Com. v. Miller, M.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: March 25, 2026
• Docket: 586 WDA 2025
• Status: Unpublished
• Author: Stevens

Opinion

J-S06036-26

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : MARK ANDREW MILLER : : Appellant : No. 586 WDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 23, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-26-CR-0000928-2023

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., SULLIVAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED: March 25, 2026

Appellant, Mark Andrew Miller, appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County on April 23, 2025.

Appellant was convicted of the following offenses following trial by jury:

Aggravated Assault by Vehicle While DUI1, Driving Under the Influence –

Controlled Substance2, Aggravated Assault By Vehicle3, Fleeing or Attempting

To Elude Officer4, Flight to Avoid Apprehension5, Recklessly Endangering

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. 1 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 3735.1(a) 2 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 3802(d)(2) 3 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 3732.1(a) 4 75 Pa. C.S.A § 3733(a) 5 18 Pa. C.S.A § 5126(a) J-S06036-26

Another Person6; Possession of a Controlled Substance7; Possession of Drug

Paraphernalia8; and Resisting Arrest9. After careful review, we affirm.10

On December 16, 2022, Troopers Alexander Ruffing and Michael

Geoghan of the Pennsylvania State Police parked their marked patrol vehicle

near the intersection of Route 983 and Englishman Road in Bullskin Township.

Notes of Testimony, Jury Trial 3/5/2025-3/7/2025 (hereinafter “N.T.”) at 15-

17. At approximately 6:55 P.M. Trooper Geoghan observed a pickup truck

occupied by several individuals who appeared to lean out of view of the

window in an attempt to conceal themselves, prompting the Troopers to

pursue the vehicle. Id. at 17-18. Shortly thereafter, the pickup truck’s brake

lights began to rapidly flash as the truck turned into the parking lot of the

Honeybear Gas Station, at which point the Troopers activated their emergency

lights to initiate a traffic stop. Id. at 19. The truck, however, only slowed

briefly to allow a female passenger to exit the vehicle before it rapidly

reaccelerated, causing its tires to squeal as the vehicle left the parking lot, cut

across three lanes of traffic along Route 119, and fled onto a narrow and

winding side road. Id. at 20-21, 25. ____________________________________________

6 18 Pa. C.S.A § 2705 7 35 Pa. C.S. § 780-113(a)(16) 8 35 Pa. C.S. § 780-113(a)(32) 9 18 Pa. C.S. § 5104.

10 We note with displeasure that the Commonwealth has failed to submit a

brief addressing the instant appeal, and furthermore the Commonwealth has not sent any correspondence to this Court explaining their failure to do so. Nevertheless, we have endeavored to analyze the merits of Appellant’s claims and have found they do not merit relief.

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The following chase was captured on MVR and spanned approximately

five to seven miles, reaching top speeds in excess of 75 miles per hour in a

35 mile per hour zone, during which time the pickup truck passed several

vehicles in a “no passing” zone, and passed into the opposing lane of travel

several times, narrowly missing multiple head-on collisions with oncoming

traffic before colliding in such a manner with the vehicle in which the victims,

Mr. and Mrs. Stern, were traveling Id. 26, 28, 30-31. The force of this collision

was sufficient to throw the Sterns’ vehicle into a spin before it came to rest

atop a raised concrete median near to the entrance of a gas station along

Route 819. Id. at 50. Trooper Geoghan called for fire and ambulance to the

scene of the collision and continued to pursue the damaged, though still

fleeing, truck, which by that time had accelerated away from the scene of the

collision, off the road and over a grassy area, and onto an on ramp to State

Route 119 South. Id. at 50-51. Trooper Geoghan was thereafter able to close

the distance between the vehicles and successfully perform a PIT maneuver,

stopping the fleeing truck. Id.

Trooper Geoghan then approached the vehicle on foot and identified

Appellant as the driver. Id. at 51-54. Appellant was at that time awake, but

he did not comply with the Trooper’s orders to show his hands, which were

concealed in his waistband. Id. at 51-54. Trooper Geoghan noted that the

vehicle was replete with clearly-visible knives, and as Appellant refused to

show the Trooper his hands, Appellant was tased. Id. at 54.

