J-S57003-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : LAQUINN TYSHAY MITCHELL : : Appellant : No. 287 MDA 2019
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 15, 2019 In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-21-CR-0003338-2016
BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED JANUARY 29, 2020
LaQuinn Tyshay Mitchell appeals from her January 15, 2019 judgment
of sentence of sixty days of incarceration and fines, which was imposed after
she was convicted of unlawful possession of marijuana, possession of drug
paraphernalia, and driving while under license suspension--DUI-related. We
affirm.
The trial court summarized the facts as follows:
On June 6, 2016, at approximately 1:00 pm, Detective John Friel of the West Shore Regional Police Department was driving his marked patrol vehicle in the Borough of Lemoyne, Cumberland County. He was on patrol in full uniform when he noticed a vehicle owned by June Latese Lowery parked on a side street next to her residence with the engine running. Ms. Lowery was an individual that Detective Friel knew, from past interactions, had a suspended driver’s license. Detective Friel drove past the vehicle and observed Ms. Lowery in the driver’s seat while the vehicle’s engine was running.
Upon observing Ms. Lowery in the driver’s seat of her automobile, Detective Friel performed a U-turn so that he could J-S57003-19
get behind the subject vehicle. [During the U-turn, Detective Friel lost sight of the vehicle for “less than ten seconds.”] (N.T., 11/6/181, at 16). Upon completing his turn, Detective Friel observed that the vehicle was being driven down the street, and he performed a traffic stop once he caught up to it. Once the vehicle was stopped, Detective Friel observed that Ms. Lowery was in the passenger seat of the automobile, and that the vehicle was being driven by an individual later identified as the Appellant. At the time of the stop, Appellant provided a false name and date of birth to Detective Friel. After a failed attempt to locate Appellant in the police database using the false information provided to him, Detective Friel gave Appellant a final opportunity to correctly identify herself. Appellant did so, and upon running her information through the police database, Detective Friel learned that Appellant had a suspended driver’s license, as well as an active arrest warrant from York County.
Pursuant to the active warrant, Appellant was taken into custody. At the time her handbag was searched, incident to arrest [and with the oral consent of Appellant], which revealed, among other items, marijuana and a grinder. (N.T., 11/6/18, at 13). This discovery led to the drug-related charges[,] which were filed against Appellant.
Trial Court Opinion, 4/3/19, at 2.
Appellant presents two issues for our review:
I. Did the trial court err in denying omnibus pre-trial motion/motion to suppress wherein police detained and questioned Appellant during a traffic stop, had elicited inculpatory statements and illegally seized evidence?
II. Was the evidence sufficient to have convicted Appellant of unlawful possession of small amount of marijuana, unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, and driving under suspension, DUI-related?
Appellant’s brief at 6 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
____________________________________________
1 Although the trial took place on November 6, 2018, the cover page of the official Transcript of Proceedings incorrectly identifies the date as November 6, 2019. We refer to the correct date.
-2- J-S57003-19
Appellant’s first issue is a challenge to the trial court’s denial of her
suppression motion. In reviewing such a claim, we are
limited to determining whether the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record, [the appellate court is] bound by [those] findings and may reverse only if the court's legal conclusions are erroneous.
Commonwealth v. Jones, 121 A.3d 524, 526 (Pa.Super. 2015) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Jones, 988 A.2d 649, 654 (Pa. 2010) (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted)).
Appellant contends that Detective John Friel lacked reasonable suspicion
to detain the vehicle she was driving and question her. The following
principles inform our analysis of this issue. There are three categories of
interactions between citizens and police:
The first of these is a “mere encounter” (or request for information) which need not be supported by any level of suspicion, but carries no official compulsion to stop or to respond. The second, an “investigative detention” must be supported by a reasonable suspicion; it subjects a suspect to a stop and a period of detention, but does not involve such coercive conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent of an arrest. Finally, an arrest or “custodial detention” must be supported by probable cause.
Commonwealth v. Ellis, 662 A.2d 1043, 1047 (Pa. 1995). We conduct an
objective examination of the totality of the circumstances in determining the
-3- J-S57003-19
level of the interaction. Commonwealth v. Strickler, 757 A.2d 884, 889
(Pa. 2000).
A police officer has authority to stop a vehicle when he has reasonable
suspicion that a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code (“MVC”) is occurring or
has occurred. Commonwealth v. Farnan, 55 A.3d 113, 116 (Pa.Super.
2012). In Commonwealth v. Houck, 102 A.3d 443 (Pa.Super. 2014), this
Court explained, “[t]o establish grounds for “reasonable suspicion” . . . the
officer must articulate specific observations which, in conjunction with
reasonable inferences derived from these observations, led him to reasonably
conclude, in light of his experience, that criminal activity was afoot and the
person he stopped was involved in that activity.” Id. at 456.
