Com. v. Meadows, J.

Opinion

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA :

v. :

: :

JAMES MEADOWS :

:

Appellant : No. 2513 EDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 6, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0003129-2025

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED AUGUST 12, 2026

Appellant, James Meadows, appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered on August 6, 2025. We vacate and remand.

As the trial court explained:

On August 30, 2024, Appellant was arrested and charged with [simple assault, aggravated assault, recklessly endangering another person (“REAP”), terroristic threats, and possessing an instrument of crime (“PIC”)].

On April 28, 2025, Appellant was found guilty in the Municipal Court of Philadelphia of [the misdemeanor crime of] simple assault and sentenced to a term of [12] months of probation.[1] The charges of aggravated assault were dismissed, and Appellant was found not guilty of PIC, REAP, and terroristic threats. . . .

On April 30, 2025, Appellant filed [an] appeal from the Municipal Court’s judgment of sentence. The matter was

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a).

listed for a de novo waiver trial before [the trial] court on August 6, 2025. Despite receiving proper notice, Appellant failed to appear at the listed court date. The [trial] court placed the matter on hold because the complainant and Appellant were not present, and indicated that it would recall it at 9:25 a.m. When the case was recalled, the complainant was present, but Appellant was not. Accordingly, the [trial] court dismissed the [] appeal and [entered judgment in the Court of Common Pleas on the judgment of the Municipal Court judge. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 1010(B).]

Trial Court Opinion, 11/19/25, at 1-2 (footnotes and some capitalization

omitted).

Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion, where he claimed that he

had good cause for his unexcused absence, as “he had car trouble and was

forced to find alternative means to arrive at court.” Appellant’s Post-Sentence

Motion, 8/11/25, at 2. The trial court denied Appellant’s post-sentence motion

on August 27, 2025, without holding a hearing, and Appellant filed a timely

notice of appeal. See Trial Court Order, 8/27/25, at 1. He raises one claim

to this Court:

Did the [trial] court abuse its discretion or commit an error of law by dismissing [Appellant’s] de novo appeal and reinstating his municipal court judgment of sentence by not waiting and dismissing the case approximately [25] minutes after the scheduled court hearing time, where there were still multiple matters to status an address [sic], and the [trial] court did not give opportunity to address [Appellant’s] slight tardiness?

Appellant’s Brief at 3.

3

In relevant part, Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 1010

provides:2

Rule 1010. Procedures for Trial De Novo

(A) When a defendant appeals after conviction by a Municipal Court judge,

(1) in a non-traffic summary case, upon the filing of the transcript and other papers, the case shall be heard de novo by the judge of the Court of Common Pleas sitting without a jury.

(2) In a Municipal Court case,[3] the attorney for the Commonwealth, upon receiving the notice of appeal, shall prepare an information and the matter shall thereafter be treated in the same manner as any other court case.

(B) If the defendant fails to appear for the trial de novo, the Common Pleas Court judge may dismiss the appeal and

____________________________________________

2 The case at bar arises out of the Philadelphia Municipal Court and is, thus,

governed by Chapter 10 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 1000 (“[t]he rules in [Chapter 10] govern all proceedings in the Philadelphia Municipal Court, including summary cases; Municipal Court cases, as defined in Rule 1001(A); [and,] the filing of appeals from Municipal Court cases”).

3 Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 1001(A) defines a “Municipal Court

case” as “any case in which the only offense or offenses charged are misdemeanors under the Crimes Code or other statutory criminal offenses for which no prison term may be imposed or which is punishable by a term of imprisonment of not more than 5 years.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 1001(A). Moreover, Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 1006(A)(1)(a) clarifies that, following a conviction in Philadelphia Municipal Court, the defendant has “the right . . . to appeal for trial de novo” to the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 1006(A)(1)(a); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 1123(a)(2) (declaring that, in a Municipal Court case, the defendant “shall have the right of appeal for trial de novo, including the right of trial by jury, to the court of common pleas”).

4

thereafter shall enter judgment in the Court of Common Pleas on the judgment of the Municipal Court judge.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 1010.

The comment to Rule 1010 declares: “Paragraph (B) makes it clear that

the Common Pleas Court judge may dismiss an appeal when the judge

determines that the defendant is absent without cause from the trial de

novo. If the appeal is dismissed, the Common Pleas Court judge must enter

judgment and order execution of any sentence imposed by the Municipal Court

judge.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 1010 cmt. (emphasis added).

