequently, the PCRA court denied Moats’ PCRA
petition. Moats timely appealed. Upon noticing that Moats had proceeded pro
se below, this Court entered an order directing the PCRA court to clarify
whether Moats was entitled to the appointment of counsel in this matter, as it
was his first PCRA petition. Order, 9/25/2023. Specifically, we stated:
If [Moats] was entitled to counsel and counsel was not appointed, the PCRA court shall appoint counsel to represent [Moats] and the PCRA court shall notify this Court in writing forthwith so that the July 19, 2023 order can be vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings. If [Moats] was not entitled to the appointment of counsel, or if [Moats] waived any right to counsel, the PCRA court shall notify this Court in writing forthwith so that the instant appeal may proceed.
Id.
The PCRA court responded that Moats was not indigent; however, Moats
responded that he was indigent. As a result, this Court issued another order,
directing the PCRA court to hold a hearing to determine whether Moats is
indigent, and if so, to appoint counsel to represent Moats. Order, 11/27/2023.
Upon determining that Moats was in fact indigent, the PCRA court appointed
2 Moats’ direct appeal counsel was permitted to withdraw on April 4, 2022.
-2- J-A02044-25
counsel to represent Moats for the instant appeal. It did not, however, make
any determination as to Moats’ right to counsel in pursuing his PCRA petition
before the court below.
Moats, through counsel, raises one issue on appeal: “Did the PCRA court
err in failing to appoint counsel for [Moats] at his [PCRA] hearing?” Moats’
Brief at 3. Moats argues that the PCRA court erred as a matter of law by
failing to determine whether he was indigent, was entitled to appointed
counsel, or properly waived his right to appointed counsel. Id. at 10. Moats
asserts the case should be remanded to the PCRA court to make a proper
determination about counsel. Id. at 10-11.
At the outset, we note that although Moats’ sentence was less than two
years, and he was sentenced on June 5, 2020, he remains eligible for PCRA
relief because the record shows that he has yet to begin serving his sentence.
See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(1)(i) (to be eligible for PCRA relief, the petitioner
must be serving a sentence of imprisonment, probation, or parole for that
crime at the time relief is granted); Commonwealth v. Kirwan, 221 A.3d
196, 200 (Pa. Super. 2019). On June 10, 2020, the trial court originally
ordered Moats to report to Greene County Prison to serve his sentence. See
Commitment Order, 6/10/2020. At the PCRA hearing, however, the PCRA
court stated that Moats “was convicted, sentenced, filed a direct appeal, was
on bail, has been on bail the whole time, and when the direct appeal was --
when the Superior Court affirmed the Trial Court’s decision, then [] Moats filed
-3- J-A02044-25
a timely [PCRA petition].” N.T., 5/16/2023, at 3. Thereafter, on July 19,
2023, following the denial of his PCRA petition, the PCRA court entered an
order directing Moats to report to Greene County Prison for the
commencement of his sentence on October 2, 2023. PCRA Court Order,
7/19/2023. Based on this record, Moats has not completed the sentence, and
therefore, he is still eligible for PCRA relief. See Kirwan, 221 A.3d at 199-
200.
Turning to Moats’ claim, the law is well settled that first-time, indigent
PCRA petitioners have a rule-based right to appointed counsel. See
Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(C) (stating that “when an unrepresented defendant satisfies
the judge that the defendant is unable to afford or otherwise procure counsel,
the judge shall appoint counsel to represent the defendant on the defendant’s
first petition for post-conviction collateral relief.”); see also Commonwealth
v. Betts, 240 A.3d 616, 624 (Pa. Super. 2020) (“An indigent petitioner has
the right to appointment of counsel to assist in prosecuting a first PCRA
petition”). “The indigent petitioner’s right to counsel must be honored
regardless of the merits of his underlying claims, … so long as the petition in
question is his first.” Commonwealth v. Kelsey, 206 A.3d 1135, 1139 (Pa.
Super. 2019) (citation omitted). A defendant can waive the right to PCRA
counsel only if that waiver is “knowing, voluntary, and intelligent[.]”
Pa.R.Crim.P. 121(A)(2). The judge must make that determination on the
record. Grazier, 713 A.2d at 82.
-4- J-A02044-25
Here, the record confirms that Moats is indigent, the current petition is
his first PCRA petition, and the PCRA court did not appoint Moats counsel to
prosecute his petition and/or file an amended petition if warranted. See, e.g.,
N.T., 05/16/2023 at 3, 9, 10, 72 (wherein the PCRA court noted that Moats
was proceeding pro se). Therefore, Moats was entitled to counsel before the
PCRA court. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(C). That the PCRA court appointed counsel
to represent Moats on appeal from the denial of his first PCRA petition does
not cure this defect. See Betts, 240 A.3d at 624 (noting that a first time
PCRA petitioner is entitled to “competent counsel at each stage of the post-
conviction review.”) (citation omitted).
We therefore vacate the PCRA court’s order dismissing Moats’ PCRA
petition and remand for further proceedings consistent with this decision.
Order vacated. Case remanded with instructions. Jurisdiction
relinquished.
DATE: 3/5/2025
-5-
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