Com. v. McKeon, M.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: February 27, 2025
• Docket: 1865 EDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : MATTHEW JAMES MCKEON : No. 1865 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Order Entered June 26, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-09-CR-0000450-2024

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., DUBOW, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 27, 2025

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the June 26, 2024

order entered in the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas granting the motion

to suppress evidence filed by Appellee, Matthew James McKeon. After careful

review, we reverse.

The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows. In the early

morning hours of October 14, 2023, Pennsylvania State Trooper George

Krukowski and his partner Trooper Thomas Kirk were on patrol in the area of

Ridge Road, West Rockhill Township, Bucks County. The troopers were in full

uniform and operating a marked patrol car.

Ridge Road is a flat, two lane, curvy roadway with a yellow center line

dividing the opposing lanes of traffic and white fog lines marking the roadway’s

shoulders. The center dividing line has rumble strips installed within it. J-S02019-25

At 12:45 AM that morning, Trooper Krukowski observed a pick-up truck-

later identified as being driven by Appellee-pass him while travelling south on

Ridge Road, prompting the trooper to turn from Old Bethlehem Road onto

Ridge Road behind the truck. He initially observed the truck drift toward, and

then hit, the fog line. After Trooper Krukowski then noticed the truck hit the

center line of the roadway while turning, Trooper Krukowski activated the

mobile video recorder (“MVR”) equipped on his patrol vehicle.

While continuing to follow the truck, Trooper Krukowski then observed

the truck drift over the fog line again, then drift back to and touch the center

line as it attempted to negotiate a turn in the road. Then the truck came to

an intersection controlled by a traffic light which, as the truck approached,

indicated red towards the truck’s lane of travel. Rather than stop at the stop

line before the intersection, the truck crossed over the line until its back tires

were resting on it.

After the light turned green, the truck continued on Ridge Road, drifting

first toward, and then striking, the fog line, and then driving back toward the

centerline and striking, but not crossing, it. 1 After following Appellee for

approximately 2 miles over a period of 5 minutes, and watching the truck

____________________________________________

1 Trooper Krukowski attributed the fact that the truck did not cross the center

line to the presence of the rumble strips which, in his experience, correct drivers back toward the center of their lane of traffic when they make contact with them. N.T. Suppression Hr’g, 6/26/24, at 28. Trooper Krukowski also explained that, in his experience, when no rumble strips are present drivers who drift toward the center line often cross over into the other lane of travel. Id.

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swerve numerous times, hit the fog or center line 5 or 6 times, and fail to

properly stop for the red light, Trooper Krukowski activated his overhead lights

and initiated a traffic stop believing that Appellee was under the influence of

alcohol or a controlled substance.

Appellee was slow to respond to Trooper Krukowski’s emergency lights,

but eventually pulled his truck over around a curve in the road. Trooper

Krukowski approached Appellee from the driver’s side, and while informing

Appellee of his observations of Appellee’s driving, he detected a strong odor

of alcohol.2

Following this incident, the Commonwealth charged Appellee with six

counts of Driving Under the Influence offenses, Possession of Drug

Paraphernalia, and the summary traffic offenses of Careless Driving and

Disregarding Traffic Lanes.3

On May 12, 2024, Appellee filed a motion to suppress the traffic stop

asserting that Trooper Krukowski lacked the requisite reasonable suspicion or

probable cause to initiate a traffic stop because Appellee’s “momentary

touches” of the center and fog lines did not create a reasonable safety concern

2 Upon his subsequent search of Appellant’s vehicle, Trooper Krukowski found

drug paraphernalia.

3 See 75 Pa.C.S §§ 3802(a)(1), 3802(b), 3802(d)(1)(i), 3802(d)(1)(ii), 3802(d)(2), 3802(d)(3); 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(32); 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3714(a), and 3309(1).

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or require any vehicles or pedestrians to take evasive action. 4 Appellee also

argued that his ability to stop at the red light-controlled intersection and to

properly use his high beams undermined the Commonwealth’s position that

the officer’s traffic stop was reasonable.

On June 26, 2024, the suppression court held a hearing on the motion

at which Trooper Krukowski testified in accordance with the above facts.