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Appellant was then pulled from the cabin of the truck and onto the

ground. Id. at 58. Trooper Geoghan re-holstered his taser and Appellant put

his hands back inside of his waistband, prompting the Trooper to strike him

several times before Appellant gave his hands to the Trooper to be secured in

handcuffs. Id. at 59. An ambulance was called to the scene of the arrest where

Appellant was assessed and treated by emergency medical personnel before

being taken by ambulance to a nearby hospital, as he was exhibiting

symptoms consistent with a seizure. Id. at 61-64, 101-102. Thus, no

standardized field sobriety testing was conducted, and Appellant was not

prompted for consent to a blood draw. Id.

A search of Appellant’s person was performed at the scene, during which

methamphetamine was found in his pocket, and additionally in his vehicle the

Troopers found: a metal smoking device with residue, fifty baggies of fentanyl,

a Rollo wrapper containing suspected methamphetamine, and a foil wrapper

containing suspected crack cocaine. Id. at 67, 73-79. During transit, Appellant

informed the treating paramedic that he had taken methamphetamine,

cocaine, and heroin. Id. 135. Said paramedic testified that his assessment of

Appellant was consistent with Appellant’s being intoxicated. Id. at 137.

Additionally, Trooper Ruffing testified that, based upon his professional

experience and training, including Advanced Roadside Impaired Driving

Enforcement (“ARIDE”), as well as his personal experience with heroin users

in his own family, he observed several indicia of opiate use in Appellant’s

conduct, including general unresponsiveness, restriction of his pupils, and a

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characteristic “nod.” Id. at 112. While a search warrant was issued for the

result of any blood tests conducted by the hospital relative to Appellant’s

narcotic use, no testing for alcohol or narcotics had been conducted. Id. at

66.

The Sterns were taken by ambulance to the hospital from the scene of

their collision with Appellant, where it was found that Mr. Stern had suffered

from a torn rotator cuff and a head injury resulting from his striking his face

against the dashboard during the collision. Id. at 156-157. Of note, no expert

medical testimony was adduced by the Commonwealth regarding the extent

of Mr. Stern’s injuries, though both Mr. and Mrs. Stern testified to the same.

Id. 146-161.

Appellant was subsequently convicted of the above-enumerated

offenses following trial by jury, and the instant timely appeal followed.

Appellant raises the following issues:

1. Whether the trial court committed reversible error by overruling Appellant's objections to the lay opinion testimony of Lynn Stem regarding the causal connection between her husband's symptoms and the motor vehicle accident?

2. Whether the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt to prove that Appellant was guilty of Aggravated Assault By Vehicle While DUI or Aggravated Assault By Vehicle?

3. Whether the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was under the influence of a controlled substance to a degree that rendered him unsafe to operate a motor vehicle?

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4. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion in imposing a sentence of five (5) years to ten (10) years incarceration where the trial court failed to consider and apply all of the sentencing factors under 42 Pa. C.S. § 9721(b) and failed to thoroughly examine Appellant's background and character, history of substance abuse?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

In addressing Appellant’s first issue, we observe the following standard

of review:

The admission of evidence is solely within the discretion of the trial court, and a trial court's evidentiary rulings will be reversed on appeal only upon an abuse of that discretion. An abuse of discretion will not be found based on a mere error of judgment, but rather occurs where the court has reached a conclusion that overrides or misapplies the law, or where the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will.

Commonwealth v. Manivannan, 2018 PA Super 112, 186 A.3d 472, 479-

480 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Appellant’s argument concerns the following testimony offered by Lynn

Stern regarding her husband’s general condition after the collision:

Q. Have you noticed any changes in your husband, sin [sic] ... from the time of this accident forward, as far as his behavior disposition, health condition, generally?

