Com. v. Mitchell, K., Jr.
Opinion
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA
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v. :
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KEVIN CLAYTON MITCHELL, JR. :
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Appellant : No. 544 MDA 2025
Appeal from the Order Entered March 28, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-38-CR-0001037-2008
BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and BENDER, P.J.E. MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED: AUGUST 17, 2026 Kevin Clayton Mitchell, Jr. appeals from the order denying his motion for Modification of Orders. We affirm.
In 2009, Mitchell pleaded nolo contendere to numerous crimes. He completed a written plea colloquy form that listed the lead charge as “criminal homicide.” See Nolo Contendere Plea Colloquy, filed 4/8/09. He underwent an oral colloquy during which the court obtained clarification that Mitchell was pleading to first-degree murder. Mitchell expressed his understanding of that charge. See N.T., 4/8/09, at 6. The court accepted the plea and sentenced Mitchell to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. We affirmed the judgment of sentence. See Commonwealth v. Mitchell, No. 1652 MDA 2009 (Pa.Super. filed August 27, 2010) (unpublished mem.).
In March 2025, Mitchell filed a motion he styled as a “Modification of Orders (42 Pa.C.S. § 5505).” He alleged that there were “patent and obvious
errors found within the sentencing order” that were contradicted by the record. Id. at 1 (unpaginated), ¶ 3. Mitchell maintained that although the sentencing order stated that he entered a nolo contendere plea to first-degree murder, the plea colloquy form stated that he entered a plea to criminal homicide. See id. at 2 (unpaginated), ¶¶ 4-5. He claimed that “the degree was an unsettled matter, to be determined by applicable procedures by law.” Id. at 2 (unpaginated), ¶ 5. He also claimed that the order imposed an illegal sentence because his sentence was “without any possibility of parole or commutation.” Id. at ¶ 6. He claimed that “[n]o statutory authorization exists for this particular sentence, which subjects it to correction by this court.” Id. at ¶ 7. The court denied the motion, and this timely appeal followed. See Order of Court, filed 3/28/25.
Mitchell raises the following questions:
1. Did the lower court err when it denied [Mitchell’s] Motion to Modify Order?
2. Did [Mitchell’s] sentence Order contain obvious and patent errors on its face, when it sentenced [Mitchell] to a term of life imprisonment without having conducted a required degree of guilt hearing, or by accepting his nolo contendere plea to First-Degree Murder, without an amendment of the Criminal Information to reflect that charge?
3. Did [Mitchell’s] sentencing Order contain obvious and patent errors on its face when it prohibited [Mitchell]
from ever being considered for sentence commutation?
Mitchell’s Br. at 2.
We do not address the merits of Mitchell’s issues because we conclude that his motion should have been treated as an untimely Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
The PCRA is “the sole means of achieving post-conviction relief,”
including challenges to the legality of a sentence. Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 465 (Pa.Super. 2013). Any motion or petition filed after the judgment of sentence becomes final should be treated as a PCRA petition where the filing “requests relief contemplated by the PCRA.” Commonwealth v. Thomas, 340 A.3d 1053, 1057 (Pa.Super. 2025), appeal denied, No. 553 MAL 2025, 2026 WL 1112123 (Pa. Apr. 24, 2026) (citation omitted). “The designation of the petition does not preclude a court from deducing the proper nature of a pleading.” Commonwealth v. Snook, 230 A.3d 438, 444 (Pa.Super. 2020) (citation omitted).
The PCRA affords an avenue for relief for illegal sentences. See Commonwealth v. Prinkey, 277 A.3d 554, 556, 559-60 (Pa. 2022) (citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(vii) (providing that PCRA petitioner may raise claim of relief under PCRA for “imposition of a sentence greater than the lawful maximum”)). “If no statutory authorization exists for a particular sentence, that sentence is illegal and subject to correction.” Commonwealth v. Devine, 326 A.3d 935, 940 (Pa.Super. 2024) (quoting Commonwealth v. Leverette, 911 A.2d 998, 1001 (Pa.Super. 2006)). Nonetheless, to garner collateral relief, a claim of an illegal sentence must be presented in a timely PCRA petition. See Commonwealth v. Woods, 179 A.3d 37, 43 (Pa.Super.
2017) (stating that a petitioner “cannot elude the PCRA’s timeliness requirements based on a claim of an illegal sentence”).
The claims that Mitchell asserted in his motion went to the legality of his sentence. Illegal sentencing claims include claims that a statutory precondition for a sentence was unfulfilled, and those asserting that the sentence lacked statutory authorization. See Commonwealth v. Seals, 353 A.3d 747, 763 n.20 (Pa.Super. 2026) (en banc). Mitchell’s claims that he was sentenced for first-degree murder without a predicate conviction for that crime, and that his sentence lacked statutory authorization were both challenges to the legality of his sentence. Mitchell’s motion should have been treated as a PCRA petition, subject to the PCRA’s time limits. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102(a)(1) (providing that a person convicted of first-degree murder shall be sentenced to death or to life imprisonment); Commonwealth v. Moore, 247 A.3d 990, 996 (Pa. 2021) (holding that claim that the statute providing the sentence for first- degree murder was unconstitutionally vague because it did not give adequate notice that the sentence of life in prison would be without parole falls within the PCRA). As such, we now address the timeliness of the petition.
Under the PCRA, the petitioner has one year from the date the judgment of sentence becomes final to file a PCRA petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment of sentence becomes final “at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the review.” Id. at § 9545(b)(3). Beyond the one-year deadline,
the petitioner must plead and prove a time-bar exception. See id. at § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). A court may not address the merits of the petition unless the petitioner pleads and proves a time-bar exception. See Commonwealth v. Walters, 135 A.3d 589, 591-92 (Pa.Super. 2016).
Mitchell’s judgment of sentence became final on September 27, 2010.
See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908 (“Whenever the last day of any such period shall fall on Saturday or Sunday, . . . such day shall be omitted from the computation”). Therefore, he had until September 27, 2011, to file a timely PCRA petition. Mitchell filed the instant petition over 10 years late; accordingly, it is patently untimely.
Mitchell suggests that this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v.
Holmes, 933 A.2d 57 (Pa. 1997) would permit the court to address his sentencing challenges. We disagree. In Holmes, our Supreme Court held that trial courts were not restricted by the 30-day time limit for courts to modify orders, and that courts had inherent power to correct patent errors in sentencing orders. 933 A.2d at 66; see 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505. However, this Court has recognized that Holmes “did not establish an alternate remedy for collateral relief that sidesteps the jurisdictional requirements of the PCRA.” Commonwealth v. Jackson, 30 A.3d 516, 521 (Pa.Super. 2011); see also Commonwealth v. Mitchell, No. 634 EDA 2024, 2025 WL 548176, at *3-4 (Pa.Super. filed February 19, 2025) (unpublished mem.).
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