Trooper Krukowski also testified regarding his training and approximately 8

years of experience in identifying impaired drivers and conducting hundreds

of traffic stops. He also testified that, in his experience, a driver’s failure to

stop at a stop line before an intersection and a delay in responding to

emergency lights are often indicative of someone who is driving impaired. On

cross-examination, Trooper Krukowski conceded that he did not mention

anything about driving under the influence in the affidavit of probable cause,

which is simply a summary of events, but instead focused on Appellee’s driving

behavior. In addition to the testimonial evidence presented by the

Commonwealth, the court viewed Trooper Krukowski’s MVR recording with

contemporaneous narration from the incident.

Following the hearing, the suppression court granted Appellee’s motion

to suppress finding that Appellee’s “slight technical violations of the law” were

insufficient to provide Trooper Kurkowski with probable cause to effectuate a

4 The MVR recording indicates that two vehicles passed Appellee in the opposite lane of travel without incident during the period recorded.

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traffic stop based on a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code. N.T. Suppression

Hr’g, 6/26/24, at 29, 31.

This appeal followed. Both the Commonwealth and the suppression

court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

The Commonwealth raises the following issue on appeal:

Did the suppression court err in finding Trooper Krukowski did not have at least reasonable suspicion, based upon the totality of the circumstances, to conduct a traffic stop on [Appellee’s] vehicle where, at approximately 12:45 [AM], the [t]rooper observed multiple instances of swerving as well as [Appellee’s] failure to stop at a clearly marked stop line when faced with a red light[?]

Commonwealth’s Brief at 4.

***

“When reviewing the grant of a suppression motion, we must determine

whether the record supports the trial court’s factual findings and whether the

legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct.” Commonwealth v.

McCleary, 193 A.3d 387, 390 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted). “We may

only consider evidence presented at the suppression hearing.” Id. (citation

omitted). “[B]ecause the defendant prevailed on this issue before the

suppression court, we consider only the defendant’s evidence and so much of

the Commonwealth’s evidence as remains uncontradicted when read in the

context of the suppression record as a whole.” Id. (citation omitted).

We are highly deferential to the suppression court’s factual findings and

credibility determinations. Commonwealth v. Batista, 219 A.3d 1199, 1206

(Pa. Super. 2019). “It is within the suppression court’s sole province as

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factfinder to pass on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to

their testimony. The suppression court is free to believe all, some or none of

the evidence presented at the suppression hearing.” Commonwealth v.

Elmobdy, 823 A.2d 180, 183 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citations omitted). “[I]f the

record supports the suppression court’s findings, we may not substitute our

own findings.” Batista, 219 A.3d at 1206 (citation omitted). However, we

“give no deference to the suppression court’s legal conclusions” and review

them de novo. Id. (citation omitted).

The Commonwealth asserts that the suppression court applied the

wrong legal standard when determining whether the traffic stop initiated by

Trooper Krukowski was legal. In particular, the Commonwealth claims that,

even though the court stated its objective was to determine whether Trooper

Krukowski had reasonable suspicion to effectuate the traffic stop to investigate

a possible DUI, the court actually applied the probable cause standard when

it “analyzed each discrete driving action asking if it amounted to a violation of

the vehicle code by itself,” to conclude that Trooper Krukowski lacked probable

cause to stop Appellee for an observed violation of the Motor Vehicle Code.

Commonwealth’s Brief at 10, 16-18. The Commonwealth contends that,

when viewing Trooper Krukowski’s observations in their totality and through

the lens of his training and experience, Trooper Krukowski had an articulable

basis for concluding that Appellee was operating his vehicle under the

influence in violation of the Motor Vehicle Code. Id. at 9. The Commonwealth

further argues that this articulable basis provided the trooper with reasonable

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suspicion that criminal activity was afoot and his need to investigate further

whether Appellee was operating his vehicle under the influence justified the

traffic stop. Id.

The Commonwealth also contends that, to the extent that the

suppression court analyzed Trooper Krukowski’s testimony to determine

whether he had reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop, the court erred

as a matter of law when it substituted its own judgment for that of Trooper

Krukowski. Id. at 15-16. In support of this claim, the Commonwealth

highlights the suppression court’s statement on the record that “if I just watch

that video and you said to me, without commentary or anything, how was the

driving? I would have said it seems normal.” Id. (citing N.T. at 28).