A. Memory loss, some memory loss. Some pain in the head still, he gets frequent pain in his head still.

Q. Okay. And has that been ongoing, the memory loss, has that been ongoing since the time of the accident?

A. Yes.

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N.T. at 152.11

Appellant identifies as the governing rule of evidence PA.R.E. 701 –

Opinion Testimony by Lay Witnesses, which allows for a witness “not testifying

as an expert, [to offer] testimony in the form of an opinion” if that opinion is:

(a) rationally based on the witness's perception;

(b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness's testimony or to

determining a fact in issue; and

(c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge

within the scope of Rule 702.

Pa.R.E. 701.

While Appellant “acknowledges that a witness may generally testify

regarding first-hand observations,” he contends “that is not what happened

in this case,” and asserts that Mrs. Stern offered an opinion not permissible

under Rule 701. Appellant’s Brief at 19. After thorough review of the testimony

at issue, we simply disagree. Mrs. Stern did no more than offer her own

11 While Appellant objected to a previously-posed question to Mrs. Stern, in

which the prosecution asked Mrs. Stern to identify symptoms suffered by Mr. Stern that resulted from the accident, the trial court clarified that Mrs. Stern would only be permitted to answer “insofar as [her testimony did not] include some medical diagnosis,” and further that Mrs. Stern would not be permitted to “testify as to what any doctor has told her, but [would be permitted] to testify as to her firsthand knowledge through her own observations about any changes [in her husband following the accident].” The above-referenced portion of testimony immediately followed. N.T. 152.

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personal observations of changes in her husband’s health following the

collision with Appellant. This testimony is clearly permissible.

Further, Appellant’s reliance on Commonwealth v. Yocolano, 169

A.3d 47 (Pa. Super. 2017) is utterly inapposite. There, this Court found error

in a trial court’s admission of testimony from an emergency room physician

and nurse who each were permitted to opine on the provenance of ligature

marks on a victim’s body without having been properly proffered as expert

witnesses pursuant to Pa.R.E. 702 and Commonwealth v. Huggins, 2013

PA Super 107, 68 A.3d 962 (Pa. Super. 2013). Indeed, this Court

acknowledged in that matter that the nurse and physician at issue could very

well have testified as expert witnesses had the Commonwealth followed the

proper pre-trial procedure of identifying the witnesses as such and providing

the defense with expert reports prior to trial. Id. As there is no question that

Mrs. Stern is not a medical expert, and the testimony she offered did not

require a medical expert, the proper procedure for qualifying a witness as an

expert is utterly irrelevant in the instant matter and we therefore discern no

possible relevance for our holding in Yocolano.

Thus, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting

the testimony of Lynn Stern regarding her first-hand observations of her

husband following the collision with Appellant’s vehicle, and Appellant’s first

issue therefore merits no relief.

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Appellant’s second and third issues challenge the sufficiency of the

Commonwealth’s evidence. In addressing such claims, we observe the

following well-established standard of review:

We must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, support the conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. Where there is sufficient evidence to enable the trier of fact to find every element of the crime has been established beyond a reasonable doubt, the sufficiency of the evidence claim must fail.

The evidence established at trial need not preclude every possibility of innocence and the fact-finder is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented. It is not within the province of this Court to re-weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder. The Commonwealth's burden may be met by wholly circumstantial evidence and any doubt about the defendant's guilt is to be resolved by the fact finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances.

Commonwealth v. Cahill, 2024 PA Super 202, 324 A.3d 516, 526 (Pa.

Super. 2024) (citations omitted).

Here, Appellant’s second issue addresses the sufficiency of the evidence

adduced relative to the charge of Aggravated Assault by Motor Vehicle.

Pursuant to the statute:

Any person who recklessly or with gross negligence causes serious bodily injury to another person while engaged in the violation of any law of the Commonwealth or municipal ordinance applying to the operation or use of a vehicle or to the regulation of traffic, except section 3802 (relating to driving under the influence of alcohol or controlled substance), is guilty of aggravated assault by vehicle, a felony of the third degree when the violation is the cause of the injury.