Also implicated herein is the legality of an officer requesting identifying
information from an individual during an investigative traffic stop. As this
Court reaffirmed in Commonwealth v. Reed, 19 A.3d 1163, 1166 (Pa.Super.
2011), Pennsylvania law does not recognize an expectation of privacy in an
individual’s identifying information. Therefore, an officer’s request for such
information alone does not implicate Fourth Amendment protections.
Moreover, the MVC authorizes police officers with reasonable suspicion of a
violation to stop a vehicle and request an operator’s license or other relevant
information. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 6308(b) (authorizing police officer with
reasonable suspicion of a MVC violation to stop vehicle and check license of
operator or other information).
-4- J-S57003-19
Appellant contends first that the trial court erred in denying her motion
to suppress because Detective Friel lacked reasonable suspicion to effectuate
the investigative stop and detention. She argues that, given the totality of
the circumstances the detective observed, his belief that Ms. Lowery was
driving the car with a suspended license did not warrant the stop. Appellant’s
brief at 17. Alternatively, Appellant posits that the reasonable suspicion of
Detective Friel only validated an investigative stop of Ms. Lowery, not
Appellant, as he had no reasonable belief that Appellant was committing a
motor vehicle violation. Id. at 23.
In support of her position, Appellant argues that the United States
Constitution and Houck, supra, place restrictions on a police officer’s
reasonable suspicion and establish a strong policy favoring protection of an
individual’s Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures. See Appellant’s brief, at 16-24. Appellant asserts that, because
Detective Friel’s reasonable suspicion was based on Ms. Lowery driving the
vehicle, the detective lacked a valid basis for an investigative stop of Appellant
as opposed to Ms. Lowery. Hence, she maintains that the seizure was illegal
and unconstitutional. Id. at 23.
Furthermore, Appellant claims that, upon stopping the vehicle and then
discovering that Ms. Lowery was not the driver, there was no longer
“reasonable suspicion that a violation of [the MVC] is occurring or has
occurred.” Id. Appellant asserts that once Detective Friel observed that Ms.
-5- J-S57003-19
Lowery was not operating the vehicle, he lacked the authority to subject
Appellant to an investigative stop since he had no reasonable suspicion that
she was illegally operating the vehicle. Id.
Appellant contends further that Detective Friel’s act of asking for her
identification following the stop was either a new, separate, and baseless
investigation of Appellant, or an impermissible and illegal continuation of the
original investigative stop. Id. at 29. Both arguments rest on Appellant’s
assumption that when Detective Friel’s reasonable suspicion of a MVC violation
was dispelled, the stop became illegal. Id. at 24. Appellant arrives at this
conclusion by meshing Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 832 A.2d 1123, 1130
(Pa.Super. 2003), establishing that an officer should utilize the “least intrusive
means reasonably available” and only continue an investigative stop for as
long as is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop and to dispel the
officer’s reasonable suspicion, with our Supreme Court’s holding in
Commonwealth v. Lyles, 97 A.3d 298 (Pa. 2014), that an officer may only
request identification during a mere encounter so long as the officer does not
suggest that compliance is required. Wielding these precedents, Appellant
argues that the continuation of the stop by asking for her name was illegal.
Appellant’s brief at 28.
Finally, Appellant asserts that Detective Friel only had a hunch as
opposed to reasonable suspicion that she was in violation of the MVC. Id.
Based on this court’s rule in Commonwealth v. Morrison, 166 A.3d 357
-6- J-S57003-19
(Pa.Super. 2017), Appellant declares that subjecting her to an investigative
detention and asking for her name was improper as Detective Friel’s
reasonable suspicion was not particularized to her. In short, Appellant
contends that she was subjected to an investigative detention without
reasonable suspicion, and that the evidence obtained should have been
suppressed.
The suppression court found that the stop was a valid investigative
detention for a MVC violation2 as Detective Friel possessed the requisite
reasonable suspicion for the stop. Such a finding is supported by Detective
Friel’s testimony that he initially observed Ms. Lowery behind the wheel of her
vehicle, which was stopped with the engine running. Seconds later, he saw
the vehicle being operated on the roadway. He testified that he had personal
knowledge that Ms. Lowery’s operator’s license was suspended at the time.
Although the stop was based on a mistake of fact, i.e., that Ms. Lowery was
operating the vehicle, the suppression court found that the mistake was
objectively reasonable, and thus, the stop was constitutional. Trial Court
2 The suppression court actually determined that Detective Friel had probable cause to stop Ms. Lowery’s vehicle. As we held in Commonwealth v. Enick, 70 A.3d 843 (Pa.Super. 2013), where a vehicle is stopped based upon an observed traffic offense that does not require further investigation, the Commonwealth must establish that the police officer had probable cause to believe that the traffic offense was committed. Appellant did not challenge the suppression court’s finding of probable cause, but focused on whether there was reasonable suspicion for the stop and successive police conduct, which is a less arduous standard.