Here, the record reflects, and the trial court found, that Trooper

Krukowski initiated a traffic stop based on his suspicions that Appellee was

operating his vehicle while under the influence of drugs or alcohol. N.T. at 15,

29-30; Suppression Ct. Op, 9/6/24, at 3. This Court has explained that:

if an officer possesses sufficient knowledge based upon behavior suggestive of DUI, the officer may stop the vehicle upon reasonable suspicion of a Vehicle Code violation, since a stop would provide the officer the needed opportunity to investigate further if the driver was operating under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance.

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Commonwealth v. Salter, 121 A.3d 987, 993 (Pa. Super. 2015).5

Reasonable suspicion is a less stringent standard than the probable cause necessary to effectuate a warrantless arrest, and depends on the information possessed by police and its degree of reliability in the totality of the circumstances. In order to justify the seizure, a police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts leading him to suspect criminal activity is afoot. In assessing the totality of the circumstances, courts must also afford due weight to the specific, reasonable inferences drawn from the facts in light of the officer’s experience, and acknowledge that innocent facts, when considered collectively, may permit the investigative detention.

Commonwealth v. Walls, 206 A.3d 537, 541-42 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation

omitted; emphasis added). The reasonable suspicion inquiry “is an objective

one, which must be considered in light of the totality of the circumstances.”

Commonwealth v. Holmes, 14 A.3d 89, 96 (Pa. 2011). In making this

assessment, the court must ask “whether, under the particular facts of a case,

an objectively reasonable police officer would have reasonably suspected

criminal activity was afoot.” Id.

After acknowledging that in order for the traffic stop to be legal, Trooper

Krukowski needed reasonable suspicion that Appellee was operating his

vehicle under the influence of drugs or alcohol, the suppression court

5 This differs from situations in which an officer observes a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code and no further investigation to determine that the violation occurred is necessary. In those situations, an officer must have probable cause to initiate the traffic stop. Commonwealth v. Cephus, 208 A.3d 1096, 1099 (Pa. Super. 2019); see also Commonwealth v. Ibrahim, 127 A.3d 819, 823 (Pa. Super. 2015) (explaining that “[i]f it is not necessary to stop the vehicle to establish that a violation of the Vehicle Code has occurred, an officer must possess probable cause to stop the vehicle”).

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explained that it granted Appellee’s suppression motion because “after

watching the [MVR recording, the court] did not believe that Trooper

Krukowski possessed reasonable suspicion that Appellee was driving in an

impaired fashion.” Suppression Ct. Op. at 7 (internal quotation marks

omitted). The court found that “drivers touch the fog lines and rumble strips

all the time[]” and “the video depicted normal driving.” Id. (internal quotation

marks omitted). Then, based on its consideration of cases analyzing traffic

stops arising from obvious violations of the Motor Vehicle Code, the

suppression court concluded that it was not clear that Appellee violated either

Section 3309(1) or Section 3112(a)(3)(i). 6 Id. at 8.

Following our review, we find that the suppression court’s findings of

fact are supported by the record, but its conclusions of law, as set forth above,

are in error. First, both the notes of testimony from the suppression hearing

and the suppression court’s opinion reflect that, despite the court’s

acknowledgement that its mandate was to consider whether Trooper

Krukowski had reasonable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop, its analysis

instead focused on whether Trooper Krukowski had probable cause to believe

that Appellee had committed an obvious violation of the Motor Vehicle Code.

Further, to the extent that the court did consider Trooper Krukowski’s

reasonable suspicion that Appellee was engaged in criminal activity, i.e.,

6 Section 3112(a)(3)(i) directs that a vehicle facing a steady red signal shall

stop at a clearly marked stop line. 75 Pa.C.S. § 3112(a)(3)(i). The Commonwealth did not charge Appellee with this offense.

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driving while intoxicated, the court failed to defer to the reasonable inferences

Trooper Krukowski drew from his observations of the totality of Appellee’s

conduct. Those facts—derived from the Commonwealth’s uncontradicted

video evidence—include Appellee weaving back and forth within his lane of

travel five or six times during a short period of time, striking both the center

line and the fog lines while doing so, and failing to stop at the stop line before

an intersection controlled by a red light. Accordingly, we conclude that the

suppression court erred as a matter of law in disregarding Trooper Krukowski’s

training and experience, in failing to defer to the reasonable inferences he

drew from his observations, and in concluding that Trooper Krukowski lacked

reasonable suspicion to effectuate a traffic stop. We, thus, reverse, the order

granting Appellee’s motion to suppress.

Order reversed. Case remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction

relinquished.

Date: 2/27/2025

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