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75 Pa. C.S. § 3732.1(a).

Appellant limits this challenge to the sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s

evidence of serious bodily injury sustained by the victim as a result of his

collision with their vehicle. Appellant’s Brief at 20-22. In essence, his

argument is that the Commonwealth failed to adduce expert testimony

regarding the causation of Mr. Stern’s injuries, and, because Mr. Stern had

preexisting neurological conditions, it was incumbent upon the Commonwealth

to adduce such evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Stern’s

headaches and memory loss were caused by Appellant colliding with their

vehicle. Id.

However, Appellant cites to no authority whatsoever in support of this

proposition. See Umbelina v. Adams, 2011 PA Super 257, 34 A.3d 151, 161

(Pa. Super. 2011), quoting In re W.H., 2011 PA Super 119, 25 A.3d 330, 339

(Pa. Super. 2011); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a)(addressing waiver). We

further note that nowhere in Appellant’s argument does he address that Mr.

Stern also testified that he also sustained a tear to his rotator cuff in the

collision. N.T. 156-157. Thus, even should we find that the Commonwealth

was required to adduce expert testimony to differentiate between the victim’s

preexisting neurological condition and the headaches and memory loss he

sustained following the collision, Appellant would not be entitled to relief.

Here, we find that the lack of citation to relevant authority in support of

Appellant’s proposition is best explained by the lack of existence of any such

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authority. Indeed, as observed by the trial court, our Supreme Court has

explained that the Pennsylvania “Rules of Evidence, and the rules of common

sense, dictate that medical testimony is not required to establish the veracity

of every illness or injury.” In re Mampe, 932 A2d 954 962 (Pa. 2007).

Here, the Commonwealth adduced a video of Appellant swerving into

oncoming traffic while traveling at a high rate of speed during his flight from

the police and colliding with the victim’s vehicle head-on; the force of the

impact was sufficient to throw the victims’ vehicle into a spin, and Mr. Stern

testified that during that collision he was thrown into the dashboard of his

vehicle where he struck his face and chest, sustaining a bloody nose and facial

bruising, and then flung back from the dash by the force of the collision during

which movement his rotator cuff tore. N.T. at 155-157. Following the injury

sustained to his head, Mr. Stern and his wife testified that Mr. Stern suffered

from headaches and memory loss. Viewing this evidence in the light most

favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, we find the evidence

to be sufficient to sustain the Commonwealth’s burden of proving serious

bodily injury beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, Appellant’s second issue

merits no relief.

In Appellant’s third issue, he contends the Commonwealth “failed to

present sufficient evidence that he was operating a motor vehicle while under

the influence of a drug or combination of drugs in violation of 75 Pa. C.S. §

3802(d)(2).” Again, Appellant’s argument amounts to imposing a non-existent

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obligation upon the Commonwealth to adduce expert testimony, here in the

form of laboratory testing, to establish that he was “under the influence of a

drug or combination of drugs to a degree which impairs the individual's ability

to safely drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of

the vehicle” as is required by 75 Pa.C.S. §3802(d)(2). Following from this

unsupported premise, Appellant contends that the Commonwealth’s reliance

on the lay opinion testimony of Trooper Ruffan and the paramedic Mr. Yurko

was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was under

the influence of a controlled substance or combination of controlled substances

as required by the statute. Appellant’s Brief at 23. However, we note again

that there simply is no requirement that the Commonwealth adduce expert

testimony to establish this element of the offense.

As noted above, the Commonwealth may meet its burden of proving any

element of a crime by wholly circumstantial evidence. Cahill, supra. Here,

the Commonwealth indeed adduced testimony from the arresting officers and

the treating paramedic regarding their observations of Appellant’s demeanor

following his arrest, each testifying that the same, based upon their training

and experience, was consistent with intoxication. Additionally, the

Commonwealth adduced video footage of Appellant’s manifestly unsafe

driving, testimony that Appellant was found in possession of various controlled

substances and suspected controlled substances on his person and in his

vehicle as well as a smoking device, and an admission from the Appellant to

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the paramedic that he had taken methamphetamine, cocaine, and heroin

approximately thirty minutes before the arrival of the paramedic. N.T. at 135.

Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the

verdict winner, we find the evidence more than sufficient to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that Appellant was operating his vehicle while under the

influence of a drug or combination of drugs to a degree which impaired his

ability to safely drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement

of his vehicle. As such, Appellant’s third issue merits no relief.

Appellant’s fourth and final issue concerns the discretionary aspects of

his sentence. In reviewing a challenge to the discretionary aspects of

sentence, our standard of review is as follows:

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 2014 PA Super 10, 84 A.3d 736, 760 (Pa.

Super. 2014), appeal denied, 626 Pa. 681, 95 A.3d 275 (Pa. 2014) (citation

omitted).

In his statement pursuant to 2119(f), Appellant contends that the

sentencing court failed “to carefully consider all relevant sentencing factors

required by 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b)” and that the sentence imposed was

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excessive. Appellant’s Brief at 15. Specifically, Appellant avers that §9721(b)

required the lower court to consider:

1) the specific need for protection of the public in relation to Frost's Actions; 2) the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and her family, and 3) Miller's need for rehabilitation.

Appellant’s Brief at 15.12

This Court acknowledges that a claim of an excessive sentence in

conjunction with a claim that the sentencing court failed to consider

mitigating factors raises a substantial question. Commonwealth v.

Caldwell, 2015 PA Super 128, 117 A.3d 763, 769-70 (Pa. Super.

2015)(en banc). However, Appellant has done very little more than

baldly assert that such is the case concerning his sentence. Appellant’s

Brief at 25-26. The sparse factual basis Appellant presents to this Court

in support of this claim is that: Appellant was sentenced to five to ten

years; he was 58 years old at time of sentencing; and he had “a history

of substance abuse problems,” without any further explanation, and

without any argument whatsoever as to why the sentence imposed

demonstrates a failure to consider those facts.

12 This Court is at a loss as to the identity of “Frost” or how his or her actions

are relevant to the sentencing of Mr. Miller, and further we presume the reference to the victim and “her family” must refer to Mrs. Stern, who was not alleged to have sustained serious bodily injury, her family being her husband Mr. Stern, who as discussed above did indeed sustain serious bodily injuries.

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Of note, Appellant has failed to inform this Court of what the

standard range sentence was relative to his offenses; whether this

sentence constitutes an aggravated range sentence; whether a pre-

sentence investigation was performed; or whether the sentencing Court

was provided with a copy thereof. In fact, Appellant does not make a

single citation to anywhere in the record where any information related

to the imposition of the challenged sentence can be found.13

Thus, this Court is left with a bald claim from Appellant that the

sentence imposed was excessive, and that the sentencing court failed

to consider certain sentencing factors. Appellant’s claim is flatly

contradicted by the opinion from the sentencing court in which the

Honorable Judge Cordaro attests she indeed did consider the factors

Appellant predicates his claim upon, but nevertheless imposed the

challenged sentence in light of the other factors at issue, notably the

danger presented by Appellant’s conduct to the public, the arresting

officers, his own passengers, and to the Sterns. As Appellant has

provided us with no cognizable argument and no citations to evidence

13 We must again note our displeasure, here due to the certified record on appeal failing to include a transcript of the sentencing hearing or a Statement in Absence of Transcript pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1923. Thus, this Court is limited in our review to what information is present on the April 16, 2025, Sentencing Order and the Amended sentencing orders issued April 17, 2025, and April 23, 2025, aided by the sentencing Court’s opinion addressing the instant appeal and explanation of her honor’s reasoning underlying the imposed sentence.

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of record in support of his claim, we find no basis upon which to question

the sentencing court’s exercise of discretion. Appellant’s final issue thus

As Appellant has failed to present any issue meriting relief, we

affirm the judgment of sentence imposed by the lower court.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

3/25/2026

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