“Therefore, before [an] appeal may be dismissed for failure to appear,

the trial court must ascertain whether the absentee defendant had adequate

cause for his absence.” Commonwealth v. Dixon, 66 A.3d 794, 796 (Pa.

Super. 2013).4 “In the event that good cause is established, the defendant is

entitled to a new [] trial.” Id.

____________________________________________

4 Dixon interpreted Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 462, which is the

general, statewide rule for trial de novo following “entry of a guilty plea or a conviction by an issuing authority in any summary proceeding.” See Pa.R.Crim.P. 462(A). Nevertheless, the relevant language of Rules 462 and 1010, as well as the relevant comments to the rules, are substantively identical. Compare Pa.R.Crim.P. 1010(B) (“If the defendant fails to appear for the trial de novo, the Common Pleas Court judge may dismiss the appeal and thereafter shall enter judgment in the Court of Common Pleas on the judgment of the Municipal Court judge”), with Pa.R.Crim.P. 462(D) (“If the defendant fails to appear [for the trial de novo], the trial judge may dismiss the appeal and enter judgment in the court of common pleas on the judgment of the issuing authority”); compare Pa.R.Crim.P. 1010 cmt. (“Paragraph (B) makes it clear that the Common Pleas Court judge may dismiss an appeal when the judge determines that the defendant is absent without cause from the trial de novo”) (emphasis added), with Pa.R.Crim.P. 462 cmt. (“Paragraph (D) makes it clear that the trial judge may dismiss a summary case appeal (Footnote Continued Next Page)

5

In the case at bar, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion, where he

averred that he had good cause for his unexcused absence, as “he had car

trouble and was forced to find alternative means to arrive at court.”

Appellant’s Post-Sentence Motion, 8/11/25, at 2. The trial court, however,

denied Appellant’s post-sentence motion without holding a hearing and, thus,

failed to “ascertain whether the absentee [Appellant] had adequate cause for

his absence.” See Dixon, 66 A.3d at 796; see also Commonwealth v.

Marizzaldi, 814 A.2d 249 (Pa. Super. 2002) (holding: the defendant’s

averment that “he was delayed because he missed the bus and that he waited

____________________________________________

when the judge determines that the defendant is absent without cause from the trial de novo”) (emphasis added). Therefore, relevant precedent interpreting Rule 462 binds our interpretation of Rule 1010.

We note that Rule 462 concerns trial de novo following “entry of a guilty plea or a conviction by an issuing authority in any summary proceeding” – and that Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 720(D) prohibits post-sentence motions “in summary case appeals following a trial de novo in the court of common pleas.” See Pa.R.Crim.P. 462(A) (emphasis added); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(D) (emphasis added). In the case at bar, however, Appellant was convicted of the misdemeanor crime of simple assault and the case proceeded in accordance with the specialized rules for proceedings in the Philadelphia Municipal Court. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 1000(A); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 1010(A)(2) (stating the procedures for a “Municipal Court case”). Moreover, as Appellant was charged with and convicted of a misdemeanor, Rule 720(D)’s prohibition of post-sentence motions in “summary case appeals” did not apply to Appellant’s case and Appellant was permitted to file his post-sentence motion. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A) (“[e]xcept as provided in paragraph[] . . . (D), a written post-sentence motion shall be filed no later than 10 days after imposition of sentence); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 1000(B) (“[a]ny procedure that is governed by a statewide Rule of Criminal Procedure that is not specifically covered in Chapter 10 or by a Philadelphia local rule authorized by these rules and adopted pursuant to Rule 105 shall be governed by the relevant statewide rule”).

6

for the next available one, which arrived in the City of Pittsburgh a few minutes

after his hearing was scheduled to begin” constituted a prima facie averment

of “good cause” for the defendant’s unexcused absence at his trial de novo);

Commonwealth v. Doleno, 594 A.2d 341 (Pa. Super. 1991) (holding: the

defendant demonstrated good cause for his absence from the trial de novo

where his attorney told him the wrong date for trial).

Respectfully, we agree with Appellant and the Commonwealth 5 and

conclude that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it failed to hold a

hearing to “ascertain whether the absentee [Appellant] had adequate cause

for his absence.” See Dixon, 66 A.3d at 796. Therefore, we must vacate the

trial court’s order of August 27, 2025, which denied Appellant’s post-sentence

motion, and remand the case, to enable the trial court to conduct an

evidentiary hearing and determine whether Appellant “had adequate cause for

his absence.”

Order of August 27, 2025 denying the post-sentence motion vacated.

Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Date: 8/12/2026

____________________________________________

5 We commend the Commonwealth for its candor in this case.