-7- J-S57003-19
Opinion, 4/3/19, at 5 n.1 (citing Commonwealth v. Chase, 960 A.2d 108,
120 (Pa. 2008) (holding that an officer need not be factually accurate in her
belief that a traffic law had been violated but, instead, need only produce facts
establishing that she reasonably believed that a violation had taken place)).
Based on the foregoing, the suppression court concluded that Detective Friel
possessed the requisite reasonable suspicion for an investigative stop, and we
find no error in that conclusion.
The focus herein is on the events after the stop. Appellant contends
that the request for her identification was overly-intrusive, and that continuing
the stop for that purpose constituted an illegal search and seizure. The
suppression court disagreed, concluding that, once the stop occurred,
“Detective Friel was properly permitted to inquire as to the identity of the
driver.” Trial Court Opinion, 4/3/18, at 5.
We find no error in the trial court’s reasoning. As this Court held in
Commonwealth v. Campbell, 862 A.2d 659, 644 (Pa.Super. 2004), an
officer’s request for identifying information during a valid traffic stop is not an
invasive practice, even when the request is directed to a passenger. The
purpose of the stop was to put an end to a suspected ongoing violation of the
MVC by ensuring that the vehicle was not being operated by an individual who
was not legally authorized to drive.
Appellant faults Detective Friel for failing to terminate the detention
immediately after he established that Ms. Lowery was not driving the vehicle.
-8- J-S57003-19
However, Appellant cites no authority in support of her contention that asking
a driver for identifying information after a stop justified by reasonable
suspicion, even though the suspicion is dispelled, is unlawfully prolonging the
detention. Detective Friel testified that he was obtaining identification
information for purposes of his report, and that “[a]nytime police interact with
individuals, we obtain their information.” N.T., 11/6/18, at 10. Appellant was
initially uncooperative with the detective’s request. When she complied, she
had difficulty spelling her name and providing her birthdate for the detective.
Detective Friel found no individual with the name and birthdate Appellant
provided when he accessed the system, further arousing his suspicion
regarding Appellant. When confronted, Appellant availed herself of the
Detective’s invitation to provide her real name and birthdate, and Detective
Friel ascertained that her license was suspended and that there was an
outstanding warrant for her arrest. As we held in Commonwealth v.
Jackson, 122 A.3d 448 (Pa.Super. 2015), nervousness and supplying false
information to a police officer may provide the requisite reasonable suspicion
to detain an individual further.
On the record before us, we find no error in the suppression court’s
conclusion that the investigative detention was lawful, that asking Appellant
for identification was permissible, and that Appellant’s conduct gave rise to
reasonable suspicion that justified prolonging the stop for further
investigation. When Appellant was placed under arrest, she requested that
-9- J-S57003-19
Detective Friel retrieve her handbag, thus subjecting the handbag to a valid
search incident to arrest.3 The handbag contained marijuana and drug
paraphernalia. N.T., 11/6/18, at 13-14. Accordingly, we find that the
suppression court’s factual findings were supported by the record, its legal
conclusions were free of error, and we affirm its denial of Appellant’s motion
to suppress.
Appellant also claims that the evidence was insufficient to support her
conviction of possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and
driving under suspension – DUI-related. Our standard of review of sufficiency
challenges “is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light
most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the
factfinder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Houck, supra at 449 (quoting Commonwealth v. Barnswell Jones, 874
A.2d 108, 120-21 (Pa.Super. 2005).
Appellant claims that without the tainted evidence procured during the
illegal search, there was insufficient evidence to support her convictions of
possession of a small amount of marijuana, unlawful possession of drug
paraphernalia, and driving under suspension, DUI-related. Although Appellant
acknowledges that sufficiency claims are reviewed based on the evidence
actually admitted at trial, her sole sufficiency argument ignores our standard
3 It was undisputed that Ms. Lowery also provided consent to search her vehicle.
- 10 - J-S57003-19
of review. Had she prevailed on her suppression issue, we would not review
the evidence based on a diminished record, as Appellant urges us to do.
Rather, we consider all evidence adduced at trial, even that which an appellant
claims should be suppressed. Commonwealth v. Koch, 39 A.3d 996, 1001
(Pa.Super. 2011) (stating “in conducting our [sufficiency] analysis, we
consider all of the evidence actually admitted at trial and do not review a
diminished record”).
Our review of the trial record confirms that the evidence was more than
legally sufficient to convict Appellant of the aforementioned charges. In
addition to Detective Friel’s testimony regarding the marijuana and drug
paraphernalia found in Appellant’s purse, she admitted that she possessed
marijuana and drug paraphernalia. N.T., 11/6/18, at 13, 30. Detective Friel
identified Appellant as operating Ms. Lowery’s vehicle while her license was
under suspension for a DUI-related offense. Appellant’s sufficiency claim is
meritless.
Judgement of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 01/29/2020
- 11 -